Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Judge WILLIAMS wrote the opinion, in which Judge NIEMEYER joined. Judge MICHAEL, wrote an opinion dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part.
OPINION
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
Lisa L. Ocheltree filed this action against her employer, Scollon Productions, Incorporated (Scollon Productions), alleging sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 1994 & Supp.2001). Following a jury trial, Ocheltree was awarded a substantial amount in compensatory and punitive damages. Scollon Productions appeals the district court’s denial - of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Because we agree that “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis” for the jury’s verdict, Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1), we reverse and remand with instructions for the district court to enter judgment in favor of Scollon Productions.
I.
A.
Scollon Productions is in the business of creating costumes for various characters and mascots, such as the South Carolina Gamecock mascot.1 Bill Scollon (Scollon) began the company 31 years ago and is the President, and Ellery Locklear is the Vice-President. The company currently employs approximately 50 people and is operated from a plant that is located in White Rock, South Carolina. Ocheltree was employed in' the production shop of the plant from February 1994 until her discharge in August 1995.
Ocheltree testified to numerous incidents of offensive behavior during her employment at Scollon Productions. According to Ocheltree, some of the primarily male staff engaged in open conversations about sex, made comments about the sexual habits of others on the staff, used foul, [354]*354vulgar, and profane language, and told sexually-oriented jokes. Ocheltree also testified about specific incidents that occurred during her employment, including an incident when she witnessed employees pretending to perform oral sex and other sexual acts on a mannequin, another incident when employees showed Ocheltree a picture of pierced male genitalia and asked her what she thought about it, and finally, an incident when a co-worker sang her a song in which the lyrics were “come to me, oh baby, come to me, your breath smells like cum to me.” (J.A. at 114-15.) According to Ocheltree’s testimony, the shop supervisor, Harold Hirsch, showed a photograph of a nude woman around the shop and engaged in several sexually explicit conversations with Ocheltree’s male coworkers.
Brian Hodge, a former employee of Scollon Productions, corroborated portions of Ocheltree’s testimony, stating that there was a good deal of “vulgar language and vulgar attitude throughout the shop,” and that this type of conduct happened “every day.” (J.A. at 199-200, 204.) He also testified to overhearing employees discuss sexual acts and witnessed employees simulate sexually explicit acts on mannequins. Hodge stated that Hirsch was often present during these discussions and conduct, had participated in some of the discussions, and had once made a sexually explicit comment. Hodge testified that he recalled a safety meeting attended by Hirsch wherein Ocheltree let it be known that she was offended by the conduct and that she wanted the language and the conduct to stop immediately. Hodge testified that he “speculated” that the men engaged in some of the behavior to “bother[ ]” Ochel-tree, and that the behavior got worse after Ocheltree complained. (J.A. at 202-03.)
According to Ocheltree, she attempted to speak to Scollon and Locklear about the work environment on different occasions, but she was never given the opportunity to meet with either. On at least one occasion, Scollon told her that he did not have time to meet with her and instructed her to speak to Locklear. On another occasion, when Locklear was on the telephone, Ocheltree wrote him a note stating that she needed to speak with him, but she did not indicate what she needed to speak with him about. Locklear testified that after he concluded his conversation, he attempted to speak to Ocheltree about the note, but he could not find her because she was not at her work station. He made no further attempts to follow up with her; nor did Ocheltree make any further attempts to speak with Locklear or Scollon. In 1995, after approximately 18 months with Scol-lon Productions, Ocheltree was discharged for excessive absenteeism, excessive use of the telephone during working hours, and because her husband had threatened physical violence against Locklear.
B.
On April 25, 1996, Ocheltree filed a complaint against Scollon Productions in the United States District Court of South Carolina, alleging sexual harassment and violations of South Carolina state law. Following a report and recommendation by a magistrate judge, the district court granted Scollon Productions’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. In his report and recommendation, the magistrate judge found that there was no basis for imposing liability on Scollon Productions because neither Scollon nor Locklear, who were the only two members of the corporation active in day-to-day management, were aware of or should have known of the offending activity. The district court concluded that Ocheltree failed to object to the finding that neither Scollon nor Lock-lear knew of the offending activity, [355]*355adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and granted summary judgment to Scollon Productions. Ocheltree filed a pro se appeal with this court.
