Little Sandy Coal Company, Inc.

• Court: United States Tax Court
• Decided: February 11, 2021
• Docket: 17431-17
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

T.C. Memo. 2021-15

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

LITTLE SANDY COAL COMPANY, INC., Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 17431-17. Filed February 11, 2021.

R disallowed a research tax credit P claimed under I.R.C. secs. 38 and 41(a) for expenses incurred by its shipbuilding subsidiary, C, in developing 11 vessels. The parties agreed to treat two of those vessels as representative of the others in regard to most of the relevant issues. P argues that substantially all of the activities of C's research in developing the vessels constituted elements of a process of experimentation for purposes of I.R.C. sec. 41(d)(1)(C) and sec. 1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., because more than 80% of the elements of each vessel differed from those of vessels C had previously developed (one of the vessels was entirely new and the other was a significantly redesigned version of a predecessor). P also argues that the work of C's production employees constructing novel elements of the redesigned vessel directly supported research and, as such, constituted elements of a process of experimentation. On the premise that the production employees' work on novel elements made up at least 87% of all of their work on the vessel, P argues that the substantially all test was met.

Served 02/11/21 -2-

[*2] Held: The requirement of I.R.C. sec. 41(d)(1)(C) and sec. 1.41- 4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., that at least 80% of a taxpayer's research must constitute elements of a process of experimentation applies to activities--not to physical components of the product being developed or improved. Consequently, the requirement is not satisfied simply because at least 80% of the product's elements differ from those of products the taxpayer previously developed.

Held, further, one who provides services in direct supervision or support of research is not "engaged in" research. See I.R.C. sec. 41(b)(2)(B). Therefore, the activities of such a person cannot "constitute elements of a process of experimentation" for purposes of I.R.C. sec. 41(d)(1)(C).

Held, further, because supplies are not activities, when the fraction described in sec. 1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., is computed using costs as a measure of activities, the costs of supplies used in the development of the product are not taken into account.

Held, further, because P has not met its burden of proving that substantially all of C's research activities in developing the vessels in issue constituted elements of a process of experimentation, none of the expenses C incurred in that development are qualified research expenses within the meaning of I.R.C. sec. 41(b).

John H. Dies, Jefferson H. Read, Jeremy M. Fingeret, and Rosalind J.

Lewis, for petitioner.

Angela B. Reynolds, Mindy Y. Chou, Naseem J. Khan, Duy P. Tran, and

Christa A. Gruber, for respondent. -3-

[*3] MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

HALPERN, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency of $324,529 in

petitioner's Federal income tax for its taxable year ended June 30, 2014, and an

accuracy-related penalty under section 6662 for that same year of $64,910.1 The

deficiency arose from respondent's disallowance of a claimed research credit under

sections 38 and 41(a) of $1,141,713. The claimed credit relates to activities

conducted by petitioner's shipbuilding subsidiary, Corn Island Shipyard, Inc.

(CIS), in developing 11 vessels. As explained in more detail below, in accordance

with an agreement between the parties, our trial on April 15, 2019, addressed

issues related to just 4 of the 11 projects in issue. In this opinion, we address only

those issues.

FINDINGS OF FACT

When petitioner filed its petition in this case, it maintained its principal

office in Lamar, Indiana. For the taxable year in issue, petitioner filed a

consolidated Federal income tax return on behalf of itself and affiliated

corporations, including CIS.

1 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue. We round all dollar amounts to the nearest dollar. -4-

[*4] General Process of Vessel Development

The design, construction, and launch of vessels typically follows a process

referred to as a "design spiral". Given the interdependence of a vessel's various

elements, the design of some elements cannot be determined until the design of

others is established. Conversely, the design of elements determined later in the

process may require changes in designs provisionally determined earlier, causing

"loops" or spirals in the process.

The design of some elements may be finally determined only during the

construction process. But that possibility does not mean that the design of the

vessel as a whole remains indeterminate until construction is complete. As CIS

engineering technician Brian Varner explained, "a lot of" design issues "get ironed

out" as the vessel is built.

Moreover, as might be expected, CIS' engineering team makes every effort

to ensure the viability of each component's design before requiring CIS to incur

the expense of fashioning the physical component. In Mr. Varner's words: "From

an engineering perspective, you try to capture everything you can up front. You

try to revise all of the drawings, hoping you caught everything." He added: "We

have to feel pretty comfortable with a design before we start cutting steel. Any

repairs or modifications become very costly very quickly." -5-

[*5] Mr. Varner's testimony finds confirmation in the report of respondent's

expert, Kenneth Smith, a naval architect and marine engineer. In his report,

Mr. Smith opined that, while the final appropriate design of a vessel may be

uncertain at the start of a project, "almost all of these uncertainties have to be

resolved well before the structural steel is assembled and welded to form the hull."

The Apex Tanker

One of the projects in regard to which petitioner claimed a research credit,

labeled "Project 720", involved a tank barge that CIS built under contract with

Apex Oil, Inc. (Apex). CIS' agreement with Apex required it to construct a vessel

of given dimensions "in accordance with the Contract Specifications, Contract

Plans, and Contract Drawings" and stated that those documents, referred to as

"CONTRACT DOCUMENTS", were attached to the contract and incorporated by

reference.2

The design of the Apex tanker was based on the design of the Penn 80, a

tanker that CIS had previously built for another customer. But the design of

several elements of the Apex tanker that differed from those of its predecessor

involved an iterative process in which proposed designs were tested through such

2 The copy of CIS' agreement with Apex included in the record does not have the Contract Documents attached. -6-

[*6] means as software modeling and engineering calculations and revised as

necessary. For example, CIS used 3D modeling to design the stern notch that

attaches the Apex tanker to the tug that pushes it. The tanker also had a towing

bridle that allows a tug to pull it. The tanker's towing bridle had to be redesigned

following a determination that, as originally designed, the bridle was interfering

with other components of the vessel. CIS' lead engineer and naval architect, Bud

Johnson, used a type of engineering calculations and analysis called "wind sail"

calculations to determine the appropriate size of the vessel's anchor. Engineering

calculations were also employed to test the strength of the tanker's longitudinal

elements and design the tanker's vapor barrier system, which involves the

application of special coatings to the top of cargo tanks to prevent corrosion.

Other changes in the Apex tanker's design determined through an iterative process

allowed it to handle more cargo than the Penn 80.

In an analysis of time records of CIS' production employees, Brian Meunier,

an engineering technician at CIS, determined that 87% of the time those

employees spent constructing the Apex tanker involved "functions that were tied

directly to items" that differed from those of the Penn 80. Mr. Meunier

determined that the production employees spent an additional 10% of their time on

items that differed in some respect from the Penn 80 but were "very much similar". -7-

[*7] After constructing the Apex tanker, CIS performed a deadweight survey on

the finished vessel to verify its displacement--that is, the amount of water it

displaces. CIS typically conducts a deadweight survey after construction of any

vessel intended for certification by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)--even

a "sister vessel" that duplicates one previously built.

A deadweight survey is important to a vessel's owner because it indicates

how much cargo the vessel can carry. Therefore, the contract between the owner

and the builder typically includes displacement among the vessel's specifications.

A sufficient variance between the displacement determined by the deadweight

survey conducted after the vessel's construction and estimates made in determining

the vessel's design may result in noncompliance with the agreed specifications.

When asked at trial why such a variance might occur, Joseph Kelly of the ABS

observed: "[V]essels are built by humans."

Nicholas Meyers, a Coast Guard inspector who professed to be very familiar

with CIS from having visited the shipyard several times a year for 10 years,

testified that he was unaware of any occasion on which CIS had revised a vessel's

design as a result of a deadweight survey. Mr. Meyers, however, admitted the

possibility of occasions he could no longer recall in which a deadweight survey

had caused CIS to make design revisions. -8-

[*8] The Dry Dock

The research credit petitioner claimed also included expenditures for

"Project 730", a dry dock that CIS built for Detyens Shipyard (Detyens). A dry

dock is a floating structure used for ship repair and maintenance. Before Project

730, CIS had not fully developed and designed a dry dock.

CIS also used engineering calculations and modeling to design the dry dock.

For example, it used modeling software to test for spacial conflicts. In the course

of the design process, CIS developed several iterations of design drawings for the

dry dock. CIS performed calculations to test various iterations of the dry dock's

design throughout the development process. The outboard side plate went through

five design revisions.

The dry dock included a safety deck that allowed personnel to enter and

access the controls and gauges for a pumping system. By filling its walls with

water, the dry dock can partially submerge to allow entry by the ship to be

repaired. The pumping system then expels the water, raising the dry dock (and the

ship it holds) to allow the necessary repairs.

