JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiff class is comprised of lawful permanent residents (“LPR’s”) faced with pending deportation or exclusion proceedings1 in which no final order of deportation or exclusion has yet been entered, who are not presently held in detention, and whose immigration documents have been confiscated by the Harlingen, Texas, office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). Plaintiffs object to INS’s practice of seizing an LPR’s laminated Form 1-151 or 1-551 (“green card”)2 and other government documents and issuing, in their place, an 1-94 “Temporary Evidence of Lawful Permanent Resident” form containing extraneous information announcing the holder’s pending removal proceedings. They additionally claim that LPR’s are entitled to notice and a hearing to determine whether they should be paroled within the United States pending a final determination in their removal proceedings.
The district court granted the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. Its final order, dated January 13, 1999, regulates the seizure of an LPR’s green card and issuance of temporary documents pending removal proceedings, requires the INS to hold a hearing before determining whether an LPR should be paroled into the United States pending a final order of removal, and guarantees LPR’s the right not to have their other lawfully issued documents confiscated unless those documents constitute bona fide evidence of unlawful conduct.3
[987]*987The government presents a series of procedural and substantive objections to the order.' With respect to the seizure of green cards and issuance of temporary documents, we conclude that the order was too sweeping in light of 8 C.F.R. § 264.5(g), which is cited by neither party nor the district court. In addition, we conclude that federal courts have no jurisdiction to review parole decisions of the Attorney General. Finally, we decide that remand is appropriate to ensure that the government has ample opportunity to press its factual and legal contentions before the district court.
We therefore vacate the order and remand for any further proceedings that may be required. We also vacate an earlier, preliminary order benefiting an individual who is not a member of the plaintiff class.
I.
The government claims the plaintiffs lack standing.4 “[T]he critical standing question is whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a personal, distinct, and palpable injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, and that such an injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” National Treasury Employees Union v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 25 F.3d 237, 241 (5th Cir.1994). In identifying an injury that confers standing, courts look exclusively to the time of filing. See Ped-erson v. Louisiana State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 870 (5th Cir.2000).
We reject the government’s contention that the plaintiffs lack standing, for want of injury, to challenge their denial of immigration documentation. Green cards “play a significant role in the day-to-day lives of LPRs.”5 And although the 1-94 forms issued in place of the green cards do evidence LPR status, they additionally state:
Warning — A nonimmigrant who accepts unauthorized employment is subject to deportation.
Important — Retain this permit in your possession; you must surrender it when you leave the U.S. Failure to do so may delay your entry into the U.S. in the future.
You are authorized to stay in the U.S. only until the date written on this form. To remain past this date, without permission from immigration authorities, is a violation of the law.
As plaintiffs adequately allege, inadequate immigration documents result in a greater degree of harassment by the INS and diminished employment opportunities. Indeed, the government admits that aliens who hold only temporary 1-94 forms are “more likely to be more closely inspected” than are holders of green cards. Although the government argues that plaintiffs fail to identify a single LPR who has actually suffered such injury, actual injury is not constitutionally required.
[988]*988Mere threatened injury is sufficient,6 and the threat in this case is real. For example, according to the plaintiffs, “[a]s a result of INS’ arbitrary confiscation of his 1-551, Loa [a former plaintiff, now deceased] endured almost two hours of detention at the border, and an unreasonable search, causing ‘inconvenience, and public humiliation.’ ” Plaintiffs therefore have asserted sufficient injury to confer standing.
More troubling is the government’s contention that the district court failed to give the government an opportunity to present argument before issuing its order. Because of our rulings on the government’s substantive claims, which we discuss below, we do not address these allegations. Instead, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings, during which the INS assuredly will have ample opportunity to press any additional legal or factual arguments it wishes to make and thereby to cure any procedural defects regarding the order.
II.
The government’s substantive objections to the order regard the issuance and confiscation of immigration documents. LPR’s are authorized to work in the United States.7 Even “LPRs who are placed in deportation proceedings do not lose the status of lawful residents and its attendant benefits until ... a final deportation order [has been] issued.” Etuk, 936 F.2d at 1447. Until deported or excluded, LPR’s are fully entitled to remain in the United States and seek employment, for “[t]he fact that an alien is subject to deportation proceedings does not affect his status as a permanent resident alien. A permanent resident alien’s status terminates only when the order of deportation is affirmed by the BIA or otherwise becomes administratively final.” Molina v. Sewell, 983 F.2d 676, 680 (5th Cir.1993).