Following briefing on the appeal, the Supreme Court issued its opinions in Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), which held that an employer is vicariously liable for a hostile work environment created by a supervisor, subject to an affirmative defense that allows the employer to avoid strict liability for one employee’s sexual harassment of another.2 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. Based upon Faragher and Ellerth, we vacated the district court’s judgment as to the hostile work environment claim and remanded. Ocheltree v. Scollon, 161 F.3d 3, 1998 WL 482783 (4th Cir. Aug.11, 1998). We affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Ocheltree’s state law claims because Ocheltree faded to preserve those issues on appeal. Id.
Upon remand, Scollon Productions filed three separate motions for summary judgment, each of which was denied by the district court. After the jury returned a special verdict in favor of Ocheltree for $7,280.00 in compensatory damages and $400,000 in punitive damages, Scollon Productions filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, requesting the district court to set aside the jury verdict, or, in the alternative to reduce the damages award based upon the statutory cap on punitive and compensatory damages in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(b)(3) (West 1994 & Supp.2001). The district court denied the motion to set aside the jury verdict but reduced the punitive and compensatory damages award to a total of $50,000 pursuant to § 1981a(b)(3)(A). Scollon Productions filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 404-05 (4th Cir.1999). A court should render judgment as a matter of law when “a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 50(a); see also Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 448, 120 S.Ct. 1011, 145 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000). “While we are compelled to accord the utmost respect to jury verdicts and tread gingerly in reviewing them, we are not a rubber stamp convened merely to endorse the conclusions of the jury, but rather have a duty to reverse the jury verdict[ ] if the evidence cannot support it.” Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1250 (4th Cir.1996) (internal citations omitted). “Judgment as a matter of law is proper when, without weighing the credibility of the evidence, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper [356]*356judgment.” Id. at 1249 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Title VII makes it an “unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge ... or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Because the workplace environment is one of the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” see Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986), Title VII creates a cause of action in favor of persons forced to work in a hostile workplace, see id. at 66, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (establishing “that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment”). To establish sexual harassment based upon a hostile or abusive work environment, a plaintiff is required to prove four elements: “(1) the subject conduct was unwelcome; (2) it was based on the sex of the plaintiff; (3) it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiffs conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) it was imputable on some factual basis to the employer.” Spicer v. Virginia, 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 393 (4th Cir.1999). Scollon Productions contends that the evidence was insufficient with respect to elements (2), (3), and (4). We need only address elements (2) and (3).
“Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at ‘discriminat [ion] ... because of ... sex.’ ” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). In evaluating the “because of’ prong, this court has noted that Title VII was not intended to reach “dirty jokes or sexually-based profanity spoken by a male supervisor to other male employees.” Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 (4th Cir.1996). We have further explained “that in prohibiting sex discrimination solely on the basis of whether the employee is a man or a woman, Title VII does not reach discrimination based on other reasons, such as the employee’s sexual behavior, prudery, or vulnerability.” Id. at 751; see also McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir.1996) (refusing to recognize a Title VII hostile work environment claim for discrimination “ ‘because of [the harasser’s] vulgarity and insensitivity and meanness of spirit”), abrogated on other grounds by Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). As we held in Hopkins, the critical issue in evaluating Title VII’s “because of’ prong is: “[W]ould the complaining employee have suffered the harassment had he or she been of a different gender?” Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 750 (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1981)); cf. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”).