The safety deck's design also went through several iterations. In particular,

the deck had to be raised 18 inches as a result of weight increases resulting from

changes in other parts of the vessel. -9-

[*9] Detyens took delivery of the dry dock at CIS' facility. Title to the vessel

transferred at that time, and Detyens was obligated to make the final payment due

to CIS under their contract. After Detyens transferred the dry dock to its own

shipyard in Charleston, South Carolina, it conducted a final raise-and-lower test on

the vessel.

Before tendering the dry dock to Detyens, CIS conducted its own tests on

the vessel, including a partial raise-and-lower test. As Mr. Varner explained, CIS

"couldn't take * * * [the dry dock] down as deep as it needed to go because of

water level limitations."

Qualified Research Expenditures Claimed

In regard to Project 720 (the Apex tanker), petitioner reported as qualified

research expenses, within the meaning of section 41(b) (QREs), $2,505,491 of

wages, $17,504 of contract research expenses, and $3,892,142 of supply costs. In

regard to Project 730 (the dry dock) petitioner reported $146,109 of wages and

$1,943,265 of supply costs. Petitioner also reported "estimated wage expenses"

not associated with any specific project of $609,276. The wages associated with

specific projects were paid to production employees. The estimated wage

expenses include portions of the wages paid to individuals identified as members

of either CIS management or its engineering team. CIS' engineers and managers -10-

[*10] did not track their hours by specific vessel. Petitioner estimated the wages

CIS paid to those individuals for qualified services by applying to each employee's

total wages an allocation percentage equal to the estimated portion of the

employee's time spent on qualified research.

The highest amount paid to any one nonproduction employee that CIS

included in QREs was $173,996 paid to Mr. Johnson (60% of his total wages for

the year in issue). Petitioner also treated as QREs $126,734 of wages that CIS

paid to members of its management team, Don Foertsch, David Foertsch, and Alan

Fleischmann, and $56,895 of wages paid to three individuals it identified as

"draftsmen", Dennis Gass, Kyle Harpenau, and Robert Kellems.3

The amount petitioner reported as contract research payments was paid to

Hayes Testing Labs (Hayes) for tests Hayes performed on welds made in the

tanker's construction. Mr. Meunier testified that, while the failure of a weld could

be the result of a design flaw, in CIS' experience, weld failures were most often

due to the welder's workmanship.

3 Although petitioner included Mr. Meunier, along with three others, in a list of "engineering technicians", Mr. Meunier himself testified that his involvement in Project 720 was "mostly * * * [on] the drafting end of it." -11-

[*11] Activities of CIS' Nonproduction Employees

In describing Mr. Johnson's responsibilities, the parties stipulated:

During the course of * * * [his] duties, Mr. Johnson worked closely with the engineering team and management to assess the manner in which the shipyard could construct the ship. Mr. Johnson conferred with management, the purchasing agent, and the production employees to evaluate specifications including those related to the criteria for vessel design and construction. Additionally, Mr. Johnson coordinated and directed projects, made detailed plans to accomplish goals, performed necessary engineering calculations, and directed the integration of technical activities. Moreover, Mr. Johnson planned and directed the installation, testing, and operation of vessels. Furthermore, Mr. Johnson directed, reviewed, and approved component and product designs, in addition to design development drawings generated from the original specifications or designs.

Mr. Meunier described Mr. Johnson as the "brain trust" of CIS.

Mr. Meunier elaborated:

He * * * was the first contact with the customer. He was engaged in the project throughout, all the way to the end. He * * * would work contract negotiations, preliminary design, did a lot of the design calcs himself, managed the yard, a lot of even decisions on where things were going to be built, he was involved in the yard, whether it was built inside, outside of the shop. But he kind of controlled the whole project throughout the yard. And like I said, he would see it all the way through to completion. He was, many times, the * * * face of the company. He would get involved in everything down to the launch and deadweight to the end. I mean, he was--from start to finish, Bud was involved in it. -12-

[*12] Although the parties stipulated descriptions of the activities of the

nonproduction employees other than Don and David Foertsch, the stipulation

simply describes the two Foertsches as "Petitioner's owners". While the

stipulation notes that they "contributed to the wage research expenses during the

2013 tax year", it does not describe the specific activities for which those expenses

were paid.

At trial, David Foertsch described his father, Don, as "oversee[ing] the

management and the operations of Corn Island Shipyard." The parties stipulated a

list of exhibits that "evidence" Don and David Foertsch's activities. The 13

exhibits listed as evidence of Don Foertsch's activities consist entirely of emails on

which he was copied. Nine of those emails have dates outside the taxable year in

issue, and at least six deal with projects other than the Apex tanker or the dry

dock.

David Foertsch's name does not appear on two of the three exhibits listed as

evidencing his activities. And two of the three exhibits involve projects other than

the Apex tanker or the dry dock. David did testify, however, that he "helped to

troubleshoot through th[e] problems with the towing bridle". -13-

[*13] Regarding Mr. Fleischmann's activities, the parties stipulated:

As Purchasing Agent, * * * [Mr.] Fleischmann gathered project specifications, [and] reviewed component materials required for each project. Based on project specifications, Mr. Fleischmann evaluated various material vendor alternatives for performance, quality, reliability, and functionality, in addition to cost of materials. After analyzing available alternatives, Mr. Fleischmann worked with the Engineering Team to obtain materials for projects. Mr. Fleischmann worked on the vessels.

The parties stipulated the following description of those individuals

petitioner identified as draftsmen, Messrs. Gass, Harpenau, and Kellems: "As

Draftsmen, these individuals utilized specialized computer software to produce 3D

plans and 2D diagrams of vessels. Additionally, these individuals converted

sketches, specifications, and engineering data into detailed 2D diagrams and 3D

Computer Aided Design ('CAD') models and drawings throughout the completion

of the vessels." At trial, Mr. Meunier explained the difference between drafting

and design work: "Drafting's more of just the actual input into AutoCAD or our

drawing it. It's * * * creating the drawings. The design work may be trying to fit

different items together properly. It's kind of one step above drafting. You maybe

don't have an engineering degree and can't perform the calculations, but you can

receive those calculations from an engineer and be able to put that to paper in a

* * * product." -14-

[*14] Projects 749 and 750

On some of its development projects, CIS collaborates with a related

corporation, Tell City Boat Works, Inc. Projects identified as 749 and 750

exemplify those collaborative projects.

OPINION

I. Background

A. Applicable Statutory and Regulatory Provisions

1. Computation of the Research Credit

Section 38(a) allows as a credit against a taxpayer's income tax the

taxpayer's "current year business credit", as well as unused business credits carried

from other years. A taxpayer's current year business credit includes "the research

credit determined under section 41(a)". Sec. 38(b)(4). For purposes of section 38,

a taxpayer's research credit includes 20% of any excess of the taxpayer's "qualified

research expenses for the taxable year" over a prescribed "base amount".

Sec. 41(a)(1).

2. Qualified Research Expenses

A taxpayer's QREs include any "in-house research expenses" and "contract

research expenses" "paid or incurred by the taxpayer during the taxable year in

carrying on any trade or business of the taxpayer". Sec. 41(b)(1). -15-

[*15] A taxpayer's "in-house research expenses" include "(i) any wages paid or

incurred to an employee for qualified services performed by such employee" and

"(ii) any amount paid or incurred for supplies used in the conduct of qualified

research". Sec. 41(b)(2)(A)(i) and (ii). Section 41(b)(2)(B) defines "qualified

services" to mean "services consisting of--(i) engaging in qualified research, or

(ii) engaging in the direct supervision or direct support of research activities which

constitute qualified research."

3. Qualified Research

As indicated by the rules described above, determining whether expenses

are QREs requires consideration of the relationship of those expenses to activities

that meet the definition of "qualified research". Research is qualified research if it

meets four requirements provided in section 41(d)(1) and is not covered by an

exclusion provided in section 41(d)(4). First, expenditures with respect to the

research must be eligible for "treat[ment] as expenses under section 174". Sec.

41(d)(1)(A). Second, the research must be undertaken to discover technological

information. Sec. 41(d)(1)(B)(i). Third, the application of that information must

be "intended to be useful in the development of a new or improved business -16-

[*16] component of the taxpayer".4 Sec. 41(d)(1)(B)(ii). And fourth,

"substantially all of the activities of" the research must "constitute elements of a

process of experimentation for a purpose" related to "a new or improved function,"

"performance," or "reliability or quality." Sec. 41(d)(1)(C), (3)(A). Section

41(d)(4) provides a list of activities that are specifically excluded from the

definition of qualified research.

a. Section 174

As noted above, the first requirement of qualified research is that the

expenses incurred in its conduct must be eligible for deduction under section 174.

