MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ASPEN, District Judge:
On March 1, 1974, the plaintiffs filed this employment discrimination action challenging “across-the-board” defendant Standard Brands’ hiring practices and terms and conditions of employment. The complaint alleges discrimination based on race, national origin, and sex in violation of both Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,1 and seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as back pay. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that Standard Brands consistently has followed a policy of refusing to hire blacks, Spanish-surnamed individuals and females for management and office positions. The complaint further alleges discriminatory impact resulting from a statistical under-utilization of blacks in blue-collar entry-level positions vis-a-vis their availability in the general workforce pool. Black and Spanish-surnamed employees allege that Standard Brands has discriminated against them by using non job-related testing procedures to determine eligibility for mechanic-trainee jobs. The female plaintiffs allege that there has been a discriminatory policy of refusing to hire women for certain entry-level jobs and denying women the opportunity to transfer or progress to certain other positions. In addition, the female plaintiffs claim that Standard Brand discriminatorily has layed off women employees while retaining less senior male employees performing similar functions.2
The plaintiffs throughout the course of this litigation have sought to pursue the case as a class action. In opinions dated January 6 and March 10,1978, Judge Grady certified a plaintiff class of all black and Spanish-surnamed males who have been or will be discriminated against in hiring, job assignment, promotion or transfer, or other terms and conditions of employment. At that time, however, Judge Grady reserved ruling on the motion to certify a female class because Lois Crane, the named representative for the asserted female class, had not alleged sufficient facts in her complaint to enable the court to determine whether she would be an adequate class representa[602]*602tive. Thereafter, Crane amended her complaint, and by an order of October 10, 1978, Judge Grady expanded the class to include all female employees who have been or will be subjected to the same genre of discrimination as the male employees.3 In that same order, the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the claims asserted by Crane.
Now, as this case nears trial, five and one-half years after this litigation began, the defendant once more is before the Court challenging the certification of the class.4 Defendant Standard Brands offers three arguments in support of its motion to amend the class certification. First, defendant argues that the female class must be decertified since discovery has shown that the named representative, Crane, cannot prevail on her individual claim. Second, defendant asserts that since the named plaintiffs all are employees of Standard Brands, they lack the capacity to represent nonemployees who currently are included within the class. On this basis, the defendant seeks to limit the class to present employees at Standard Brands. Third, the defendant seeks to amend the class certification ordered by Judge Grady by imposing time limitations on class membership.
Decertification of the Female Class
Judge Grady’s order of October 10 indicated that the female class was certified “subject to redefinition if further proceedings indicate that the class as currently defined is inappropriate in light of the evidence presented by the plaintiffs.” Local 194, et al. v. Standard Brands, Inc., 74 C 587 Slip Op. at 6 (N.D.Ill., October 10, 1978). The defendant argues that discovery conducted since the October 10 order makes it clear that Crane cannot prove that she has been discriminated against. Since Crane’s personal claims may be resolved by granting summary judgment in favor of Standard Brands, the defendant further argues that Crane is not a member of, and thus cannot represent the interests of, the female class. There being no other named female plaintiffs in the case, the defendant concludes that no other party is capable of representing the interests of the female class. As a result, the defendant asks that the female class be decertified.
The primary premise of the defendant’s theory is that the Court must grant summary judgment in its favor.5 This is a premise, however, that the Court cannot accept. The essence of sex discrimination under Title VII is the application of different standards for men and women. Carroll [603]*603v. Taiman Federal Savings & Loan Association of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991, 92 S.Ct. 536, 30 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). Crane’s answers to defendant’s interrogatories suggest that she plans to introduce at trial evidence which she believes shows that Standard Brands consistently refused to hire women to perform certain jobs, and denied women an equal opportunity to bid for certain positions generally held by men. Thus, Crane alleges disparate treatment both to herself personally and to her as a member of the female class.
The portions of plaintiffs’ answers to the interrogatories cited by Standard Brands do not indicate to the contrary. The defendant argues that because Crane bid on two particular jobs, there could be no discrimination on the basis of her failure to obtain those jobs. Crane’s argument, however, is that the defendant discouraged women from bidding for certain jobs and prohibited them from obtaining certain positions. The fact that the female plaintiff unsuccessfully bid for a particular job by no means precludes a finding of discrimination.
