Local 827 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Verizon New Jersey

382 F. Supp. 2d 670, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17244
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedAugust 18, 2005
DocketCivil Action 02-5669 (JEI)
StatusPublished

This text of 382 F. Supp. 2d 670 (Local 827 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Verizon New Jersey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Local 827 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Verizon New Jersey, 382 F. Supp. 2d 670, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17244 (D.N.J. 2005).

Opinion

OPINION

IRENAS, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff, Local 827 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“IBEW” or the “Union”) has filed a two-count Complaint against Defendants Verizon New Jersey, Inc. (“VNJ”) and Verizon Network Integration Corp., Inc. (“VNI”). In its Complaint the Union has alleged that certain work performed by non-union outside contractors, specifically “NCR Customer Engineers” or “NCR CEs,” 1 is the same or substantially comparable to work that is currently or has historically been per *672 formed by Union employees, and thus the type of work that VNI is required by the parties’ labor agreements to assign to Union employees. The Complaint also alleges that Union employees were wrongfully denied certain wiring work.

The Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as this matter arises under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. 2 We apply federal law and traditional rules of contract interpretation when they are not inconsistent with federal law. Teamsters Indus. Emp. Welfare Fund v. Rolls-Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir.1993).

Presently before this Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment by the Defendants. 3 Because the factual record developed by the parties on this motion would not permit a finder of fact to conclude that the work performed by the NCR CEs was the same or comparable to the work currently or historically performed by Union members, summary judgment will be granted.

I.

A.

The Union is a labor organization representing certain classifications of employees of Defendant VNJ, an operating telephone company (“OTC”) that is the successor to Bell Atlantic New Jersey, Inc. (Comply 5.) VNJ provides telephone and data transmission services in New Jersey. VNI provides software configuration, installation, monitoring and maintenance services on private wide area data networks (“WANs”) to large commercial customers, such as banks, schools, power companies and hospitals. (Stmt. Of Facts, ¶ 1.) VNI will use VNJ employees for certain work. Both VNJ and VNI are wholly owned subsidiaries of Verizon Communications (“Verizon”).

During the Bell Atlantic-GTE merger in 1998, a number of agreements were drawn up to resolve work classification issues. 4 These agreements designated which work would be performed by the employees belonging to the various bargaining units attached to Verizon. Verizon bargained with the Communications Workers of America, and both agreed upon a Customer Bid Work Agreement (“CBWA”) and a Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) which were subsequently adopted by Plaintiff.

Both agreements serve as the foundation for Plaintiffs claims. The CBWA states that:

For the part of the Work which is currently or has been historically performed by IBEW bargaining unit employees, Verizon Network Integration Corp., Inc., VNICI, shall utilize Verizon New Jersey, Inc. as its sole contractor and its IBEW [Union] represented employees shall perform the work.

*673 (CBWA, ¶ 2.) The MOA also provides that Union employees should be utilized to perform work for VNI that “is currently, has been historically, or is substantially comparable to work performed by IBEW bargaining unit employees.... ” (MOA, ¶ 3.) The MOA’s Interpretative Comments explain that: “Work will be considered ‘historically performed’ by IBEW-represented employees if it has been performed by such employees within the last seven years and over a significant period of time.” (MOA Interpretative Comments, ¶ I.) In addition, “current” work is defined as including any “evolution of work.” (Id. at ¶ 2)

The Union contends that it is entitled to perform “maintenance” or repair work on customers’ data networks. This work, according to the Union, is being sub-contracted out to NCR CEs in violation of the agreements. The Union asserts that NCR CEs do work that historically was performed by Union employees, and/or is work that evolved from past Union work. The Union also argues that its members, belonging to three classifications of employees, System Technician' — -Operations, System Technician — OCS, and Network Technician, currently do comparable work. Many of Plaintiffs arguments are based on the Union’s work with three types of data transmission equipment — the CSU/DSU, the MUX, and the Fast Packet Switch. 5

Defendants contend that the disputed work is complex software-based work. Aceording to Defendants, only high level management employees, not Union employees, historically have worked and currently work on modifying, configuring and repairing the complex software which is at the heart of most networks. Defendants assert that only upper management type work has been contracted to NCR CEs.

The Union also seeks an injunction and unspecified damages for wiring work it claims that it is entitled to perform. The work refers to the wiring for data and voice networks throughout buildings. According to the Union, Defendants bid and contracted this work out, in violation of the applicable labor agreements. Defendants assert that March, 2003, marked the last time that they bid for wiring work and contend that there are no plans to bid for wiring work in the future.

II.

The test for summary judgment is stated in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules. Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving *674 party. Pollock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir.1986).

The role of the court is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 5.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

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382 F. Supp. 2d 670, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17244, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/local-827-international-brotherhood-of-electrical-workers-v-verizon-new-njd-2005.