Section 174(a)(1) allows a taxpayer to "treat research or experimental

expenditures which are paid or incurred by him during the taxable year in

connection with his trade or business as expenses which are not chargeable to

capital account." The taxpayer can deduct any expenditures that he treats as not

chargeable to capital account. Sec. 174(a)(1). Sec. 1.174-2(a)(1), Income Tax

Regs., provides:

The term research or experimental expenditures, as used in section 174, means expenditures incurred in connection with the taxpayer's

4 Sec. 41(d)(2)(B) defines "business component" to mean "any product, process, computer software, technique, formula, or invention which is to be-- (i) held for sale, lease, or license, or (ii) used by the taxpayer in a trade or business of the taxpayer." -17-

[*17] trade or business which represent research and development costs in the experimental or laboratory sense. The term generally includes all such costs incident to the development or improvement of a product. * * * Expenditures represent research and development costs in the experimental or laboratory sense if they are for activities intended to discover information that would eliminate uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of a product. * * *

Section 1.174-2(a)(3), Income Tax Regs., defines "product" to include "any

pilot model, process, formula, invention, technique, patent, or similar property,

and includes products to be used by the taxpayer in its trade or business as well as

products to be held for sale, lease, or license." Section 1.174-2(a)(4), Income Tax

Regs., as amended in 2014, provides: "[T]he term pilot model means any

representation or model of a product that is produced to evaluate and resolve

uncertainty concerning the product during the development or improvement of the

product. The term includes a fully-functional representation or model of the

product". -18-

[*18] b. Process of Experimentation

The fourth, and probably most stringent,5 requirement of qualified research

is that substantially all of the activities involved in the research must "constitute

elements of a process of experimentation for a purpose" related to "a new or

improved function," "performance," or "reliability or quality." Sec. 41(d)(1)(C),

(3)(A). Section 1.41-4(a)(5)(i), Income Tax Regs., elaborates as follows on what a

process of experimentation involves:

For purposes of section 41(d) and this section, a process of experimentation is a process designed to evaluate one or more alternatives to achieve a result where the capability or the method of achieving that result, or the appropriate design of that result, is uncertain as of the beginning of the taxpayer's research activities. A process of experimentation must fundamentally rely on the principles of the physical or biological sciences, engineering, or computer science and involves the identification of uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of a business component, the identification of one or more alternatives intended to eliminate that uncertainty, and the identification and the conduct of a process of evaluating the alternatives (through, for example, modeling,

5 As we observed in Union Carbide Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-50, 2009 WL 605161, at *80 (quoting S. Rept. No. 99-313, at 694- 695 (1986), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) at 694-695), aff'd, 697 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2012), Congress added the process of experimentation requirement to sec. 41 because of the legislators' "concern[] that taxpayers had been claiming the credit 'for virtually any expenses relating to product development' as opposed to high technology." Although sec. 174 and the process of experimentation requirement both focus on the elimination of uncertainty, the latter "imposes a more structured method of discovering information than section 174 requires and may not include all actions a taxpayer takes to resolve uncertainty." Id. -19-

[*19] simulation, or a systematic trial and error methodology). A process of experimentation must be an evaluative process and generally should be capable of evaluating more than one alternative. * * * Uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of the business component (e.g., its appropriate design) does not establish that all activities undertaken to achieve that new or improved business component constitute a process of experimentation.

Section 1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., provides an arithmetic test for

determining when "substantially all" of a taxpayer's otherwise qualifying research

activities in regard to a business component involve a process of experimentation.

According to the regulations:

The substantially all requirement of section 41(d)(1)(C) * * * is satisfied only if 80 percent or more of a taxpayer's research activities, measured on a cost or other consistently applied reasonable basis * * *, constitute elements of a process of experimentation for a purpose described in section 41(d)(3). Accordingly, if 80 percent (or more) of a taxpayer's research activities with respect to a business component constitute elements of a process of experimentation for a purpose described in section 41(d)(3), the substantially all requirement is satisfied even if the remaining 20 percent (or less) of a taxpayer's research activities with respect to the business component do not constitute elements of a process of experimentation for a purpose described in section 41(d)(3), so long as these remaining research activities satisfy the requirements of section 41(d)(1)(A) and are not otherwise excluded under section 41(d)(4). The substantially all requirement is applied separately to each business component.

Id. -20-

[*20] B. Issues Selected for Initial Trial

Given the complexity of factual issues involved in determining a taxpayer's

eligibility for the research credit, it is not unusual for the taxpayer and the

Commissioner to agree, in conducting cases that involve the credit, to single out a

sample of research projects to be addressed by the court in the expectation that the

court's decision in regard to the sample projects will enable the parties to resolve

their differences in regard to the other projects. See, e.g., Trinity Indus., Inc. v.

United States, 757 F.3d 400, 404-405 (5th Cir. 2014), aff'g 691 F. Supp. 2d 688

(N.D. Tex. 2010); Suder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-201, at *53; Union

Carbide Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-50, 2009 WL 605161,

at *2, aff'd, 697 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2012). The parties before us have agreed to that

approach. As noted at the outset, in accordance with their agreement (and our

order reflecting it), the trial we held on April 15, 2019, addressed just four of the

projects in issue. In particular, the trial considered the following issues, as

described in our Order of April 2, 2019:

(1) Whether the Petitioner conducted qualified research under I.R.C. sec. 41(d) with respect to the business components identified for Project 720 (the 87,000 bbl tanker barge sold to Apex Oil) and Project 730 (the dry dock sold to Detyen's Shipyard); -21-

[*21] (2) Whether any exclusion found in I.R.C. sec. 41(d)(4) applies with respect to the business components identified for Projects 720 and 730;

(3) The includible amount of qualified research expenses for the business components identified for Project 720 and Project 730 * * *; and

(4) The TCBW [Tell City Boat Works] issues with respect to Projects 749 and 750. * * *

Shortly after trial, the parties executed a stipulation that describes their

agreement regarding the impact of our disposition of the four issues listed above.

In effect, the parties agreed to treat the Apex tanker and the dry dock as

representative in regard to the general issues common to all of the development

projects for which petitioner claimed QREs--that is, the definition of qualified

research, the applicability of any statutory exclusions, and the determination of

QREs. The parties also agreed to treat Projects 749 and 750 as representative of

CIS' collaborative projects with TCBW. Therefore, we understand the fourth item

listed above to encompass only those issues that arise because of that

collaboration. As described below, the disposition of those issues raised by

Projects 749 and 750 that are common to all projects, regardless of TCBW's

involvement, will generally be governed by our conclusions regarding Projects

720 and 730. -22-

[*22] Under the parties' stipulation, our resolution of the general issues listed in

items (1) through (3) above will be binding on petitioner for purposes of

determining the QREs from all 11 of the projects at issue and will also bind

respondent except to the extent that we grant him leave to introduce additional

evidence or make additional arguments concerning projects other than Project 720

or 730. Except to the extent that our resolution of the unique TCBW issues

requires the exclusion from QREs of amounts claimed in regard to Project 749 or

750, the QREs of all projects will be determined by extrapolation from the

proportion of claimed QREs that we allow for Projects 720 and 730.

With that background, we address below, in turn, each of the four issues

listed in our order of April 2, 2019, and the parties' posttrial stipulation.

II. Issue (1): Whether CIS Conducted Qualified Research With Respect to the Apex Tanker and Dry Dock

Issues (1) and (2) can be viewed as preliminary steps in the determination

required by Issue (3)--that is, "[t]he includible amount of qualified research

expenses for the business components identified for Project 720 [the Apex tanker]

and Project 730 [the dry dock]". As described above, to be a QRE, an expense

must bear a relationship specified in section 41(b) to an activity that satisfies the

four elements of the definition of qualified research listed in section 41(d). -23-

[*23] Therefore, it is appropriate to begin the determination of which reported

expenses are QREs by determining the extent to which the activities involved in

the development of the tanker and dry dock meet the definition of qualified

research (Issue (1)). But activities that meet the four tests listed in section

41(d)(1) are not qualified research if they are covered by one of the exclusions

provided in section 41(d)(4) (Issue (2)). Determining those activities that meet the

definition of qualified research and are not covered by a statutory exclusion allows

for the ultimate determination of the amount of those expenses that bear the

requisite relationship to qualified research to be included in QREs (Issue (3)).

