Lipscomb v. Corbin

District Court, W.D. Virginia·Decided December 5, 2022·No. 7:22-cv-00511·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION

DANIEL THOMAS LIPSCOMB, ) Plaintiff, ) Civil Case No. 7:22-cv-00511 ) v. ) ) By: Elizabeth K. Dillon CLAY A. CORBIN, et al., ) United States District Judge Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Daniel Thomas Lipscomb, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, has filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants have violated his constitutional rights by denying him the opportunity to see an optometrist so he can receive prescription glasses. Lipscomb names eight defendants, who are properly considered in two groups. First, there are two defendants (Captain G. Hurlock and Nurse Seymour), both of whom work at Prince Williams Adult Detention Center (PWADC). The remaining defendants interacted with Lipscomb at the Northwestern Regional Adult Detention Center (NRADC), where he is currently housed. These defendants (collectively the NRADC Defendants) are Clay A. Corbin, Captain Tana Jones, LPN Kovak, Nurse A. Tanner, Practitioner Robert Dryden, and Captain Heath Custer. The case is before the court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). For the reasons set forth herein, Lipscomb’s claims against defendants Hurlock and Seymour will be dismissed. I. BACKGROUND Lipscomb began wearing glasses in 2012. While at PWADC in 2018, he was seen by an outside optometrist and was prescribed glasses. He left PWADC in August 2019.1

1 Based on information obtained in other cases brought by Lipscomb, Lipscomb was released from custody and began a term of probation. He later was accused of violating probation and was arrested. On January 24, 2020, he was admitted to NRADC. During the medical intake session, Lipscomb completed paperwork stating that he wears glasses, but he did not have them in his possession. He later began submitting sick call requests asking to have his eyes examined and asking for glasses. He claims that the lack of corrective eyewear is causing him a number of

symptoms. These include a “stabbing pain” in his right eye, an inability to see even “five feet in front of” him, seeing double, blurry vision in both eyes, and headaches from straining to see. (Compl. at 3, 5, Dkt. No. 1.) He also alleges that his eyesight is getting worse. (Id. at 5.) Further, despite repeated requests to be taken to an optometrist and despite grieving the denial of his requests, he has not been taken to an optometrist or received glasses.2 In his first claim, Lipscomb asserts that all of the defendants have violated his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent toward his serious medical need for prescription glasses. His complaint describes his second claim as: “Violation of 14th Amendment Due Process, pretrial detainee Rights. Equal Protection. There has been other people held at NRADC that have been take[n] to eye doctors.” (Compl. 2.)3

II. DISCUSSION Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the court must conduct an initial review of a “complaint in

2 According to a response to his grievance from Captain Jones, Lipscomb may obtain an appointment with an optometrist if he pays the cost and transportation cost, but he is not entitled to the NRADC paying for such an appointment because his “[b]lurred vision (myopia) is not a serious medical condition” and he has “no prior diagnosis of a serious medical condition involving [his] eyesight.” (Dkt. No. 1-1, at 2.)

3 Lipscomb identifies himself as a pretrial detainee in his complaint, although the issue of his status has arisen in other cases he has filed and poses an interesting legal question. See, e.g., Lipscomb v. Whitley, No. 7:20CV00411, 2022 WL 2680614, at *6 (W.D. Va. July 12, 2022). Assuming he is a pretrial detainee as he claims, the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, governs his claim concerning the denial of medical care. Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300 (2021). The Eighth Amendment standards have previously been adopted in addressing such claims, although there is a circuit split as to whether Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), has altered that standard for pretrial detainees. See Mays, 992 F.3d at 301 & n.4 (explaining the split and collecting authority). In Mays, the Fourth Circuit declined to resolve the issue because the case before it did not require it to do so. See id at 300–01. Similarly, because the court’s resolution of Lipscomb’s claims herein would be the same under either standard, it is not necessary to resolve the issue here. a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (requiring court, in a case where a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, to dismiss the case if it is frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted). Pleadings of self-represented litigants are accorded

liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). Liberal construction does not mean, however, that the court can ignore a clear failure in pleadings to allege facts setting forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). “To state a claim under § 1983[,] a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Loftus v. Bobzien, 848 F.3d 278, 284–85 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Liability under § 1983 is “personal, based upon each defendant’s own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th

Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted). Thus, a § 1983 claim requires factual detail about each defendant’s personal involvement. See Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that liability will lie under § 1983 only “where it is affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally” in the violation of plaintiff’s rights and affirming dismissal of claim where plaintiff did not allege personal involvement by defendant) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)). To demonstrate deliberate indifference of a constitutional magnitude, an inmate must show that (1) he has a medical condition that has been “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention” and (2) the defendant “had actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s serious medical needs and the related risks, but nevertheless disregarded them.” Gordon v. Schilling, 937 F.3d 348, 356–57 (4th Cir. 2019).

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