Lisa Boggess, as administrator of the Estate of Brent Boggess, and as next friend to minors Z.B. and J.B., Drake L. Boggess, individually, and Kim Buttshaw, individually v. City of Waterloo and Kenneth Schaff

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: May 1, 2026
• Docket: 25-0559
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 25–0559

Submitted March 25, 2026—Filed May 1, 2026

Lisa Boggess, as administrator of the Estate of Brent Boggess and as next friend to minors Z.B. and J.B.; Drake L. Boggess; and Kim Buttshaw,

Appellants,

vs.

City of Waterloo and Kenneth Schaff,

Appellees.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David P.

Odekirk, judge.

The plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s summary judgment applying

the statutory immunity in Iowa Code § 670.4A to dismiss their common law tort

claims arising from a fatal police shooting. Reversed and Case Remanded.

Waterman, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

David A. O’Brien of Dave O’Brien Law, Cedar Rapids; Connor N.

Mulholland of Mueller, Schmidt, Mulholland & Cooling, PLLC, Des Moines; and

Neven J. Mulholland of Johnson, Mulholland, Cochrane, Cochrane, Yung &

Engler, P.L.C., Fort Dodge, for appellants.

Bruce L. Gettman, Jr., Adam J. Babinat, and Luke M. Zahari of Redfern,

Mason, Larsen & Moore, P.L.C., Cedar Falls, and Timothy C. Boller of Weilein &

Boller, P.C., Cedar Falls, for appellees. 2

Waterman, Justice.

Waterloo police officer Kenneth Schaaf fatally shot an unarmed driver,

Brent Boggess, moments after Boggess crashed head-on into an occupied squad

car following a prolonged, low-speed chase. This civil action was filed against the

City of Waterloo and Schaaf alleging the police shooting was unjustified. The suit

sought recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The defendants removed

the case to federal court, which granted their motion for summary judgment

dismissing the § 1983 claims based on Harlow qualified immunity.1 Boggess v.

City of Waterloo, No. C23–2057–LTS–MAR, 2024 WL 3928889, at *11 (N.D. Iowa

Aug. 23, 2024). The federal court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the state claims, id. at *12, and the litigation resumed in the Iowa District

Court for Black Hawk County. That court in turn relied on issue preclusion to

grant the defendants’ renewed motion for summary judgment under a similar

qualified immunity in Iowa Code § 670.4A (2022).

The plaintiffs appealed, and a few months later, in another case, our court

held that § 670.4A is inapplicable to common law tort claims, Doe v. W. Dubuque

Cmty. Sch. Dist., 20 N.W.3d 798, 806–08 (Iowa 2025). Schaaf and the City argue

that Doe was wrongly decided and urge our court to overrule or distinguish it.

We retained the appeal and now apply Doe and its progeny and our law on issue

preclusion to reverse the district court’s summary judgment ruling.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The police chase that ended with this fatal shooting began in the early

morning hours of November 16, 2021. Officer Connor Weber was on patrol in

Waterloo. He radioed dispatch to report that a man (later identified as Boggess)

1See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 3

attempted to strike him with his truck. Weber activated his emergency lights and

siren and pursued Boggess’s Chevrolet Silverado. Other officers joined the chase.

Boggess took evasive action, including driving into yards and through a

waterway. Eventually, Boggess stopped his truck in an alley where several

officers on foot “tried to speak and reason with Boggess through his open

driver’s-side window.” Boggess, 2024 WL 3928889, at *3. Officer Nick Weber (no

relation to Connor) was in a police cruiser stopped in the alley in front of Boggess.

Schaaf approached on foot and saw Boggess suddenly accelerate forward,

reaching a “top speed of 8 mph before colliding with Weber’s vehicle.” Id. “Schaaf

fired six rounds at Boggess in rapid succession after the impact.” Id. “Multiple

rounds struck Boggess resulting in his death.” Id.

In November 2022, Boggess’s widow filed this lawsuit against the City and

Schaaf. She seeks money damages as administrator of the Estate of Brent

Boggess and on behalf of their minor children. The lawsuit alleged Schaaf’s “use

of excessive force” caused Boggess’s “wrongful death” in violation of article I, § 8

of the Iowa Constitution, an implied cause of action for money damages

recognized in Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017), overruled by,

Burnett v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 2023). In response to Burnett overruling

Godfrey, the plaintiffs amended their petition to add federal excessive force

claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983. The defendants removed the case to federal court.

