Long v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re Long)

292 B.R. 635, 50 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 48, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 413, 2003 WL 21026919
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedMay 8, 2003
DocketBAP 01-6042
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 292 B.R. 635 (Long v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re Long)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Long v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In Re Long), 292 B.R. 635, 50 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 48, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 413, 2003 WL 21026919 (bap8 2003).

Opinion

SCHERMER, Bankruptcy Judge.

Educational Credit Management Corporation (“Appellant”) appealed the bankruptcy court order discharging the student loan obligation of debtor Nanci Ann Long (“Debtor”). This court upheld the bankruptcy court’s order under a clearly erroneous standard. 1 After further appeal, however, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has remanded the matter for a de novo review by this Court. 2

ISSUE

The issue on appeal is whether the Debtor’s student loan obligation to Appellant should be discharged as imposing an undue hardship on the Debtor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). We conclude that under the totality of circumstances test such obligation will not impose an undue hardship on the Debtor and therefore should not be discharged.

BACKGROUND

The Debtor is a single woman with a ten year old child. She was thirty-nine years *637 old at the time of the trial in this matter. The Debtor attended Northwest College of Chiropractic and financed her education, in part, through the student loans which are the subject of this dispute. She graduated and became a licensed Doctor of Chiropractic in 1987. She practiced chiropractic medicine from 1987 through 1995, first working for others, then starting her own practice with another doctor.

In 1993, the Debtor began to suffer “flu-like” symptoms. Her condition deteriorated over the next two years. In 1995 she transferred her practice to another doctor. Her chiropractic license subsequently lapsed. In 1997 she sought medical treatment for her condition. The Debtor eventually began a regimen of medication which has enabled her to regain employment.

In the fall of 1998, the Debtor enrolled in Metropolitan State University to pursue a degree in human services and a minor in social gerontology. She hopes to pursue a career in hospice counseling.

The Debtor works approximately thirty-two hours per week as a laboratory manager at a community college nine months of the year. She earns $12.59 per hour. Her annual income is $14,000.00, or $1,166.66 per month. She lives with her parent and pays them between $500 and $600 per month to cover rent, utilities, car payment, car insurance, health insurance, cellular telephone, child care, and food. She also pays $50 per month for medical insurance co-payments, personal items, and toiletries; $100-$275 per month for gasoline; $100 per month for dining out, groceries, and entertainment; and $80 per month for her daughter’s private school tuition. She also pays her tuition which varies in price between $500 and $800 depending on the course.

At the time of trial, the Debtor owed the Appellant approximately $61,800, including principal, interest, and collection costs, on consolidated student loans which had totaled $35,322.81 in 1987.

The Debtor also has three student loans payable to the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) guaranteed by the Health Education Assistance Loan Program in the amount of $14,700 which the bankruptcy court determined to be non-dischargeable (the “HEAL Loans”).

The Debtor qualifies for the Income Contingent Repayment Plan offered by the Department of Education through the William D. Ford Loan Consolidation Program. Pursuant to the Income Contingent Repayment Plan, the Debtor’s monthly payments to cover the loan to Appellant and the HEAL Loan would be $54.00 based on her current level of income. If the Debtor participated in this program for twenty-five years, any remaining balance would be cancelled at that time. The Debtor is aware of the Income Contingent Repayment Plan but did not apply for it.

On May 31, 2000, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. She filed a complaint seeking a determination that her indebtedness to the Appellant as well as her indebtedness to the DHHS on the HEAL Loan should be discharged as an undue hardship. The bankruptcy court determined that the HEAL Loan should not be discharged but that the loan to the Appellant should be discharged. The Appellant appealed to this Court which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision in a split opinion under the clearly erroneous standard of review. On further appeal, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the proper standard of review is a de novo review and remanded to this Court to conduct this de novo review.

*638 STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the bankruptcy court’s determination of undue hardship de novo. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir.2003).

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, a student loan obligation is excepted from discharge “unless excepting such debt from discharge ... will impose an undue hardship on the debt- or and the debtor’s dependents.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). The debtor bears the burden of proving undue hardship by a preponderance of the evidence. Woodcock v. Chemical Bank, NYSHESC (In re Woodcock), 45 F.3d 363 (10th Cir.1995); Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir.1981); Standfuss v. U.S. Dept. of Educ. (In re Standfuss), 245 B.R. 356, 359 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.2000); Kopf v. U.S. Dept. of Educ. (In re Kopf), 245 B.R. 731, 734 (Bankr.D.Me.2000), citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991); Clark v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 240 B.R. 758, 761 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1999).

Congress’ intent in excepting student loans from discharge was clear: Congress wanted to prevent the “undeserving student borrower from abusing the bankruptcy process.” Andresen v. Neb. Student Loan Program, Inc. (In re Andresen), 232 B.R. 127, 130 (8th Cir. BAP 1999). Congress did not, however, define undue hardship. In the Eighth Circuit, the test for undue hardship requires an inquiry into the totality of circumstances with special attention to the debtor’s past, current, and reasonably reliable future financial resources; the reasonable necessary living expenses of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents; and any other relevant facts and circumstances unique to the particular bankruptcy case. Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Long), 322 F.3d 549, 554 (8th Cir.2003); Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews),

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Bluebook (online)
292 B.R. 635, 50 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 48, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 413, 2003 WL 21026919, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/long-v-educational-credit-management-corp-in-re-long-bap8-2003.