Long v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-1557
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD D. LONG, No. 24-1557 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:23-cv-01325-AR v. MEMORANDUM* FOSTER WHEELER ENERGY CORPORATION,

Defendant - Appellant,

and

3M COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Karin J. Immergut, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 4, 2025 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, BYBEE, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

1 Plaintiff-Appellee Richard Long sued fifty-one defendants in Oregon state

court for manufacturing asbestos-containing products that allegedly caused him to

develop malignant pleural mesothelioma. After discovery revealed that Long was

present on Navy ships, defendant Foster Wheeler Energy Corporation (Foster

Wheeler) removed Long’s case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, the federal

officer removal statute. Long filed a motion to remand his case to Oregon state

court. The district court granted Long’s motion to remand, and Foster Wheeler

appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), and we affirm.

1. Foster Wheeler bears the burden of establishing that “a causal nexus

[exists] between federally directed conduct and [Long’s] claims.” See Doe v.

Cedars-Sinai Health Sys., 106 F.4th 907, 913 (9th Cir. 2024). Because Long has

disclaimed, with respect to his claims against Foster Wheeler, “causes of action for

any exposures of any kind to asbestos dust while [he] was working on Navy vessels,”

and separately stated that “the only exposure evidence [he] will discuss will be the

exposures on civilian ships, not Navy ships, not Coast Guard ships, not current

civilian ships that were commissioned by the military,” Long does not challenge any

“act that [Foster Wheeler] contends it performed under the direction of the Navy” or

other military branch. See Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2014).

Consequently, no “causal nexus exists between [Long’s] claims and the actions

[Foster Wheeler] took pursuant to a federal officer’s direction.” Id. at 1120. The

2 district court did not err in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over Long’s claims

under 28 U.S.C. § 1442.

2. Foster Wheeler also argues that the district court should have denied

Long’s motion to remand because it had admiralty jurisdiction over Long’s claims.

But the “saving to suitors” clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) forbids district courts from

retaining improperly removed cases based off admiralty jurisdiction. “[W]hen a

plaintiff brings a maritime cause of action against a person in state court, a federal

court lacks admiralty jurisdiction over that claim. In order to remove such a claim

to federal court, the defendant must assert some other basis of jurisdiction, such as

diversity jurisdiction.” County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 32 F.4th 733, 763

(9th Cir. 2022) (internal citation omitted). The district court did not err in concluding

that it lacked admiralty jurisdiction over Long’s claims.

AFFIRMED.