JOHNSON, Justice.
This is a personal injury case that has been the subject of a prior appeal in which [1052]*1052the decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals (Long I). Long v. Hendricks, 109 Idaho 73, 705 P.2d 78 (Ct.App.1985). The present appeal followed the remand by the Court of Appeals in Long I and the entry of a supplemental judgment by the trial court. On this appeal we again assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the supplemental judgment of the trial court in all respects. Long v. Hendricks, 114 Idaho 157, 754 P.2d 1194 (Ct.App.1988). We granted review of the decision of the Court of Appeals at the request of Long. Following the issuance of our initial opinion in March 1989, we granted rehearing.
We have reviewed and considered the briefs, the record, the opinions of the Court of Appeals in Long I and in this appeal. We have also heard and considered the arguments of counsel. Considering all of these, we concur with the decision of the Court of Appeals except in one respect. We reverse the supplemental judgment of the trial court to the extent that it did not award Long interest on the amount of the additional medical expenses and on the amount of the original judgment up to the date of the tender of the amount of that judgment. In all other respects we affirm the supplemental judgment of the trial court. As to all of the issues except one on which we affirm the trial court, we do so on the basis of the opinion of the Court of Appeals. In affirming the trial court’s denial of post judgment interest on the amount of the original judgment, we depart somewhat from the rationale of the Court of Appeals.
I.
LONG IS NOT ENTITLED TO POST JUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT.
The trial court refused to award Long post judgment interest on the amount of the original judgment. The trial court’s rationale for this decision was that the notice of tender of the amount of the judgment was an “unconditional tender” as provided for in I.C. § 10-1115 (1979). This notice of tender stated that the clerk of the court was authorized to release the funds tendered “upon the presentation of a Satisfaction of Judgment, duly executed by [Long].” The Court of Appeals concluded that Long had failed to establish that he would have been prejudiced by accepting the amount tendered. 114 Idaho at 160, 754 P.2d at 1197. We conclude that he would have been prejudiced in his right to appeal, if he had accepted the amount tendered, regardless of whether he had signed a satisfaction of judgment. For this reason we view this issue in a different light than either the trial court or the Court of Appeals.
We focus not on the condition imposed by the Hendrickses, but instead on the fact that Long chose to appeal the denial of a new trial. We conclude that when he chose to appeal and not to accept the amount of the original judgment that was tendered, he gave up the right to claim post judgment interest.
Following the trial, Long filed a motion for an additur or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court denied this motion. The denial of the motion was one of the issues Long raised in Long I. If the trial court or the Court of Appeals had granted Long a new trial, he might have received less as a result of the new trial than he did in the first trial.
Long chose to forego the collection of the judgment he received and to appeal the denial of a new trial. Whether the tender by the Hendrickses had been made pursuant to I.C. § 10-1115 or in the form in which it was made, Long could not have accepted it and still have pursued his appeal.
I.C. § 10-1115 provides a procedure for a judgment debtor to satisfy a judgment. By this procedure the judgment creditor is guaranteed full payment of the judgment, and the judgment debtor is given an opportunity to clear the title to property that would be subject to a judgment lien. Ra[1053]*1053dioear Corp. v. Crouse, 97 Idaho 501, 505, 547 P.2d 546, 550 (1975). In Radioear this Court held that the depositing of funds with the clerk by the judgment debtor was not inconsistent with the judgment debtor’s right to move to vacate the judgment. Where the judgment debtor not only deposits funds with the clerk, but also authorizes the release of the funds to the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor may not then appeal the judgment. Bob Rice Ford, Inc. v. Donnelly, 98 Idaho 313, 315, 563 P.2d 37, 39 (1977). Here, we are presented with an appeal by a judgment creditor instead of a judgment debtor following a tender that was purportedly pursuant to I.C. § 10-1115.
Since the Hendrickses conditioned their tender by requiring Long personally to sign a satisfaction of judgment, the tender did not conform to the procedure provided in I.C. § 10-1115. However, the fact that it did not is irrelevant to our consideration here. In fact, the clerk did sign a satisfaction of judgment pursuant to I.C. § 10-1115.
