Lois Scoon v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 7, 2026
DocketDC-1221-24-0725-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Lois Scoon v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Lois Scoon v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lois Scoon v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

LOIS SCOON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-1221-24-0725-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: April 7, 2026 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Gilbert J. Comley , Esquire, Elizabethtown, Kentucky, for the appellant.

Diane Tardiff , Esquire, Bedford, Massachusetts, for the agency.

Erica Skelly , Esquire, Akron, Ohio, for the agency.

Joved Gonzalez-Rivera , Esquire, Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, for the agency.

Jennifer Kaye Sniadecki , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

FINAL ORDER

The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which granted the appellant corrective action in this individual right of action appeal. On petition for review, the agency argues that the administrative judge reframed the appellant’s allegations to support her prima facie case without first finding jurisdiction over them; erred in finding that the appellant established contributing factor with regard to her disclosure to Congress; and erred in determining that the agency did not meet its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 2 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

2 In her response to the agency’s petition for review, the appellant contends that the Board should dismiss the agency’s petition for failure to provide interim relief. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3. When, as here, the appellant is the prevailing party in the initial decision and the administrative judge orders interim relief, a petition for review filed by the agency must be accompanied by a certification that the agency has complied with the interim relief order either by providing the interim relief ordered, or by making a determination that returning the appellant to the place of employment would cause undue disruption to the work environment. Johnson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 9, ¶ 6. If an agency makes a determination that returning an appellant to her previous position as interim relief would pose an undue disruption, it 3

ORDER We ORDER the agency to cancel the appellant’s removal and to restore the appellant effective April 17, 2024. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision. We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision. We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b). No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not

must nonetheless return the employee to a pay status pending the outcome of its petition for review and provide appropriate pay and benefits. Id., ¶ 7. Here, the agency provided the appellant with the required interim relief, including returning her to a pay status pending the outcome of the petition for review. PFR File, Tab 4. Thus, we deny the appellant’s request to dismiss the agency’s petition for failure to provide interim relief. 4

fully carried out the Board’s Order and should include the dates and results of any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a). For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be made within the 60-day period set forth above.

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at title 5 of the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203.

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Related

John H. Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts
726 F.2d 730 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Kenneth Johnson v. Department of Veterans Affairs
2023 MSPB 9 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2023)

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Bluebook (online)
Lois Scoon v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lois-scoon-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2026.