UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Long Shores Lot Owners Association Inc.
v. Civil No. 20-cv-196-LM Opinion No. 2020 DNH 117 Vance Dubuclet
O R D E R
Plaintiff Long Shores Lot Owners Association Inc. (the
“Association”) filed this action against pro se defendant Vance
Dubuclet in the Strafford County Circuit Court as a small claims
action to collect unpaid real estate owners’ association dues.
The action proceeded to judgment against Dubuclet, and Dubuclet
unsuccessfully appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
Dubuclet subsequently removed the action to this court. For the
reasons set forth below, the court remands the Association’s
action sua sponte to the Strafford County Circuit Court.
BACKGROUND
Neither party’s filings are models of clarity, and some of
the material facts are difficult to determine with certainty.
It is possible, however, to glean from the record a partial
history of this action’s pre-removal proceedings. The recital
that follows is drawn from the exhibits attached to Dubuclet’s Notice of Removal, doc. no. 1-1, the statements Dubuclet made in
ostensible support of removal, doc. no. 1, and the statements
the Association offered in support of its pending motion to
dismiss, doc. no. 8.
In or around September 2018, the Association initiated
these proceedings as a small claims action in the Strafford
County Circuit Court. Although the Association’s complaint is
not in this court’s record, its gravamen appears to have been
that Dubuclet, as owner of a lot in Barrington, New Hampshire,
owed an “Annual Mandatory Road Maintenance Fee” (at times
characterized as membership dues) that he had not paid for “many
years.” Doc. no. 1-1 at 17. Dubuclet made appearances in the
Association’s small claims action, including filing at least two
motions either styled or construed by the state court as motions
to dismiss. In March 2019, the court granted default judgment
in the Association’s favor, apparently as a sanction for
Dubuclet’s intentional delay of proceedings.1 The court awarded
the Association damages in the amount of $3,148.35.
1 Dubuclet’s dilatory conduct apparently included, among other things, intentional failure to appear at a telephonic hearing that had been scheduled specifically to accommodate his convenience. Dubuclet was subsequently given the opportunity to show good cause why default should not have been entered, but apparently declined to make any attempt to do so.
2 Dubuclet appealed the judgment to the New Hampshire Supreme
Court. In May 2019, the New Hampshire Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal. Dubuclet nevertheless refused to pay the judgment.
The Association filed a motion to enforce the judgment with
the Strafford County Circuit Court. The court construed the
Association’s motion as a motion for periodic payments, set a
hearing on the motion for January 16, 2020, and directed
Dubuclet to provide a statement of his assets and liabilities in
advance of the hearing. Dubuclet neither provided the requested
information nor appeared at the hearing.
Effective February 3, 2020,2 Dubuclet removed the
Association’s action to this court.3 Although he was required to
do so under the removal statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a),
Dubuclet did not submit a copy of the Association’s complaint
(or any other pleading) in support of his Notice of Removal. As
a result, there is no pleading in this court’s docket asserting
any claim.
2 Dubuclet’s Notice of Removal was signed and dated as of January 24 but not filed until February 3, 2020.
3 It appears from the parties’ filings that, at the time Dubuclet removed this case, the Strafford County court had not resolved the Association’s motion for periodic payments. However, it is not clear whether the Strafford County court considered the matter closed, whether it would have rescheduled the hearing if allowed the opportunity to do so, or whether an order resolving the motion would have been forthcoming had Dubuclet not removed this action when he did.
3 In the course of the sixteen-page, single-spaced narrative
that he offers in support of removal, Dubuclet expressly asserts
that neither this court nor the Strafford County Circuit Court
can properly exercise either personal jurisdiction over him or
subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. Doc. no. 1 at 2.