The tender put Long to the choice of either appealing or accepting the amount tendered. He could not have done both. His acceptance of the tendered amount would have foreclosed his appeal.
In Bechtel v. Evans, 10 Idaho 147, 77 P. 212 (1904), this Court stated principles that are germane to the issue presented here. There, a judgment had been entered. Defendant contested some items in the cost bill which plaintiff had submitted, and some of the costs were disallowed by the trial court. The judgment debtor then paid to the clerk of the court the full amount of the judgment, including the awarded costs, plus accrued interest on both the amount recovered and costs. That sum, in turn, was paid to the judgment creditor. The attorney for the judgment creditor signed a satisfaction of the entire amount of the judgment which was duly entered upon the docket. The judgment creditor subsequently appealed the order granting costs. The judgment debtor moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the judgment had been satisfied, and therefore the judgment creditor could not prosecute an appeal. This Court agreed and said:
It seems to us, as a general proposition of law, that a successful party should not be allowed to gather in and . enjoy the fruits of his judgment and thereafter prosecute an appeal and complain of error committed against him.
Upon reason and principle, however, it appears to us that the test should be this: If the party has collected his judgment, and in seeking to gain more by the prosecution of an appeal thereby incurs the hazard of eventually recovering less, then his appeal should be dismissed. If, on the other hand, the appeal is from such an order or judgment as that he could in no event recover a less favorable judgment and that he incurs no hazard of ever receiving less than the judgment already collected by him, we see no objection to the prosecution of his appeal, (Cowles v. Dickenson, 8 Cow. 328; Knapp v. Brown, 45 N.Y. 207; Alexander v. Alexander, 104 N.Y. 643, 10 N.E. 37.)
... This is not a case where a new trial could be ordered.
10 Idaho at 149-50, 77 P.
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JOHNSON, Justice.
This is a personal injury case that has been the subject of a prior appeal in which [1052]*1052the decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals (Long I). Long v. Hendricks, 109 Idaho 73, 705 P.2d 78 (Ct.App.1985). The present appeal followed the remand by the Court of Appeals in Long I and the entry of a supplemental judgment by the trial court. On this appeal we again assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the supplemental judgment of the trial court in all respects. Long v. Hendricks, 114 Idaho 157, 754 P.2d 1194 (Ct.App.1988). We granted review of the decision of the Court of Appeals at the request of Long. Following the issuance of our initial opinion in March 1989, we granted rehearing.
We have reviewed and considered the briefs, the record, the opinions of the Court of Appeals in Long I and in this appeal. We have also heard and considered the arguments of counsel. Considering all of these, we concur with the decision of the Court of Appeals except in one respect. We reverse the supplemental judgment of the trial court to the extent that it did not award Long interest on the amount of the additional medical expenses and on the amount of the original judgment up to the date of the tender of the amount of that judgment. In all other respects we affirm the supplemental judgment of the trial court. As to all of the issues except one on which we affirm the trial court, we do so on the basis of the opinion of the Court of Appeals. In affirming the trial court’s denial of post judgment interest on the amount of the original judgment, we depart somewhat from the rationale of the Court of Appeals.
I.
LONG IS NOT ENTITLED TO POST JUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT.
The trial court refused to award Long post judgment interest on the amount of the original judgment. The trial court’s rationale for this decision was that the notice of tender of the amount of the judgment was an “unconditional tender” as provided for in I.C. § 10-1115 (1979). This notice of tender stated that the clerk of the court was authorized to release the funds tendered “upon the presentation of a Satisfaction of Judgment, duly executed by [Long].” The Court of Appeals concluded that Long had failed to establish that he would have been prejudiced by accepting the amount tendered. 114 Idaho at 160, 754 P.2d at 1197. We conclude that he would have been prejudiced in his right to appeal, if he had accepted the amount tendered, regardless of whether he had signed a satisfaction of judgment. For this reason we view this issue in a different light than either the trial court or the Court of Appeals.
