Linman, Scott v. Marten Transport, Ltd.

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJune 13, 2024
Docket3:22-cv-00204
StatusUnknown

This text of Linman, Scott v. Marten Transport, Ltd. (Linman, Scott v. Marten Transport, Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Linman, Scott v. Marten Transport, Ltd., (W.D. Wis. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

SCOTT LINMAN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,

OPINION and ORDER Plaintiff,

v. 22-cv-204-jdp

MARTEN TRANSPORT, LTD,

Defendant.

This proposed class action arises from a cyberattack on defendant Marten Transport, Ltd. Plaintiff Scott Linman alleges that Marten failed to adequately protect its computer network, which allowed cybercriminals to steal information that included full names and social security numbers of prospective, current, and former Marten employees. On November 16, 2023, the court denied without prejudice Linman’s unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the parties’ proposed settlement and asked the parties to address numerous concerns. Dkt. 36. In response, the parties amended their proposed settlement and Linman has filed a renewed motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. Dkt. 37. The court is persuaded that certification and preliminary approval is appropriate, and the court will also approve the proposed class notice. So, the court will grant Linman’s amended motion for preliminary approval, direct the parties to send notice to the collective and class members, set a deadline for a motion for final approval, and set a date for a fairness hearing. ANALYSIS A. Class certification Approval of the state-law class certification is governed by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23. There are three requirements for class certification under Rule 23: (1) the class must be clearly defined with objective criteria, Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015); (2) the class must satisfy the threshold requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a); and (3) the class must meet the requirements of at least one of the types of class actions listed in Rule 23(b). The court concludes that Linman has satisfied each of the relevant Rule 23 requirements: Class definition. In response to the court’s order denying Linman’s first motion for preliminary approval of the settlement, the parties have revised the settlement to define the

class as “individuals who received or were sent notice from Defendant Marten Transport, Ltd.’s September 30, 2021 to October 4, 2021 Data Incident.” Dkt. 39-1, at 3. This revised definition is clear and uses objective criteria. Numerosity. There are 35,511 potential members of the class, which is numerous enough to make joinder impractical. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Commonality, typicality, and adequacy of the named plaintiff. The claims in this case turn on whether Marten’s took adequate measures to protect its network from cyberattacks. Common questions of law or fact concerning Marten’s policies will resolve the

allegations of the entire class. The court sees no apparent conflicts between Linman’s interests and those of the rest of the class, and he has claims that are typical of the class. So these requirements are met. Adequacy of class counsel. Class counsel have significant experience litigating and obtaining settlements for similar class and collective actions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1); Dkt. 39, ¶¶ 3, 15. The court will approve Nathan D. Prosser of Hellmuth & Johnson, M.

Anderson Berry of Clayeo Arnold, A Professional Corp., and Terence R. Coates of Markovits, Stock & DeMarco, LLC as class counsel. Predominance and Superiority. Linman contends that this action satisfies Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that the action’s common questions of law or fact predominate over questions that affect only individual members, and that the controversy would best be resolved through a class action. To determine whether common questions predominate, the court considers (1) the class members’ interests in individually controlling their own claims; (2) the nature and extent of any other litigation about the controversy; (3) the desirability of

concentrating the litigation here; and (4) any management challenges that the case may present. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The main issue in this case is whether Marten failed to adequately protect the data on its network. The answer to this question will be the same regardless of the identity of individual class members, so the court concludes that common questions predominate over individual ones. A class action is superior to other methods of adjudicating the case because the large size of the class (35,511 class members) and the small amount of damages for each class or collective member makes individual lawsuits impractical. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). B. Preliminary approval The court may grant preliminary approval when the court concludes that it “will likely be able to” give final approval to the settlement, applying the factors listed in Rule 23(e)(2).1

These include the adequacy of relief to the class, the relative fairness of the settlement for each class member, and the reasonableness of the attorney fees. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). The court raised several concerns about the proposed settlement in its previous order: (1) Linman did not explain how the parties arrived at their settlement figure, and Linman provided no metric for determining the fairness of the settlement; (2) Linman did not explain how the estimated $50 pro rata payment to each class member was calculated; (3) the parties did not justify the incentive award for the class representative; (4) Linman did not explain the proposed method of distributing relief to the class; and (5) Linman provided flawed and

insufficient information about attorney fees. The court is satisfied that Linman addressed these concerns. Under the agreement, Marten is to pay $520,000 to establish a common settlement fund, which will be used to pay attorney fees, litigation expenses, an incentive award to Linman, the cost of notice and administrative expenses, and payments to class members. The amended

1 One of the concerns raised in the court’s previous order was that Linman did not discuss the factors enumerated in the 2018 amendment to Rule 23 that courts must consider. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). Linman’s amended motion for preliminary approval still relies on an outdated standard for approving a class settlement agreement. Dkt. 38, at 21–22 (citing In re AT & T Mobility Wireless Data Services Sales Litig., 270 F.R.D. 330, 346 (N.D. Ill. 2010) and Wong v. Accretive Health, Inc., 773 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2014)). The other revisions in the amended motion provide sufficient information for the court to grant preliminary approval notwithstanding Linman’s citation of the old standard, but Linman’s motion for final approval of the settlement should focus on the factors identified in the current version of Rule 23. settlement agreement and Linman’s brief in support of the amended motion for preliminary approval estimate the following amounts for fees and expenses:  $152,000 for attorney’s fees;  $15,000 for litigation expenses;

 $44,000 for administrative costs; and  $5,000 for Linman’s incentive award. Dkt. 38, at 9–13 and Dkt. 39-1, at 5, 7, 15.

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