While these assertions might seem calculated to foreclose the
removal they are ostensibly intended to support, he also asserts
that “[t]his is a claim arising under the Constitution, Laws or
Treaties of the United States, which is fraudulent, but is being
enforced by [the Strafford County Circuit Court].” Doc. no. 1
at 4. In addition, Dubuclet asserts the existence of a
conspiracy among the Association and various third parties
(among them the Strafford County Circuit Court and all of the
Justices of the New Hampshire Supreme Court) to deprive him of
various federally protected civil rights. Apparently on the
basis of either the purported federal nature of the
Association’s claim and/or the Association’s purported
conspiracy to violate his civil rights (or both), Dubuclet
suggests that this court may properly exercise federal-question
jurisdiction over the Association’s action.
4 DISCUSSION
Where, as here, an action was filed originally in state
court and subsequently removed to federal court, the federal
court must remand the action if at any time it determines that
it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
At first-pass analysis, this action does not appear to present a
case or controversy over which the court could even potentially
exercise jurisdiction. As noted, there is no pleading stating
any claim in the court’s docket, and it is apparent that the
only claim ever asserted in the course of proceedings before the
Strafford County court has already been resolved by judgment.
Setting that question aside, it is clear that this court
could not properly exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the
Association’s claim even if it had not already proceeded to
judgment. Nothing in the record suggests that the Association’s
claim for unpaid dues was brought under or raises any question
of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. While it is possible
that Dubuclet may believe that he could have raised federal
defenses to the Association’s claim before it proceeded to
judgment (it does not appear that he did so), it is well settled
that “[a] defense that raises a federal question is inadequate
to confer federal jurisdiction.” Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (citing Louisville &
5 Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)). Similarly,
while it is possible that Dubuclet may believe that he could
have pled federal or constitutional counterclaims against the
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Long Shores Lot Owners Association Inc.
v. Civil No. 20-cv-196-LM Opinion No. 2020 DNH 117 Vance Dubuclet
O R D E R
Plaintiff Long Shores Lot Owners Association Inc. (the
“Association”) filed this action against pro se defendant Vance
Dubuclet in the Strafford County Circuit Court as a small claims
action to collect unpaid real estate owners’ association dues.
The action proceeded to judgment against Dubuclet, and Dubuclet
unsuccessfully appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
Dubuclet subsequently removed the action to this court. For the
reasons set forth below, the court remands the Association’s
action sua sponte to the Strafford County Circuit Court.
BACKGROUND
Neither party’s filings are models of clarity, and some of
the material facts are difficult to determine with certainty.
It is possible, however, to glean from the record a partial
history of this action’s pre-removal proceedings. The recital
that follows is drawn from the exhibits attached to Dubuclet’s Notice of Removal, doc. no. 1-1, the statements Dubuclet made in
ostensible support of removal, doc. no. 1, and the statements
the Association offered in support of its pending motion to
dismiss, doc. no. 8.
In or around September 2018, the Association initiated
these proceedings as a small claims action in the Strafford
County Circuit Court. Although the Association’s complaint is
not in this court’s record, its gravamen appears to have been
that Dubuclet, as owner of a lot in Barrington, New Hampshire,
owed an “Annual Mandatory Road Maintenance Fee” (at times
characterized as membership dues) that he had not paid for “many
years.” Doc. no. 1-1 at 17. Dubuclet made appearances in the
Association’s small claims action, including filing at least two
motions either styled or construed by the state court as motions
to dismiss. In March 2019, the court granted default judgment
in the Association’s favor, apparently as a sanction for
Dubuclet’s intentional delay of proceedings.1 The court awarded
the Association damages in the amount of $3,148.35.
1 Dubuclet’s dilatory conduct apparently included, among other things, intentional failure to appear at a telephonic hearing that had been scheduled specifically to accommodate his convenience. Dubuclet was subsequently given the opportunity to show good cause why default should not have been entered, but apparently declined to make any attempt to do so.
2 Dubuclet appealed the judgment to the New Hampshire Supreme
Court. In May 2019, the New Hampshire Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal. Dubuclet nevertheless refused to pay the judgment.