The activities that CIS conducted in developing the Apex tanker or the dry

dock will be "qualified research", as defined by section 41(d)(1), only if those

activities meet each of the four tests specified in that section. As explained below,

petitioner has not established that substantially all of the development activities

CIS conducted in regard to either the tanker or the dry dock "constitute[d]

elements of a process of experimentation for a purpose described in * * * [section

41(d)(3)(A)]". See sec. 41(d)(1)(C). Consequently, we need not decide whether

any research CIS conducted as part of those projects met any of the other three

tests specified in section 41(d). In regard to the first issue covered by our April

15, 2019, trial, we conclude that CIS did not conduct qualified research, within -24-

[*24] the meaning of section 41(d), with respect to either the tanker or the dry

We have no doubt that CIS' efforts to design the tanker and dry dock

involved activities that "constitute[d] elements of a process of experimentation"

for a purpose related to "a new or improved function," "performance," or

"reliability or quality." See sec. 41(d)(1)(C), (3)(A). As indicated in our Findings

of Fact, the design of elements of each vessel involved iterative processes in

which proposed designs were tested through such means as software modeling and

engineering calculations and revised as necessary.

That the design of each vessel involved iterative processes of the type

described in section 1.41-4(a)(5)(i), Income Tax Regs., should not be surprising:

CIS had never designed and built a dry dock before and, while the Apex tanker

was based on the Penn 80, there were, as respondent admits, "many differences

between the two vessels". As noted above, however, petitioner has not

demonstrated that substantially all of CIS' research activities in developing either

the Apex tanker or the dry dock constituted elements of a process of

experimentation for one of the purposes specified in section 41(d)(3)(A). -25-

[*25] A. The Apex Tanker

1. Petitioner's Primary Argument

In claiming that CIS' development of the tanker meets the substantially all

test of section 41(d)(1)(C), petitioner lists various elements of the vessel,

including the hull, that, in comparison to the Penn 80, "were redesigned and re-

engineered * * * during the development process". Petitioner alleges that the

tanker's hull "alone makes up 90% of the vessel." Petitioner then claims:

"Demonstrating that the vast majority of the vessel, including every major system

on the vessel, was re-engineered and redesigned meets the substantially all

requirement."

We disagree. Section 1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., requires that the

substantially all test be applied in reference to activities--not physical elements of

the business component being developed or improved. We cannot accept--indeed,

petitioner does not even argue--that a business component's proportion of novel

elements is a "reasonable basis", see sec. 1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., for

measuring the proportion of research activities undertaken in the product's

development that constitute elements of a process of experimentation for a

purpose described in section 41(d)(3). For starters, the design of some, or even

all, of the elements whose design was uncertain at the outset could have been -26-

[*26] determined by means other than a process of experimentation. As noted

above, section 1.41-4(a)(5)(i), Income Tax Regs., provides: "Uncertainty

concerning the development or improvement of the business component (e.g., its

appropriate design) does not establish that all activities undertaken to achieve that

new or improved business component constitute a process of experimentation."

Moreover, even if determining the design of every new element required a process

of experimentation, we would not anticipate that the extent of that experimentation

would vary in proportion to the size of each element. Determining the design of

smaller, more complex elements might require more experimentation than

determining the design of larger but simpler elements.

To the extent that the opinion of the District Court for the Northern District

of Texas in Trinity Indus., 691 F. Supp. 2d 688, can be read to support petitioner's

position, we decline to follow that court's analysis. The taxpayer in Trinity Indus.

was, like CIS, in the business of shipbuilding. The court considered the extent to

which the expenses the taxpayer incurred in developing six vessels were QREs

within the meaning of section 41(b). The court concluded that the taxpayer's

research in developing only two of those vessels met the process of

experimentation requirement. -27-

[*27] Although the court in Trinity Indus. found that 80% of the costs the

taxpayer incurred in developing two of the six vessels in issue were part of a

process of experimentation, its opinion does not explain how it made that

calculation. The court simply described some of the aspects of those vessels that

were novel in comparison to vessels previously developed by the taxpayer. See,

e.g., id. at 694 ("The court does not intend to enumerate everything about the

Mark V [special operations deployment craft] that was new and required research

expenditures, but rather to give a flavor of the effort required."). It is not at all

clear from the court's analysis that it conducted the quantitative analysis section

1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., requires. In fact, the court's response to the

Government's complaint that the taxpayer treated insurance costs as QREs

suggests that the court did not engage in the required analysis. Addressing the

Government's complaint, the court wrote:

The implication is that the Court should scour the records and determine which line items are for matters not properly considered QRE. The Court believes that this is an issue the 80% rule of Treas. Reg. 1.41-4(a)(6) is intended to address. The Court finds that the additional expenses the government cites are properly considered research expenditures in that the business component--the ship--could not have been developed without them. Under the 80% rule, the Court finds that those costs are properly included in QRE * * *

Id. at 697. -28-

[*28] If the court did not make a line-by-line determination of those otherwise

qualifying research expenditures that involved a process of experimentation, we

do not understand how the court concluded that the 80% test was met. Moreover,

the proposition that the court's finding in regard to the 80% test meant that all

costs necessary in the development of the ship were QREs conflicts with the

governing regulation. Section 1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., makes it clear that

"the remaining 20 percent (or less) of a taxpayer's research activities with respect

to the business component [that] do not constitute elements of a process of

experimentation for a purpose described in section 41(d)(3)" must "satisfy the

requirements of section 41(d)(1)(A)"--that is, the cost of the activities must be

eligible for deduction under section 174. Not all costs necessary in the

development of a business component are research or experimental expenditures

within the meaning of section 174. (We are hard pressed to see, for example, how

the purchase of insurance is an activity "intended to discover information that

would eliminate uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of a

product." Sec. 1.174-2(a)(1), Income Tax Regs.)

Because the District Court in Trinity Indus. did not explain how it arrived at

its finding that the taxpayer's research on two of the vessels in issue satisfied the

substantially all test of section 41(d)(1)(C), and because, in each case, the court -29-

[*29] stated its finding after a recitation of those aspects of the vessels that were

new or redesigned, we can understand how petitioner might have interpreted the

court's substantially all analysis to have turned on an assessment of the proportion

of novel elements in each vessel. If that understanding of the court's analysis is

correct, however, we judge the analysis unsupported by the governing regulations

and thus decline to follow it.

2. Petitioner's Alternative Argument

As an alternative argument, petitioner claims to have "demonstrated that

substantially all of the time spent by * * * [CIS'] employees also went toward

elements of a process of experimentation." Relying on Mr. Meunier's

determination that at least 87% of the time CIS production employees spent

working on the Apex tanker involved elements of that vessel that differed from the

Penn 80, petitioner concludes that CIS "has far exceeded the substantially all

requirement."6

6 Mr. Meunier's analysis did not take into account the activities of CIS' nonproduction employees--that is, members of the engineering group and management personnel. We might reasonably expect that members of CIS' engineering group, at least, spent a higher proportion of their time on activities that were part of a process of experimentation than did production employees. But we cannot take that as a foregone conclusion. Therefore, even if Mr. Meunier's analysis were otherwise valid in assessing the satisfaction of the process of experimentation requirement of sec. 41(d)(1)(C), it would be incomplete. -30-

[*30] Again, the novelty of an element of a business component does not establish

that the work involved in developing that element involves a process of

experimentation. Moreover, the regulation on which petitioner relies in claiming

that the activities its production employees performed in building the tanker were

qualified services within the meaning of section 41(b)(2)(B) demonstrates that

their services did not "constitute elements of a process of experimentation" for one

of the purposes specified in section 41(d)(3)(A).

As noted above, section 41(b)(2)(B) defines "qualified services" to mean

"services consisting of--(i) engaging in qualified research, or (ii) engaging in the

direct supervision or direct support of research activities which constitute

qualified research." Section 1.41-2(c)(3)(ii), Income Tax Regs., provides that

"direct support of research includes the services of * * * a machinist for machining

a part of an experimental model used in qualified research."

We understand petitioner to rely on section 1.41-2(c)(3)(ii), Income Tax

Regs., for the proposition that the activities performed by CIS' production

employees on the Apex tanker were qualified services under section

41(b)(2)(B)(ii). Petitioner observes that a "fully-functional representation or

model of * * * [a] product" can be a "pilot model", as defined by section -31-

[*31] 1.174-2(a)(4), Income Tax Regs.7 Therefore, petitioner concludes, the Apex

tanker was a pilot model. And, apparently presuming that the term "pilot model",

as defined by section 1.174-2(a)(4), Income Tax Regs., has the same meaning as

the term "experimental model", as used in section 1.41-2(c)(3)(ii), Income Tax

Regs., petitioner posits: "[I]ndividuals who are making parts for said pilot models

can have their time allocated toward the R&D credit as qualified direct support

(i.e. a machinist making parts for an experimental model)."