The parties conducted discovery including depositions of the officers and review

of body camera and dash camera videos. The defendants moved for summary

judgment on grounds of federal qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding qualified immunity shields a government

official from individual liability when his conduct does not violate “clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 4

have known”). The plaintiffs resisted. The federal court reviewed the evidentiary

record and concluded:

Plaintiffs have come forward with sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude Schaaf violated Boggess’ constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure by using deadly force under these circumstances. Based on the totality of the circumstances including the low-speed chase, the lack of any indication that Boggess was armed or had committed a serious crime, the position of Boggess’ vehicle surrounded by law enforcement in the alley and that his vehicle had come to a stop immediately before the use of deadly force, a reasonable jury could conclude that deadly force was objectively unreasonable as there was no risk of serious bodily injury to anyone on the scene.

Boggess, 2024 WL 3928889, at *9 (footnote omitted). But the federal court went

on to grant the motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the specific

right at issue was not clearly established:

Plaintiffs have cited no other precedent demonstrating it was clearly established that it was objectively unreasonable for an officer to use deadly force under these circumstances at the time Schaaf fired his weapon. When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Weber remained in his vehicle at the time Boggess accelerated towards him. Plaintiffs have cited no case law clearly establishing that an officer may not use deadly force against a driver who accelerates head on toward an occupied police vehicle, even from a short distance away, and with the knowledge of the events that led up to that moment. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has recognized that an officer did not violate clearly established law by firing at a fleeing vehicle to prevent possible harm to “occupied vehicles in [the driver’s] path,” as well as other officers on foot whom she believed were in the immediate area and other citizens who might have been in the area. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004) (per curiam). Without identifying clearly established law, such that Schaaf was on notice at the time that his actions violated Boggess’ constitutional rights, plaintiffs have failed as a matter of law to show that Schaaf is not entitled to qualified immunity. As such, Schaaf is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim. 5

Id. at *11 (alteration in original). The federal court declined to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims. Id.

at *12. The case resumed in the Iowa District Court.

The plaintiffs’ fifth amended petition alleged Iowa common law claims for

assault (count I), battery (count II), and a third claim entitled “Wrongful Use of

Deadly Force by a Law Enforcement Officer as Expressly Provided by Statute”

(count III), which cited Iowa Code §§ 704.12 and 804.8, statutes governing police

use of force during arrests. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the

basis of the qualified immunity in Iowa Code § 670.4A and on issue preclusion

based on the federal court summary judgment applying Harlow. The plaintiffs

resisted. The district court concluded that § 670.4A effectively adopted Harlow

qualified immunity, and it applied issue preclusion based on the federal ruling

to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing counts I, II,

and III. The plaintiffs appealed from that final judgment, and a few months later,

we held in Doe that § 670.4A does not apply to common law tort claims. 20

N.W.3d at 806–08. The plaintiffs argue that Doe is dispositive and mandates

reversal. The defendants urge us to overrule or narrow Doe to affirm the district

court’s summary judgment. We retained the case.

II. Standard of Review.

We review district court rulings granting summary judgment for correction

of errors at law. Clark v. State, 955 N.W.2d 459, 463 (Iowa 2021). “[W]hether the

elements of issue preclusion are satisfied is a question of law.” Id. at 464 (quoting

Emps. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Van Haaften, 815 N.W.2d 17, 22 (Iowa 2012)). We review

the district court ruling on issue preclusion for legal error. Id. 6

III. Analysis.

We must decide whether the district court erred by granting the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment under § 670.4A. The district court

applied issue preclusion based on the federal court summary judgment

dismissing the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim under Harlow. The district court did not

have the benefit of our subsequent decision in Doe. In Doe, we held that § 670.4A

does not apply to common law claims. 20 N.W.3d at 806–08. The defendants on

appeal argue that Doe was wrongly decided and should be overruled or narrowed

to affirm the district court’s summary judgment. The plaintiffs argue that Doe

mandates reversal. We agree with the plaintiffs and also conclude that the

district court erred by applying issue preclusion.

The defendants raise colorable arguments why § 670.4A should apply to

common law claims. They note that Doe involved only negligence claims and

contend that Doe “painted with too broad a brush” to sweep in intentional tort

claims without adversarial briefing on that issue. They argue the text and

legislative history of § 670.4A, the “Back the Blue Act,” demonstrate that the

immunity encompasses common law claims. But we reached a different

conclusion in Doe, and we reaffirm that conclusion now.