Similarly, the defendant observes that Crane and five other women' bid for the job of Permanent Grocery Line Operator, and that Crane was awarded the job. On this basis, the defendant argues that Crane’s allegation of discrimination must fail. However, this argument misconceives the nature of Crane’s contention. The fact that Crane obtained a particular position does not answer the more basic question of whether this was a “male” or “female” position. It is that question — whether certain' jobs have been reserved exclusively for men — which will be critical in determining the existence of sex discrimination. The defendant has offered no evidence that convinces this Court that the question no longer is a live issue in the case. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment as to Crane is denied. As a result, the motion to decer-tify the female class is denied as well. .
Decertification of Persons Discriminatorily Refused Employment
It is undisputed that the individuals who are named plaintiffs in this litigation all are present employees of Standard Brands. On this basis,- the defendant argues that there is no representative with the capacity to represent adequately the interests of those persons who allegedly have been discrimina-torily denied employment, and that all such individuals should be removed from the class. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that since their complaint alleges “across-the-board” discrimination, it is unnecessary that the named representatives suffer each and every type of injury allegedly suffered by the class members. Alternatively plaintiffs allege that even if the individual plaintiffs lack capacity to represent those refused employment, the plaintiff union and the intervenor-plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) are qualified to represent that subclass.
A. Across-the-Board Theory
The Seventh Circuit has observed that because the Civil Rights Act of 1964 attacks class-based discrimination, 'it is particularly appropriate that suits to remedy violations of the Act be brought as class actions. Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Company, 416 F.2d 711, 719-720 (7th Cir. 1969).6 The use of the class action vehicle in Title VII litigation, however, raises difficult questions concerning compliance with Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7 In [604]*604particular, efforts to certify broad classes of aggrieved employees as well as those persons refused employment often may be at odds with the Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.
A number of courts have eliminated this hurdle to class certification by adopting an “across-the-board” approach to Title VII class actions. In the first case to use this theory, Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969), the court permitted a discharged employee to represent a class alleging discrimination in all phases of employment. The court held that where the complaint constitutes an “across-the-board” attack on unequal employment practices, the named representative of the class need not have suffered every type of discrimination alleged by the class:
While it is true, as the lower court points out, that there are different factual questions with regard to different employees, it is also true that the ‘Damoclean threat of a racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial class [and] is a question of fact common to all members of the class.’
417 F.2d at 1124. Thus, the court found this common thread of racial discrimination adequate to satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). This view had been endorsed by a majority of courts of appeals and district courts. See e. g., Senter v. General Motors Company, 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870, 97 S.Ct. 182, 50 L.Ed.2d 150 (1976); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975); Barnett v. W. T. Grant Company, 518 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011, 95 S.Ct. 2415, 44 L.Ed.2d 679 (1975); Reed v. Arlington Hotel Company, 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854, 94 S.Ct. 153, 38 L.Ed.2d 103 (1974).8
The decision in East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 52 L.Ed.2d 543 (1977), however, casts doubt on the continuing validity of the across-the-board approach. The named plaintiffs in the case, who allegedly were aggrieved by the defendant’s discriminatory transfer policy, filed suit on behalf of all blacks and Mexican-Americans who had been subjected to across-the-board employment discrimination. The plaintiffs, however, failed to move for certification of the asserted class. At trial, the court found that the transfer policy was neutral, and that the named plaintiffs were not qualified to perform the jobs which they sought. Accordingly, the trial judge dismissed the class allegations of the complaint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the trial judge early on should have considered the issue of class certification, notwithstanding the failure of the plaintiffs to raise the issue. Observing that “the requirements of Rule 23(a) must be read liberally in the context of suits brought under Title VII and Section 1981,” the court determined that the class should be certified. Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 50-51 (5th Cir. 1974). The court then reached the merits of the class claim, finding that the employer’s practices denied the class equal employment opportunities.
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit ruling, holding that the named plaintiffs were inappropriate class representatives under Rule 23(a). The Court found that since the named plaintiffs had failed to prevail on their individual claims, and had stipulated that they personally had suffered no other discrimination, they were not members of the class they sought to represent. Moreover, the Court observed that the named plaintiffs’ failure to move [605]*605for class certification as well as the apparent conflict between the plaintiffs’ demands and certain class requests suggested that the plaintiffs could not “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” 431 U.S. at 403-405, 97 S.Ct. at 1897.
