London Luxury LLC v. Walmart Inc.

District Court, W.D. Arkansas·Decided March 21, 2024·No. 5:22-cv-05059·Unknown

Opinion

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

LONDON LUXURY, LLC PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT V. CASE NO. 5:22-CV-5059 WALMART, INC. DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Before the Court are the following ripe motions:

• London Luxury’s Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Dr. Randy V.

Bradley (Doc. 246);

• Walmart, Inc.’s Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Dr. Willy Shih (Doc. 237);

• London Luxury’s Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Mr. Sheshank Kamalapuram (Doc. 260);

• Walmart’s Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Mr. Ryan Siskey (Doc.

229); and

• Walmart’s Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Dr. Robert N. Phalen (Doc. 233).

On March 11, 2024, the Court held a pretrial conference and entertained oral argument from the parties as to each Motion listed above. After oral argument concluded, the Court ruled from the bench, DENYING the Motions concerning Dr. Bradley, Mr. Kamalapuram, Mr. Siskey, and Dr. Phalen, and GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART the Motion concerning Dr. Shih. The following Order sets forth the Court’s reasoning in greater detail. To the extent this Order differs from what was announced from the bench, this Order will control.

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I. LEGAL STANDARD

The decision whether to exclude expert testimony is committed to a district court’s discretion—subject, of course, to the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 702. Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC, 754 F.3d 557, 561 (2014). Rule 702 states that:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert's opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

The Eighth Circuit has “boiled down” these requirements into a three-part test:

First, evidence based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge must be useful to the finder of fact in deciding the ultimate issue of fact. This is the basic rule of relevancy. Second, the proposed witness must be qualified to assist the finder of fact. Third, the proposed evidence must be reliable or trustworthy in an evidentiary sense, so that, if the finder of fact accepts it as true, it provides the assistance the finder of fact requires.

Johnson, 754 F.3d at 561 (quoting Polski v. Quigley Corp., 538 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 2008)). The proponent of expert testimony bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that these requirements are satisfied. See Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 748, 757–58 (8th Cir. 2006).

A district court possesses broad discretion in making its reliability determination.

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 142 (1999). When assessing the validity of expert opinions, the trial court may consider one or more of the following non-exclusive factors: (1) whether the theory or methodology can be tested; (2) whether the theory or

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methodology has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593– 94 (1993). “An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. However, “[e]xpert testimony that is speculative is not competent proof and contributes nothing to a legally sufficient evidentiary basis.” J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 243 F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).

“A witness can be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education . . . .” Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Beelman River Terminals, Inc., 254 F.3d 706, 715 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). And “[t]he relative skill or knowledge of an expert goes to the weight of that witness’s testimony, not its admissibility.” Loudermill v. Dow Chem. Co., 863 F.2d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1988). “[I]t is the responsibility of the trial judge to determine whether a particular expert has sufficient specialized knowledge to assist jurors in deciding the specific issues in [a] case.” Wheeling Pittsburg Steel Corp., 254 F.3d at 715.

To prove useful to a jury, an expert’s opinion should rely on their specialized knowledge; “[w]here the subject matter is within the knowledge or experience of lay people, expert testimony is superfluous.” Ellis v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 738 F.2d 269, 270 (8th Cir. 1984). Further, an expert should not make unsupported assertions that go beyond their area of expertise. See Anderson v. Raymond Corp., 340 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion where it prohibited an

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expert from testifying on matters admittedly beyond his expertise). To that end, an expert should not opine on legal conclusions, as they will not assist the jury either. Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 475 (8th Cir.1995) (“The legal conclusions were for the court to make. It was an abuse of discretion to allow the testimony.”).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Dr. Randy V. Bradley (Doc. 246)

Walmart has designated Dr. Randy V. Bradley as an expert witness on supply chains. London Luxury seeks to exclude his testimony because it is speculative, “divorced from any of the facts of this case,” and “of no use to the jury.” (Doc. 297, p. 5). London Luxury criticizes Dr. Bradley because he supposedly “did no work to investigate the facts” and instead discussed in his expert report only general principles and practices used in supply chain management. Id. Finally, London Luxury critiques Dr. Bradley’s expert report for containing impermissible legal conclusions.

Despite these critiques about the substance of Dr. Bradley’s opinions, London Luxury at least agrees that he is a qualified expert in the field of supply chain management. Dr. Bradley is Associate Professor of Supply Chain Management at the University of Tennessee. He has published a number of articles in peer-reviewed publications on various topics in the field of supply chain management. Therefore, the Court finds him qualified to offer expert testimony on global supply chains and strategic sourcing, supply chain management, and risk management.

Next, the Court turns to the question of whether Dr. Bradley’s opinions are reliable and trustworthy in the evidentiary sense and likely to assist the jury in deciding the

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London Luxury LLC v. Walmart Inc., (W.D. Ark. 2024).

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