BELSON, Senior Judge:
At trial, a jury found appellees Flexible Packaging Association (FPA) and its president, Glenn Braswell, liable to appellant Gaye Lively for intentional infliction of emotional distress and, under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C.Code §§ 1-2501 et seq., for: (1) discrimination due to a hostile work environment; (2) discrimination due to unequal pay; and (3) unlawful retaliation. The jury awarded specific amounts of compensatory damages for each of the four counts, and a single lump sum of punitive damages for all four counts. Following the verdict, appellees filed a motion seeking judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. The trial court granted judgment as a matter of law on all four counts, and also conditionally granted the alternative relief of a new trial on all counts. Appellant claims error in the overturning of the verdicts. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the grant of judgment as a matter of law on all of appellant’s claims.
I.
FPA is a trade association of companies that manufacture flexible packaging materials. The headquarters in Washington, D.C., with a staff of twenty, lobbies Congress on behalf of its membership. Gaye Lively began working at FPA in 1980 as a secretary. From 1980 to 1986, Mrs. Lively consistently received positive evaluations and corresponding promotions. In 1986, when Mrs. Lively was Director of Administration and Meetings, Glenn Braswell was hired as FPA’s president and Mrs. Lively’s ultimate supervisor. In 1990, Mrs. Lively became the Director of Membership, a position she held until her termination in 1998. In that role she had responsibility for recruiting new members and retaining current members for the association.
At trial, the jury heard evidence regarding Mrs. Lively’s claim that she was sexually harassed on numerous occasions be[958]*958tween 1987 and 1992 by Mr. Braswell and Rick Thornburg, FPA’s Director of Government Relations. According to Mrs. Lively’s testimony, while on a company trip in December 1987, in front of Mr. Braswell and a board member, Mr. Thorn-burg pulled her down on his lap in a limousine and said that he wanted to look down her cleavage. Aso in 1987, Mr. Braswell had Marjina Kaplan, FPA’s Director of Marketing and Communications, hire a male stripper for Mrs. Lively’s birthday, an event that Mrs. Lively testified was humiliating to her. Mrs. Lively acknowledged that she and others had previously hired a female dancer to dance with bare midriff at a party for Mr. Bras-well. At a management meeting in July 1992, Mr. Thornburg suggested that a female staff member wear a miniskirt to a government conference to attract state legislators to FPA’s booth. Aso in 1992, Mr. Thornburg made an offensive comment about Mrs. Lively always being on her knees. At a meeting in October 1992, with nineteen or twenty FPA members present, Mr. Braswell jokingly suggested that Mrs. Lively was having sexual relations with a board member. Mrs. Lively testified that Mr. Braswell and Mr. Thorn-burg frequently referred to women as bimbos, hookers, old maids, and dykes, and made derogatory references to women’s bodies.1 In addition, three other female employees testified that they were subjected to sexually offensive comments on a regular basis by Mr. Braswell and Mr. Thornburg.
Mrs. Lively testified that on several occasions she complained to Mr. Braswell about the above-described incidents. She also testified that two other female employees complained to her regarding comments made about their bodies by Mr. Thornburg, and that she conveyed these complaints to Mr. Braswell. She testified that another female employee complained to her about comments made to her by Mr. Braswell, but said that she did not report that comment to anybody because “what was the sense of reporting it to anybody? Nothing was being done.” Mrs. Lively’s expert witness, Dr. Sandler, opined that FPA’s sexual harassment policy failed to provide specific procedures for handling complaints and did not provide any route for corrective action except through Mr. Braswell.
There was also evidence of Mr. Bras-well’s retaliatory conduct toward those who complained of his sexually harassing behavior. In particular, Marjina Kaplan testified that she was the target of Mr. Braswell’s retaliation in 1988. Ms. Kaplan testified that after she informed Mr. Bras-well of complaints made by female employees of sexual harassment by Mr. Thornburg, Mr. Braswell responded with a series of abusive and hostile acts against her that culminated in an unfounded “below standard” performance evaluation that led her to resign. At the time of her resignation, she wrote a memorandum to each member of FPA’s Board of Directors (“Board”), describing Mr. Braswell’s ongoing harassment.