Addressing more generally the question of class actions to remedy employment discrimination, the Court reiterated that class representatives must “ ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” 431 U.S. at 403, 97 S.Ct. at 1896. The Court rioted:
We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs. Common questions of law or fact are typically present. But careful attention to the requirements of Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23 remains nonetheless indispensable. The mere fact that a complaint alleges racial or ethnic discrimination does not in itself ensure that the party who has brought the lawsuit will be an adequate representative of those who may have been the real victims of that discrimination.
431 U.S. at 405-406, 97 S.Ct. at 1898.
Inasmuch as Rodriquez made no explicit mention of the “across-the-board theory,” a number of courts have held that Rodriquez did not intend to limit that approach. See e. g. Satterwhite v. City of Greenville, 578 F.2d 987, 993-994 n.8 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc); Beasley v. Griffin, 81 F.R.D. 114, 116 (D.Mass.1979); Wajda v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, 80 F.R.D. 303, 307-312 (E.D.Pa.1978); Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank of Dallas, 78 F.R.D. 352, 357 (N.D.Tex.1978). This line of cases reasons that Rodriquez turned upon the findings that the named plaintiffs were not members of the class asserted and that they were inadequate representatives within the meaning of Rule 23(a)(4). Thus,
[gjiven that the ‘across-the-board’ approach is simply a judicial gloss on the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23, it is difficult to understand how Rodriquez . . . could be taken as a rejection of that approach.
Wajda v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, 80 F.R.D. at 308.
This interpretation of Rodriguez, however, fails to deal adequately with the Court’s more general observations about adherence to the requirements of Rule 23. Although the facts of Rodriguez concern the requirements of class membership and adequacy of representation, this Court does not see how these factors can be divorced from the remainder of Rule 23(a). The goals underlying Rule 23(a) are twofold. The requirements of numerosity and commonality ensure that the class action device is the most judicially efficient mechanism for resolving the contested issues. On the other hand, class membership, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation all are designed to ensure that the interests of the absentee class members are protected. See e. g., E.E.O.C. v. D. H. Holmes Company, Ltd., 556 F.2d 787, 795 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962, 98 S.Ct. 3082, 57 L.Ed.2d 1129 (1978). This latter goal is of particular importance in Rule 23(b)(2) class actions such as this one, since absentee class members do not have the option of disassociating themselves from the class action. By limiting the impact of Rodriguez, the courts’ capacity to effectuate the purposes’ of Rule 23(a) would be diminished. The Court does not believe that Rodriguez contemplated the selective enforcement of the requirements of Rule 23(a).
Therefore, it is evident that the “across-the-board” theory must be reevaluated in light of Rodriguez. Under the relaxed application of Rule 23(a), commonality and typicality of claims generally have been satisfied by the inherent class characteristics of Title VII litigation. This characterization of racial discrimination as a group wrong suitable for classwide attack under Rule 23(a), however, creates a situation in which virtually any Title VII action could be eligible for class certification.9 This re-[606]*606■suit would obtain irrespective of the lack of judicial economy that would result from the action or the divergence of the claims. This Court finds that implicit in Rodriguez1 admonition that compliance with Rule 23(a) remains indispensable in Title VII actions is a rejection of the “across-the-board” theory as an interpretation of the general class action principles.
Moreover, the policy goals of Title VII cannot be invoked to justify noncompliance with Rule 23(a). It is true that the policy of nondiscrimination is entitled to the highest of priority, Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975), and that suits by private individuals play an important role in the vindication of that policy. Furthermore, it has been argued that liberal class certification fosters the public-oriented goals of Title VII by providing relief for class members who are reluctant to prosecute valid claims for fear of employer reprisal. See e. g. Mack v. General Electric Company, 329 F.Supp. 72, 75 (E.D.Pa.1971). The reasoning of Rodriguez, however, indicates that these benefits do not form the proper basis for class certification in the absence of compliance with Rule 23(a). In passing Title VII, the Congress created no express exemption from the terms of Rule 23(a); Rodriguez suggests that the federal courts refrain from creating implicit exceptions to the general class action rules.