With respect to the vast majority of offensive conduct upon which Ocheltree relies, the uneontested evidence demonstrates conclusively that Ocheltree would have been exposed to the same atmosphere had she been male. Of the cata-logued offensive behavior, only three incidents were directed toward Ocheltree — the [357]*357vulgar song, the body-piercing magazine, and the sexual acts with the mannequin.3 The remainder of the conduct occurred in group settings as part of the male workers’ daily bantering toward one another and was overheard or witnessed by Ocheltree. Cf. Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 754 (“several of the incidents upon which Hopkins relies occurred in group settings”); White v. Federal Express Corp., 939 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir.1991) (“Most of the racist incidents detailed ... were not directed against plaintiff_”). Moreover, the uncontested evidence demonstrated that the men’s behavior did not begin or change as of the date Ocheltree began working with Scollon Productions but had been ongoing before she came to work for Scollon Productions.4 (J.A. at 241-42); cf. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir.1993) (court may consider “the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environment of the workplace both before and after the plaintiffs introduction into its environs” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Additionally, setting aside the incidents involving the mannequin and the vulgar song, there was no evidence demonstrating that the offensive behavior that occurred in Ocheltree’s presence was gender-related. The discussions certainly were sexually explicit, including the discussion regard[358]*358ing the body-piercing magazine, and while they were generally degrading, humiliating, and even insulting, they were not aimed solely at females in any way. Compare Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998 (“We have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations.”); Lack v. Wal-Mart, rnc., 240 F.3d 255, 258 (4th Cir.2001) (overturning a jury verdict for lack of evidence supporting the “because of’ prong where the supervisor regularly told sexually explicit jokes, used sexually vulgar language, and generally had an “unabashed taste for lewd humor”), with Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir.2000) (“A work environment consumed by remarks that intimidate, ridicule, and maliciously demean the status of women can create an environment that is as hostile as an environment that contains unwanted sexual advances.”). Ocheltree conceded that the conduct was equally offensive both to men and women. Two of Ocheltree’s male coworkers, Steve Zouras and John Riddle, complained to management about the other workers’ behavior. Cf. Lack, 240 F.3d at 262 (“Lack fails to come to grips with the fact that female employees (including his original co-plaintiff Susan Willis) also lodged similar complaints regarding Bragg’s behavior. This fact undercuts Lack’s claim to a substantial extent.”); id. (“In its totality, the evidence compels the conclusion that Bragg was just an indiscriminately vulgar and offensive supervisor, obnoxious to men and women alike.”). Ocheltree testified that there was never any suggestion that she engage in sexual relations with anyone at the plant, that she was not frightened by any of the behavior, that nobody touched her in a sexual or threatening manner, and that none of the comments were related in any manner to her appearance. (J.A. at 147); cf. Hartsell v. Duplex Prod., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 773 (4th Cir.1997) (“There is no allegation that Hartsell was inappropriately touched, propositioned, flirted with, taunted, or even ogled.”). Also of significance is the fact that the vulgarities alleged here, including “mother f-r,” “faggot,” “d—k head,” “p-ssy,” “blow job,” and “ass,” (J.A. at 35-36), are not “unambiguous [gender] epithet[s],” Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, Inc., 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir.2001), such that it would be reasonable to assume that they were animated by gender bias.5 The dissent disputes this final point, claiming that many of the sexually-explicit conversations portray women as “sexually subordinate” to men. Post at 370. We cannot agree that the evidence supports such a characterization; the conversations simply depict — in graphic and crude terms — heterosexual sex, including oral sex. Indeed, the conversations depict the sexual prowess of females at least to the same extent as they do males.
To demonstrate that the harassment was directed at her because of her gender, Ocheltree relies upon the testimony of Hodge, in which he stated that he believed the men acted the way they did to “bother” Ocheltree. (J.A. at 202.) Hodge conceded, however, that his testimony regarding the motivation for the conduct was [359]*359pure speculation.6 Additionally, even if the alleged harassers were intending to bother Ocheltree, there is no evidence that those participating in the offensive conduct were attempting to bother her because of her gender. On the evidence presented, the jury would not be permitted to make the inferential leap that Ocheltree’s gender motivated the men’s offensive behavior. As noted above, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that the men engaged in the same type of behavior before Ochel-tree began working at Scollon Productions, continued to engage in the behavior around the other men while Ocheltree worked there, and that several other men found the behavior equally offensive.
