IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
LINNELL WEST, No. 88505-7-I
Appellant,
DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FISHERMEN’S FINEST HOLDINGS, LLC,
Respondent.
COBURN, J. — Linnell West sued his employer Fishermen’s Finest Holdings, LLC (FFH) for maritime remedies for hand injuries he claimed that he suffered while working at the company’s shipyard and for the worsening of such injuries that occurred during his subsequent work aboard one of the company’s fishing vessels while it was at sea. West brought claims as a seaman under the federal Jones Act 1 and the general maritime law doctrines of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure. FFH moved for summary judgment on the basis that West was not a seaman when he was working at the shipyard and was thus not covered by the Jones Act or general maritime law. The trial court granted FFH’s motion as to West’s claims related to his injuries at the shipyard, which West appealed.
Because West’s appeal is not from a “final judgment” within the meaning of RAP
1 46 U.S.C. § 30104.
2.2(a)(1) and does not warrant discretionary review, appellate review of the trial court’s interlocutory order is not appropriate. We dismiss the appeal and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
FFH manages fishing vessels, including the American No. 1. During fishing seasons, the American No. 1 makes various fishing trips to Alaska. American No. 1 crewmembers are contracted by FFH on a single-trip basis. In between fishing seasons, FFH employs laborers to perform maintenance and repair projects on the vessels in the shipyard. In late 2022 FFH contracted with West as a crewmember for one of American No. 1’s fishing trips. West subsequently worked on the American No. 1 in FFH’s shipyard under a different contract before returning home to California before the end of the year. He later contracted with FFH to work as a crewmember for a second fishing trip aboard the American No. 1 in early 2023.
In February 2024 West sued FFH for work-related injuries asserting negligence under the federal Jones Act, unseaworthiness of the American No. 1, and failure to provide maintenance and cure. West alleged that he suffered the onset and exacerbation of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) during his work as a seaman subject to the Jones Act and general maritime law.
FFH moved for summary judgment on the basis that West was not a seaman at the time he allegedly began to suffer from CTS-related numbness in his hands when working at the shipyard. FFH argued, “The undisputed facts in this case establish that at the time of his alleged injury Mr. West was a land-based contractor working in shipyard …. Therefore, his Jones Act negligence and general maritime law claims should be
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dismissed.” West filed a response arguing that a question of fact remained as to whether he was a seaman at all times relevant to his claims. West asserted that he began to feel numbness and pain in both of his hands at the shipyard and that the pain and numbness worsened during his second fishing trip aboard the American No. 1. FFH indicated in reply that it was not until West was deposed that FFH discovered that West’s initial injury allegedly occurred at the shipyard, prompting its summary judgment motion based on West’s status as a land-based worker at the time he was injured at the shipyard.
At the hearing on summary judgment, the trial court sought clarification from West as to his position on the date of his injuries.
THE COURT: Let me ask you about that injury date. What date are you asking the Court to look at that [West] was injured when on the vessel, or was he injured when he was doing the dry dock work or the dock work?
[WEST’S COUNSEL]: Well, Your Honor, I think that’s one of the fact-specific things that a jury is required to determine. … [A]s [FFH’s]
counsel noted, we have taken the position that the injury occurred while [West] was doing … work in the shipyard. But there is other, you know, contemporaneous evidence … which identify the injury occurring and then being exacerbated by the work that [West] did while he was out at sea, and that’s exactly the type of thing that a jury is required to do because those are factual determinations.
THE COURT: But you, on behalf of your client, have to make a – have to take a stand. And I’m sure that you have decided whether to suggest that the initial injury occurred either while he was in – I’m going to call it dry dock. ... Whether he was – when he was working on the ship when it was not in Alaska, or whether this numbness and so forth, this issue occurred while he was on a vessel. What is it? What are you saying in your complaint as to the date that the injury began?
[WEST’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. And so our stance is that he was injured while he was in the shipyard ….
THE COURT: Okay.
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[WEST’S COUNSEL]: But that is still something that is required to be determined by the jury because there is conflicting evidence on it.
THE COURT: And you’re saying that even if the injury took place there when he was not on a vessel, when he was on the vessel in January, that injury was made worse?
[WEST’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.
The trial court granted FFH’s motion, titled, “ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S STATUS AS NON-SEAMAN.” The written order states:
This matter came before the Court on [FFH’s] Motion for Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss [West’s] claim based in maritime law because at the time of his injury Mr. West was not a seaman. ...
NOW THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS THAT there is no reasonable evidentiary basis to support a finding that at the time of his alleged injury Mr. West was a seaman. There are no genuine issues of material fact that at the time of his alleged injury Mr. West was not a seaman.