On the basis of Rodriguez, then, this Court must address the propriety of the “across-the-board” class that has been certified.10 The individuals who are named plaintiffs in this case allege that they have suffered personal discrimination as a result of the defendant’s discriminatory policies with respect to job assignment, transfer and promotion, and other conditions of employment. None of these individuals, however, claim that they have endured discrimination stemming from the employer’s hiring practices. As a result, the individual plaintiffs share no bond of common questions of fact or law with persons who might have been discriminatorily denied employment by Standard Brands. Furthermore, the individual plaintiffs’ claims, which relate to alleged discrimination during employment, are not typical of the claims of persons who may have been denied employment for discriminatory reasons. This poses the threat of less than adequate protection of the claims of persons who have been denied employment. It may be that the interests of plaintiff employees will persuade them to litigate less vigorously the claims of those who seek the opportunity for employment. Thus, this Court joins the other tribunals which have held that an employee-plaintiff may not represent a class of persons challenging an employer’s hiring practices. See e. g. Scott v. University of Delaware, 601 F.2d 76, 87 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931, 100 S.Ct. 275, 62 L.Ed.2d 189 (1979); Hill v. Western Electric Company, Inc., 596 F.2d 99, 101-102 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929, 100 S.Ct. 271, 62 L.Ed.2d 186 (1979); Chavez v. Tempe Union High School District No. 213, 565 F.2d 1087, 1094 n.10 (9th Cir. 1977); Walker v. World Tire Corporation, Inc., 563 F.2d 918, 921-22 (8th Cir. 1977). Accordingly, the Court holds that the individual named plaintiffs may not represent those persons who allegedly have been discriminated with respect to hiring.11
[607]*607B. The Union and EEOC as Class Represen ta ti ves
As a result of this holding, the Court must reach the question of whether these alleged victims of hiring discrimination nonetheless may be represented by the union or the EEOC. In an earlier appeal concerning this case, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff union “may represent those of its members it seeks to represent in this action.” Local 194, Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union v. Standard Brands, 540 F.2d 864, 867 (7th Cir. 1976). The court therein also held that organizational suits were not bound by the rigid requirements of Rule 23. Id. On this basis, the plaintiffs argue that the union may represent the class of persons who allegedly have been discriminatorily refused employment.
The Seventh Circuit opinion, however, held that the union could represent its members in this litigation. As noted by Judge Grady, these members consist of the employer’s production and maintenance workers. Local 194, Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union v. Standard Brands, 74-587, Slip Op. at 1 (N.D.Ill., January 6, 1978) (unpublished opinion). Thus, the plaintiffs’ argument must fail for the simple reason that persons who have been denied employment would not ordinarily be members of the union.12
The capacity of the EEOC to represent a class of persons who allegedly have been discriminated against in hiring presents a more difficult question. When the EEOC intervenes in a lawsuit pursuant to § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, the agency no doubt seeks to vindicate the broad public policy goals that underlie Title VII. On this basis, the plaintiffs argue that Rule 23(a) should be inapplicable to the EEOC, citing E.E.O.C. v. General Telephone Company of the Northwest, Inc., 599 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1979). However, all Title VII suits, whether brought by private individuals or by the EEOC, further the policy goals of Title VII by striking at discriminatory employment practices.13 In Rodriguez, as discussed above, the Supreme Court observed that adherence to the general class actions rules remains indispensable in Title VII litigation. The Court finds no justification for distinguishing between private actions and EEOC actions under § 706 under the Rodriguez rule.
The cases which have exempted EEOC actions under § 706 from the requirements of Rule 23(a) rely on two arguments to support their approach. First, they assert that neither Rule 23 nor Title VII expressly provides that EEOC actions must comply with the general class actions rules. General Telephone Company, 599 F.2d at 327-330. This position, however, erroneously alters the applicable presumption. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it normally is presumed that actions which seek to proceed on a classwide basis must comport with the requirements of Rule 23(a). Fed. R.Civ.P. 1 (“These rules govern all suits of a civil nature ... at law or in equity . .”). Indeed, Rule 81, which exempts a number of substantive actions from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, makes no mention of § 706 actions brought by the EEOC. Nor do the express terms of Title VII itself provide for an exception to the require-[608]*608merits of Rule 23(a).14 This argument, therefore, provides no basis for permitting the EEOC to avoid the mandate of Rodriguez with respect to Rule 23(a). E.E.O.C. v. D. H. Holmes, Ltd., 556 F.2d 787, 794-795 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962, 98 S.Ct. 3082, 57 L.Ed.2d 1129 (1978).15
Second, the opinions exempting the EEOC from the requirements of Rule 23(a) have analogized § 706 actions to “pattern and practice” suits brought by the agency under § 707, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6. Since Rule 23(a) generally has not been applied to § 707 suits, “it would be illogical to apply a different rule with respect to § 706 actions ‘in view of the seemingly identical nature of the two sections.’ ” General Telephone Company, 599 F.2d at 331.
