Littlejohn v. Gallagher

District Court, S.D. California·Decided April 26, 2023·No. 3:23-cv-00297·Unknown

Opinion

MAURICE D. LITTLEJOHN, Case No.: 23-cv-0297-BAS-MDD Booking No. 22728794, ORDER: Plaintiff, (1) GRANTING MOTION FOR vs. LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS (ECF No.

2); AND TREVOR GALLAGHER, et al., (2) SCREENING PURSUANT TO Defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) Plaintiff, currently detained at George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”), is proceeding pro se and has filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff claims Defendants, all officers with the San Diego Police Department, used excessive force against him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, causing him to be hospitalized with “broken ribs, [a] broken ta[i]l bone, and blood clots” in his lungs and legs. (Id. at 3.) He seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff has also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 2.) Having reviewed the filings, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2). Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), the Court also has a duty to screen Plaintiff’s claims sua sponte. For the following reasons, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s Complaint clears the “low threshold” of sua sponte screening. II. Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b); Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016). Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1),1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84. In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his trust account statement. It shows $249.55 in average monthly deposits credited to his account over the

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