We agree with petitioner that, if the efficacy of the proposed design of a

component of the Apex tanker could be determined only by testing the physical

component after its fabrication, the component could be viewed as an

experimental model and the work of the production employees could be viewed as

directly supporting the research involved in testing the component. If that

research were qualified research (which would depend, among other things, on

satisfaction of the substantially all test of section 41(d)(1)(C)), the wages paid to

the production employees for the construction of that element of the tanker would

7 The amendments to sec. 1.174-2, Income Tax Regs., adopted in 2014 "apply to taxable years ending on or after July 21, 2014." Id. para. (d). The regulations, however, allow taxpayers to apply the amended provisions "to taxable years for which the limitations for assessment of tax ha[ve] not expired." Id. We take petitioner's invocation of the definition of "pilot model" provided in sec. 1.174-2(a)(4), Income Tax Regs., as amended in 2014, as an indication that it has chosen to apply the amended provisions to its taxable year ended June 30, 2014. -32-

[*32] be QREs. But it does not follow that, if the testing of that component of the

tanker involved a process of experimentation, the work of the production

employees in fabricating the physical component was part of that process of

experimentation. In fact, section 1.41-2(c)(3)(ii), Income Tax Regs., tells us that

the work of the production employees would not be considered part of that process

of experimentation. The work of the production employees directly supports the

research involved in testing the model, but the production work does not have a

close enough nexus to the testing to be considered qualified research in its own

right. The fabrication of an experimental model and the use of that model in

qualified research (e.g., testing the model's design as part of a process of

experimentation) are, by definition, two different things. The latter is qualified

research; the former is not. The qualified research in which the physical

component is used--which may include testing as part of a process of

experimentation--does not encompass the fashioning of the component. The

distinction that section 41(b)(2)(B) draws between "engaging in qualified

research" and "engaging in the * * * direct support of research activities which

constitute qualified research" allows no other conclusion.

We agree with petitioner that "[t]he fact that personnel would have

performed tasks that, standing alone, do not appear to constitute a process of -33-

[*33] experimentation, does not mean supporting activities are not qualified."

Wages paid to production employees can be for qualified services, as defined by

section 41(b)(2)(B), even if those employees do not engage in a process of

experimentation. But we do not agree that, "[i]f the activities are in direct support,

they are considered an element of the process of experimentation and are

claimable." Petitioner cites no statutory basis for its notion of "experimentation by

association". Indeed, petitioner's argument ignores the distinction drawn by the

plain terms of section 41(b)(2)(B) between engaging in qualified research and

directly supporting qualified research. A production worker who directly supports

qualified research is not himself engaged in qualified research and thus cannot be

engaged in any process of experimentation the research might involve.

Even if we were to accept that activities provided in direct support of

experimentation could be viewed as elements of the process of experimentation--

despite the fact that the provider of those supporting activities is, by definition, not

himself "engaged" in the experimentation--it would not follow that all of the

efforts of CIS' production employees fabricating novel components of the Apex

tanker were elements of that process of experimentation. Petitioner asserts that

"CIS's uncertainty as to the appropriate design of the Apex 720 Tanker was not

resolved until the deadweight survey was conducted confirming that the vessel -34-

[*34] met the functional and economic requirements as laid out in the

specifications". If valid, that assertion might suggest that the tanker's various

elements were uniquely interdependent, so that the construction of the entire

vessel--or at least its novel elements--was part of a process of experimentation.

See Trinity Indus., 691 F. Supp. 2d at 692 ("[T]he systems [of a vessel] do not

exist in a vacuum * * * [but instead] interact with each other, sometimes in

complex and nonintuitive ways."). In other words, the argument might run, even

accepting that novelty does not, by definition, require experimentation, in the case

of the Apex tanker, it did. Respondent, however, reasons that, because CIS

typically conducts a deadweight survey after construction of any vessel intended

for ABS certification, the deadweight survey must be a quality control test that

assesses whether the subject vessel has been constructed in accordance with its

design rather than a test of the validity of the design itself.

Respondent overstates the case. The routine conduct of deadweight surveys

on "first-in-class" and sister vessels alike demonstrates that assessing the validity

of a vessel's design cannot be the only purpose of the survey. But assessment of

design could nonetheless be one of the purposes served by a deadweight survey

when the subject vessel is first-in-class. Although we understand Mr. Kelly to

have attributed unfavorable results of a deadweight survey to errors in -35-

[*35] construction rather than design flaws, and Mr. Meyers' testimony can be

taken as support of that view, we nonetheless cannot rule out the possibility that

an unfavorable result from a deadweight survey performed on a first-in-class

vessel could be due to an error in the calculations made during the vessel's design

rather than a construction error. Engineers, after all, are human, too.

Even accepting that the deadweight survey conducted after CIS finished

construction of the Apex tanker could have led to design revisions, we do not view

that possibility as establishing that the design of the tanker as a whole remained

materially in doubt pending the completion of that procedure. If the displacement

determined in the deadweight survey failed to comply with the contract

specifications, we expect CIS would have refashioned or redesigned elements of

the tanker only to the extent necessary to bring it into compliance. It would not

have scrapped the entire vessel and started afresh.

We also accept the possibility of more limited testing of physical

components after their fabrication--but before completion of the entire vessel--to

validate the design of those components. But petitioner has not established that

postfabrication testing was required to determine the design of every component -36-

[*36] of the Apex tanker that differed from its predecessor.8 As one might expect,

CIS' engineers made every effort to ensure the viability of a component's design

before requiring their employer to incur the expense of fashioning the physical

component. They may not always have achieved that goal: Evaluation of further

design iterations might have been required in some cases after testing of the

physical component proved the initial design defective. But that prospect does not

establish that all novel components of the tanker were, by definition, used in a

process of experimentation. Again, novelty may create uncertainty, but resolution

of that uncertainty need not require experimentation. See sec. 1.41-4(a)(5)(i),

Income Tax Regs.; see also Siemer Milling Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2019-37, at *36 ("Although Siemer faced uncertainty with respect to whether the

wheat hybrids that it tested would be sufficient for current or new products, it did

8 Petitioner makes much of a purported "concession" at trial by one of respondent's attorneys, Mr. Tran, "that uncertainties were happening throughout construction." The exchange to which petitioner refers occurred when the Court asked about the purpose of a line of Mr. Tran's inquiry during his cross- examination of Mr. Varner. In response, Mr. Tran referred to petitioner's claim that "there were design uncertainties throughout the construction of the project" and advised the Court that the purpose of his inquiry was "to show what some of those design uncertainties were". At most, we understand Mr. Tran only to have accepted, as we have, that the design of some of the tanker's elements were resolved only during construction--not that the design of the vessel as a whole remained materially uncertain until construction was complete. -37-

[*37] not establish that it engaged in a process of experimentation with respect to

the wheat hybrids.").

In sum, petitioner has not provided us with grounds to include in the

numerator of the fraction described in section 1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., any

of the activities of CIS' production employees. Those who directly support

research are, by definition, not engaged in research. See sec. 41(b)(2)(B).

Consequently, their activities cannot be viewed as elements of any process of

experimentation that research might entail. Even if, contrary to the plain terms of

section 41(b)(2)(B), we were to accept the possibility that the work of production

employees could be part of a process of experimentation, petitioner has not

established the portion of their time those employees engaged in experimentation.

3. Calculation of Relevant Fraction

a. Production Activities Included in Denominator-- The Apex Tanker as a Pilot Model

If the activities of CIS' production employees--though perhaps directly

supporting research--are nonetheless not part of a process of experimentation, the

activities those employees undertook working on the Apex tanker could not be

included in the numerator of the fraction described in section 1.41-4(a)(6), Income

Tax Regs. But if petitioner is correct that the tanker is a "pilot model", as defined -38-

[*38] by section 1.174-2(a)(4), Income Tax Regs., and if, as a consequence, the

activities of the production employees were included in the denominator of the

relevant fraction, it would be arithmetically impossible for CIS' research in

developing the tanker to satisfy the substantially all test of section 41(d)(1)(C).

As a general rule, section 174 applies to the costs of developing the concept

of a product but not to the costs of building the product itself. See Mayrath v.

Commissioner, 41 T.C. 582, 590 (1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1966);

Union Carbide Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 2009 WL 605161, at *79 (citing,

inter alia, Mayrath v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. at 590). But when a taxpayer

constructs a physical product for the purpose of assessing the viability of its

concept, the construction costs can be considered costs of developing the concept

of the product and thus can be deducted under section 174. The 2014 amendments

to section 1.174-2, Income Tax Regs., clarified that point by adopting, for the first

time, a definition of "pilot model" and providing examples of the treatment of pilot

models under section 174. Section 1.174-2(a)(11), Example (7), Income Tax

Regs., confirms that the costs of producing a pilot model can qualify as research or

experimental expenditures under section 174. The example involves an aircraft

manufacturer who sought to develop an experimental aircraft capable of taking off

and landing vertically. The taxpayer "produce[d] a working aircraft at a cost of -39-

[*39] $5,000,000" for the purpose of "evaluat[ing] and resolv[ing] uncertainty

during the development or improvement of the product and test[ing] the

appropriate design" of the aircraft. Sec. 1.174-2(a)(11), Example (7), Income Tax

Regs. The example concludes that the aircraft the taxpayer built was a pilot

model, as defined by section 1.174-2(a)(4), Income Tax Regs., and that "the

$5,000,000 of costs that * * * [the taxpayer] incurred in producing the aircraft

qualifie[d] as research or experimental expenditures under section 174." Id. That

was true even though the taxpayer sold the aircraft "[i]n a later year". Id.

