Livingston v. Fast Cash USA, Inc.

753 N.E.2d 572, 2001 Ind. LEXIS 717, 2001 WL 925774
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 16, 2001
Docket94S00-0010-CQ-609 & 94S00-0010-CQ-610
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 753 N.E.2d 572 (Livingston v. Fast Cash USA, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Livingston v. Fast Cash USA, Inc., 753 N.E.2d 572, 2001 Ind. LEXIS 717, 2001 WL 925774 (Ind. 2001).

Opinions

[574]*574RUCKER, Justice.

Case Summary

This cause comes to us as a certified question from the United States District Courts for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis and Terre Haute Divisions, and for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division. Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 64, which allows certification of questions of Indiana law for consideration by this Court, we have accepted the following question: is the minimum loan finance charge permitted by Indiana Code section 24-4.5-3-508(7), when charged by a licensed supervised lender, limited by Indiana Code section 24-4.5-38-508(2) or Indiana Code section 85-45-7-2. The answer is yes.

Facts and Procedural History

The certified question arises from numerous cases pending in the federal courts. A majority of the defendants are lenders who are in the business of making small, short-term, single-payment, consumer loans generally referred to as "payday" loans. Some of the defendants are collection agencies or attorneys who do not make loans but represent lenders in actions to collect from borrowers who have defaulted on their loan obligations.1 The loan amounts range from $50 to $400 and extend for a period of less than thirty days. Lenders contract for and receive as a finance charge an amount equal to or less than the minimum loan finance charge permitted by Indiana Code section 24-4.5-8-508(7). Plaintiffs are persons who have obtained loans from one or more Lenders.

Although the details vary from person to person as well as from lender to lender, typically a payday loan works as follows. The borrower applies for a small loan and gives the lender a post-dated check in the amount of the loan principal plus a finance charge. Depending on the lender, the finance charge varies from $15 to $33. In return, the lender gives the borrower a loan in cash with payment due in a short period of time, usually two weeks. When the loan becomes due, the borrower either repays the lender in cash the amount of the loan plus the finance charge, or the lender deposits the borrower's check. If the borrower lacks sufficient funds to pay the loan when due, then the borrower may obtain a new loan for another two weeks incurring another finance charge.

Acting on behalf of themselves and a putative class of borrowers, plaintiffs allege that Lenders violated Indiana law by contracting for and receiving the minimum loan finance charge permitted by Indiana Code section 24-4.5-3-508(7) when the finance charge exceeded the 836% annual percentage rate ("APR") specified in Indiana Code section 24-4.5-3-508(2) or the 72% APR specified in Indiana Code section 85-45-7-2. Each of the cases pending in the Southern District of Indiana has been stayed pending this Court's determination of the certified question. The cases in the Northern District of Indiana have been dismissed without prejudice pending this Court's determination.

Discussion

The 1968 Uniform Consumer Credit Code was originally adopted by this State's Legislature in 1971 and is referred to as the Indiana Uniform Consumer Credit Code ("IUCCC"). Rates on loan finance charges for supervised loans2 are gov[575]*575erned by Indiana Code section 24-4.5-3-508(2) and minimum loan finance charges 3 are governed by Indiana Code section 24-5-3-508(7). More specifically, subsection 3-508(2) provides in relevant part:

The loan finance charge, calculated according to the actuarial method, may not exceed the equivalent of the greater of the following: [] the total of [] thirty-six percent (386%) per year on that part of the unpaid balances of the principal which is three hundred dollars ($300). ...

In turn, subsection 8-508(7) dictates in relevant part:

With respect to a supervised loan not made pursuant to a revolving loan account, the lender may contract for and receive a minimum loan finance charge of not more than thirty dollars ($30).4

The parties agree that a fifteen-day loan of $200 with a minimum loan finance charge of $33 represents an APR of interest totaling 402%. However, according to Lenders, subsection 3-508(7) is an exception to subsection 3-508(2). Relying on various tenets of statutory construction Lenders contend they are entitled to receive from a borrower a minimum loan finance charge in any amount up to $33 even if the charge exceeds the maximum APR of 36%. We rely on similar tenets but reach a different conclusion.

Where a statute has not previously been construed, the express language of the statute controls the interpretation and the rules of statutory construction apply. Ind. State Fair Bd. v. Hockey Corp. of America, 429 N.E.2d 1121, 1123 (Ind.1982). We are required to determine and effect the legislative intent underlying the statute and to construe the statute in such a way as to prevent absurdity and hardship and to favor public convenience. Superior Constr. Co. v. Carr, 564 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind.1990). In so doing, we should consider the objects and purposes of the statute as well as the effects and repercussions of such an interpretation. State v. Windy City Fireworks, Inc., 600 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), adopted by 608 N.E.2d 699.

Before the 1971 adoption of the IUCCC, the Indiana Legislature had passed an array of lending and usury laws. Replaced by the IUCCC, many had been in existence before the turn of the century.5 One such statute, commonly referred to as the "petty loan" statute, was specifically designed to "provide for a limited and uniform rate of interest upon small loans for short terms." Cotton v. Commonwealth Loan Co., 206 Ind. 626, 190 N.E. 853, 855 (1934); Pub.L. No. 167-1913, §§ 1-5, 1913 Ind. Acts 457-60. Unlike [576]*576most lending statutes for which interest rates were generally based on an annual rate, the petty loan statute differed in that it was based on a monthly rate. Cofton, 190 N.E. at 855 (discussing the then existing interest rate of 34% per month for loans up to $300). With the 1971 enactment of the IUCCC, the legislature retreated from a monthly rate of interest and instead set the interest rate at 36% per year for loans of $300 or less. See I.C. § 24-4.5-3-508(2)(a)(1); Pub.L. No. 366-1971, § 4, 1971 Ind. Acts 1687-88. Of course, with this change nothing prohibited lenders from continuing to provide "small loans for short terms." Cotton, 190 N.E. at 855. However, the statute suggests that although the legislature apparently contemplated the continued existence of small loans, consistent with its stated purpose "to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing retail installment sales, consumer credit, small loans and usury," 1.C. § 24-4.5-1-102(2)(a) (emphasis added), the legislature anticipated that even though small, the loans would extend for at least one year. Subsection 3-508(8)(b) lends support to the view that the then newly enacted IUCCC anticipated longer term loans. That subsection refers to "prepayment" which in turn is controlled by Indiana Code section 24-4.5-3-210. We observe that a one or two-week payday loan is not very amenable to a prepayment scheme.

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Bluebook (online)
753 N.E.2d 572, 2001 Ind. LEXIS 717, 2001 WL 925774, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/livingston-v-fast-cash-usa-inc-ind-2001.