Lloyd v. Lloyd

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama

Lloyd v. Lloyd

292 So. 2d 668, 52 Ala. App. 374, 1974 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 410

CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Alabama

DecidedApril 3, 1974

DocketCiv. 258

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 292 So. 2d 668 (Lloyd v. Lloyd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lloyd v. Lloyd, 292 So. 2d 668, 52 Ala. App. 374, 1974 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 410 (Ala. Ct. App. 1974).

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Opinions

BRADLEY, Judge.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County modifying a prior divorce decree as it related to alimony payments. The divorce decree, rendered in 1969, directed appellee to pay appellant $450 per month as alimony. The modification decree appealed from reduced this amount to $250 per month.

The evidence was heard orally by the trial court and revealed that appellee and appellant had been married in 1965 and divorced in 1969. Prior to the time of the divorce appellant had been under the care [376]*376of a psychiatrist and was unemployed. Appellee was in good health and earning about $37,500 per year. Subsequent to the divorce, appellant has earned a bachelor of science degree in biology from the University of Alabama at Birmingham and is now pursuing a master’s degree in psychology. Further, she has sought and is seeking admittance to the University of Alabama medical school. During the time since the divorce, she has held a parttime job at two different times, earning a total of about $2,500. She is now thirty three years old, owns a 1969 Camaro automobile, is relatively debt-free. She stated that she is in good health, both physically and mentally, and only sees her psychiatrist sporadically. Appellee is now earning $40,000 per year, has remarried and is now supporting his wife, her three children by a former marriage and his two teenage daughters by a former marriage. The three children of his new wife receive $75 per week from their father. The appellee has increased his indebtedness in the past year by some $7,500 due mainly to the alimony payments, and he recently purchased a farm where the family now lives for $87,500 which is one hundred percent financed with monthly payments of $572. He formerly contributed $200 per month to his parents’ support but is no longer able to do so.

The trial court found that there had been a substantial change in circumstances since the divorce decree in that appellant was able-bodied and could work and that appellee had remarried and assumed increased obligations without any material increase in income.

After the appeal was perfected to this court, appellee filed a motion here asking that a portion of the record be stricken, and submission was taken on the motion and the merits. We will consider the motion first.

On the Motion

The parties, through their attorneys, entered into a written agreement regarding the abridgment of the record on appeal. The agreement stated that the parties agreed to abridge the record but could not agree on the scope of the abridgment. The failure to agree on the scope of the abridgment nullifies the agreement to abridge since the parties failed to agree on the contents of the record.

Appellee also admitted that the record on appeal was complete but objected to the inclusion of certain material that he considered irrelevant. This aspect of the motion appears to be self-defeating for the reason that appellee is saying at one and the same time that the record is complete yet contains irrelevant matter.

Based on the absence of an agreement to abridge the record and the admission that the record is complete, the motion to strike is overruled.

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BRADLEY, Judge.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County modifying a prior divorce decree as it related to alimony payments. The divorce decree, rendered in 1969, directed appellee to pay appellant $450 per month as alimony. The modification decree appealed from reduced this amount to $250 per month.

The evidence was heard orally by the trial court and revealed that appellee and appellant had been married in 1965 and divorced in 1969. Prior to the time of the divorce appellant had been under the care [376]*376of a psychiatrist and was unemployed. Appellee was in good health and earning about $37,500 per year. Subsequent to the divorce, appellant has earned a bachelor of science degree in biology from the University of Alabama at Birmingham and is now pursuing a master’s degree in psychology. Further, she has sought and is seeking admittance to the University of Alabama medical school. During the time since the divorce, she has held a parttime job at two different times, earning a total of about $2,500. She is now thirty three years old, owns a 1969 Camaro automobile, is relatively debt-free. She stated that she is in good health, both physically and mentally, and only sees her psychiatrist sporadically. Appellee is now earning $40,000 per year, has remarried and is now supporting his wife, her three children by a former marriage and his two teenage daughters by a former marriage. The three children of his new wife receive $75 per week from their father. The appellee has increased his indebtedness in the past year by some $7,500 due mainly to the alimony payments, and he recently purchased a farm where the family now lives for $87,500 which is one hundred percent financed with monthly payments of $572. He formerly contributed $200 per month to his parents’ support but is no longer able to do so.

The trial court found that there had been a substantial change in circumstances since the divorce decree in that appellant was able-bodied and could work and that appellee had remarried and assumed increased obligations without any material increase in income.

After the appeal was perfected to this court, appellee filed a motion here asking that a portion of the record be stricken, and submission was taken on the motion and the merits. We will consider the motion first.

On the Motion

The parties, through their attorneys, entered into a written agreement regarding the abridgment of the record on appeal. The agreement stated that the parties agreed to abridge the record but could not agree on the scope of the abridgment. The failure to agree on the scope of the abridgment nullifies the agreement to abridge since the parties failed to agree on the contents of the record.

Appellee also admitted that the record on appeal was complete but objected to the inclusion of certain material that he considered irrelevant. This aspect of the motion appears to be self-defeating for the reason that appellee is saying at one and the same time that the record is complete yet contains irrelevant matter.

Based on the absence of an agreement to abridge the record and the admission that the record is complete, the motion to strike is overruled.

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Bluebook (online)

292 So. 2d 668, 52 Ala. App. 374, 1974 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 410, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lloyd-v-lloyd-alacivapp-1974.

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