Lisette Pena Almonte v. United States Attorney General, et al.

District Court, M.D. Florida·Decided June 16, 2026·No. 3:26-cv-01479·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

LISETTE PENA ALMONTE,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-1479-WWB-PDB

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.,

Respondents. ___________________________________

ORDER

Petitioner initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) is currently detaining Petitioner at Baker County Detention Center. (Id.). According to Petitioner, ICE detained him on December 29, 2025, to begin removal proceedings and his removal order became final on February 9, 2026. (Id. at 3). He argues that his prolonged detention has violated his rights seemingly under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (See generally id.). As relief, Petitioner requests that the Court order his immediate release. (Id. at 5). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that indefinite detention of aliens raises serious constitutional concerns. 533 U.S. 678. Once an order of removal is final, ICE should make every effort to remove the alien within a reasonable time. Id. at 701. The Court also concluded that six months is a presumptively reasonable period to detain a removable alien awaiting deportation. Id. “Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court appears to view the six-month period to include the 90-day removal period plus 90 days thereafter.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). After that six-month period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the Government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut

that showing. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052. To that end, this Court considers only the post-removal order detention when determining whether the presumptively reasonable six-month period has passed. If ICE detained Petitioner for any period before his removal order became final, that fact is immaterial to the Court’s analysis. Here, Petitioner alleges that his removal order became

final on February 9, 2026. (Doc. 1 at 3). Thus, the relevant post-removal order detention began on that date—February 9, 2026. At the time Petitioner filed his Petition on June 5, 2026, he had been in post-removal order custody for 116 days (excluding the date on which the Petition was filed). Thus, any claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe and is dismissed without prejudice as premature. To the extent Petitioner seeks to raise a freestanding procedural or substantive due process claim, the Court notes that when the Supreme Court confronted the constitutional perils of indefinite immigration detention in Zadvydas, it did not instruct lower courts to start weighing the process afforded to the detainee. It set a timer. For the first six months, detention is presumptively reasonable. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. So, until that timer goes off, Zadvydas itself seemingly supplies the constitutional metric. Martinez v. Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 566 (6th Cir. 2020). “In other words, the Zadvydas standard is due process: a § 1231 detainee who fails the Zadvydas test fails to prove a due process violation.” Castaneda v. Perry, 95 F.4th 750, 760 (4th Cir. 2024). Thus, any independent due process claim fails. Finally, to the extent that Petitioner argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs his current detention, that claim lacks merits because Petitioner has a final order of removal and thus 8 U.S.C. § 1231 governs his detention. Accordingly, itis ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows: 1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice. 2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file. DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on June 16, 2026.

vs \

UNITED STAVES T T JUDG

Jax-7 C: Lisette Pena Almonte, A064414717

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Lisette Pena Almonte v. United States Attorney General, et al., (M.D. Fla. 2026).

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Related

Zadvydas v. Davis
533 U.S. 678 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Walter Melara Martinez v. Christopher LaRose
968 F.3d 555 (Sixth Circuit, 2020)
Edgardo Vasquez Castaneda v. Paul Perry
95 F.4th 750 (Fourth Circuit, 2024)