“Stare decisis alone dictates continued adherence to our precedent absent

a compelling reason to change the law.” Book v. Doublestar Dongfeng Tyre Co.,

860 N.W.2d 576, 594 (Iowa 2015).2 We have already applied Doe’s holding in

several subsequent cases rejecting immunity under § 670.4A for common law

tort claims. See, e.g., Mormann v. City of Manchester, 27 N.W.3d 820, 825, 830

2Doe overruled Nahas v. Polk County, 991 N.W.2d 770 (Iowa 2023), which had applied the

heightened pleading requirement in § 670.4A to intentional tort claims. See Doe, 20 N.W.3d at 806 (“The qualified immunity defense and the heightened pleading standard apply [i]n toto or not at all. To the extent Nahas said something different, we overrule it . . . .” (citation omitted)). 7

(Iowa 2025) (affirming judgment for plaintiffs on assault and battery claims

against police officer arising from use of excessive force to end police chase);3

City of Davenport v. Am. Fam. (In re Davenport Hotel Bldg. Collapse), 27 N.W.3d

270, 273 (Iowa 2025) (“The qualified immunity provisions in § 670.4A do not

apply to the common law tort claims asserted against the City defendants in this

case.”); Est. of Kahn v. City of Clermont, 22 N.W.3d 252, 258 (Iowa 2025)

(reinstating common law tort claims that the district court had dismissed under

§ 670.4A); see also Montague v. Skinner, 30 N.W.3d 213, 218 (Iowa 2026)

(following Doe to hold the “essentially identical” immunity provision in § 669.14A

of the Iowa Tort Claims Act does not apply to common law claims).

We see no compelling reason to overrule these precedents. Applying these

precedents, we reverse the district court’s summary judgment ruling and

reinstate the plaintiffs’ common law tort claims. The parties agree that count I

(assault) and count II (battery) are common law claims.

Count III, however, alleges violations of Iowa Code § 704.12, which

provides, “A peace officer or other person making an arrest or securing an

arrested person may use such force as is permitted by sections 804.8, 804.10,

804.13 and 804.15,” and violations of Iowa Code § 804.8, which states,

1. A peace officer, while making a lawful arrest, is justified in the use of any force which the peace officer reasonably believes to be necessary to effect the arrest or to defend any person from bodily harm while making the arrest. However, the use of deadly force or a chokehold is only justified when a person cannot be captured any other way and either of the following apply:

a. The person has used or threatened to use deadly force in committing a felony.

3The Mormann v. City of Manchester defendants conceded in supplemental briefing that

Doe defeated their claimed immunity from assault and battery claims under § 670.4A. 27 N.W.3d at 830. 8

b. The peace officer reasonably believes the person would use deadly force against any person unless immediately apprehended.

We have “concluded that the substantive qualified immunity protections in

§ 670.4A appl[y] only to alleged claims involving violations of statutory or

constitutional rights, not to common law tort claims.” Est. of Kahn, 22 N.W.3d

at 258 (citing Doe, 20 N.W.3d at 806–07). The defendants have argued that the

plaintiffs’ claims in count III, which involve alleged violations of “statutory

rights,” are thereby subject to the qualified immunity in § 670.4A. But this issue

is not briefed on appeal. In our view, § 804.8 sets an objective standard of

reasonableness that provides police officers with a justification defense to a

common law tort claim. See White v. Harkrider, 990 N.W.2d 647, 656 (Iowa 2023)

(characterizing justification for use of force under § 804.8 as “an affirmative

defense to assault that the defendants must plead and prove”); see also

Williams v. City of Burlington, 516 F. Supp. 3d 851, 873 (S.D. Iowa 2021)

(describing § 804.8 as setting an “objective reasonableness standard” for police

use of deadly force). We decline to decide in the first instance whether excessive

force claims alleging violations of Iowa Code §§ 707.12 and 804.8 are common

law claims or rather claims involving statutory rights subject to the immunity

provision in § 670.4A under Doe and Estate of Kahn v. City of Clermont. See

Benskin, Inc. v. W. Bank, 952 N.W.2d 292, 307 (Iowa 2020) (“Although the issue

was minimally raised, it wasn’t briefed, and we decline to reach it now. ‘A

supreme court is “a court of review, not of first view.” ’ ” (quoting Plowman v. Fort

Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 413 (Iowa 2017))).

Instead, we resolve the appeal as to count III on a different ground. We

determine that the district court erred by relying on issue preclusion to grant

summary judgment. A threshold requirement for employing issue preclusion is

that “the issue concluded must be identical.” Clark, 955 N.W.2d at 465–66 9

(quoting Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1981)). The

federal district court decided that the federal Harlow immunity required

dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims under a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

plaintiffs’ Iowa and federal excessive force claims and the immunities under

Harlow and § 670.4A may be similar, but we cannot conclude that the state and

federal claims and defenses are identical. The elements of common claims for

assault and battery are not identical to the elements of an excessive force claim

under § 1983 alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. And the immunity defense under Iowa Code § 670.4A does not

apply to assault and battery claims in any event. We hold that the district court

erred by relying on issue preclusion to enter summary judgment. We reinstate

count III as well as counts I and II on that basis.

IV. Disposition.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s summary

judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

Reversed and Case Remanded.