Liu v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 1, 2023
• Docket: 21-179
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 1 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HUI LIU, No. 21-179 Agency No. Petitioner, A087-396-576 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 27, 2023**

Before: OWENS, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Hui Liu, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision denying her

motion to reopen her case and reissue its October 16, 2014 decision summarily

dismissing her appeal. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen and

reissue for abuse of discretion. Hernandez-Velasquez v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1073,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1077 (9th Cir. 2010). Our review is limited to the denial of the motion to

reopen and reissue, and we are not permitted to review the BIA’s dismissal of

her appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) decision on the merits. Toufighi

v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 995 (9th Cir. 2008). As the parties are familiar with

the facts, we do not recount them here. We deny the petition.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Liu’s motion to reissue

its 2014 decision because the BIA properly mailed that decision to Liu’s address

on record, and Liu failed to timely inform the BIA of her new address. See

Singh v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (“If the decision was

properly mailed, then the BIA fulfilled its statutory duty of service.”); see also 8

U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(ii) (stating that a noncitizen “must provide the Attorney

General immediately with a written record of any change of [] address”).

Liu contends that she did not understand her duty to submit a change of

address form because she is pro se and is not fluent in English. However, the IJ,

through an interpreter, informed Liu of the duty, confirmed her current address,

and provided her with physical copies of the change of address form at least

three different times. In addition, the notice of appeal form also communicates

the obligation to inform about a change of address. Moreover, Liu filed change

of address forms several times prior to the BIA’s 2014 decision.

Liu further contends that “procedural requirements” should be relaxed

because she is pro se. While the “rights of pro se litigants require careful

protection where highly technical requirements are involved,” Garaux v. Pulley,

2 21-179 739 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1984), the change of address requirement is not

highly technical, and Liu submitted four such forms.

Contrary to Liu’s contention, she cannot claim a lack of fairness in favor

of expediency because she had a full hearing before the IJ and appealed the IJ’s

decision to the BIA. Cf. Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 93 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting

that the desire for expediency in immigration cases cannot “justify the

evisceration” of a noncitizen’s rights). Liu’s contention that she received bad

advice from a non-attorney also does not warrant granting her petition. See

Hernandez v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that

reliance upon a non-attorney does “not affect the fundamental fairness of [the

petitioner’s] proceedings”).

The stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

PETITION DENIED.

3 21-179