Hodge also testified that the behavior worsened after Ocheltree complained about the behavior at a meeting, which Ocheltree contends is evidence that the sexually explicit behavior was motivated by gender. Notably lacking, however, was evidence demonstrating that after Ochel-tree complained, the offensive behavior worsened only toward her, as opposed to worsening toward all employees. Indeed, from Hodge’s testimony, one can only conclude that the behavior worsened for all employees and was equally offensive to men and women alike. Accordingly, giving Ocheltree the benefit of all permissible inferences, none of the offensive behavior catalogued by Ocheltree was directed at her because of her gender, save the vulgar song and the simulated sex with the mannequin, which arguably could be construed as gender-related harassment, in that both could be perceived as particularly demeaning towards women or as veiled sexual propositions. Assuming, without deciding, that these two incidents constitute gender-related harassment, we next consider whether the incidents were so severe or pervasive as to have altered the terms of Ocheltree’s employment.
In analyzing the third element of a hostile work environment claim, this court has emphasized that “[n]ot all sexual harassment that is directed at an individual because of his or her sex is actionable.” Hartsell, 123 F.3d at 772 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers would be neither pervasive nor offensive enough to be actionable. The workplace that is actionable is the one that is hellish.” Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
When presented in other Title VII cases with the type of isolated, scattered incidents that are at issue here, we repeatedly have held that the conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive as a matter of law. See, e.g., Hartsell, 123 F.3d at 773 (“But the claims propounded by Hartsell — even assuming them all to be true — are so trivial, so isolated, and so far from the paradigmatic case of sexual harassment, that summary judgment was clearly appropriate.”); Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 754 (listing cases involving infrequent, isolated incidents in which we have held that harassment was not severe or pervasive as a matter of law). Thus, we have no difficulty concluding that the two arguably gender-related incidents directed at Ochel-tree during the year and a half that she was employed at Scollon Productions were not severe or pervasive for purposes of Title VII. Having failed to introduce suffi[360]*360cient evidence establishing the third element of Ocheltree’s hostile work environment claim, the claim is not cognizable as a matter of law. Accordingly, the district court erred by refusing to grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of Scollon Productions.7
C.
The dissent agrees that the gender-based conduct identified in Part A is insufficient, as a matter of law, to create a hostile or abusive work environment under this circuit’s jurisprudence. Post at 366. The dissent further agrees “that much of the sexual talk Ocheltree heard — vulgar though it may be — cannot be seen as disproportionately demeaning to women.” Post at 373-74. The dissent concludes, however, that “Oeheltree’s coworkers’ constant descriptions of their sexual exploits, including their near-obsessive interest in discussions of oral sex,” post at 374, constitute gender-based harassment and that, upon considering these conversations, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. In so concluding, the dissent relies principally upon the shock value of the salacious conduct.8 However well-intentioned the dissent’s analysis may be, it ignores or substantially discounts controlling circuit and Supreme Court Title VII jurisprudence and relies upon a number of flawed premises, warranting a somewhat extended response.
