Litchfield v. Boogher

142 S.W. 302, 238 Mo. 472, 1911 Mo. LEXIS 325
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedDecember 19, 1911
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 142 S.W. 302 (Litchfield v. Boogher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Litchfield v. Boogher, 142 S.W. 302, 238 Mo. 472, 1911 Mo. LEXIS 325 (Mo. 1911).

Opinion

KENNISH, P. J.

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, perpetually enjoining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs’ right to the use of a private alley in said city.

It appears from the record that City Block 4907A, in the city of St. Louis, is a tract of land in the form of a half block, consisting of lots thirty-one to fifty-nine, inclusive, all fronting’ north on McPherson avenue. The defendant owns lots fifty-five to fifty-nine, inclusive, being the east end of the said block. Lot fifty-nine is the corner lot, and on the east abuts on King’s Highway, a street running north and south. The block is bounded on the south by an addition to said city known as Portland Place. The lots in said block have a xmif orm depth of one hundred and ninety-five feet and three and three-fourths inches. The' alleged alley in controversy is upon the south ten feet of the lots, adjoining Portland Place, and extending east and west the entire length of the block. In the year 1901 the defendant purchased lot fifty-nine and built a hotel thereon. Within a few years before and [476]*476after that time the other lots in the block were bnilt np and are now occupied as residence property. The property-owners, upon the assumption that the private alley was to be opened on the south ten feet of their lots, did not build their fences and outbuildings beyond the north line of said ten-foot strip of ground. The defendant also bnilt her hotel on this line. For some time prior to the institution of this litigation the alleged alley was occupied by telephone poles and was used, to a limited extent, for teaming purposes, for the convenience of tho'se residing in the block. In the year 1906 defendant placed a chain across the alley, at its opening on King’s Highway, the east line of her property, and forbade the public or the property-owners in the block to pass through. Thereupon plaintiffs, as property-owners in the block, brought this action to restrain and enjoin the defendant from interfering with their alleged right to use said ten-foot strip of ground as a private alley, and for general relief.

It was shown by the evidence that said Block 4907A was part of an addition to the said city of St. Louis, laid out in the year 1891 by the Park Place Realty Company. This land was then unimproved as city property, except that some fences and sidewalks were built thereon by the company to make the property more attractive to prospective purchasers. In a few years thereafter the company had disposed of all of the lots in the block. All of the deeds made to this property by the realty company, except two, contained the following reservation, viz.:

“The southern ten feet of the above-described lot is set apart to be used as a private alley, laid out for the exclusive use and benefit of present owners of lots 31 to 59, both inclusive, in City Block No. 4907, and for the use and benefit of the heirs and assigns of said lot owners, but subject to the right and privilege granted to the city of St. Louis for construction and [477]*477maintenance of sewers beneath said private alley and the right and privilege is granted to the parties in interest to dedicate to the public use forever said' ten feet strip with the consent and approval of the proprietors of lots owning’ the majority of front feet on the south line of McPherson in the subdivision known as Forest Park Place.”

The two deeds in which the foregoing reservation was not made contained the following corresponding provision, in connection with the description of the property conveyed, viz.:

“ Arid having a depth southwardly 185 feet, 10 inches more or less between parallel lines one hundred feet wide to the north line of an alley ten feet wide. ’ ’

• The deed made by the Park Place Realty Company 'to the first grantee of said lot fifty-nine, now owned by defendant, contained the reservation first above set forth, and each subsequent conveyance, until that made to defendant, contained a provision recognizing the reservation of the south ten feet of this lot for a private alley. The deed to defendant purported to convey the entire one hundred and ninety-five feet and three and three-fourths .inches, absolutely and without any reference to a reservation for alley purposes. A plat of this addition, including the block in question, was filed in the office of the recorder of deeds of the city of St. Louis, and no mention or dedication of the alley in controversy was made therein.

Upon a trial of the issues the court found for the plaintiffs and entered a decree that the temporary injunction be made perpetual as prayed! No question is presented as to the pleadings, and it is* stated by the appellant that “the sole question involved is' plaintiffs’ present right to the injunction against the defendant.”

(1) A conveyance of real estate, reserving a portion thereof as a private alley, for the use of the owners of certain property described in the deed, creates-[478]*478an easement in the property conveyed, appurtenant to the property for the use of which the easement is reserved. [Whitelaw v. Rodney, 212 Mo. 540; Rabich v. Stone, 137 Mo. App. 318; Jones on Easements, sec. 209; Elliott on Roads and Streets (3 Ed.), sec. 29; City of Chicago v. Borden, 190 Ill. 430; 14 Cyc. 1160.]

The law applicable to the facts of this case is stated in 14 Cyc., supra, as follows: “The acceptance by a grantee of a deed conveying a right of way in express terms and defining with precision the exact piece of land over which the easement is to extend is an acceptance of all it conveys, and no act is required of him to show his acceptance of the easement as the owner of the dominant tenement. . A grantee in a deed creating an easement over the. granted-premises by its acceptance becomes bound by all its restrictions, reservations and exceptions. In other words, one who acquires title through a deed expressly reserving a right of way through the land is estopped by the deed from denying the existence of the right of way.”

And in the case of Whitelaw v. Rodney, supra, l. c. 549, this court said: “All that is necessary to create an easement o.f the kind under consideration ‘is a clear manifestation of the intention of the person who is the source of title to subject one parcel of land to a restriction in its use for the benefit of another, whether that other belongs at the time to himself or to third persons, and sufficient language to make that restriction perpetual.’ [2 Wash., Real Property (4 Ed.), sec. 8, p. 303.] ”

If a reservation of an alleyway is made in a deed, so that an easement appurtenant to other property is created, the omission of said reservation in a subsequent conveyance of the servient estate will not relieve it from the burden of such easement. [McDonald v. Quick, 139 Mo. 498; City of Chicago v. Borden, supra.]

Applying the foregoing well settled principles of law to the facts of this case, it is clear that an alley [479]*479for the use of the other property-owners in the block was reserved upon-the south ten feet of defendant’s lot. This is not a case forresorting to extrinsic facts, and circumstances for the purpose of construing a latent ambiguity in a deed. All of the deeds, in apt words, plainly and unequivocally reserved the ground described and set it apart for an alley, for the use of the persons named and their assigns forever, and nothing further was necessary to be done to make such right operative.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
142 S.W. 302, 238 Mo. 472, 1911 Mo. LEXIS 325, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/litchfield-v-boogher-mo-1911.