If CIS' purpose in producing the Apex tanker was to "evaluate and resolve

uncertainty" concerning the product, it would qualify as a pilot model for purposes

of section 174. See sec. 1.174-2(a)(4), Income Tax Regs. It would follow that the

costs CIS incurred in producing the tanker, including the wages it paid to its

production employees, would qualify as research or experimental expenditures

under section 174, like the costs of producing the experimental aircraft in section

1.174-2(a)(11), Example (7), Income Tax Regs.

If the activities engaged in by CIS' production employees working on the

Apex tanker are included in the denominator of the fraction described in section

1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., but not the numerator, the relevant fraction could

not equal or exceed 80%. The prescribed fraction measures the proportion of -40-

[*40] (i) research activities conducted in regard to a business component that

constitute elements of a process of experimentation for a qualified purpose to

(ii) all research activities in regard to the business component that satisfy the

requirements of section 41(d)(1)(A) (i.e., the costs of which can be deducted under

section 174) that are not covered by one of the statutory exclusions from qualified

research. (Clause (i) describes the numerator of the fraction described in section

1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., and clause (ii) its denominator.) Because the

fraction described in section 1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., considers activities,

the supply costs petitioner claims as QREs for Project 720 are not taken into

account in computing the fraction. Instead, we must consider the activities of CIS'

employees.9 The record provides no means of measuring the activities of CIS'

9 For purposes of applying the substantially all test of sec. 41(d)(1)(C), we do not take into account Hayes' activities testing welds made in the tanker's construction. Respondent claims that the testing Hayes performed was for quality control and, as such, was covered by exclusions provided in sec. 41(d)(4)(D)(v) and sec. 1.174-2(a)(6)(i), Income Tax Regs. (as amended in 2014). Petitioner attempts to distinguish quality assurance testing from quality control testing but does not apply that distinction to the specific work performed by Hayes or otherwise explain why Hayes engaged in qualified research. Moreover, petitioner's own witness, Mr. Meunier, testified that weld failures were most often due to the welder's workmanship. We therefore accept respondent's argument. Because the amounts CIS paid to Hayes were not research or experimental expenditures, within the meaning of sec. 174(a), Hayes' activities are excluded from both the numerator and the denominator of the fraction described in sec. 1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs. -41-

[*41] nonproduction employees other than the wages paid to those employees.

Therefore, if the relevant fraction includes activities of both groups of employees,

those activities would have to be measured by their cost--that is, the wages CIS

paid the employees for their conduct of the activities. If the $2,505,491 of wages

CIS paid to its production employees is included in the denominator of the

relevant fraction but not its numerator, the fraction could not equal or exceed 80%.

Even if all $609,276 of wages paid to nonproduction employees that petitioner

claimed as QREs was for qualified research on the Apex tanker that involved a

process of experimentation, the relevant fraction would be only about 19.6%

($609,276 ÷ ($609,276 + $2,505,491)).

It is far from clear, however, that the Apex tanker qualifies as a "pilot

model", as defined by section 1.174-2(a)(4), Income Tax Regs. As explained

above, the classification of a product as a pilot model turns on the taxpayer's

purpose in producing it. In that respect, the Apex tanker can be distinguished

from the experimental aircraft described in section 1.174-2(a)(11), Example (7),

Income Tax Regs. Although the taxpayer in the example ended up selling the

aircraft, the example is careful to note that the taxpayer's purpose in building the

aircraft was to "evaluate and resolve uncertainty during development or -42-

[*42] improvement of the product and test the appropriate design". Petitioner has

made no such showing with respect to the Apex tanker.

The Apex tanker can also be distinguished from other examples of pilot

models provided in the regulations. Section 1.174-2(a)(11), Example (5), Income

Tax Regs., involves a taxpayer that spent $5,000 producing several models of a

product to "test[] the appropriate design" before mass-producing the product. The

example concludes that the $5,000 the taxpayer spent producing the models was

covered by section 174. Although the taxpayer ultimately "enter[ed] into a

contract to sell one of the models to a customer", the example is careful to note

that that occurred only "[u]pon completion of several years of testing". Section

1.174-2(a)(11), Example (3), Income Tax Regs., involves a taxpayer who, like

CIS, entered into a contract to design and build a custom product (in that case, a

machine) to a customer's specifications. The taxpayer spent $10,000 to produce a

model of the machine to evaluate and resolve design uncertainty and spent an

additional $1,000 to test the model. Once it had determined the appropriate

design, the taxpayer spent $20,000 to build the machine itself. The example

concludes that the $11,000 the taxpayer spent to build and test the model was

covered by section 174, but the $20,000 the taxpayer spent to build the machine

itself was not. Section 1.174-2(a)(11), Example (3), Income Tax Regs., thus draws -43-

[*43] a distinction between a model of a product and the product itself. The

example accepts that the taxpayer's purpose in building the model was to evaluate

and resolve design uncertainty. By contrast, the taxpayer built the machine itself

to fulfill its contractual obligations to its customer.

b. Production Activities Excluded From Both Numerator and Denominator

Under the circumstances, however, we need not decide whether the Apex

tanker is a pilot model, within the meaning of section 1.174-2(a)(4), Income Tax

Regs. If the tanker does not qualify as a pilot model, it would not be clear that any

of the wages CIS paid to its production employees for the construction of the

tanker would be research or experimental expenditures, within the meaning of

section 174.10 But petitioner has not established that the fraction described in

section 1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., would equal or exceed 80% in regard to

the Apex tanker even if the activities of CIS' production employees were excluded

10 Some of the wages CIS paid to its production employees for construction of the Apex tanker might be eligible for deduction under sec. 174 regardless of whether the tanker qualifies as a pilot model. Sec. 1.174-2(a)(1), Income Tax Regs., as amended in 2014, provides: "Costs may be eligible under section 174 if paid or incurred after production begins but before uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of the product is eliminated." It does not follow, however, that the costs of producing each and every component of a product are deductible under sec. 174 as long as the design of any one component remains uncertain. -44-

[*44] from the fraction's denominator. If production employees' activities were

excluded from both the numerator and denominator, the fraction would take into

account only the activities of the engineering group and CIS management. In that

case, the research CIS conducted in developing the tanker would satisfy the

substantially all test of section 41(d)(1)(C) if at least 80% of the research activities

engaged in by members of engineering group and CIS management as part of that

project constituted elements of a process of experimentation. But petitioner has

not provided a breakdown of the activities of those nonproduction employees by

project, much less provided evidence of the portions of the time they spent on each

project that did or did not involve elements of a process of experimentation.

i. Mr. Johnson

Given Mr. Johnson's role in the development of the vessels in issue, we are

not surprised that petitioner included more of his wages in QREs than those of any

other employee. While we accept that Mr. Johnson's activities included some that

would qualify as elements of a process of experimentation, the record

demonstrates that his responsibilities were very much broader.

We doubt that the customer relations and management activities

Mr. Johnson engaged in involved a process of experimentation. Even the "direct

supervision" of experimentation is not itself experimentation. As noted above, -45-

[*45] section 41(b)(2)(B)(ii) includes in the definition of "qualified services"

"engaging in the direct supervision or direct support of research activities which

constitute qualified research." And section 1.41-2(c)(2), Income Tax Regs.,

provides: "The term 'direct supervision' as used in section 41(b)(2)(B) means the

immediate supervision (first-line management) of qualified research (as in the case

of a research scientist who directly supervises laboratory experiments, but who

may not actually perform experiments)." Just as direct support of qualified

research is not itself qualified research, direct supervision of such research is not

qualified research. See sec. 41(b)(2)(B) (contrasting in clauses (i) and (ii) the

direct engagement in qualified research and the direct supervision or support of

qualified research). Thus, while a person who directly supervises research may

perform qualified services, he is not himself engaged in qualified research and

cannot be treated as conducting himself any experimentation that research

involves. The descriptions of Mr. Johnson's activities included in the record

indicate that, even if he spent 60% of his time on services that would meet the

definition of "qualified services" (if the research involved in the various projects

he directed were qualified research), a considerable portion of his activities did not

constitute elements of a process of experimentation, within the meaning of section

1.41-4(a)(5), Income Tax Regs. -46-

[*46] ii. Management Team

The $126,734 of wages paid to Don Foertsch, David Foertsch, and

Mr. Fleischmann that petitioner treated as QREs itself constitutes more than 20%

of the total $609,276 nonproduction employee wages that petitioner treated as

QREs. The record provides little detail of the nature of any research activities

Don Foertsch might have conducted. In particular, we do not understand how the

emails on which Don was copied but may not even have read provide evidence of

activities--involving experimentation or otherwise--that he may have engaged in.