In addition, federal law guarantees LPR’s certain rights of documentation they can use to prove, to potential employers and others, their right to be in the United States. How that right is protected in practice, however, is within the express discretion of the Attorney General.8
In granting the plaintiffs injunctive relief on the question of LPR documentation, the district court relied substantially on a 1990 internal INS policy clarification (the “McNary Memorandum”),9 which di[989]*989rected the INS not to seize green cards absent individualized circumstances and must “be followed until appropriate regulations and operations instructions are published.” The district court erred in relying on the McNary Memorandum, for an agency’s internal personnel guidelines “neither confer upon [plaintiffs] substantive rights nor provide procedures upon which [they] may rely.” Fano v. O’Neill,
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JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiff class is comprised of lawful permanent residents (“LPR’s”) faced with pending deportation or exclusion proceedings1 in which no final order of deportation or exclusion has yet been entered, who are not presently held in detention, and whose immigration documents have been confiscated by the Harlingen, Texas, office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). Plaintiffs object to INS’s practice of seizing an LPR’s laminated Form 1-151 or 1-551 (“green card”)2 and other government documents and issuing, in their place, an 1-94 “Temporary Evidence of Lawful Permanent Resident” form containing extraneous information announcing the holder’s pending removal proceedings. They additionally claim that LPR’s are entitled to notice and a hearing to determine whether they should be paroled within the United States pending a final determination in their removal proceedings.
The district court granted the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. Its final order, dated January 13, 1999, regulates the seizure of an LPR’s green card and issuance of temporary documents pending removal proceedings, requires the INS to hold a hearing before determining whether an LPR should be paroled into the United States pending a final order of removal, and guarantees LPR’s the right not to have their other lawfully issued documents confiscated unless those documents constitute bona fide evidence of unlawful conduct.3
[987]*987The government presents a series of procedural and substantive objections to the order.' With respect to the seizure of green cards and issuance of temporary documents, we conclude that the order was too sweeping in light of 8 C.F.R. § 264.5(g), which is cited by neither party nor the district court. In addition, we conclude that federal courts have no jurisdiction to review parole decisions of the Attorney General. Finally, we decide that remand is appropriate to ensure that the government has ample opportunity to press its factual and legal contentions before the district court.
We therefore vacate the order and remand for any further proceedings that may be required. We also vacate an earlier, preliminary order benefiting an individual who is not a member of the plaintiff class.
I.
The government claims the plaintiffs lack standing.4 “[T]he critical standing question is whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a personal, distinct, and palpable injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, and that such an injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” National Treasury Employees Union v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 25 F.3d 237, 241 (5th Cir.1994). In identifying an injury that confers standing, courts look exclusively to the time of filing. See Ped-erson v. Louisiana State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 870 (5th Cir.2000).
We reject the government’s contention that the plaintiffs lack standing, for want of injury, to challenge their denial of immigration documentation. Green cards “play a significant role in the day-to-day lives of LPRs.”5 And although the 1-94 forms issued in place of the green cards do evidence LPR status, they additionally state:
Warning — A nonimmigrant who accepts unauthorized employment is subject to deportation.
Important — Retain this permit in your possession; you must surrender it when you leave the U.S. Failure to do so may delay your entry into the U.S. in the future.
You are authorized to stay in the U.S. only until the date written on this form. To remain past this date, without permission from immigration authorities, is a violation of the law.
As plaintiffs adequately allege, inadequate immigration documents result in a greater degree of harassment by the INS and diminished employment opportunities. Indeed, the government admits that aliens who hold only temporary 1-94 forms are “more likely to be more closely inspected” than are holders of green cards. Although the government argues that plaintiffs fail to identify a single LPR who has actually suffered such injury, actual injury is not constitutionally required.
[988]*988Mere threatened injury is sufficient,6 and the threat in this case is real. For example, according to the plaintiffs, “[a]s a result of INS’ arbitrary confiscation of his 1-551, Loa [a former plaintiff, now deceased] endured almost two hours of detention at the border, and an unreasonable search, causing ‘inconvenience, and public humiliation.’ ” Plaintiffs therefore have asserted sufficient injury to confer standing.
More troubling is the government’s contention that the district court failed to give the government an opportunity to present argument before issuing its order. Because of our rulings on the government’s substantive claims, which we discuss below, we do not address these allegations. Instead, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings, during which the INS assuredly will have ample opportunity to press any additional legal or factual arguments it wishes to make and thereby to cure any procedural defects regarding the order.
II.
The government’s substantive objections to the order regard the issuance and confiscation of immigration documents. LPR’s are authorized to work in the United States.7 Even “LPRs who are placed in deportation proceedings do not lose the status of lawful residents and its attendant benefits until ... a final deportation order [has been] issued.” Etuk, 936 F.2d at 1447. Until deported or excluded, LPR’s are fully entitled to remain in the United States and seek employment, for “[t]he fact that an alien is subject to deportation proceedings does not affect his status as a permanent resident alien. A permanent resident alien’s status terminates only when the order of deportation is affirmed by the BIA or otherwise becomes administratively final.” Molina v. Sewell, 983 F.2d 676, 680 (5th Cir.1993).
In addition, federal law guarantees LPR’s certain rights of documentation they can use to prove, to potential employers and others, their right to be in the United States. How that right is protected in practice, however, is within the express discretion of the Attorney General.8
In granting the plaintiffs injunctive relief on the question of LPR documentation, the district court relied substantially on a 1990 internal INS policy clarification (the “McNary Memorandum”),9 which di[989]*989rected the INS not to seize green cards absent individualized circumstances and must “be followed until appropriate regulations and operations instructions are published.” The district court erred in relying on the McNary Memorandum, for an agency’s internal personnel guidelines “neither confer upon [plaintiffs] substantive rights nor provide procedures upon which [they] may rely.” Fano v. O’Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1264 (5th Cir.1987). The memorandum merely articulates internal guidelines for INS personnel; it does not establish judicially enforceable rights.
