1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 LINGLING FAN, Case No. 25-cv-07860-VKD
9 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 10 v. FORMA PAUPERIS; (2) SCREENING COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915; AND (3) DENYING WITHOUT CALIFORNIA UNIVERSITY - SILICON PREJUDICE MOTION TO SEAL 12 VALLEY, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 12, 13, 14 13 Defendants. 14 On August 30, 2025, Lingling Fan, who is representing herself, filed a complaint in the 15 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”), alleging (among other 16 things) violation of the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. Pursuant to an order issued by 17 SDNY, the action was transferred to this District. See Dkt. No. 6. Following transfer, this Court 18 issued an order directing Ms. Fan to indicate whether she intended to seek leave to proceed in 19 forma pauperis (“IFP”) by filing an updated IFP application on this District’s IFP application 20 form.1 Dkt. No. 9. Now pending before this Court are Ms. Fan’s IFP application and her motion 21 to seal her IFP application and contact information. Dkt. Nos. 12, 13, 14. 22 For the reasons discussed below, this order grants Ms. Fan’s IFP application. Additionally, 23 this order denies without prejudice Ms. Fan’s sealing motion; stays service of process; and screens 24 her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Ms. Fan is directed to take corrective action by 25 November 21, 2025, or her case may be dismissed. 26 27 1 I. IFP APPLICATION 2 A court may allow a plaintiff to prosecute an action in federal court without prepayment of 3 fees or security if the plaintiff submits an affidavit showing that he or she is unable to pay such 4 fees or provide such security. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A court may dismiss a case filed without 5 the payment of the filing fee whenever it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; 6 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a 7 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). “[S]ection 8 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners.” Lopez v. 9 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). 10 Following the transfer of this action, the Court ordered that if Ms. Fan presently seeks 11 leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, she should complete this District’s IFP 12 application form and file that form with the Court. See Dkt. No. 9. That order appended a 13 courtesy copy of the IFP application form and also provided Ms. Fan with a link where the form 14 can be accessed on this District’s website. Id. Rather than file a renewed IFP application on the 15 appropriate form, Ms. Fan re-filed a copy of her August 26, 2025 IFP (short form) application that 16 she filed in SDNY. See Dkt. No. 12; see also Dkt. No. 2. 17 Although Ms. Fan failed to comply with the Court’s order to file a renewed IFP application 18 as directed, the Court has considered her short form application, which reflects that she has no 19 income or assets, and that she has some debt. Dkt. No. 12. On this basis, the Court finds that Ms. 20 Fan is eligible for IFP status and grants her application. 21 II. REVIEW OF COMPLAINT 22 While pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a complaint does not state a claim if it fails 23 to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 24 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must include 25 facts that are “more than labels and conclusions, and formulaic recitation of the elements of a 26 cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 27 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 1 the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 679. 2 According to her complaint, Ms. Fan is a practitioner of traditional Chinese medicine. 3 Dkt. No. 1 at ECF 1. Defendants are California University-Silicon Valley (“University”), Ivie 4 Chen, and Philip Yang. Papers appended to the complaint identify Ms. Chen as the Director of 5 Student Services. See id. at ECF 8. Mr. Yang is identified as President of the University. See id. 6 at ECF 7, 12. Ms. Fan alleges that defendants fraudulently duped her into enrolling at the 7 University, and then wrongfully withheld her diploma, in an effort to prevent her from obtaining a 8 license and competing with defendants’ clinic. She also alleges, among other things, that 9 defendants forced her to work at their clinic “at depressed wages”; that Mr. Yang harassed and/or 10 stalked her; and that “[d]efendants or their associates orchestrated” a car accident intended to 11 injure her and interfere with her licensure. Id. at ECF 1-3. The complaint further alleges, “[o]n 12 information and belief” that “actors . . . aligned with Defendants” are responsible for an “illegal 13 lockout + burglary in NY” in which “devices with internship logs and videos [were] stolen.” Id. at 14 ECF 3. While the complaint appends communications (apparently from the Sunnyvale police 15 department) questioning the extent of injury to Ms. Fan or damage to her car (if any), Ms. Fan 16 maintains that the accident resulted in personal injury and “significant damage” to her car. See id. 17 at ECF 3, 4, 24-25, 27. Documents appended to the complaint also indicate that defendants placed 18 Ms. Fan on disciplinary probation for failure to pay her tuition in full and for threatening, 19 quarreling with, and harassing other University students, staff, and officials—assertions which Ms. 20 Fan disputes. See id. at ECF 12-22. 21 The complaint seeks compensatory damages of $45 million, as well as injunctive relief, 22 including the issuance of a diploma and a “verification letter confirming degree/zero 23 balance/conferral date,” an order of “No-contact/anti-interference,” and “Evidence preservation + 24 limited forensic imaging.” See id. at ECF 6. 25 The complaint asserts federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which 26 provides that federal district courts have jurisdiction over civil actions in which the matter in 27 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 (exclusive of interest and costs) and is between 1 Fan does not allege the citizenship of each of the parties, including herself. See id. at ECF 2; see 2 also Civil L.R. 3-15(b)(3) (in diversity actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), requiring non- 3 government parties to file a statement of citizenship). Accordingly, the complaint, on its face, 4 does not assert sufficient facts to support federal diversity jurisdiction. To the extent Ms. Fan 5 continues to rely on diversity of citizenship as a basis for federal jurisdiction, she must file an 6 amended complaint that states the citizenship of each party to support diversity jurisdiction under 7 28 U.S.C.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 LINGLING FAN, Case No. 25-cv-07860-VKD