As a result of Ms. Kaplan’s memorandum, the Board’s Compensation and Personnel Committee entered into the minutes of its special meeting of January 1989 a warning to Mr. Braswell about his management style. The Committee chairman’s contemporaneous statement to Mr. Braswell went so far as to call him a “chauvinist,” having “a tendency to demean women and their abilities.” It also upbraided him for using the terms “whores” and “hookers” at a staff meeting. Though the Committee issued the warning, it took no other corrective action. According to Mrs. Lively, following Mr. Bras-[959]*959well’s chastising by the Committee, he called a meeting of the staff directors. At this meeting, he accused Mrs. Lively of reporting his conduct to the Board, said that if she did she was a liar, and instructed the directors that they were not to complain to the Board.
In 1988, Mrs. Lively had received from Mr. Braswell her first unfavorable personnel evaluation, criticizing her written and oral communications. This was the third annual evaluation of her that he had performed.
Following this series of events, Mrs. Lively retained an attorney who wrote a letter to the Board in February 1989 complaining about Mr. Braswell’s handling of the matter. Mrs. Lively testified that Mr. Braswell’s negative attitude toward her became worse once he learned of the letter. The Board issued a letter to Mr. Braswell in August 1990, indicating that some senior members of the association were “unhappy” about what they considered unfair treatment of Mrs. Lively. The Board also sanctioned Mr. Braswell with an unusual restriction, preventing him from criticizing or disciplining Mrs. Lively. However, the Board, under a different chairman, lifted this restriction in 1992. In the meantime, Mrs. Lively was promoted to director of membership in late 1990.
In an incident unrelated to the alleged sexual harassment, Mrs. Lively injured her hip at work on November 18, 1991. She continued to work full-time until she underwent surgery a year later, in November 1992. After this surgery Mrs. Lively recuperated at home and then she worked in the office part-time in December.
On December 11, 1992, the last day that Mrs. Lively worked at the office, Mr. Braswell conducted a personnel evaluation of her. In the evaluation, Mr. Braswell advised Mrs. Lively that her communication skills were inadequate for her position as Director of Membership. As a result, Mrs. Lively was placed on probation for six months, and was required to undergo testing at a center which primarily served learning disabled children. The testing at the center was made a condition of her continued employment. In addition, Mr. Braswell indicated that if Mrs. Lively’s problems with communication skills did not improve after she went to the center it was likely that she would be demoted. The letter was signed by Mr. Braswell and Michael McNamara, then Chairman of FPA’s Board.
Mrs. Lively refused to undergo the testing, but offered two alternative testing solutions. Mr. Braswell responded in writing that he had checked out both alternatives before choosing the center he had specified, that one was unsuitable because it was designed to serve non-high school graduates up to the ninth grade level, and that the other, the Anne Arun-del Community College, had informed him that it lacked diagnostic services. He added, however, that he would be interested in pursuing the community college if in fact it could offer such testing. He stated that FPA still regarded diagnostic testing at his suggested center as the appropriate first step, but indicated a willingness to accept another equally competent diagnostic center.
Mrs. Lively worked part-time from her home from December 1992 through March 1993. She was paid her full salary by FPA until May 1993, when she was placed on temporary total disability. It was during this period that FPA found it necessary to hire Jerry West, a former chairman of the Board, to perform Mrs. Lively’s duties on a temporary basis from his home in North Carolina.2 Mrs. Lively’s position was eventually filled by a person who worked full-time in the office.
On June 11, 1993, Mr. Braswell informed Mrs. Lively that she must return [960]*960to work with a full medical clearance on July 15, 1993, or be fired. Because Mrs. Lively was scheduled for surgery on July 8, 1993, she could not return to work and was terminated on July 15, 1993, seven months after her last appearance in the office. FPA explained that Mrs. Lively was terminated because of her inability to return to work in the office. [Tr. 6/17/96 p. 22]
Mrs. Lively filed suit against Mr. Bras-well and FPA on December 8, 1993, five months after her termination. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mrs. Lively on all four counts, awarding: (1) $156,600 for discrimination due to a hostile work environment; (2) $155,135 for discrimination due to unequal pay; (3) $91,823 for unlawful retaliation; and (4) $54,600 for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The jury also awarded Mrs. Lively the lump sum of $535,658 in punitive damages for all four counts.
II.