THEREFORE, [FFH’s] Motion to Dismiss [West’s] claim for injury allegedly sustained during his employment in shipyard is hereby GRANTED.
West appealed.
DISCUSSION
RAP 2.2(a)(1) permits a party to appeal from a “final judgment entered in any action or proceeding” as a matter of right. A final judgment is “one that settles all the issues in a case.” In re Det. of Turay, 139 Wn.2d 379, 392, 986 P.2d 790 (1999); see CR 54(a)(1) (providing that a “judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in the action”). In the absence of an appealable final judgment, a party seeking review is limited to discretionary review. See RAP 2.3(a), (b). We give a notice of appeal
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of a decision that is not appealable “the same effect as a notice for discretionary review.” RAP 5.1(c).
RAP 2.3(b) sets forth the specific circumstances warranting discretionary review:
(1) The superior court has committed an obvious error which would render further proceedings useless;
(2) The superior court has committed probable error and the decision of the superior court substantially alters the status quo or substantially limits the freedom of a party to act;
(3) The superior court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by an inferior court or administrative agency, as to call for review by the appellate court; or
(4) The superior court has certified, or that all parties to the litigation have stipulated, that the order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion and that immediate review of the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.
A party may typically appeal only when the trial court has finally disposed of all claims and all parties. State v. Trask, 91 Wn. App. 253, 265, 957 P.2d 781 (1998); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Owens, 177 Wn. App. 181, 192, 311 P.3d 594 (2013); see RAP 2.2(d); CR 54(a). We generally disfavor interlocutory appeals. Maybury v. City of Seattle, 53 Wn.2d 716, 721, 336 P.2d 878 (1959); Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 773, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). Piecemeal appeals of interlocutory orders are discouraged because they are disruptive to the efficient and methodical administration of justice. See Maybury, 53 Wn.2d at 721; Doerflinger v. New York Life Ins. Co., 88 Wn.2d 878, 882-83, 567 P.2d 230 (1977). Any order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims does not terminate the actions as to any of the claims or parties. Schiffman v. Hanson Excavating Co., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 681, 687-88, 513 P.2d 29 (1973). An order that adjudicates fewer than all the
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claims is “subject to revision at any time prior to the entry of a final judgment adjudicating the entire action.” Id. at 688.
A seaman may bring claims for relief based on a vessel owner’s negligence under the Jones Act 2 and a shipowner’s duty to provide maintenance and cure 3 under general maritime law. 4 Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354, 115 S. Ct. 2172, 132 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1995). Maritime actions brought in state courts are governed by both common law and statutory federal maritime law. Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc.,174 Wn.2d 70, 76, 272 P.3d 827 (2012). Both the Jones Act and a shipowner’s duty to pay maintenance and cure must be broadly and liberally construed to benefit injured seamen. See Havens v. F/T Polar Mist, 996 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that “the duty to provide a safe ship is broad” and “even the slightest negligence is sufficient to sustain a finding of liability” under the Jones Act); Gibson v. Am. Constr. Co., Inc., 200 Wn. App. 600, 609, 402 P.3d 928 (2017) (“[T]he Jones Act is to be liberally construed in favor of the injured worker.”) (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 180, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 93 L. Ed. 1282 (1949)); Dean, 177 Wn.2d at 407-08 (discussing a shipowner’s duty to pay maintenance and cure) (citing Vella, 421 U.S. at 4; Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531-32, 82 S. Ct. 997, 8 L. Ed. 2d 88 (1962)).
Under general maritime law, an injured seaman may also seek relief against their
2 Under the Jones Act, “A seaman injured in the course of employment ... may elect to bring a civil action at law, with the right of trial by jury, against the employer.” 46 U.S.C. § 30104.
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“[A] shipowner has a duty to provide maintenance and cure to a seaman who ‘becomes ill or is injured while in the service of the ship.’” Dean v. Fishing Co. of Alaska, Inc., 177 Wn.2d 399, 405-06, 300 P.3d 815 (2013) (quoting Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 3, 95 S. Ct. 1381, 43 L. Ed. 2d 682 (1975)).
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“Injured seamen do not qualify for state or federal worker compensation for on-the-jobinjuries .” Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 174 Wn.2d 70, 76, 272 P.3d 827 (2012) (citing RCW 51.12.100(1); 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G)).