The crux of the dissent’s analysis relies on the premise that “[cjourts have ... recognized that harassing conduct can be ‘because of sex’ even when the conduct ‘is not directed at a particular individual or group of individuals, but is disproportionately more offensive or demeaning to one sex.’ ” Post at 372 (quoting Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1486, 1522-23 (M.D.Fla.1991)). It then states that a Title VII plaintiff can demonstrate that conduct is gender-based by showing that the “environment was more hostile to her because of her sex than it would have been to a man.” Post at 373. Despite the dissent’s protestations to the contrary, such an analytical framework defines “discrimination] ... because of ... sex” exclusively by reference to the potential unintended effects of offensive conduct on a particular gender, without regard to the motivation for, or intent underlying, the offensive conduct.9 Whatever merit this approach might have, it is diametrically opposed to the construction that has been given to the phrase “discriminat [ion] [361]*361... because of ... sex” throughout Title VII sexual harassment jurisprudence.10 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998 (examining the question of what “discrimination] ... because of ... sex” means and focusing on the harasser’s motivation for the offensive conduct, and thus reaffirming that the critical issue is discriminatory intent); Lack, 240 F.3d at 261 (asking whether offensive comments were “animated by Bragg’s hostility to Lack as a man”); Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 242 (4th Cir.2000) (“An employee is harassed or otherwise discriminated against ‘because of his or her gender if, ‘but for’ the employee’s gender, he or she would not have been the victim of the discrimination.”) (citing Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir.1996)); Succar v. Dade Co. Sch. Bd., 229 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir.2000) (reiterating that harassment is “because of’ gender only when the harassment is motivated by gender); Green v. Administrators of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 659 (5th Cir.2002) (approving a jury instruction that stated that jury must find that gender was the “but for” cause of the harassing conduct); Williams v. General Motors, Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir.1999) (ruling that a plaintiff must show that “but for the fact of her sex, she would not have been the object of harassment” (citation omitted)); see also DeClue v. Central Illinois Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir.2000) (discussing distinction between sexual harassment hostile work environment claim and a sexual discrimination disparate impact claim); Gillming v. Simmons Indus., 91 F.3d 1168, 1171-72 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming a jury instruction that required the jury to find that the harassing acts were intentional and motivated by gender); EEOC Comp. Manual (CCH) § 615.2(b)(3) (1987) (“[T]he crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a member or members of one sex differently from members of the other sex.”); see generally David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1697, 1772-74 (2002) (concluding that use of an “effects” test or a disparate impact test, as opposed to a motivation test, is improper when evaluating a sexual harassment claim).
Moreover, the dissent fails to explain persuasively how its analysis comports with that set forth in Lack, wherein we [362]*362explicitly rejected the argument that sexually explicit jokes and sexually vulgar language directed at, and offensive to, both genders constitute discrimination because of sex. Lack, 240 F.3d at 258 (addressing a set of sexually vulgar remarks comparable to the type and number of those at issue here); see also Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 749 (stating that Title VII does not reach “dirty jokes or sexually-based profanity spoken by a male supervisor to other male employees.”). In so holding, we relied on the fact that Lack had not introduced any evidence, comparative or otherwise, of gender-based discrimination. Lack, 240 F.3d at 262 (“Lack, however, failed to offer such evidence — or any other basis for a jury to conclude that Bragg’s conduct was not just sexually tinged harassment, but was instead harassment because of sex.”). Accordingly, far from being “a logical extension” of Title VII principles, the dissent’s analysis sharply diverges from well established case law in the Supreme Court and in virtually every circuit, including this one.
We do not dispute, of course, that sexually explicit banter can, in some circumstances, constitute gender-based discrimination, but the inquiry is always whether “but for” the plaintiffs gender, the harassment would not have occurred — not whether “but for” the plaintiffs gender, she would have felt discriminated against, irrespective of the harasser’s motivation. Ocheltree has presented no legally sufficient evidence demonstrating that her gender motivated the men’s sexually explicit conduct and conversations (save, perhaps, the mannequin and vulgar song incidents discussed above, supra at 358); i.e., no evidence demonstrating that she would not have been exposed to the same offensive behavior had she been male. Thus, she has not proven that the sexually explicit behavior upon which the dissent relies constitutes genderbased discrimination.11
The dissent’s contrary conclusion is premised not only upon an improper analytical framework but also upon an overly rigid view regarding the significance of the fact that the offensive discussions were sexual in content. The dissent would have us adopt a rule that conversations between males about their heterosexual activities in the presence of a female virtually always constitute sex-based harassment because, according to the dissent’s characterization, these conversations depict women as “sex[363]*363ually subordinate to men.”12 As the Court stated in Oncale, however, “[w]e have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998; see also id. at 81, 118 S.Ct. 998 (“[Title VII] does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex.”). Rather, the motivation for the harassment must be evaluated in light of “the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.” Id. at 81, 118 S.Ct. 998. Here, an examination of the relevant context involves an acknowledgment that the offensive conduct took place in a costume production shop where public access is controlled, not a church office, retail shop, bank, or professional office.13 In fact, were we to adopt the dissent’s rhetoric and hold that harassment inevitably is because of sex whenever “a workplace is suffused with representations of women as sexual objects,” one wonders how any business that deals routinely with sexually explicit content would escape Title VII liability.