Following the verdict, appellees filed a motion seeking judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. The trial judge granted judgment as a matter of law on the unequal pay and retaliation claims, concluding that those jury verdicts were based on insufficient evidence. In the alternative, the trial judge ordered a new trial as to those counts based on his view that the verdicts were clearly against the weight of the evidence. The court also granted judgment as a matter of law as to the hostile work environment and emotional distress claims, concluding that, although the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury verdict, these claims were time-barred. In the alternative, the court granted a new trial on those counts, not because the verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence, but because the jury’s punitive damages award was unitary, i.e., a single lump sum based on all four counts, rather than apportioned among the various counts of the complaint.
III.
“In determining whether or not the trial judge properly granted judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict, the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 817 (1998) (citing Etheredge v. District of Columbia, 635 A.2d 908, 915 (D.C.1993)). “The plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference from the evidence.” Id. (citations omitted). “Moreover, it is the responsibility of the jury (and not the judge) to weigh the evidence and to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. at 817-18 (citation omitted). “If impartial triers of fact could reasonably find the plaintiffs evidence sufficient, the case may not be taken from the jury.” Id. (citing Finkelstein v. District of Columbia, 593 A.2d 591, 594 (D.C.1991) (en banc)).
A. Unequal Pay
In order to succeed on an unequal pay claim, the plaintiff must establish that the employer paid men and women unequally “for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.” Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 984 (D.C.1984) (emphasis added). Mrs. Lively attempted to prove her claim by showing a disparity in pay between her position and those directorships held by men. The trial judge found, however, that Mrs. Lively’s evidence was insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to find that these other director positions involved work equivalent to Mrs. Lively’s director position. Specifically, the judge concluded that a comparison of the job descriptions of these various directorships revealed important differences in duties and required experience.
We agree that Mrs. Lively’s evidence was insufficient to support a finding that she was performing substantially the [961]*961same work as the other directors. Comparing the job description of Mrs. Lively’s membership directorship with those of the other five directorships (Business and Economic Research, Finance and Administration, Government Relations, Operations and Technology, and Public Relations and Marketing) reveals important differences in experience and duties. Mrs. Lively’s directorship (1) supervised the fewest persons; (2) did not require a bachelor’s degree; (3) had minimal responsibility outside the organization; (4) had the lowest skill requirements; and (5) required the least experience.
Mrs. Lively contends that the jury’s verdict should stand because it reflects a determination that, although she was not entitled to pay equal to that of the other directors, she was still underpaid relative to her worth. Before trial, Mrs. Lively framed her pay claim broadly enough to support such a verdict: “[s]exually discriminatory administration of salary and other benefits of employment.” At trial, however, she limited her claim to one for “unequal pay,” both in her requested jury instructions and on the verdict form. As her claim went to the jury, therefore, it was one for equal pay, which could succeed only upon proof that she performed substantially the same work. See, e.g., Gunther v. County of Washington, 623 F.2d 1303, 1321 (9th Cir.) (“Where a Title VII plaintiff, claiming wage discrimination, attempts to establish a pyima facie case based solely on a comparison of the work she performs, she will have to show that her job requirements are substantially equal, not comparable, to [those] of a similarly situated male.”), aff'd, 452 U.S. 161, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981). Because appellant did not submit evidence tending to show that she performed substantially the same work as the other directors, the trial court properly granted judgment as a matter of law on this claim.
B. Hostile Work Environment
Mrs. Lively contended that “she was subjected to discrimination in the course of employment by the defendants on the basis of gender by ... the creation and encouragement of a sexually hostile environment.”
The trial court ruled that Mrs. Lively’s hostile work environment claim was time-barred. Claims under the DCHRA must be filed “within one year of the unlawful discriminatory act, or the discovery thereof.” D.C.Code § l-2556(a) (1999 Repl.). Mrs. Lively filed her claim on December 8, 1993. In order to clear the bar of the statute of limitations, Mrs. Lively was required to show that the hostile work environment she experienced continued beyond December 8, 1992. Her last day in the office was December 11, 1992, and aside from events that occurred during her visit to the office on that day, there was no testimony of matters that may have contributed to the existence of a hostile work environment at her place of employment during the one-year limitations period. Mrs. Lively testified that on December 11 she overheard Mr. Braswell call another woman the “dumbest girl I’ve ever seen.”3 The trial court, citing Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir.1996), ruled that the December 11 statement was insufficient to establish a sexually hostile work environment against Mrs. Lively. The trial court also rejected Mrs. Lively’s argument that Mr. Braswell’s per[962]*962formance evaluation of the same date and ensuing personnel actions brought her hostile environment claim within the statute of limitations. Appellant argues that the two matters just mentioned, the “dumbest girl” remark and the performance evaluation, carried a pre-existing sexually hostile work environment into the one-year period of limitations.
