An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-256
Filed 18 June 2025
Guilford County, No. 23 CVD 520660
APRIL ROSE LONANO, Plaintiff,
v.
COTY MICHAEL MURPHY, Defendant.
Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 3 November 2023 by Judge Angela
Foster in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25
September 2024.
The Law Offices of J. Scott Smith, PLLC, by Attorney Samuel Moore, for plaintiff-appellant
Coty Michael Murphy, pro se, no brief filed for defendant-appellee.
STADING, Judge.
April Rose LoNano (“Plaintiff”), appeals from an order denying the entry of a
domestic violence protective order (“DVPO”) against her then boyfriend, Coty Michael
Muphy (“Defendant”). For the following reasons, we remand the trial court’s order
for entry of appropriate findings of fact. LONANO V. MURPHY
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
On 27 October 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint and moved for a DVPO against
Defendant. In her complaint, Plaintiff referenced events stemming from “an
emergency 50B” she received against Defendant in February 2023. Plaintiff also
alleged, on 19 July 2023, that Defendant threw a lighter at her face, grabbed her
wrist, which drew blood and left a scar. On this occasion, Plaintiff maintains her
hand was broken while defending herself. Plaintiff claimed she told Defendant not
to contact her on 11 October 2023, but Defendant wrote her from jail “with scary
overly-romanticized statements.” Plaintiff further stated Defendant contacted her
again on 20 and 25 October 2025 with a “similar message” sent “through the jail
texting app.”
In her request for relief, among other things, Plaintiff sought a permanent
DVPO directing Defendant not to: assault, threaten, abuse, follow harass or interfere
with her; go to her residence; or contact her. Plaintiff also requested an ex parte
DVPO which was denied after a hearing on 27 October 2023. The trial court
scheduled a hearing on 3 November 2023 to determine whether to issue a permanent
DVPO.
At the outset of the next hearing, the trial court asked Plaintiff’s attorney, “do
you wish to ask your client questions, or do you want me to go ahead with the
preliminary matters?” Her attorney responded, “I suppose you could go ahead.” The
trial court asked Plaintiff to explain “what happened and when did it happen to cause
-2- LONANO V. MURPHY
you to come to court and ask for a 50B Domestic Violence Protective Order.” Plaintiff
recounted, “the most recent physical assault was [on] 19 July [2023],” and since then,
Defendant had continued to contact her. The trial court noted the complaint’s filing
date of 27 October 2023 and asked about the most recent incident prompting her
request for a DVPO—the content of Defendant’s message. Plaintiff responded:
“Basically . . . that he wanted to stay together and that he’s planning on coming back
to live at my house, which I do not want him there.”
The trial court asked Plaintiff, “[w]hat did [Defendant] say that constitutes
domestic violence?” Plaintiff again referenced the earlier event when Defendant
“gave [her] a black eye and broke [her] hand and scratched [her] wrist.” Focusing on
the recent allegation of domestic violence prompting her request, the trial court again
asked Plaintiff, “[w]hat did [Defendant] say in that text message that constitutes
domestic violence?” Plaintiff said: “Harassment is what the message is. . . . He’s
texted me multiple times. I’ve repeatedly told him to stop.” Pressed again for the
message’s content, Plaintiff stated, “the same things, overly romanticized messages,
insisting on coming to live back at my house.” Plaintiff continued, “[Defendant] is
violent. He has . . . been abusing me for years.”
Once more, the trial court focused questioning on the recent allegation of
domestic violence. Plaintiff responded Defendant has a pending court date and the
trial court explained, “I do not utilize what’s transpiring in a criminal courtroom to
make the burden in this courtroom.” Plaintiff repeated her desire for the DVPO,
-3- LONANO V. MURPHY
stating, “I need protection to keep him away from me and my house and my
belongings and my family.” The trial court asked Plaintiff’s attorney if he wished to
be heard. Plaintiff’s attorney neither requested a direct-examination of his client,
nor offered to admit any other evidence. Rather, he proceeded to argue the trial court
should grant Plaintiff’s request for a permanent DVPO.
The trial court concluded Plaintiff did not qualify for a DVPO. The same day
of the hearing, the trial court entered its order on form AOC-CV-306. That order did
not contain written findings of fact, but did conclude as a matter of law that Plaintiff
“has failed to prove grounds of issuance of a domestic violence protective order.” The
trial court thereby dismissed Plaintiff’s action. Plaintiff entered her written notice of
appeal on 15 November 2023.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(2)(2023) (“From
any final judgment of a district court in a civil action.”).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff raises two issues for our consideration: (1) whether the trial court
erred by dismissing Plaintiff’s action without competent evidence; and (2) whether
the trial court abused its discretion “by conducting the 50B hearing in such a way as
to deny Plaintiff an adequate opportunity to be heard.” After careful review of the
trial court’s order, we remand for the trial court to make findings of fact.