Also incorrect is the assumption pervading the dissent that women are more insulted and demeaned by sexual banter about heterosexual sex, and particularly discussions of oral sex, than are men.14 This assumption is paternalistic and contrary to Title VII itself. The Fifth Circuit has cautioned against formulating Title VII jurisprudence against the backdrop of such outdated stereotypes, stating:
A hostile environment claim embodies a series of criteria that express extremely insensitive conduct against women, conduct so egregious as to alter the conditions of employment and destroy their equal opportunity in the workplace. Any lesser standard of liability, couched in terms of conduct that sporadically ■ wounds or offends but does not hinder a female employee’s performance, would not serve the goal of equality. In fact, a less onerous standard of liability would attempt to insulate women from everyday insults as if they remained models of Victorian reticence. A lesser standard of liability would mandate not equality but preference for women: it would create incentives for employers to bend [364]*364over backwards in women’s favor for fear of lawsuits. Now that most American women are working outside the home, in a broad range of occupations and with ever-increasing responsibility, it seems perverse to claim that they need the protection of a preferential standard. The careful, heightened phrasing of a hostile environment claim, enforceable where working conditions have palpably deteriorated because of sexually hostile conduct, aims to enforce equality, not preference.
DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir.1995). Similarly, feminist literature recognizes that eliminating sexual content in the workplace is not a viable or valuable goal of hostile work environment jurisprudence and that working women can be, and usually are, as comfortable as are men with sexually explicit conduct and conversations. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683, 1794 (1998) (“Sexuality should not be conceptualized solely as a sphere of gender domination, but also as a potential arena of women’s empowerment.”); id. at 1791-92 (“[FJeminism receives a bad rap when workers are fired in the name of a feminist-inspired cause of action for merely talking about sex.... [SJuch firings may sow the seeds of backlash against protecting women from genuinely harmful forms of hostile work environment harassment.”); Barbara Gutek, Sex and the Workplace: The Impact of Sexual Behavior and Harassment on Women, Men, and Organizations 143 tbl.2 (1985) (showing that, even though 28% of a random sample of women working in male-dominated workplaces experienced frequent sexual talk or joking, a very minor percentage of those sampled considered sexual harassment to be a major problem at work); Ellen Carol DuBois & Linda Gordon, Seeking Ecstasy on the Battlefield: Danger and Pleasure in Nineteenth-Century Feminist Sexual Thought, in Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality 31, 32-39 (Carol S. Vance ed., Pandora Press 1992) (discussing how 19th-century “social purity” feminists’ emphasis on sexuality as a realm of danger and oppression for women replicated sexist and classist tendencies within wider society to separate women into those deserving of protection and those deserving of condemnation); cf. Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin and Women’s Liberation, 72 Tex. L.Rev. 1097, 1119-20 (1994) (noting that, in the context of pornography regulation, “Ij'Judges, juries, and most members of the public are likely to find most explicit and ‘deviant’ sexual depictions repell[e]nt and view as degrading not only sexual portrayals that descriptively, humorously, playfully, or ironically depict subordinated women, but also those that are explicitly intended to challenge that subordination”).
Because we view all facts and inferences in favor of Ocheltree, we have not relied on evidence regarding Ocheltree’s participation in the offensive conduct, which, for the most part, she generally denied, to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Nevertheless, to place in context the dissent’s description of the environment at Scollon Productions, we note there is substantial evidence that Ocheltree does not fit the dissent’s model of femininity. Several witnesses testified that they heard Ocheltree talk about her “pet name” for her husband’s penis and other sexual matters. (J.A. at 239-40, 278.) These witnesses also testified that Ocheltree brought a picture of herself to work in which she was dressed in a bikini and asked a co-worker if he thought it was sexy. One coworker testified that Ochel-tree brought a picture into work of a wall upon which her husband had written her name in urine. The coworker also testi[365]*365fied about an occasion when two other workers were discussing whether to “use six or eight inch domes” to construct the head of one of the costumes, and Ocheltree “volunteer[ed] that she was not interested in six or eight inches because she had twelve inches waiting for her at home.” (J.A. at 240, 343.) With respect to the body-piercing book, a coworker testified that Ocheltree voluntarily looked at the book “by herself’ while on break.15 (J.A. at 343.) This evidence would suggest that Ocheltree was not any more sensitive to vulgarity than some of her male counterparts. Thus, in concluding that “a reasonable woman” would be more offended and demeaned by sexually explicit conversations than a man, the dissent adopts the very stereotypes that Title VII was designed to eradicate.