In order to review the trial judge’s rulings, we must consider both the nature of a sexually hostile or abusive workplace and the doctrine of continuing violation. In deciding these issues, we will apply available District of Columbia precedents. In filling any interstices in our controlling precedents we may be aided by federal precedents arising from litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.). East v. Graphic Arts Indus. Joint Pension Trust, 718 A.2d 158, 159 (D.C.1998) (“this court has often looked to cases construing Title VII ... to aid us in construing the [DCHRA]” because “the anti-discrimination provisions of both statutes are substantially similar”) (quoting Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 361 n. 17 (D.C.1993)). Because of differences in the statutes, however, such federal precedents do not necessarily' dictate the result this court will reach. Id.
In reviewing this aspect of the case, we must also observe this court’s opinion in East, supra, a case certified to this court by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to consider an argument of equitable tolling of limitations in an employment discrimination case. There, we pointed out that statutes of limitations serve an important judicial function. East, supra, 718 A.2d at 161. We went on to state that “[i]t is particularly important that employment discrimination cases be brought promptly ... [as such claims] ‘are apt to become stale quickly because the evidence necessary to support or refute such claims often consists of subjective estimations of the discriminatory climate at the work place_’ ” East, supra, 718 A.2d at 161 (quoting Davis v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 449 A.2d 278, 280 (D.C.1982)).
A sexually hostile environment arises when the workplace is permeated with sexual intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)).
In order to extend the period of a hostile work environment, the allegedly harassing act within the statute of limitations need not be sufficient, standing alone, to comprise a claim. Martin v. Nannie and Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1415 & n. 5 (10th Cir.1993). However, a plaintiff must show that the incidents both before and during the statutory period constitute a continuing course of conduct and are not discrete unrelated acts. Id.
A continuing violation exists where there is a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period, or the maintenance of a discriminatory system both before and during the statutory period. To be considered continuing in nature, however, the discrimination may not be limited to isolated incidents, but must pervade a series or pattern of events which continue into the filing period.
Doe v. District of Columbia Comm’n on Human Rights, 624 A.2d 440, 444 n. 5 (D.C.1993) (citations omitted).
Under the principles relied on by most if not all of the federal circuits in evaluating claims of continued violations, the “dumbest girl” remark and the performance evaluation, along with the subsequent related exchanges preceding Mrs. Lively’s termination, did not serve to bring Mrs. Lively’s hostile environment claim within the one-year period of limitations.
[963]*963A number of federal circuit and district courts have adopted the approach to continuing violation issues taken by the Fifth Circuit in Berry v. Board of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 232, 93 L.Ed.2d 158 (1986). There, the Fifth Circuit set forth nonexclusive considerations for identifying the existence of a continuing violation, including: (1) whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination; (2) the frequency of the violations; and (3) their permanence, i.e., whether the nature of the earlier violations should have triggered the employee’s awareness of the need to assert her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. Berry, supra, 715 F.2d at 981.4
The third, “permanency,” factor in the Berry analysis is “perhaps of most importance.” Id. The inquiry regarding this factor is whether the plaintiff was aware of, or at least suspected, dis[964]*964crimination at the time of the earlier, time-barred incidents. Compare Sabree v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local No. 33, 921 F.2d 396, 402 (1st Cir.1990) (continuing violation theory not applicable where plaintiff “believed, at every turn, that he was being discriminated against”) with Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 476, 481-82 (3d Cir.1997) (continuing violation theory applies where harassment intensified and plaintiff did not realize until later the severity of the harassment). In cases involving hostile work environment claims: “the plaintiff may not base her ... suit on conduct that occurred outside the statute of limitations unless it would have been unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on that conduct, as in a case in which the conduct could constitute, or be recognized, as actionable harassment only in light of events that occurred later, within the period of the statute of limitations.” Galloway, supra note 3, 78 F.3d at 1167; see also Sabree, supra, 921 F.2d at 402; Rush, supra, 113 F.3d at 481-82; Speer v. Rand McNally & Co., 123 F.3d 658, 663-64 (7th Cir.1997) (no continuing violation where plaintiff was aware of the nature of the discriminatory acts as they occurred).
