Livingston Parish Police Jury v. Acadiana Shipyards, Inc.

598 So. 2d 1177
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 10, 1992
DocketNos. 91 CA 1473-91 CA 1486
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 598 So. 2d 1177 (Livingston Parish Police Jury v. Acadiana Shipyards, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Livingston Parish Police Jury v. Acadiana Shipyards, Inc., 598 So. 2d 1177 (La. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinions

CRAIN, Judge.

Fourteen lawsuits with a total of 1200 plaintiffs were filed against 84 defendants seeking damages for personal injury, mental anguish and economic and property damage allegedly caused by hazardous or toxic waste emanating from a hazardous waste dump site located in Livingston Parish. The hazardous waste site is known as the Combustion, Inc. site. Among the named defendants are the sellers, manufacturers and transporters of the alleged hazardous waste or toxic chemicals, and the owners and previous owners of the site. [1181]*1181The suits were joined pursuant to Rule XXVI of the Rules of the Twenty-First Judicial District Court.

Plaintiffs moved for class certification. After a hearing on the matter the class was certified. The trial court ruled that the geographical area within which the class is to be comprised consists of that area located within 2.5 miles of the center of the Combustion site.

From the judgment granting class certification defendants appeal alleging several assignments of error. The primary issues raised on appeal are whether the legislative and jurisprudential criteria for class certification have been met; whether the trial judge correctly relied on his personal observations in establishing geographical boundaries of the class; and whether there is any scientific basis for establishing any class.

PREREQUISITES OF CLASS ACTION

In the third and fourth assignments of error alleged in brief by Defendants’ Steering Committee and in the second assignment of error alleged by appellant/defendant Borden, Inc., defendants contend that plaintiffs have not satisfied the codal and jurisprudential prerequisites for class certification. The prerequisites for the institution of a class action are 1) the parties are so numerous as to make joinder impracticable, La.C.C.P. art. 591; 2) common character among class members of the right sought to be enforced, La.C.C.P. art. 591(1); and (3) adequate representation of absent class members.

a) Numerosity

Defendants contend that the first prerequisite for a class action has not been met in that the thirteen separate actions had already been joined prior to the certification hearing, thus proving that the join-der of the 1200 plaintiffs in this case is not impractical.

In written reasons for judgment the trial court stated that although adjudication of the case by consolidation is possible, the class action is the better method by which to proceed.

The class action was devised to solve problems associated with adjudicating lawsuits in cases involving an unwieldy number of parties who should be joined. In lawsuits involving numerous plaintiffs there is a likelihood that the membership of the group will continually change through death or otherwise, thus causing recurring interruptions of the action. Additionally, with such a large group of parties there is the likelihood that one or more of the members will be beyond the reach of the court’s process. See Stevens v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 309 So.2d 144 (La.1975). Given that all prerequisites are met, the class action is the best method to resolve the problems associated with trying this case, e.g., the trial court has the authority to adopt a management plan to manage the litigation; and a judgment or decree in a class action binds all class members, representative or absent.

b) Adequate Representation

Defendants contend that the claims of class representatives do not adequately represent those of absent class members.

The claims of the class representatives should be a cross-section of, or typical of, the claims of all class members. This determination is made by the trial court and will not be disturbed by this court absent manifest error. See Ellis v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 550 So.2d 1310 (La.App. 1st Cir.1989), writ denied, 559 So.2d 121 (La.1990). In written reasons for judgment, the trial judge found that the representative plaintiffs’ claims are for personal injury, property damage, or both, allegedly caused by toxins coming from the Combustion site, and are representative of claims of the entire class. A reading of the pleadings, depositions, exhibits and testimony presented at the certification hearing firmly convinces us that the trial court’s determination in this matter is not clearly wrong.

b) Common Character

Defendants contend that although common issues of fact and law are present in this action, a class action is not justifiable because individual factual and legal [1182]*1182issues predominate or overwhelm those which are common to the parties.

In addition to the “common question” of law or fact required by La.C.C.P. art. 591(1) the jurisprudence has added the requirement that there must be a “common character” among the rights of the representatives and absent class members. McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc., 456 So.2d 612 (La.1984).

The “common character” requirement limits the class action to “cases in which it would achieve economies of time, effort and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.” McCastle, 456 So.2d at 616. The purpose of utilizing the “common character” criteria is to assist the court in identifying cases in which the class action best affords economy of effort and uniformity of result without unduly affecting procedural safeguards for all parties. Id.

In written reasons for judgment the trial court enumerated five possible issues which are common to all class members:

1. Whether or not the substances deposited, stored, burned, or treated at the Combustion, Inc., site contained elements which are toxic, or harmful to human health.
2. Whether or not such toxins, if in existence, did in fact escape into the water and into the air; when did they escape and in what amounts;
3. Whether or not such toxins were of a sufficient concentration to endanger human or animal health within the geographical area involved in the release;
4. Whether or not any or all of the defendants had a legal duty to anticipate such a risk and provide precautions against such discharges; and
5. Whether or not punitive damages for such discharges are applicable and should be awarded.

After reviewing the pleadings, depositions, and evidence introduced at the certification hearing we conclude the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in finding the existence of a “common character.” The common issues of causation and duty predominate over individual issues of damages and individual defenses asserted by defendants to various subclasses of plaintiffs or other defendants. A mass tort is very susceptible to inconsistent determinations, thus the rights of all parties would be protected by a class action. Further a class action in this situation would be less costly, more efficient and a more expedient method of adjudication.

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Livingston Parish Police Jury v. Acadiana Shipyards
598 So. 2d 1177 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1992)

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598 So. 2d 1177, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/livingston-parish-police-jury-v-acadiana-shipyards-inc-lactapp-1992.