-4- LONANO V. MURPHY
A. Competent Evidence
Plaintiff first argues there was not competent evidence to support the trial
court’s findings of fact and therefore its conclusions of law were not proper in light of
those findings.
Since the trial court has not entered written findings of fact in its order, we are
presently unable to evaluate Plaintiff’s contention. See Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708,
712, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980) (citation omitted) (“In the absence of such findings,
this Court has no means of determining whether the order is adequately supported
by competent evidence.”).
B. Conduction of the Hearing
Plaintiff next argues the trial court “abused its discretion in conducting the
hearing by refusing to hear anything beyond the most recent incident of alleged
domestic violence.” She further claims the trial court abused its discretion “by asking
Plaintiff direct questions as if she were pro se, not allowing Plaintiff’s counsel to be
heard on the merits of the case, not allowing Plaintiff’s counsel to call and examine
witnesses, not allowing Plaintiff’s counsel to present exhibits or other physical
evidence.”
At this juncture, without the trial court’s findings of fact, we are unable to
assess Plaintiff’s claim that the trial court “abused its discretion in conducting the
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-256
Filed 18 June 2025
Guilford County, No. 23 CVD 520660
APRIL ROSE LONANO, Plaintiff,
v.
COTY MICHAEL MURPHY, Defendant.
Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 3 November 2023 by Judge Angela
Foster in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25
September 2024.
The Law Offices of J. Scott Smith, PLLC, by Attorney Samuel Moore, for plaintiff-appellant
Coty Michael Murphy, pro se, no brief filed for defendant-appellee.
STADING, Judge.
April Rose LoNano (“Plaintiff”), appeals from an order denying the entry of a
domestic violence protective order (“DVPO”) against her then boyfriend, Coty Michael
Muphy (“Defendant”). For the following reasons, we remand the trial court’s order
for entry of appropriate findings of fact. LONANO V. MURPHY
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
On 27 October 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint and moved for a DVPO against
Defendant. In her complaint, Plaintiff referenced events stemming from “an
emergency 50B” she received against Defendant in February 2023. Plaintiff also
alleged, on 19 July 2023, that Defendant threw a lighter at her face, grabbed her
wrist, which drew blood and left a scar. On this occasion, Plaintiff maintains her
hand was broken while defending herself. Plaintiff claimed she told Defendant not
to contact her on 11 October 2023, but Defendant wrote her from jail “with scary
overly-romanticized statements.” Plaintiff further stated Defendant contacted her
again on 20 and 25 October 2025 with a “similar message” sent “through the jail
texting app.”
In her request for relief, among other things, Plaintiff sought a permanent
DVPO directing Defendant not to: assault, threaten, abuse, follow harass or interfere
with her; go to her residence; or contact her. Plaintiff also requested an ex parte
DVPO which was denied after a hearing on 27 October 2023. The trial court
scheduled a hearing on 3 November 2023 to determine whether to issue a permanent
DVPO.
At the outset of the next hearing, the trial court asked Plaintiff’s attorney, “do
you wish to ask your client questions, or do you want me to go ahead with the
preliminary matters?” Her attorney responded, “I suppose you could go ahead.” The
trial court asked Plaintiff to explain “what happened and when did it happen to cause
-2- LONANO V. MURPHY
you to come to court and ask for a 50B Domestic Violence Protective Order.” Plaintiff
recounted, “the most recent physical assault was [on] 19 July [2023],” and since then,
Defendant had continued to contact her. The trial court noted the complaint’s filing
date of 27 October 2023 and asked about the most recent incident prompting her
request for a DVPO—the content of Defendant’s message. Plaintiff responded:
“Basically . . . that he wanted to stay together and that he’s planning on coming back
to live at my house, which I do not want him there.”
The trial court asked Plaintiff, “[w]hat did [Defendant] say that constitutes
domestic violence?” Plaintiff again referenced the earlier event when Defendant
“gave [her] a black eye and broke [her] hand and scratched [her] wrist.” Focusing on
the recent allegation of domestic violence prompting her request, the trial court again
asked Plaintiff, “[w]hat did [Defendant] say in that text message that constitutes
domestic violence?” Plaintiff said: “Harassment is what the message is. . . . He’s
texted me multiple times. I’ve repeatedly told him to stop.” Pressed again for the
message’s content, Plaintiff stated, “the same things, overly romanticized messages,
insisting on coming to live back at my house.” Plaintiff continued, “[Defendant] is
violent. He has . . . been abusing me for years.”