This court has applied this factor in the context of a “continuous tort” claim, stating “[0]nce the plaintiff has been placed on notice of an injury and the role of the defendant’s wrongful conduct in causing it, the policy disfavoring stale claims makes application of the ‘continuous tort’ doctrine inappropriate.” Hendel v. World Plan Executive Council, 705 A.2d 656, 667 (D.C.1997) (citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Krouse, 627 A.2d 489, 497-98 (D.C.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 817, 115 S.Ct. 75, 130 L.Ed.2d 30 (1994); Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 312 (D.C.2000)).
Applying the permanency factor to the claims of Mrs. Lively, the record shows that appellant knew appellee’s conduct between 1987 and 1992 was actionable. Mrs. Lively sought legal advice in early 1989 as a result of actions taken by Mr. Braswell against the staff in the wake of allegations by Marjina Kaplan that he had retaliated against her for complaining of sexual harassment. This also occurred after several alleged incidents involving Mrs. Lively occurred in 1987, one involving a remark about her “cleavage,” the other the hiring of a male stripper, and Mrs. Lively’s first negative personnel evaluation in 1988. On the basis of this record, it appears clear that by early 1989 Mrs. Lively knew, or should have known, that the earlier incidents were discriminatory. The continuing violation theory is premised on the equitable notion that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until a reasonable person would be aware that her rights have been violated. See, e.g., Martin v. Nannie & Newborns, Inc., supra note 3, 3 F.3d at 1415 n. 6. Mrs. Lively had such awareness by 1989. Application of the Berry permanency factor strongly supports the conclusion that the statute of limitations began to run on Mrs. Lively’s hostile environment claim involving activities in 1988 and 1989, at the latest, when she hired an attorney to deal with problems in early 1989.
Turning to the requirement for similarity between incidents (the first Berry factor), we are persuaded that Mr. Braswell’s performance evaluation of Mrs. Lively, communicated to her on December 11, was of an entirely different nature from the incidents of sexual harassment. We turn to a discussion of the Berry similarity factor now, and in doing so will consider how Mrs. Lively’s claim would fare under the expansive approach taken by the Ninth Circuit, which has given that particular factor great weight.
The Ninth Circuit has rejected the three-factor Berry test, see Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973, 987 (9th Cir.2000).5 [965]*965In deciding a number of cases involving facts somewhat similar to those in this case, the court has used the first Berry factor (same type of discrimination) in determining whether the “alleged discriminatory acts are related closely enough to constitute a continuing violation.” Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent, 883 F.2d 1472, 1480-81 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting Berry, supra, 715 F.2d at 981).
In Green, the appellant’s allegations involved time-barred incidents of sexual harassment by other employees as well as failure to train and relocat , along with timely allegations of subsequent discrimination relating to medical leave, medical benefits, poor references, and discharge. The court concluded that the time-barred incidents “represent a separate form of alleged employment discrimination,” id. at 1481, from the more recent acts complained of, and thus were not within the statute.
In Draper v. Coeur Rochester, Inc., 147 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.1998), the Ninth Circuit cited Supreme Court precedent for the requirement that the court engage in “careful consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.” Id. at 1109 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998)). In Draper, immediately after plaintiff accused her supervisor of persisting in his sexually harassing treatment, he responded by telephoning his supervisor in plaintiffs presence and telling him that plaintiff was in his office “digging up old bones, and accusing him of sexually harassing her.” Her supervisor then began to laugh in a manner that plaintiff perceived as derisive and mocking. In this context, no leap was required to make a connection between this later treatment of the plaintiff and the earlier, time-barred incidents, and to view it as an extension of the same type of behavior. By contrast, the record here provides no direct connection between the manner in which Mrs. Lively’s performance evaluation was conducted and the earlier incidents of harassment against her. The inference that these incidents are related is simply the same inference a jury may make when evaluating a claim of retaliation.6 If this court were to consider the possibly retaliatory act by Mr. Braswell as an extension of the hostile work environment, the definition of hostile work environment would be broadened to include many acts that are properly challenged as retaliatory.
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Fielder, supra, shows that that court still follows Green. In Fielder, the appellant alleged that she had been subjected to a series of related discriminatory and retaliatory acts which extended into the limitations period. The court stated that “[b]e-cause the legal elements of the various Title VII violations-hostile work environment and retaliation-are different, ‘we consider the allegations with respect to each theory separately, in determining whether any of the events underlying these claims occurred with the relevant period of limitations.’” Fielder, supra, 218 F.3d at 984 (quoting Draper, supra, 147 F.3d at 1108) (emphasis added). “Every incident of discrimination before the limitations period need not be of the same type, so long as there is a corresponding type of diserimi-[966]*966nation within the period.” Id. at 986. The court considered and compared the alleged acts within the period and before the period in concluding that summary judgment was inappropriate because there was a material issue of fact as to whether there was a continuing violation.