We focus not on the condition imposed by the Hendrickses, but instead on the fact that Long chose to appeal the denial of a new trial. We conclude that when he chose to appeal and not to accept the amount of the original judgment that was tendered, he gave up the right to claim post judgment interest.
Following the trial, Long filed a motion for an additur or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court denied this motion. The denial of the motion was one of the issues Long raised in Long I. If the trial court or the Court of Appeals had granted Long a new trial, he might have received less as a result of the new trial than he did in the first trial.
Long chose to forego the collection of the judgment he received and to appeal the denial of a new trial. Whether the tender by the Hendrickses had been made pursuant to I.C. § 10-1115 or in the form in which it was made, Long could not have accepted it and still have pursued his appeal.
I.C. § 10-1115 provides a procedure for a judgment debtor to satisfy a judgment. By this procedure the judgment creditor is guaranteed full payment of the judgment, and the judgment debtor is given an opportunity to clear the title to property that would be subject to a judgment lien. Ra[1053]*1053dioear Corp. v. Crouse, 97 Idaho 501, 505, 547 P.2d 546, 550 (1975). In Radioear this Court held that the depositing of funds with the clerk by the judgment debtor was not inconsistent with the judgment debtor’s right to move to vacate the judgment. Where the judgment debtor not only deposits funds with the clerk, but also authorizes the release of the funds to the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor may not then appeal the judgment. Bob Rice Ford, Inc. v. Donnelly, 98 Idaho 313, 315, 563 P.2d 37, 39 (1977). Here, we are presented with an appeal by a judgment creditor instead of a judgment debtor following a tender that was purportedly pursuant to I.C. § 10-1115.
Since the Hendrickses conditioned their tender by requiring Long personally to sign a satisfaction of judgment, the tender did not conform to the procedure provided in I.C. § 10-1115. However, the fact that it did not is irrelevant to our consideration here. In fact, the clerk did sign a satisfaction of judgment pursuant to I.C. § 10-1115.
The tender put Long to the choice of either appealing or accepting the amount tendered. He could not have done both. His acceptance of the tendered amount would have foreclosed his appeal.
In Bechtel v. Evans, 10 Idaho 147, 77 P. 212 (1904), this Court stated principles that are germane to the issue presented here. There, a judgment had been entered. Defendant contested some items in the cost bill which plaintiff had submitted, and some of the costs were disallowed by the trial court. The judgment debtor then paid to the clerk of the court the full amount of the judgment, including the awarded costs, plus accrued interest on both the amount recovered and costs. That sum, in turn, was paid to the judgment creditor. The attorney for the judgment creditor signed a satisfaction of the entire amount of the judgment which was duly entered upon the docket. The judgment creditor subsequently appealed the order granting costs. The judgment debtor moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the judgment had been satisfied, and therefore the judgment creditor could not prosecute an appeal. This Court agreed and said:
It seems to us, as a general proposition of law, that a successful party should not be allowed to gather in and . enjoy the fruits of his judgment and thereafter prosecute an appeal and complain of error committed against him.
Upon reason and principle, however, it appears to us that the test should be this: If the party has collected his judgment, and in seeking to gain more by the prosecution of an appeal thereby incurs the hazard of eventually recovering less, then his appeal should be dismissed. If, on the other hand, the appeal is from such an order or judgment as that he could in no event recover a less favorable judgment and that he incurs no hazard of ever receiving less than the judgment already collected by him, we see no objection to the prosecution of his appeal, (Cowles v. Dickenson, 8 Cow. 328; Knapp v. Brown, 45 N.Y. 207; Alexander v. Alexander, 104 N.Y. 643, 10 N.E. 37.)
... This is not a case where a new trial could be ordered.
10 Idaho at 149-50, 77 P. at 212-13 (citations omitted).
Here, Long sought a new trial and rejected the tendered amount. He had a right to do so. However, by doing so he gave up his right to interest on the amount of the original judgment from the date of the tender. The Hendrickses had made the amount of the judgment available to Long, if he chose to accept it. The choice to let the tendered amount remain unclaimed was his. The gamble he was taking was that he would be successful in his appeal and obtain a larger judgment on retrial. Allowing him to seek this result by appealing and not accepting the amount tendered is inconsistent with allowing him to collect interest on the amount tendered. Allowing him to collect post judgment interest here would make it impossible for a judgment [1054]*1054debtor to avoid payment of interest on a judgment where the judgment creditor sought a new trial.
