Lochhead v. Alacano

662 F. Supp. 230, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5380
CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedJune 22, 1987
DocketCiv. 86-C-0875A
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 662 F. Supp. 230 (Lochhead v. Alacano) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lochhead v. Alacano, 662 F. Supp. 230, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5380 (D. Utah 1987).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

ALDON J. ANDERSON, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, formerly a minority shareholder in Arctic Circle, Inc., has sued defendants, former officers and directors of Arctic Circle, claiming that they breached a fiduciary duty owed to him as a shareholder; violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b)) and its corollary Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5); and committed common law fraud upon him. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges that defendants fraudulently issued to themselves options to purchase Arctic Circle stock from the corporation at prices far below fair market value, thereby diluting plaintiff’s interest in the company without giving fair consideration. 1 Plaintiff claims that defendants devised this scheme and intentionally concealed their activities from him in anticipation of the November 1985 merger of Arctic Circle into Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. Plaintiff maintains that defendants’ object was to increase their own proportionate ownership of Arctic Circle and thereby obtain more shares of Quaker State stock than they were entitled to at the expense of plaintiff and Arctic Circle’s other minority shareholders.

Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the stock option plan adopted by defendants in 1982 was never approved by Arctic’s shareholders in that no notice of a shareholders’ meeting was sent to the shareholders and, *232 in fact, no meeting ever occurred. Plaintiff claims that defendants fabricated minutes of a shareholders’ meeting for which notice was purportedly sent and at which the stock option plans were purportedly approved by the shareholders. 2 Plaintiff further alleges that defendants fraudulently concealed from Quaker State the circumstances surrounding the supposed adoption of the 1982 plan and that Quaker State accordingly failed to disclose the alleged improprieties to Arctic Circle’s shareholders in the Prospectus and Registration Statement which it published in connection with the merger. Plaintiff requests damages of $1,391,790 representing the value of the Quaker State stock of which he claims to have been illegally deprived.

Defendants have requested dismissal of plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, arguing that directors and officers of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty only to the corporation and not to individual shareholders. Defendants have also moved for dismissal of plaintiff’s 10b-5 and common law fraud claims on grounds, inter alia, that plaintiff has failed to plead his claims of fraud with the particularity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 3

II. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

Defendants have filed a 12(b)(6) motion asserting that under Utah law directors and officers of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty not to individual shareholders, but only to the corporation. To the extent this accurately characterizes the state of the law in Utah, plaintiff would be permitted to bring his suit for breach of fiduciary duty only derivatively and not, as plaintiff has done, individually. A fiduciary duty carries with it an obligation to deal fairly and openly with those to whom the duty is owed. Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978). As to corporate directors and officers, the majority rule is that the duty is owed to the corporation itself and to the shareholders only collectively. 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia on the Law of Private Corporations, § 848 at 218 (rev. perm. ed. 1986). The minority rule is that the duty runs also to the corporation’s shareholders as individuals and a few jurisdictions adhere to the intermediate position that directors owe a limited fiduciary duty to individual shareholders in stock transactions with the shareholders. Shermer v. Baker, 2 Wash.App. 845, 472 P.2d 589 (1970). The rationale for the majority position is apparently that directors resemble trustees of the corporation which has been placed in their care, but are not trustees of individual shares of stock owned by the shareholders. The editors of Fletcher are unpersuaded by this reasoning and consider the minority position to be the better rule.

It is clear, however, that Utah adheres to the majority position that a director’s duty runs only to the corporation. In 1980, the Utah Supreme Court wrote:

“While the statement is made that directors and officers stand in a like relation to the stockholders of the corporation, 3 Fletcher § 838, in Utah it is clear that that relation is to the stockholders collectively.” (emphasis in the original).

Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980). See Jones Mining Co. v. Cardiff Mining & Mill Co., 56 Utah 449, 456, 191 P. 426, 428 (1920).

None of the three Utah cases which plaintiff brings to the court’s attention refutes the proposition stated in Richardson. Most nearly on point is the following statement from Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1982): “Directors and officers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporation and its stockholders.” It is unlikely, however, that this passing reference to stockholders was intended to reverse the Court’s strong declaration just *233 two years earlier in Richardson, especially since the Nicholson case involved a suit by a parent corporation against its former directors and its subsidiary corporation and the question of a duty running to the shareholders as individuals was not at issue.

Plaintiff also cites Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco LTD., 618 P.2d 497, 504 (Utah 1980). This case, however, merely stands for the proposition that majority shareholders are obliged not to vote their stock to defraud minority shareholders. There can be no doubt as to the truthfulness of this statement, but it does not explain to whom the duty is owed. As in Nicholson, the court had no opportunity to decide whether a duty was owed to shareholders.

Finally, plaintiff proffers Elggren v. Woolley, 64 Utah 183, 228 P. 906 (1924), a sixty-seven year old case that did not even involve an action for breach of fiduciary duty. The Richardson position therefore represents this court’s best estimate of Utah’s position on the subject. In Utah, it appears that no fiduciary duty runs from directors and officers to individual shareholders.

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Bluebook (online)
662 F. Supp. 230, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5380, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lochhead-v-alacano-utd-1987.