In its recent decision in Van Steenburgh v. Rival Co., 171 F.3d 1155 (8th Cir.1999), the Eighth Circuit did not adopt the Berry analysis in a case in which the factors involving continued violation closely resembled those in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Draper, supra. Instead, the Eight Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit approach of placing reliance on relatedness as opposed to the several Rem/ factors. In Van Steenburgh, the alleged harassment consisted of repeated sexual advances, touching, offensive comments, and threats of retaliation, with months often passing between incidents. Van Steen-burgh, supra, 171 F.3d at 1157-58. The only incident within the limitations period occurred when plaintiffs supervisor, the harassing individual, in front of his own supervisor and numerous coworkers of plaintiff, advised plaintiff in a manner the circuit described as hostile that he was placing another worker above her in the plant’s hierarchy. Id. at 1158. The court noted that the jury could have found the supervisor’s actions to be discriminatory because he would not have treated a male employee in the same way in which he treated plaintiff. The link between the most recent act and the previous sexually offensive acts was the offensive manner in which the supervisor treated the female employee. In the present case, in contrast, there was no showing that the manner in which Mr. Braswell conducted his performance evaluation of Mrs. Lively was untoward or different from the manner in which he conducted such meetings with male employees.7
There are many other federal circuit opinions applying the Rem/ requirement of same type of discrimination. In Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.1989), for example, the plaintiffs co-workers engaged in a continuing course of hostile behavior involving sexual grabbing as well as hostile and sexually explicit comments both within and outside the statutory period. The court stated: “Waltman’s claim undisputedly meets the first Berry element that the alleged acts involve the same subject matter; every incident reported by Waltman involves sexual harassment.” 875 F.2d at 475. Another example of “same subject matter” is Glass v. Petro-Tex Chem. Corp., 757 F.2d 1554, 1561 n. 5 (5th Cir.1985). There, the plaintiff charged her employer with discriminatory failure to promote, stemming from three employment decisions made over a five-year period, only the last of which occurred within the statutory period. In Glass, the court described the shared subject matter of the discriminatory acts narrowly as “promotion to payroll manager.” Id.8
[967]*967In the instant case, the outcome is the same whether we apply the Fifth Circuit’s three-factor Berry test or the Ninth Circuit’s more permissive Draper approach.9 Addressing first the December 11 incident, in which Mr. Braswell commented to another employee that she was “the dumbest girl I’ve ever seen,” we note that it was an isolated incident which was unlike the other incidents which served as the basis for Mrs. Lively’s hostile work environment claim.
The fact that the comment was not directed at Mrs. Lively and was not sexual, while not entirely conclusive, detracted considerably from any tendency to crea' e a hostile environment and also demonstrates that the comment was dissimilar from previous incidents. It was neither substantial enough nor similar enough to those incidents to trigger the continuing violation doctrine. See Galloway, supra, 78 F.3d at 1167 (finding co-worker’s reference to appellant as “sick bitch” not discriminatory because it was “in context, not a sex-or gender-related term”). The use of the term girl itself is not sexually hostile. See Paragon Cable Manhattan (labor arbitration), 100 LA 905, 908-909 (1992) (“using the word ‘girl’ to address a woman may not be politically correct, but it does not rise, or more accurately sink, to the level of sexual harassment”); see also Gearhart v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 27 F.Supp.2d 1263 (D.Kan.1998) (summary judgment granted in hostile work environment case where male supervisor referred to plaintiff and female co-workers as “the girls” and female co-worker showed plaintiff faxes with sexual connotations), aff'd, 194 F.3d 1320 (10th Cir.1999) (reported in full text format at 1999 WL 781056, 1999 U.S.App.LEXIS 24359). Mr. Braswell’s words on December 11, 1992 did not, therefore, rise to a level that constituted a “violation during the limitation period that can serve as the anchor for the earlier conduct.” Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir.1994) (citing Purrington v. University of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir.1993)).
Similarly, Mr. Braswell’s performance evaluation of Mrs. Lively, communicated to her on December 11, was of an entirely different nature from the incidents of sexual harassment, noted above, as was his eventual termination of her employment.