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vessel owner alleging the vessel’s unseaworthiness. 5 Gibson, 200 Wn. App. at 609 (citing Chandris, 515 U.S. at 354). The unseaworthiness doctrine is broad. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499, 91 S. Ct. 514, 27 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1971). The doctrine is a form of strict liability that does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate fault. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 207-08, 116 S. Ct. 619, 133 L. Ed. 2d 578 (1996); Gravatt v. City of New York, 226 F.3d 108, 116 (2d Cir. 2000).
Federal courts have recognized that the aggravation of a seaman’s preexisting injury can support claims under the Jones Act, maintenance and cure doctrine, and/or unseaworthiness doctrine. See, e.g., Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 108-10, 108 n.1, 80 S. Ct. 173, 4 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1959) (holding that evidence supported jury’s finding that petitioner proved causation of aggravation of previously latent tubercular condition in action for maintenance and cure payments and damages under the Jones Act or, alternatively, the unseaworthiness doctrine); see also Evans v. United Arab Shipping Co. S.A.G., 4 F.3d 207, 210 (3d Cir. 1993) (the Jones Act); Messier v. Bouchard Transp., 688 F.3d 78, 83-84 (2d Cir. 2012) (maintenance and cure); Pineiro v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 191, 193 (N.D. Cal. 1945) (unseaworthiness).
Here, West sought relief based on his purported seaman status at the time he was initially injured at the shipyard as well as for the worsening of his hand injuries when he worked aboard the American No. 1 on the second fishing trip. The language of
5 “Unseaworthiness is a claim under general maritime law based on the vessel owner’s duty to ensure that the vessel is reasonably fit to be at sea.” Shoffner v. State, 172 Wn. App. 866, 873 n.2, 294 P.3d 739 (2013) (citing Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441, 121 S. Ct. 993, 148 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2001)).
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the trial court’s order specifically dismissed West’s claims that stemmed from the alleged onset of his hand injuries at the shipyard but did not address his remaining claims for the aggravation of such injuries that occurred during the second fishing trip. Therefore, the trial court’s order did not dispose of all of West’s claims for relief under maritime law and is thus not a final judgment appealable under RAP 2.2(a)(1).
We observe that FFH waited until oral argument to raise the issue of whether the trial court’s order was an appealable final judgment under RAP 2.2. See West v. Fisherman's Finest Holdings, LLC, No. 88505-7-I (Apr. 15, 2026), at 14 min., 29 sec. through 15 min., 21 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-2026041152/. Consequently, the dispute was presented to this court after both parties submitted briefing that discussed the merits of the trial court’s order as if it was the final decision in the case, and after the filing of an amicus brief that prompted West’s answer. In its response brief, FFH did not raise the issue of appealability under RAP 2.2(a)(1) but instead argued that West did not bring a claim based on the aggravation of his hand injuries. FFH argued that had West raised a claim based on the worsening of his condition, West’s “current appeal would have been an interlocutory appeal.” At oral argument, FFH acknowledged that West’s action based on the aggravation of his injuries remains for trial following the trial court’s order dismissing West’s claims specific to his initial injury at the shipyard. See West, supra, at 15 min., 27 sec. through 16 min., 6 sec.
As a matter of this court’s jurisdiction, litigants may raise the appealability of a trial court’s order at any time. See RAP 2.5(a). However, FFH had the option of raising an issue under RAP 2.2(a)(1) by moving for dismissal of the appeal upon West’s
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designation of the order in his notice of appeal, or by raising the threshold issue in its response brief. We encourage litigants to raise questions of appellate court jurisdiction as early as possible to promote efficient resolution and prevent the unnecessary expenditure of time, resources, and costs for everyone involved. See Minehart v. Morning Star Boys Ranch, Inc., 156 Wn. App. 457, 462, 232 P.3d 591 (2010) (citing Maybury, 53 Wn.2d at 721). An unnecessary delay in raising the question of whether a trial court’s order is ripe for this court’s review is antithetical to the orderly administration of justice. See Minehart, 156 Wn. App. at 462 (citing Maybury, 53 Wn.2d at 721); Fox, 115 Wn.2d at 503-04; Doerflinger, 88 Wn.2d at 882-83.
Even in treating West’s notice of appeal as a notice for discretionary review, 6 we conclude that his appeal does not meet any of the narrow standards under RAP 2.3(b). Given the record before this court and the arguments presented by West, any error in the trial court’s order is not obvious or probable. The interlocutory nature of the order does not render further proceedings useless, nor does it substantially alter the status quo or limit any party’s freedom to act as contemplated by RAP 2.3(b)(1) or (2). Accordingly, the trial court’s interlocutory order is not presently appealable, and this unripe appeal should be dismissed.
6 See RAP 5.1(c).
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We dismiss West’s appeal and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
WE CONCUR: