Lipton v. Kiamie Princess Marion Realty Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Lipton v. Kiamie Princess Marion Realty Corp.

2 A.D.3d 318, 768 N.Y.S.2d 603, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13672

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 23, 2003

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 2 A.D.3d 318 (Lipton v. Kiamie Princess Marion Realty Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lipton v. Kiamie Princess Marion Realty Corp., 2 A.D.3d 318, 768 N.Y.S.2d 603, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13672 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louise Gruner Gans, J.), entered on or about April 7, 2003, which, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion insofar as it sought summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs first cause of action, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant dismissing the complaint.

The lease agreement sought to be enforced by plaintiff was signed on behalf of defendant landlord by a person who was not an officer, director, shareholder or employee of defendant, and whose authority, if any, to bind defendant in the matter was not set forth in a signed writing. The lease agreement is therefore unenforceable under the statute of frauds (General Obligations Law § 5-703 [2]; see Commission on Ecumenical Mission & Relations of United Presbyt. Church v Roger Gray, Ltd., 27 NY2d 457, 464 [1971]; Urgo v Patel, 297 AD2d 376, 377 [2002]; DeMartin v Farina, 205 AD2d 659, 660 [1994]).

In view of the foregoing, we need not consider the other issues raised by the parties. Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Tom, Ellerin, Lerner and Friedman, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louise Gruner Gans, J.), entered on or about April 7, 2003, which, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion insofar as it sought summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs first cause of action, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant dismissing the complaint.

The lease agreement sought to be enforced by plaintiff was signed on behalf of defendant landlord by a person who was not an officer, director, shareholder or employee of defendant, and whose authority, if any, to bind defendant in the matter was not set forth in a signed writing. The lease agreement is therefore unenforceable under the statute of frauds (General Obligations Law § 5-703 [2]; see Commission on Ecumenical Mission & Relations of United Presbyt. Church v Roger Gray, Ltd., 27 NY2d 457, 464 [1971]; Urgo v Patel, 297 AD2d 376, 377 [2002]; DeMartin v Farina, 205 AD2d 659, 660 [1994]).

In view of the foregoing, we need not consider the other issues raised by the parties. Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Tom, Ellerin, Lerner and Friedman, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

2 A.D.3d 318, 768 N.Y.S.2d 603, 2003 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13672, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lipton-v-kiamie-princess-marion-realty-corp-nyappdiv-2003.

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