The rationale for this conclusion is that if Long had accepted the tendered amount and had been allowed to continue with his appeal, he might eventually have been determined to be entitled to less than what he had received. In that case, at the time the subsequent judgment was entered he might not have had the amount he received from the Hendrickses and might have been insulated from their efforts to recover the overpayment.
When a judgment debtor wishes to cut off the accrual of post judgment interest, the tender of the amount of the judgment is sufficient. If by appealing the judgment creditor is not taking the risk of receiving less than the amount tendered, the judgment creditor may accept the tendered amount and continue with the appeal. If, however, as'in this case, the judgment creditor appeals the denial of a new trial and takes the risk of receiving less than the tendered amount, it is unfair to require the judgment debtor to pay post judgment interest after the date of the tender. The judgment debtor has no effective way of eliminating the obligation for post judgment interest except by the tender. Having chosen to appeal and reject the tender, the judgment creditor should not be heard to complain about the lack of post judgment interest.
II.
LONG IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST ON THE ADDITIONAL MEDICAL EXPENSES FROM THE DATE OF THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court that Long was not entitled to interest from the date of the original judgment on the amount of the additional loss of wages and on the amount of the additional medical expenses that were awarded on remand. 114 Idaho at 160-62, 754 P.2d at 1197-99. We concur with the decision of the Court of Appeals with regard to interest on the additional loss of wages for the reasons given in their opinion. We disagree, however, with the denial of interest on the amount of the additional medical expenses.
The different treatment given by the Court of Appeals in Long I to the question of additional loss of wages and to addition medical expenses on remand is dispositive. As to the consideration of additional loss of wages the Court of Appeals said:
Long’s evidence tended to prove he lost wages of $21,000 (the wages he would have earned, less the wages he actually earned). We believe that the evidence in the record and the findings made by the trial court do not justify an award of only $2,000 for lost wages. Accordingly, we remand the case to reconsider, and to make more particular findings on, the issue of lost wages____ On remand the judge should make particular findings as to the amount of any wages lost by Long prior to December 15, 1978, as well as to the amount of wages lost between December 15, 1978 and the date of trial.
109 Idaho at 79, 705 P.2d at 84 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
We agree with the analysis of the Court of Appeals in its opinion in the current appeal that it cannot be said that, as a matter of law that the amount of the additional loss of wages “was ascertainable prior to the proceedings on remand.” 114 Idaho at 162, 754 P.2d at 1199. However, the same is not true with regard to the additional medical expenses.
In Long I the Court of Appeals addressed the subject of additional medical expenses as follows:
The trial court awarded Long $2,527.85 in medical expenses incurred as a result of the accident. Long had submitted proof of other expenses for which no award was made. The court made no findings to explain why the expenses were not allowed. These expenses were [1055]*1055shown by exhibits numbered C, D, E and J. Generally, the reasonable value of all necessary medical expenses may be recovered. Because there were no findings made as to these items of expense, we cannot determine whether the court’s failure to include them was oversight or as a result of a determination to exclude them. Accordingly, on remand the trial court should include the expenses or show the basis for their rejection.
109 Idaho at 79-80, 705 P.2d at 84-85 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The effect of this language was to direct the trial court to modify the judgment by awarding the additional medical expenses, unless the trial court could “show the basis for their rejection.” The amount of the additional medical expenses was liquidated. The trial court awarded these additional expenses to Long in the supplemental judgment. Under the authorities cited by the Court of Appeals, interest should have been awarded on the amount of the additional medical expenses from the date of the original judgment.
III.
CONCLUSION.
The supplemental judgment of the trial court is affirmed, except as interest on the amount of additional medical expenses. The case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment including interest on the additional medical expenses from the date of the original judgment.
Costs to appellant.
No attorney fees on appeal.
BAKES, C.J., and BOYLE and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.