Applying the requirement that we consider the allegations with respect to each theory separately to Mrs. Lively’s performance evaluation, one cannot characterize the performance evaluation or its follow-up as “sexual or gender-based harassment”; it is, however, readily characterized as retaliation.10 The record does not show any reference to sexual harassment or any [968]*968laughter or offensive comments, as in Draper, that would transform Mr. Bras-well’s evaluation into an incident that is harassing on its face or one in which the offender treated the appellant in a manner in which he would not have treated a male employee, as in Van Steenburgh. Moreover, the evaluation was a specific incident of alleged discrimination that was different in character from Mrs. Lively’s other allegations ‘'of persistent discriminatory conduct, save for a limited similarity to a performance evaluation four years earlier. Accordingly, we conclude that the performance evaluation and the exchange of letters that followed it did not serve to trigger the continuing violation theory and thus permit Mrs. Lively to base her hostile environment claim on occurrences that took place before the one-year limitation period.11
C. Intentional Inñiction of Emotional Distress
Generally, an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is governed by the residuary three-year limitation of D.C.Code § 12-301(8) only if it is “not intertwined with any of the causes of action for which a period of limitation is specifically provided.” Saunders v. Nemati, 580 A.2d 660, 665 (D.C.1990). To the extent that Mrs. Lively’s emotional distress claim is based on Mr. Braswell’s sexually discriminatory conduct, it is “intertwined with” her hostile work environment claim and thus it assumes the hostile work environment claim’s one-year limitation period. Mrs. Lively’s emotional distress claim, therefore, is restricted to incidents that occurred within the year preceding the filing of her complaint, ie., her performance evaluation, discontinuance of her worker’s compensation benefits, and her termination.
“To establish the required degree of ‘outrageousness,’ the plaintiff must allege conduct ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ” Kerrigan v. Britches of Georgetowne, Inc., 705 A.2d 624, 628 (D.C.1997) (citations omitted). In the employment context, we have been demanding in the proof required to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. For example, in Kerrigan, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had “targeted him for a sexual harassment investigation, manufactured evidence against him in order to establish a false claim of sexual harassment, leaked information from the investigation to other employees, and unjustifiably demoted him to the position of store manager in order to promote a woman to his position.” Id. We held that those allegations, even if true, were of the type attributable to “employer-employee conflicts [that] do not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of outrageous conduct.” Id. (quoting Howard Univ. v. Best, supra, 484 A.2d at 986). Because appellant’s claim is limited to the events after December 8, 1992, conduct that was certainly no more outrageous than that alleged in Kerrigan, it fails as a matter of law.
We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to appellant’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
D. Retaliation
In order to succeed in her gender-based retaliation claim, Mrs. Lively had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that FPA’s stated reason for terminating her— ie., that Mrs. Lively needed to resume full-time employment — was a pretext for the actual reason — ie., that Mrs. Lively [969]*969was fired in retaliation for the sexual harassment complaints she made to the Board and Mr. Braswell. The trial court ruled that no reasonable juror could have concluded that FPA’s reason was a pretext, because Mrs. Lively herself testified that she could not return to work for health reasons, not because of sexual harassment.
Mrs. Lively also argues that the trial court should have considered events other than her termination in evaluating retaliation. For example, she asserts that Mr. Braswell retaliated against her with verbal abuse, unfair' salary decisions, and unwarranted criticisms in personnel evaluations. Although Mrs. Lively attempted at trial to broaden her retaliation claim to include these events, her counsel did not object to the court’s final jury instructions, which limited the claim to retaliatory termination. She therefore has not preserved those issues for appeal.
“To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must establish: (1) she was engaged in a protected activity, or that she opposed practices made unlawful by the DCHRA; (2) the employer took an adverse personnel action against her; and (3) a causal connection existed between the two.” Knight v. Georgetown Univ., 725 A.2d 472, 478 (D.C.1999). Once the prima facie case has been established, “a rebuttable presumption arises that [Mr. Braswell’s] conduct amounted to unlawful discrimination.” Arthur Young v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C.1993). Mr. Braswell can rebut this presumption “by articulating some legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason for the employment action at issue.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). “[Ojnce the employer offers a nondiscriminatory reason, it becomes [Mrs. Lively’s] burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason is pretextual.” Knight, supra, 725 A.2d at 478. By addressing the insufficiency of Mrs. Lively’s proof that FPA’s stated reasons for terminating her were pretextual, the trial judge implicitly indicated that she had established a prima facie case of retaliation, and we will assume, arguendo, that she did.
In reviewing the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law, we must reverse if, having given Mrs. Lively the benefit of every reasonable inference, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found sufficient Mrs. Lively’s evidence of retaliation. See Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 817 (D.C.1998). Mrs. Lively would rely on the following evidence that appel-lees’ reason for terminating her was a pretext: (1) Mr. Braswell and Mr. Thorn-burg had sexually harassed Mrs. Lively in the past; (2) Mr. Braswell had taken extreme measures to prevent any complaints of sexual harassment from coming to the attention of the Board; and (3) the person who was engaged to perform Mrs. Lively’s duties during her period of whole or partial incapacitation before her termination, and who earned out those duties until a full-time person assumed Mrs. Lively’s duties at FPA’s headquarters, worked part-time from his home in North Carolina for one year.
Mrs. Lively had surgery on her hip in November 1992. In December, she returned to work on a “modified work schedule,” working shorter days to avoid rush hour. She testified that she worked every second day in December until December 11, the day of her annual evaluation with Mr. Braswell, and that from then until March she worked from home making telephone calls to members because it was membership renewal time. Doctor’s notes were admitted into evidence indicating that she could not work in November, that she could do only “light duty” from December 2 to December 16, and that from then until April 6 she was unable to go to work. Significantly, Mrs. Lively acknowledged that her own doctor’s notes showed that starting on April 8, 1993, she was “totally incapacitated for work.”
[970]*970Mrs. Lively testified that she spoke to Mr. Braswell on one occasion between December and March and that she also spoke to Jane Dandelski, an administrative assistant. Mr. Braswell testified that he was not aware that Mrs. Lively was working at home “nor did we instruct her to work at home. I am not aware that she worked any of 1993 either at the office or at home.” Mr. Braswell also testified that management did not discuss offering her temporary employment working at home, and that she had not requested such accommodation. He was receiving “constant reports from medical sources indicating that she was unable to return to work,” and some staff members had visited her and reported back that she was unable to return to work and was not going to be able to return to work. In early 1993 FPA found it necessary to engage former Board Chairman Jerry West to assume Mrs. Lively’s job “on a temporary part-time basis.” Appellant’s position was ultimately filled by someone who worked full-time in the office.
On June 11, a full six months after Mrs. Lively’s last day in the office, defendants sent plaintiff a letter saying that if she could not return to work by July 15 she would be terminated. Ms. Lively testified that'her attorney responded with a letter asking for additional time, which was not granted. The record shows, however, that the letter from Mrs. Lively’s attorney did not request additional time, although it stated that return on July 15 was not possible. In July she went on long-term disability. She testified that she believed she could have continued to do the job as she had been doing from home and coming in part-time, because “90 percent of my recruitment and retention was done by telephone, and that’s what I was doing at home.”
It is clear that Mrs. Lively was not able to come in to work between December 11, 1992 and July 15, 1993. Although the record would support a finding that Mrs. Lively worked part-time at home until March, 1992, she did not do any work after that time, and her doctor’s notes showed that she was “totally incapacitated for work.” The record is devoid of any evidence that Mrs. Lively discussed alternative work arrangements with Mr. Braswell during this period. Giving Mrs. Lively the benefit of every inference, a reasonable juror could not conclude that FPA’s stated reasons for terminating Mrs. Lively’s employment were pretextual. It is certainly true that the events preceding Mrs. Lively’s absence from the office — Mr. Braswell’s action toward, and in the presence of, of Mrs. Lively, the showing of prior acts of retaliation, Mr. Braswell’s attempts to squelch further complaints, and the performance evaluation in which Mrs. Lively was placed on probation and threatened with demotion — all shed light on Mr. Braswell’s state of mind, and suggest that her incapacitation may have been convenient for him. Nonetheless, the evidence is clear that she was unable to work for over three months before her employment was terminated. Because no reasonable juror could conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that FPA’s explanation — that Mrs. Lively was unable to come to work — was pretextual, we affirm the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on this claim.
E. Punitive Damages
The jury awarded $535,658 in punitive damages after returning verdicts in appellant’s favor on all of her claims. Because we affirm the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on all of appellant’s claims, we also affirm the trial court’s ruling setting aside the jury’s award of punitive damages.
Affirmed.