On brief, petitioner justifies its inclusion of a portion of Don's wages in QREs on

the ground that he "directly supervised" qualified research performed by

Mr. Johnson. Again, activities constituting the direct supervision of research that

might involve a process of experimentation are not themselves elements of a

process of experimentation.

David Foertsch's testimony regarding his efforts to "troubleshoot" the

problems with the tanker's towing bridle indicates that, in addition to his

management responsibilities, he may have engaged in at least some activities that

constituted elements of a process of experimentation. But the record allows us no

means of determining the extent of his time David spent on experimentation. -47-

[*47] At least some of the activities Mr. Fleischmann engaged in as part of the

development of the vessels in question--and perhaps a considerable portion--did

not involve a process of experimentation. As we have previously observed, "the

'evaluation of products available from vendors is not a process of

experimentation.'" Siemer Milling Co. v. Commissioner, at *24 (quoting section

1.41-4(a)(8), Example (5), Income Tax Regs.). On brief, petitioner refers to

Mr. Fleischmann as having "directly supported" research it claims to be qualified

research by "determining the supplies required to complete the vessel." Again,

activities that directly support research that might involve a process of

experimentation do not themselves constitute elements of a process of

experimentation. See sec. 41(b)(2)(B).

iii. Draftsmen

The distinction Mr. Meunier drew between drafting and design calls into

question the extent to which Messrs. Gass, Harpenau, and Kellems--as well as

Mr. Meunier himself in regard to Project 720--were involved in processes of

experimentation. Simply drawing a design provided by an engineer (or other

designer) need not involve an evaluation of design alternatives. The choice

between alternatives, and any experimentation involved in that choice, may well

have been made by the designer before asking the draftsman to draw up the chosen -48-

[*48] design. It is also not clear that drafting "fundamentally rel[ies] on the

principles of the physical or biological sciences, engineering, or computer

science". See sec. 1.41-4(a)(5)(i), Income Tax Regs. Mr. Meunier acknowledged

that a draftsman does not need an engineering degree. And the drafters' use of

computers in preparing their drawings does not qualify their work as

experimentation. See sec. 1.41-4(a)(7), Income Tax Regs. ("The employment of

computers or information technology * * * does not itself establish that qualified

research has been undertaken."). Finally, petitioner effectively concedes that the

draftsmen's work was not itself experimentation by describing those employees,

along with CIS' purchasing agent and production workers, as providing "direct

support" services--in the case of the draftsmen, "by aiding in the computer aided

design of drawings".

iv. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the record does not allow us to determine

the percentage of research activities conducted by CIS' nonproduction employees

that constituted elements of a process of experimentation. We cannot make that

determination even in the aggregate--for all 11 projects petitioner took into

account in computing its claimed research credit--much less for those employees'

work on the Apex tanker in particular. But we need not arrive at a specific -49-

[*49] percentage. Nor do we need to establish that the percentage was less than

80%.11 It suffices to say that petitioner has not given us grounds to conclude, on

the basis of the record before us, that substantially all of the research CIS

conducted in developing the Apex tanker constituted elements of a process of

experimentation.

c. Substantiation Rules

We recognize that petitioner might have been handicapped in its ability to

demonstrate satisfaction of the substantially all test provided in section

41(d)(1)(C) by the absence of any nontax reason for CIS to track in detail the work

performed by members of its management and engineering teams. The governing

regulations, however, require taxpayers claiming research credits to "retain records

in sufficiently usable form and detail to substantiate that the expenditures claimed

are eligible for the credit." Sec. 1.41-4(d), Income Tax Regs. In connection with

amendments to that section of the regulations proposed in 2001 and adopted in

2004, Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) acknowledged that the

need for taxpayers to keep records that they would not otherwise keep "ha[d] made

11 We note, however, that the wages petitioner included in QREs paid to those whom it described as providing either direct supervision or direct support services (Don Foertsch, Mr. Fleischmann, and Messrs. Gass, Harpenau, and Kellems) sum to $134,221, which is more than 20% of the $609,276 of wages paid to all nonproduction employees that petitioner treated as QREs. -50-

[*50] administration of the research credit burdensome for the IRS." REG-

112991-01, 2002-4 I.R.B. 404, 409. Therefore, the amendments eliminated a more

detailed recordkeeping requirement that had been included in the regulations

before 2004. The amendments reflect policymakers' "conclusion that taxpayers

must be provided reasonable flexibility in the manner in which they substantiate

their research credits." Id. The regulations, as amended, thus do not require

taxpayers "to keep records in a particular manner". Id. But a taxpayer's records,

however kept, must be "in sufficiently usable form and detail to substantiate that

the expenditures claimed are eligible for the credit". Id. While the 2004

amendments to the regulations reflect a goal of reducing the need for taxpayers to

keep records not otherwise necessary, the drafters accepted that they could not

eliminate that possibility. CIS' choice not to maintain detailed records of how its

nonproduction employees spent their time placed on petitioner the burden of

demonstrating--in some manner--the portion of those individuals' work that did

and did not involve a process of experimentation. Petitioner's failure to introduce

evidence on that point indicates a failure to comply with even the liberalized

substantiation requirement adopted in 2004. -51-

[*51] B. The Dry Dock

According to petitioner, the substantially all analysis in regard to the dry

dock "is much simpler" than the analysis regarding the tanker. In the case of the

dry dock, "[t]he entire vessel is new." On the premise that "[t]here is no aspect of

the vessel that was not newly designed during the development process",

petitioner concludes that "the development of the entirety of the Detyens 730 Dry

Dock (100%) constituted elements of a process of experimentation."

We agree that petitioner's analysis is "simple[]". But it is not the analysis

that section 1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs., requires. Again, the substantially all

test does not consider the proportion of a business component that differs from

other business components the taxpayer has developed. Instead, it measures

activities--in particular, the proportion of (i) a taxpayer's research activities in

regard to a business component that constitute elements of a process of

experimentation for a qualifying purpose to (ii) those research activities whose

costs are deductible under section 174. Accepting that the dry dock consisted

entirely of novel elements that CIS had not previously designed and built would

establish only that the design of those elements was uncertain at the start of the

development process. Resolving that design uncertainty may have required, but

did not necessarily require, a process of experimentation. See sec. 1.41-4(a)(5)(i), -52-

[*52] Income Tax Regs. ("Uncertainty concerning the development or

improvement of * * * [a] business component (e.g., its appropriate design) does

not establish that all activities undertaken to achieve that new or improved

business component constitute a process of experimentation.").

As was the case with the Apex tanker, we see no basis in the record for

concluding that CIS' research in developing the dry dock met the substantially all

requirement of section 41(d)(1)(C). The substantially all test measures activities.

Therefore, even when those activities are measured by their cost, the $1,943,265

CIS paid for supplies used in building the dry dock would not be part of the

fraction described in section 1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax Regs.

Petitioner has not established that any of the activities engaged in by CIS'

production employees in working on the dry dock should be included in the

numerator of the relevant fraction. As explained supra part II.A.2., the distinction

section 41(b)(2)(B) draws between engaging in qualified research and directly

supporting qualified research means that a production worker who directly

supports research is not engaged in that research and thus cannot be engaged in

any process of experimentation that research might involve.

Moreover, even if we were to accept that activities provided in direct

support of experimentation could be viewed as elements of the process of -53-

[*53] experimentation, it would not follow that all of the work on the dry dock

performed by CIS' production employees was part of that process of

experimentation. Petitioner asserts that "CIS's uncertainty as to the appropriate

design of the Detyens 730 Dry Dock was not resolved until the final raise and

lower test was conducted". But Detyens itself conducted that test after taking

delivery of the dry dock at CIS' facility and transporting it to Charleston, South

Carolina. CIS' actions in tendering the dry dock to Detyens and requesting final

payment demonstrate that, as far as it was concerned, it had determined an

appropriate design for the vessel and built it in accordance with that design.