The Association filed a motion to enforce the judgment with
the Strafford County Circuit Court. The court construed the
Association’s motion as a motion for periodic payments, set a
hearing on the motion for January 16, 2020, and directed
Dubuclet to provide a statement of his assets and liabilities in
advance of the hearing. Dubuclet neither provided the requested
information nor appeared at the hearing.
Effective February 3, 2020,2 Dubuclet removed the
Association’s action to this court.3 Although he was required to
do so under the removal statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a),
Dubuclet did not submit a copy of the Association’s complaint
(or any other pleading) in support of his Notice of Removal. As
a result, there is no pleading in this court’s docket asserting
any claim.
2 Dubuclet’s Notice of Removal was signed and dated as of January 24 but not filed until February 3, 2020.
3 It appears from the parties’ filings that, at the time Dubuclet removed this case, the Strafford County court had not resolved the Association’s motion for periodic payments. However, it is not clear whether the Strafford County court considered the matter closed, whether it would have rescheduled the hearing if allowed the opportunity to do so, or whether an order resolving the motion would have been forthcoming had Dubuclet not removed this action when he did.
3 In the course of the sixteen-page, single-spaced narrative
that he offers in support of removal, Dubuclet expressly asserts
that neither this court nor the Strafford County Circuit Court
can properly exercise either personal jurisdiction over him or
subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. Doc. no. 1 at 2.
While these assertions might seem calculated to foreclose the
removal they are ostensibly intended to support, he also asserts
that “[t]his is a claim arising under the Constitution, Laws or
Treaties of the United States, which is fraudulent, but is being
enforced by [the Strafford County Circuit Court].” Doc. no. 1
at 4. In addition, Dubuclet asserts the existence of a
conspiracy among the Association and various third parties
(among them the Strafford County Circuit Court and all of the
Justices of the New Hampshire Supreme Court) to deprive him of
various federally protected civil rights. Apparently on the
basis of either the purported federal nature of the
Association’s claim and/or the Association’s purported
conspiracy to violate his civil rights (or both), Dubuclet
suggests that this court may properly exercise federal-question
jurisdiction over the Association’s action.
4 DISCUSSION
Where, as here, an action was filed originally in state
court and subsequently removed to federal court, the federal
court must remand the action if at any time it determines that
it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
At first-pass analysis, this action does not appear to present a
case or controversy over which the court could even potentially
exercise jurisdiction. As noted, there is no pleading stating
any claim in the court’s docket, and it is apparent that the
only claim ever asserted in the course of proceedings before the
Strafford County court has already been resolved by judgment.
Setting that question aside, it is clear that this court
could not properly exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the
Association’s claim even if it had not already proceeded to
judgment. Nothing in the record suggests that the Association’s
claim for unpaid dues was brought under or raises any question
of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. While it is possible
that Dubuclet may believe that he could have raised federal
defenses to the Association’s claim before it proceeded to
judgment (it does not appear that he did so), it is well settled
that “[a] defense that raises a federal question is inadequate
to confer federal jurisdiction.” Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (citing Louisville &
5 Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)). Similarly,
while it is possible that Dubuclet may believe that he could
have pled federal or constitutional counterclaims against the
Association prior to removal (it does not appear that he did
so), it is equally well settled that “federal jurisdiction
exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of
the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint,” Caterpillar, Inc.
v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987), and that federal
jurisdiction cannot “rest upon an actual or anticipated
counterclaim,” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009),
see also Ballard's Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Transue, 865 F.2d 447,
449 (1st Cir. 1989).
It follows that this court lacks federal-question
jurisdiction over this action. Dubuclet does not assert that
this court can properly exercise any other form of subject-
matter jurisdiction, and it is in any event clear that diversity
jurisdiction is absent here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (diversity
jurisdiction requires that “the matter in controversy exceed[]
the sum or value of $75,000”). In the absence of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction, remand is required under Section
1447(c).
6 CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, this action is remanded to
the Strafford County Circuit Court. All pending motions are
denied as moot.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________ Landya McCafferty United States District Judge
July 9, 2020
cc: Philip L. Pettis, Esq. Vance Dubuclet, pro se