This view glosses over a number of important distinctions between § 706 and § 707 proceedings. Section 707 suits are the result of independently-initiated EEOC investigations. Although the EEOC may seek individual remedies in § 707 actions, the primary purpose of the suit is to vindicate the public interest in Title YII policy. Section 706 suits, on the other hand, are triggered by individual complaints filed with the EEOC. When the EEOC files an action under § 706, it functions “as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties . . .” Occidental Life Insurance Company of California v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 368, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2455, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977). Any public benefit that accrues from such litigation is incidental.
Moreover, exemption from Rule 23(a) makes sense in the context of pattern and practice suits under § 707 for the reason that those suits do not proceed in the same fashion as the normal class action. In pattern and practice suits, “the question of individual relief does not arise until it has been proved that the employer has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination.” International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1868, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). At that time, individual relief may be awarded if the EEOC can show that individuals were potential victims of the proven discrimination. Id. In essence, this technique is a mass application of collateral estoppel by the government on behalf of victims of discrimination; a judgment is obtained against the employer, and parties entitled to enforce that judgment are granted relief. Class actions, however, proceed on the basis of an a priori determination of individuals who will be entitled to relief if the employer's liability ultimately is proven.16 In this context, Rodriguez held that class actions must comport with the requirements of Rule 23(a). Section 707 does not persuade this Court that a different rule should apply merely because the EEOC is the named plaintiff in a § 706 action.
Therefore, the Court finds that the EEOC must satisfy the requirements of [609]*609Rule 23(a) in order to qualify as a class representative in a § 706 class action. See e. g. E.E.O.C. v. D. H. Holmes, Ltd., 556 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962, 98 S.Ct. 3082, 57 L.Ed.2d 1129 (1978); E.E.O.C. v. Page Engineering Company, 17 FEP Cases 1638 (N.D.Ill.1978).17 The Court agrees with the reasoning of D. H. Holmes that the EEOC generally will satisfy the requirements of class membership 18 and adequacy of representation.19 With respect to numerosity, commonality, and typicality, however, the Court believes that the EEOC can satisfy Rule 23(a) only to the extent that the private individual whose interest the agency seeks to represent could comply with the rule. In this case, the Court already has held that the individual plaintiffs are ineligible to represent those persons allegedly discriminated in hiring for failure to satisfy the commonality and typicality elements of Rule 23(a). Since the EEOC stands “in the shoes” of the individual complainant, the agency lacks the capacity to represent the class of hiring discriminatees as well.20
[610]*610
Applicable Time Limitations
The defendant also asks this Court to impose time limits as to the earliest and latest date that alleged discrimination is actionable in this suit. Specifically, the defendant argues that no discrimination against women occurring prior to July 24, 1969 (90 days prior to the filing of the complaint with the EEOC), and no discrimination against males prior to March 1, 1969 (5 years prior to the filing of the complaint), should be actionable. Standard Brands also argues that no discrimination occurring subsequent to March 1, 1974, the date that complaint was filed, should be at issue in this lawsuit.
The request to establish the 1969 dates as the earliest time at which Standard Brands’ practices will be examined depends upon a rigorous application of the 90-day internal statute of limitations period contained in Title VII21 and the five-year period that is applicable to § 1981 suits.22 The defendant assumes that all statutory violations that might have occurred prior to these dates is time-barred. The complaint, however, alleges that discriminatory practices have been the consistent policy of the defendant at least as far back as July 2,1965. Thus, it is clear that the complaint seeks to include acts prior to 1969 as part of a “continuing violation” theory.