In sum, the dissent misapprehends the controlling law, ignores the context in which the offensive behavior took place, and attempts to transmute Title VII into a neo-Victorian chivalry code designed to protect what the dissent imagines to be the tender sensitivities of contemporary women. Such a requirement of preferential and paternalistic treatment would be a strange interpretation of statutory language that demands equality. For the above-stated reasons, we are constrained to reject the dissent’s overly broad conception of when harassment constitutes “dis-criminat[ion] ... because of ... sex” in a hostile work environment claim.
D.
Finally, in response to the dissent’s repeated assertions that we have not given proper deference to the jury’s verdict, it bears mention that the jury should not have been given the opportunity to consider Ocheltree’s claim because, as a matter of law, the evidence of sexual harassment was insufficient to submit the claim to the jury. The fact that the claim was improperly submitted to the jury does not allow us, as the dissent suggests, to affirm the jury’s verdict on the basis of evidence that is legally insufficient to support the verdict. Our holding in this regard is neither novel nor exceptional; we consistently have granted judgment as a matter of law when presented in other Title VII cases with conduct of the type alleged by Ocheltree. See, e.g., Lack, 240 F.3d at 258, 262 (overturning a jury verdict on similar evidence presented here); Hartsell, 123 F.3d at 768-69, 772-73 (concluding that Hartsell was not entitled to proceed to trial when coworker referred to Hartsell as a “minivan driving mommy,” and made comments such as “[W]hy don’t you go home and fetch your husband’s slippers like a good little wife, that’s exactly what my wife is going to do for me,” and “We’ve made every female in this office cry like a baby. We will do the same to you.”); Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 187-88 (4th Cir.1989) (affirming directed verdict in Title VII case despite evidence that female police officer was subjected to pornographic material placed in her station mailbox and to fellow officers’ sexually explicit conversations); Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 751 (noting that “because of ... sex in Title VII does not mean because of the victim’s ... vulnerability to sexually-focused speech or conduct” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.1995) (“The concept of sexual harassment is designed to protect working women from the kind of male attentions that can make the workplace hellish for women.... It is not de[366]*366signed to purge the workplace of vulgarity”)- To the extent the dissent would have us employ a more lenient standard due to the extremely distasteful nature of the facts of this case, we agree that there exists “a profound difference in our respective approaches to reviewing a jury verdict.” Post at 380.
III.
Regardless of how repulsive we find the behavior to have been during and before Ocheltree’s employment with Scollon Productions, we are compelled to conclude that the conduct does not give rise to an actionable claim for sexual harassment under Title VII. As we stated in Hopkins: “While we do not approve of [the plaintiffs co-worker’s] apparent willingness to offend and provoke employees with his ambiguously sexual innuendoes, Title VII was not designed to create a federal remedy for all offensive language and conduct in the workplace.... ” Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 754. “There perhaps ‘ought to be a law against’ ... puerile and repulsive workplace behavior ... in order to protect the victims against its indignities and debilitations, but ... Title VII is not that law.” Id. at 752 (quoting McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196). “Ultimately ... our role as courts is limited to faithfully interpreting the statutes enacted by the Congress and signed into law by the President,” Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 144, and Title VII was not enacted as a workplace code for “gentlemanly conduct” or chivalry. Thus, we conclude that the district court erred by denying Scollon Productions’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, and we reverse and remand for the district court to enter judgment in favor of Scollon Productions.16
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.