Inexplicably, neither the district court nor any of the parties cite 8 C.F.R. § 264.5(g) (2000), which states in its entirety:
A person in exclusion proceedings shall be entitled to evidence of permanent resident status until ordered excluded. Such evidence shall be in the form of a temporary Form 1-551 issued for a period sufficient to accomplish the exclusion proceedings. A person in deportation proceedings shall be entitled to evidence of permanent resident status until ordered deported or excluded. Issuance of an Permanent Resident Card to a person in exclusion or deportation proceedings, provided the person had status as a lawful permanent resident
when the proceeding commenced, shall not affect those proceedings.
Because the district court erred to the extent that its order relied on the McNary Memorandum, we vacate the order and remand so the court can determine whether an injunction is appropriate in light of § 264.5(g). In doing so, we make a number of observations regarding the scope and meaning of that regulation.
Section 264.5(g) reqvires that the INS issue the temporary form 1-551 to persons in exclusion proceedings.10 By contrast, the regulation does not specify the form of documentation with respect to those in deportation proceedings.
In addition, § 264.5(g) requires only that the INS provide documentary evidence of LPR status. The regulation plainly does not restrict the INS from attaching additional notations to caution employers that a potential worker, although an LPR and therefore currently authorized to work in the United States, is also facing pending deportation proceedings and thus may not be available for an extended period of employment.
The Attorney General is free to issue new regulations and amend the requirements of § 264.5(g) (provided, of course, that the requisite procedure is fol[990]*990lowed). Absent any legal authority to the contrary, however, the district court may not interfere with the Attorney General’s statutory discretion to balance an LPR’s interest in possessing particular forms of documentation against an employer’s interest in knowing a potential employee’s present and future immigration status.
III.
The government also challenges the portion of the order respecting the Attorney General’s discretion to grant parole within the United States. The Attorney General is vested with broad powers over the custody of all aliens (including LPR’s) against whom deportation or exclusion proceedings are pending.11 “[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Where such an alien “is arriving on land (whether or not at a designated port of arrival) from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States, the Attorney General may return the alien to that territory pending a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C).
Alternatively, instead of paroling the individual out of the United States,
[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.... [P]ending such decision, the Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).12
The plaintiffs argue that, pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), due process requires the INS to provide an LPR with notice of his right to parole within the United States13 and with a parole hearing before the Attorney General decides how to exercise her discretion. Congress, however, has denied the district court jurisdiction to adjudicate deprivations of the plain[991]*991tiffs’ statutory and constitutional rights to parole.14
The plaintiffs respond that the Attorney General’s parole authority at issue in this case is found not in 8 U.S.C. § 1226, but instead in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C). Therefore, they argue, the bar on judicial review contained in § 1226(e), which applies only to “this section,” does not bar this suit. But § 1225(b)(2)(C) only authorizes the Attorney General to return an applicant for admission to Mexico pending the exclusion proceedings. It is § 1226(a), by contrast, that authorizes her to grant parole within the United States to an LPR subject to removal proceedings.
In sum, “[t]he Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of’ parole — including the manner in which that discretionary judgment is exercised, and whether the procedural apparatus supplied satisfies regulatory, statutory, and constitutional constraints' — is “not ... subject to review.” § 1226(e). Without reaching the merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, we therefore vacate those portions of the order that require the INS to hold parole hearings. In doing so, we note that the executive branch, of course, has an independent duty to uphold the Constitution, irrespective of whether its actions are subject to judicial review.15
IV.
Before the subject order was entered, the district court granted preliminary relief to Jesus Garza-Pacheco. On appeal, the government asserts that the court had no authority to grant any relief whatsoever to him, because he is neither a named plaintiff nor a member of the plaintiff class.
We quickly dispense with the plaintiffs’ assertion that this court has no appellate jurisdiction to review the Garza-Pacheco order. Appellants have the “choice of appealing from [a preliminary] order within fifteen days or of awaiting a final decree, for all interlocutory orders are reviewable on appeal from the final decree.” Gloria Steamship Co. v. Smith, 376 F.2d 46, 47 (5th Cir.1967) (citations omitted). And although the government’s notice of appeal designates only the January 13, 1999, order, a “notice of appeal to this Court from the final decree of the District Court invoked the jurisdiction of this Court to examine the interlocutory order as well as the final decree.” Id.
We also agree with the government’s argument on the merits. The plaintiff class is restricted to LPR’s “who are under deportation or exclusion proceedings, in whose cases no final order of deportation or exclusion has been entered.” Garza-Pacheco therefore was not a valid member of the class, because a final order of deportation has been executed against him. “In the complaint the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(a). Failure to name a party denies a court jurisdiction over that party.16
[992]*992We therefore VACATE the final order of January 13, 1999, and the preliminary order regarding Garza-Pacheco, and we REMAND for any further necessary proceedings.