Liston v. Julien's Pest Control

CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedOctober 25, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-00060
StatusUnknown

This text of Liston v. Julien's Pest Control (Liston v. Julien's Pest Control) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Liston v. Julien's Pest Control, (D. Utah 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

BRAD LISTON, an individual, ORDER AND MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION FOR Plaintiff, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. Case No. 2:23-cv-00060 JULIEN’S PEST CONTROL dba EVOLVE PEST CONTROL, a Nevada

limited liability company; NEPHI JULIEN, an individual; and SHAD District Judge Tena Campbell TEERLINK, an individual, Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead Defendants.

Plaintiff Brad Liston has moved for partial summary judgment against Defendants Evolve Pest Control (Evolve) and Evolve’s members, Nephi Julien and Shad Teerlink. (ECF No. 46.) While Mr. Liston brought claims for breach of contract, fraud, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, he has only moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. The court held a hearing on Mr. Liston’s motion on September 20, 2023. Having considered the parties’ briefing, the relevant law, and the parties’ arguments, the court grants Mr. Liston’s motion. BACKGROUND Mr. Liston and Evolve entered into a Sales Representative & Independent Contractor Marketing Deal Agreement (Agreement) on May 16, 2020. (Decl. Brad Liston, ECF No. 46 at 14 ¶ 1.1) Under the Agreement, Mr. Liston would work as a Sales Representative for Evolve selling pest control services in the Dallas-Fort Worth area for about five years. (Agreement, ECF

1 Mr. Liston’s motion and declaration were docketed together at ECF No. 46. Citations are to PDF pages rather than internal document pages. No. 10-1 at 2, 6; see Liston Decl. at 14 ¶ 2 (stating that the Agreement’s term was from January 1, 2021, through August 31, 2025).) Mr. Liston succeeded as a Sales Representative, and Evolve appointed him to be a Sales Representative Manager for the 2021 sales season. (Liston Decl. at 14 ¶ 3.) As Sales Manager, Mr. Liston recruited and trained a team of nine independent

contractors for Evolve. (ECF No. 46 at 2.) In 2021, Mr. Liston generated $362,491 in revenue for Evolve through personal sales. (Liston Decl. at 15 ¶ 5.) The Agreement required Evolve to pay Sales Representatives 60% commission on all of their qualifying personal sales, plus $100 per sale serviced during each payroll period. (Id. at 14 ¶ 4; ECF No. 10-1 at 7.) Sixty percent commission on $362,491 is $217,494.60. (Liston Decl. at 15 ¶ 6.) Subtracting the $46,300 Evolve already paid Mr. Liston—representing $100 per sale he serviced during the 2021 payroll period—Mr. Liston claims that Evolve owes him $171,194.60 in damages. (Id. at 15 ¶¶ 8–9.) LEGAL STANDARD A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the case. Birch v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 812 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Once the movant shows there is an absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[W]hile [courts] draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, ‘an inference is unreasonable if it requires a degree of speculation and conjecture that renders [the factfinder’s] findings a guess or mere possibility.’” GeoMetWatch Corp. v. Behunin, 38 F.4th 1183, 1200 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A., 858 F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 2017)). ANALYSIS To prevail on a breach of contract claim in Nevada,2 a party must show “1) the existence

of a valid contract, 2) a breach by the defendant, and 3) damage as a result of the breach.” Saini v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919–20 (D. Nev. 2006) (citation omitted). The parties agree that the Agreement was a valid contract. (ECF No. 46 at 5; Opp’n to Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 48 at 9.) The other two elements are disputed. I. Breach by Defendants “Failure to perform one’s obligations within the express terms of an agreement constitutes a literal breach of contract.” Saini, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 923 (citation omitted). To determine whether a party has breached, the court first looks at whether the contract’s language is clear and unambiguous. Mendenhall v. Tassinari, 403 P.3d 364, 373 (Nev. 2017). If the language is clear and unambiguous, the contract will be enforced as is. Id. In construing a

contract, every word must be given effect, and no provision shall be made meaningless. Id. Defendants breached the Agreement when they failed to pay Mr. Liston 60% commission on his qualifying personal sales. In Section 3, the Agreement states that “Evolve Pest Control shall pay Sales Rep the commissions and bonuses set forth in … Exhibit B.” (ECF No. 10-1 at

2 The parties agree that Nevada law applies. This case was brought in the District of Nevada before it was transferred to this district. (Order Granting Stipulation to Transfer Action to District of Utah, ECF No. 30.) The District of Nevada was a proper venue for this action because Defendants reside in and are citizens of Nevada. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (“A civil action may be brought in … a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the [s]tate in which the district is located.”). Where original venue is proper, and the parties jointly stipulate to change venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, courts typically apply the law of the transferor court. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1515–16 (10th Cir. 1991). 3.) Exhibit B provides that “60% commission will be paid for all qualifying personal sales. $100 will be paid per sale serviced during each payroll period.” (Id. at 7.) But “[i]f Sales Rep terminates th[e] Agreement and does not work the dates required by th[e] Agreement, Sales Rep will receive a maximum of their up front pay per each qualifying, active, paying sale and forfeits

all overrides and bonuses.” (Id. at 3.) This means that even if Mr. Liston terminated the Agreement,3 whether Defendants breached depends on if the commission Mr. Liston is asking for qualifies as “up front pay” or if it is forfeited as an “override” or “bonus.” Whether Mr. Liston terminated the Agreement is therefore not material. The Agreement does not define “up front pay.” (ECF No. 10-1.) Yet the Agreement’s language is clear and unambiguous that “commissions” and “overrides” are different. (See ECF No. 10-1 at 7 (“70% of the total remaining commission and calculated overrides owed will be paid on November 20th, of each year.”) (emphasis added).) Exhibit B references Exhibit C for “[m]arketing [d]eal [o]verrides.” (Id.

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Saini v. International Game Technology
434 F. Supp. 2d 913 (D. Nevada, 2006)
Birch v. Polaris Industries, Inc.
812 F.3d 1238 (Tenth Circuit, 2015)
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc.
928 F.2d 1509 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Liston v. Julien's Pest Control, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/liston-v-juliens-pest-control-utd-2023.