The purpose of this theory is “to add some flexibility to an otherwise rigid jurisdictional filing requirement that might often result in the denial of Title VII remedies to employees who have suffered employment discrimination.” In Re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142, 1148 (7th Cir. 1978). Under this doctrine, the claim of an aggrieved party will not be time-barred, even if the normally applicable period for filing has passed, if the alleged violation actually continued up to the time charges are filed. Id.
The defendant argues that the continuing violation theory no longer is valid. In United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1979), the Supreme Court refused to apply the continuing violation theory in a Title VII action. There, the plaintiff, who had been discriminatorily fired in 1968 and rehired in 1972, without back seniority, attacked the defendant’s seniority system on the ground that it perpetuated the effects of the 1968 discriminatory act. The Court, however, observed that the seniority system itself was neutral in its operation. Thus, the fact that it gave present effect to some past discrimination was insufficient to state a claim under Title VII. “[T]he emphasis should not be placed on mere continuity; the critical question is whether any present violation exists.” 431 U.S. at 558, 97 S.Ct. at 1889 (emphasis original).
In the Airline Cases, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Evans from the situation in which the discriminatory policy itself continues up until the time of filing. Where a discriminatory policy continues in existence, the critical question posited by Evans ■ — whether any present violation exists — is answered in the affirmative. In such a case, the continuing violation theory is not being used to attack an employer policy which no longer is in existence, but rather, it operates to bring within the scope of litigation all those acts which are pursuant to the present policy of the employer. Use of the continuing violation theory in the former instance clearly would undermine the goals served by the statute of limitations. An employer could be unfairly surprised by stale claims brought on the basis of discrete acts performed far in the past. In the latter case, however, any acts for which the employer is held liable would be [611]*611the result of a policy which he maintained up to the date of the complaint. Accordingly, he cannot claim that the statute of limitations is circumvented by holding him responsible for the results of that policy.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit has found the continuing violation theory to be viable in a situation such as the one presented by this case. Since the alleged discriminatory policies in this case continued in.effect up until the filing of the EEOC complaint in 1969, the Court finds that discriminatory acts which might have occurred as far back as July 2, 1965, may be included in this action.23
The defendant’s request to close the class as of March 1, 1974, relies on the authority of Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 71 n.3, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1887, n.3, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976). There, the Supreme Court held that district courts lack jurisdiction over the claims of prospective class members who in the future may be discriminated against. This does not mean, however, that the class of injured persons must be closed as of the time of the complaint. As observed by the court in Curtis v. Voss, 73 F.R.D. 580 (N.D.Ill.1976):
[T]he exclusion of an individual at the time the class is defined does not imply exclusion at the time judgment is entered. Moreover, from a pragmatic viewpoint, the district court is concerned with those who in the future may be class members only to the extent that at some point, their previously hypothetical grievance matures into a claim upon which the requested relief may be granted. When this occhrs, the person qualifies as a present class member, even if the class definition is specifically limited to those who have already been injured or threatened with injury by the defendant’s con-, duct. Since the future class members who actually suffer injury thereby become present class members eligible for relief, a definition encompassing future members is superfluous.
Id. at 582-583.
Thus, while the Court agrees that persons who in the future may be discriminated against cannot be included in the class at this time, the Court declines to freeze the constituency of the class as of March 1, 1974. If the defendant is found liable for violations of Title VII of § 1981, then all employees who actually have suffered injury as of the date of judgment will be treated as members of the class for the purposes of relief.
To summarize, the Court finds that Crane has the capacity to represent the class of female employees alleging discrimination in job assignment, transfer and promotion policy, and terms and conditions of employment. The Court concludes, however, that no named plaintiff in this action may represent the class of persons allegedly discriminated against in hiring. Therefore, those persons must be removed from the class in this case. The Court also holds that the class includes persons allegedly discriminated by defendant’s policies as far back as July 2, 1965, and that the class may be expanded to include persons who suffer discrimination from this time until the conclusion of the litigation.
Accordingly, the Court modifies the class certification, and redefines the class in this case as follows:
All black, Spanish-surnamed, and female citizens who have been or are employed at defendant’s Pershing Road facility, and since July 2, 1965, have been or are being discriminated against (i) in their job assignments, and/or (ii) in their transfer or promotion opportunities, and/or (iii) in their terms and conditions [612]*612of employment because of race, national origin, or sex.
It is so ordered.