Local 32, Afge, Afl-Cio v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, and Office of Personnel Management, Intervenor

728 F.2d 1526, 234 U.S. App. D.C. 292, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3343, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 24580
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedMarch 13, 1984
Docket82-1756
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 728 F.2d 1526 (Local 32, Afge, Afl-Cio v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, and Office of Personnel Management, Intervenor) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Local 32, Afge, Afl-Cio v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, and Office of Personnel Management, Intervenor, 728 F.2d 1526, 234 U.S. App. D.C. 292, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3343, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 24580 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Opinion

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge FAIRCHILD.

FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge:

Local 32 seeks review of the Federal Labor Relations Authority’s decision upholding OPM’s refusal to bargain over two union proposals: Proposal II, 1 that positions be filled from a certificate of best qualified applicants, and Proposal VI, that an employee demoted through no fault of his/her own be selected to fill the first vacancy at his/her former grade level. 2 The Authority concluded that both proposals infringed on OPM’s rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(2)(C). See 8 F.L.R.A. No. 97 (1982). This subsection reserves to the agency the authority, “with respect to filling positions, to make selections for appointment from — (i) among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion or (ii) any other source.”

*1528 The agency’s authority to fill positions under § 7106(a)(2)(C) is not without limit. Section 7106(b) states in part:

Nothing in this section shall preclude any agency and any labor organization from negotiating—
(2) procedures which management officials of the agency will observe in exercising any authority under this section; or
(3) appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of any authority under this section by such management officials.

5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(2), (3).

In American Federation of Government Employees Local 2782 v. FLRA, 702 F.2d 1183 (D.C.Cir.1983), this circuit examined the extent to which § 7106(b)(2) and (3) permit negotiation of proposals involving the filling of positions of employment otherwise reserved to management discretion by § 7106(a)(2)(C), The court found that § 7106(b)(2) permits negotiation of “procedures” for implementing the substantive rights of management guaranteed by § 7106(a). In this way § 7106(b)(2) clarifies rather than limits the scope of management rights under § 7106(a). 702 F.2d at 1186. Accordingly, the court noted, this circuit has approved the Authority’s “direct interference test” to determine if a proposal may be characterized as “procedural” and therefore negotiable. Id. “[A] proposal ... [is] nonnegotiable if its implementation would ‘directly interfere with the agency’s basic right’ ” as reserved under section 7106(a). Dept. of Defense v. FLRA, 659 F.2d 1140, 1159 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom. AFGE v. FLRA, 455 U.S. 945, 102 S.Ct. 1443, 71 L.Ed.2d 658 (1982) (quoting AFGE v. Air Force Logistics Command, 2 F.L.R.A. 604, 613 (1980)).

The American Federation court contrasted the clarifying function of § 7106(b)(2) with the limiting function of § 7106(b)(3).

There is no way to regard “appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected” as a clarification of the scope of management prerogatives. “Appropriate arrangements” (unlike “procedures”) is a meaningless clarification — and one that would not have to be limited to “employees adversely affected” as opposed to all employees. The conclusion is unavoidable that what was intended was an exception to the otherwise governing management prerogative requirements of subsection (a).

702 F.2d at 1187 (emphasis in original). The court found the Act’s legislative history further supports a reading of § 7106(b)(3) as permitting the negotiation of some constraints on § 7106(a) management prerogatives.

With this understanding of the interplay of §§ 7106(a)(2)(C), (b)(2) and (b)(3), we turn to the proposals at issue in this case. Proposal II provides:

Except where management is required by law, regulation, or this contract to select a particular person, selections for vacancies will be made by officials choosing from a certificate of best-qualified applicants for the position. The parties may, from time to time, agree to deviations from this requirement in individual cases or categories of cases, when they deem it advisable for affirmative action or other legitimate purposes. The parties note that they are in disagreement over the agency’s claim that 5 U.S.C. 7106(a) gives it the legal right or duty to unilaterally disregard the competitive selection requirement under certain circumstances. The merits of the management claim in any particular case will be considered by the parties in their efforts to resolve any resulting grievance, and the parties note the obligation of arbitrators to interpret contract provisions in light of governing law. The parties note further that an arbitration award ordering remedies contrary to governing law may be overturned on appeal to the Federal Labor Relations Authority.

The Authority interpreted Proposal II as requiring OPM to make “selections for appointments from among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion under section 7106(a)(2)(C)(i) . .. and as a corollary . .. not [to] make selections for *1529 appointments from any other appropriate source under section 7106(a)(2)(C)(ii).” The Authority therefore concluded Proposal II interfered with agency discretion reserved by subsection (a)(2)(C)(ii), and was nonnegotiable. On review, the Authority simply argues that Proposal II requires that management fill positions from a limited list of best qualified candidates.

The question for us is whether the Authority’s application of the Act is “arbitrary, capricious, abusive of discretion [or] contrary to law.” National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 691 F.2d 553, 564 (D.C.Cir.1982). We cannot say the Authority’s finding concerning Proposal II is any of those.

Local 32 disputes the Authority’s interpretation of Proposal II. The union explains that its proposal for a certificate of best qualified applicants was meant to insure that the merits of candidates from all sources be considered in the formulation of a certified list; the proposal was not intended to require that management select only from promotion eligibles. It suggests that management could make its best qualified certificate large enough to include every qualified applicant, and conceivably could choose the comparatively least qualified one.

Although the language of the Proposal could conceivably be stretched to that extent, it is contrary to the ordinary meaning of the terms “best qualified.” The Federal Personnel Manual explains:

Best qualified candidates are measured against other candidates.

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728 F.2d 1526, 234 U.S. App. D.C. 292, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3343, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 24580, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/local-32-afge-afl-cio-v-federal-labor-relations-authority-and-office-of-cadc-1984.