Once more, the trial court focused questioning on the recent allegation of
domestic violence. Plaintiff responded Defendant has a pending court date and the
trial court explained, “I do not utilize what’s transpiring in a criminal courtroom to
make the burden in this courtroom.” Plaintiff repeated her desire for the DVPO,
-3- LONANO V. MURPHY
stating, “I need protection to keep him away from me and my house and my
belongings and my family.” The trial court asked Plaintiff’s attorney if he wished to
be heard. Plaintiff’s attorney neither requested a direct-examination of his client,
nor offered to admit any other evidence. Rather, he proceeded to argue the trial court
should grant Plaintiff’s request for a permanent DVPO.
The trial court concluded Plaintiff did not qualify for a DVPO. The same day
of the hearing, the trial court entered its order on form AOC-CV-306. That order did
not contain written findings of fact, but did conclude as a matter of law that Plaintiff
“has failed to prove grounds of issuance of a domestic violence protective order.” The
trial court thereby dismissed Plaintiff’s action. Plaintiff entered her written notice of
appeal on 15 November 2023.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(2)(2023) (“From
any final judgment of a district court in a civil action.”).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff raises two issues for our consideration: (1) whether the trial court
erred by dismissing Plaintiff’s action without competent evidence; and (2) whether
the trial court abused its discretion “by conducting the 50B hearing in such a way as
to deny Plaintiff an adequate opportunity to be heard.” After careful review of the
trial court’s order, we remand for the trial court to make findings of fact.
-4- LONANO V. MURPHY
A. Competent Evidence
Plaintiff first argues there was not competent evidence to support the trial
court’s findings of fact and therefore its conclusions of law were not proper in light of
those findings.
Since the trial court has not entered written findings of fact in its order, we are
presently unable to evaluate Plaintiff’s contention. See Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708,
712, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980) (citation omitted) (“In the absence of such findings,
this Court has no means of determining whether the order is adequately supported
by competent evidence.”).
B. Conduction of the Hearing
Plaintiff next argues the trial court “abused its discretion in conducting the
hearing by refusing to hear anything beyond the most recent incident of alleged
domestic violence.” She further claims the trial court abused its discretion “by asking
Plaintiff direct questions as if she were pro se, not allowing Plaintiff’s counsel to be
heard on the merits of the case, not allowing Plaintiff’s counsel to call and examine
witnesses, not allowing Plaintiff’s counsel to present exhibits or other physical
evidence.”
At this juncture, without the trial court’s findings of fact, we are unable to
assess Plaintiff’s claim that the trial court “abused its discretion in conducting the
hearing by refusing to hear anything beyond the most recent incident of alleged
domestic violence.” Id. But the trial court did not exceed its authority by questioning
-5- LONANO V. MURPHY
Plaintiff. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, R. 614 (2023) (“The court may interrogate
witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.”); see also State v. Mack, 161 N.C.
App. 595, 598, 589 S.E.2d 168, 171 (2003) (citation omitted) (“The trial judge’s broad
discretionary power to supervise and control the trial ‘will not be disturbed absent a
manifest abuse of discretion.’”). And when considering Plaintiff’s other contentions,
the record shows her attorney was heard on the merits of the case. Furthermore, the
record shows that the trial court did not prohibit Plaintiff or her attorney from acting
on the other alleged shortcomings.
C. Written Findings
Finally, we address the sufficiency of the trial court’s order dismissing
Plaintiff’s complaint for a DVPO.
When considering a motion for a DVPO “under Chapter 50B . . . Rule 52(a)(1)
of the North Carolina rules of Civil Procedure requires the trial court to make
findings of fact, as well as separately state its conclusions of law based on those
findings of fact.” D.C. v. D.C., 279 N.C. App. 371, 372, 865 S.E.2d 889, 889 (2021).
It is not enough that there may be evidence in the record sufficient to support findings which could have been made. The trial court must itself determine what pertinent facts are actually established by the evidence before it, and it is not for an appellate court to determine de novo the weight and credibility to be given to evidence disclosed by the record on appeal.
Coble, 300 N.C. at 712–13, 268 S.E.2d at 189 (1980) (citations omitted).
-6- LONANO V. MURPHY
As was done here, it is customary for a trial court to use form AOC-CV-306
when entering a written disposition in civil domestic violence court. The order
contains conclusion of law #5 on the form, which states Plaintiff “has failed to prove
grounds for issuance of a domestic violence protective order,” and thereby concludes
“this action is dismissed . . . .” However, the order does not include any findings of
fact. See Stancill v. Stancill, 241 N.C. App. 529, 534–35, 773 S.E.2d 890, 894 (“After
receiving evidence, the trial court must make findings of fact and conclusions of law
. . . .”); see also D.C., 279 N.C. App. at 372, 865 S.E.2d at 889. We therefore remand
the order for the entry of appropriate findings of fact.
IV. Conclusion
For the above reasons, we remand the trial court’s order for it to enter findings
of fact consistent with the record evidence.
REMANDED.
Judges ARROWOOD and CARPENTER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
-7-