CIS' conduct of its own tests upon completing construction of the dry dock,

such as the partial raise-and-lower test, does not establish that the design of every

element of the vessel remained uncertain before those tests were successfully

completed. The dry dock's failure to meet one or more of those tests might have

required the redesign of some of its elements. Again, however, we trust that CIS

would not have been compelled in that event to scrap the entire vessel and start

afresh. Accepting that the design of the vessel's various elements involved "more

than ordering off a menu", see Trinity Indus., 691 F. Supp. 2d at 692, does not

require us to accept that the construction of the entire vessel was part of a process

of experimentation. -54-

[*54] If the activities of the production employees carried out in their work on the

dry dock were included in the denominator of the relevant fraction but not the

numerator, the state of the record would, as explained above, require us to measure

the relevant activities by cost. In that event, the $146,109 of wages paid to

production employees for work on the dry dock would be included in the fraction's

denominator. Consequently, the fraction would equal or exceed 80% only if the

numerator were at least $584,436 ($584,436 = 0.8 ($584,436 + $146,109)). That

would be the case only if about 96% of the nonproduction employee wages that

petitioner claimed as QREs for all projects ($584,436 ÷ $609,276) related to the

dry dock alone--and, even then, only if all of the nonproduction employee wages

allocable to the dry dock were for activities that constituted elements of a process

of experimentation.

If the dry dock did not qualify as a pilot model, within the meaning of

section 1.174-2(a)(4), Income Tax Regs., some or even all of the activities carried

out by production employees in the vessel's construction might be excluded from

the denominator of the fraction described in section 1.41-4(a)(6), Income Tax

Regs. The fraction might measure only the proportion of the activities engaged in

by members of CIS' engineering and management teams in developing the dry

dock that involved a process of experimentation. Again, however, petitioner has -55-

[*55] not provided sufficient information about how its nonproduction employees

spent their time--by project--to allow us to make the required determination. As

was the case with the Apex tanker, the record provides us no basis for concluding

that substantially all of the research CIS conducted in developing the dry dock

constituted elements of a process of experimentation.

C. The "Shrinking-Back" Rule

If research conducted in the development of a business component as a

whole fails the process of experimentation requirement, research related to

elements of the business component may nonetheless be qualified research under

the "shrinking-back rule" provided in section 1.41-4(b)(2), Income Tax Regs.

That section provides:

The requirements of section 41(d) * * * are to be applied first at the level of the discrete business component * * *. If these requirements are not met at that level, then they apply at the most significant subset of elements of the product * * * [or other business component]. This shrinking back of the product is to continue until either a subset of elements of the product that satisfies the requirements is reached, or the most basic element of the product is reached and such element fails to satisfy the test. * * *

Like the taxpayer in Trinity Indus., 691 F. Supp. 2d at 692, petitioner has

chosen to employ an "all or nothing" strategy that prevents us from applying the

shrinking-back rule of section 1.41-4(b)(2), Income Tax Regs., to identify -56-

[*56] elements of either the Apex tanker or the dry dock whose development

involved qualified research. Petitioner did not break down engineering and

management team activities by project, much less by elements of each vessel. Mr.

Meunier categorized the activities of production employees working on the Apex

tanker between work on novel elements, work on elements similar to those of the

Penn 80, and work on elements the same as those of the Penn 80. But the record is

not sufficiently detailed to allow us to determine activities related to specific

elements of either the tanker and the dry dock that may have been part of a process

of experimentation. It may well be that CIS' research in regard to some--even

many--elements of those vessels satisfied the process of experimentation

requirement and the other tests applied in the definition of qualified research. But

petitioner has not given us the means of making that determination.

D. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, we conclude that CIS did not conduct

qualified research, as defined by section 41(d), with respect to the Apex tanker or

the dry dock. -57-

[*57] III. Issue (2): Applicability of Section 41(d)(4) Exclusions to Research on Apex Tanker or Dry Dock

Because we conclude that CIS did not conduct qualified research, within the

meaning of section 41(d), in developing either the Apex tanker or the dry dock, we

need not consider the applicability to either project of the exclusions provided in

section 41(d)(4).

IV. Issue (3): QREs Paid or Incurred in Development of Apex Tanker and Dry Dock

Our conclusion regarding Issue (1) (conduct of qualified research) also

resolves Issue (3) (amount of QREs). As noted above, the QREs petitioner

reported in respect of the Apex tanker consist of $2,505,491 of wages that CIS

paid to production employees and $3,892,142 of supply costs. Petitioner also

reported contract research expenses for that project of $17,504. In regard to the

dry dock, petitioner reported QREs of $146,109 for wages CIS paid to production

employees and $1,943,265 of supply costs. In addition, petitioner reported QREs

of $609,276 for wages paid to nonproduction employees of CIS for work on the 11

vessels whose development petitioner claims involved qualified research.

Although the definitions of the different components of QREs vary, they share a

common element in that all those amounts must bear a connection to qualified

research. If research conducted in the development of a business component is not -58-

[*58] qualified research, none of the expenses incurred in the project can be

QREs. In particular, the wages CIS paid to its employees could qualify as "in-

house research expenses" only to the extent paid or incurred for "qualified

services", as defined by section 41(b)(2)(B). To meet that definition, services

must consist of either "(i) engaging in qualified research, or (ii) engaging in the

direct supervision or direct support of research activities which constitute

qualified research." Because petitioner has not established that the research CIS

conducted in developing the Apex tanker and the dry dock was qualified research,

as defined by section 41(d), we cannot treat as qualified services, within the

meaning of section 41(b)(2)(B), any of the services provided by CIS employees in

the course of either project. Thus, none of those wages can be included in QREs

by reason of section 41(b)(1)(A) and (2)(A)(i).

Section 41(b)(3)(A) defines "contract research expenses" to mean "65

percent of any amount paid or incurred by the taxpayer to any person (other than

an employee of the taxpayer) for qualified research." Unless the research involved

in the development of the Apex tanker was qualified research, the amount that CIS

paid to Hayes would not be contract research expenses, as defined by section

41(b)(3)(A), regardless of the applicability of the exclusions for quality control

testing. Consequently, CIS' payments to Hayes are not includible in QREs under -59-

[*59] section 41(b)(1)(B). Finally, supply costs are included in in-house research

expenses only to the extent they are "paid or incurred for supplies used in the

conduct of qualified research". Sec. 41(b)(2)(A)(ii). Because petitioner has not

established that CIS' development of the Apex tanker and the dry dock involved

qualified research, the costs of the supplies used in the development of those

vessels cannot be included in in-house research expenses under section

41(b)(2)(A)(ii) and thus cannot be QREs.

For the reasons explained above, the includible amount of QREs for each of

the Apex tanker and the dry dock pursuant to section 41(a) and (b) was zero.

V. Issue (4): The TCBW Issues

Our resolution of the general issues exemplified by Projects 720 and 730

renders moot any issues unique to Projects 749 and 750 because of CIS'

collaboration with TCBW. As noted above, in their posttrial stipulation, the

parties agreed to treat the Apex tanker (Project 720) and the dry dock (Project 730)

as representative in regard to the general issues common to all of the development

projects for which petitioner reported QREs. Under that stipulation, our resolution

of Issues (1) through (3) binds petitioner for purposes of determining the QREs

from all 11 of the projects it took into account in its claimed research credit. We

have determined that no portion of the QREs petitioner reported in respect of -60-

[*60] Projects 720 and 730 are allowable for the purpose of computing the

research credit allowed by section 41(a). Extrapolating from that determination

the QREs allowable in respect of Projects 749 and 750 yields the result that the

QREs for each of those projects were also zero, without regard to any unique

issues raised by CIS' collaboration with TCBW. Our disposition of the case thus

does not require that we resolve the issues respondent raised that are unique to

Projects 749 and 750.

VI. Issues Remaining for Further Proceedings

The parties' posttrial stipulation contemplated that any second trial

necessary in this case would be limited to (1) any arguments we allow respondent

to make concerning projects other than Projects 720 and 730, (2) the calculation of

the base amount for determining any research credit allowed to petitioner for the

taxable year ended June 30, 2014, and (3) petitioner's liability for the accuracy-

related penalty respondent determined. We expect that, given our resolution of the

generally applicable issues raised by Projects 720 and 730, respondent will have

no reason to seek leave to raise additional issues in regard to other projects for

which petitioner claimed QREs. In addition, our conclusion that CIS did not pay

or incur any QREs for the taxable year in issue in connection with Project 720 or

730--or, by extrapolation, any other development project--renders moot the -61-

[*61] question of petitioner's base amount for determining any allowable research

credit. We will therefore issue an order directing the parties to advise us

concerning the need for a second trial to address petitioner's liability for the

accuracy-related penalty respondent determined or any other issues relevant to

petitioner's Federal income tax liability for the year in issue not resolved by this

opinion.

An appropriate order will be issued.