9 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 10 v. FORMA PAUPERIS; (2) SCREENING COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 11 § 1915; AND (3) DENYING WITHOUT CALIFORNIA UNIVERSITY - SILICON PREJUDICE MOTION TO SEAL 12 VALLEY, et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 12, 13, 14 13 Defendants. 14 On August 30, 2025, Lingling Fan, who is representing herself, filed a complaint in the 15 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”), alleging (among other 16 things) violation of the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. Pursuant to an order issued by 17 SDNY, the action was transferred to this District. See Dkt. No. 6. Following transfer, this Court 18 issued an order directing Ms. Fan to indicate whether she intended to seek leave to proceed in 19 forma pauperis (“IFP”) by filing an updated IFP application on this District’s IFP application 20 form.1 Dkt. No. 9. Now pending before this Court are Ms. Fan’s IFP application and her motion 21 to seal her IFP application and contact information. Dkt. Nos. 12, 13, 14. 22 For the reasons discussed below, this order grants Ms. Fan’s IFP application. Additionally, 23 this order denies without prejudice Ms. Fan’s sealing motion; stays service of process; and screens 24 her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Ms. Fan is directed to take corrective action by 25 November 21, 2025, or her case may be dismissed. 26 27 1 I. IFP APPLICATION 2 A court may allow a plaintiff to prosecute an action in federal court without prepayment of 3 fees or security if the plaintiff submits an affidavit showing that he or she is unable to pay such 4 fees or provide such security. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A court may dismiss a case filed without 5 the payment of the filing fee whenever it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; 6 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a 7 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). “[S]ection 8 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners.” Lopez v. 9 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000). 10 Following the transfer of this action, the Court ordered that if Ms. Fan presently seeks 11 leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, she should complete this District’s IFP 12 application form and file that form with the Court. See Dkt. No. 9. That order appended a 13 courtesy copy of the IFP application form and also provided Ms. Fan with a link where the form 14 can be accessed on this District’s website. Id. Rather than file a renewed IFP application on the 15 appropriate form, Ms. Fan re-filed a copy of her August 26, 2025 IFP (short form) application that 16 she filed in SDNY. See Dkt. No. 12; see also Dkt. No. 2. 17 Although Ms. Fan failed to comply with the Court’s order to file a renewed IFP application 18 as directed, the Court has considered her short form application, which reflects that she has no 19 income or assets, and that she has some debt. Dkt. No. 12. On this basis, the Court finds that Ms. 20 Fan is eligible for IFP status and grants her application. 21 II. REVIEW OF COMPLAINT 22 While pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a complaint does not state a claim if it fails 23 to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 24 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must include 25 facts that are “more than labels and conclusions, and formulaic recitation of the elements of a 26 cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 27 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 1 the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. at 679. 2 According to her complaint, Ms. Fan is a practitioner of traditional Chinese medicine. 3 Dkt. No. 1 at ECF 1. Defendants are California University-Silicon Valley (“University”), Ivie 4 Chen, and Philip Yang. Papers appended to the complaint identify Ms. Chen as the Director of 5 Student Services. See id. at ECF 8. Mr. Yang is identified as President of the University. See id. 6 at ECF 7, 12. Ms. Fan alleges that defendants fraudulently duped her into enrolling at the 7 University, and then wrongfully withheld her diploma, in an effort to prevent her from obtaining a 8 license and competing with defendants’ clinic. She also alleges, among other things, that 9 defendants forced her to work at their clinic “at depressed wages”; that Mr. Yang harassed and/or 10 stalked her; and that “[d]efendants or their associates orchestrated” a car accident intended to 11 injure her and interfere with her licensure. Id. at ECF 1-3. The complaint further alleges, “[o]n 12 information and belief” that “actors . . . aligned with Defendants” are responsible for an “illegal 13 lockout + burglary in NY” in which “devices with internship logs and videos [were] stolen.” Id. at 14 ECF 3. While the complaint appends communications (apparently from the Sunnyvale police 15 department) questioning the extent of injury to Ms. Fan or damage to her car (if any), Ms. Fan 16 maintains that the accident resulted in personal injury and “significant damage” to her car. See id. 17 at ECF 3, 4, 24-25, 27. Documents appended to the complaint also indicate that defendants placed 18 Ms. Fan on disciplinary probation for failure to pay her tuition in full and for threatening, 19 quarreling with, and harassing other University students, staff, and officials—assertions which Ms. 20 Fan disputes. See id. at ECF 12-22. 21 The complaint seeks compensatory damages of $45 million, as well as injunctive relief, 22 including the issuance of a diploma and a “verification letter confirming degree/zero 23 balance/conferral date,” an order of “No-contact/anti-interference,” and “Evidence preservation + 24 limited forensic imaging.” See id. at ECF 6. 25 The complaint asserts federal diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which 26 provides that federal district courts have jurisdiction over civil actions in which the matter in 27 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 (exclusive of interest and costs) and is between 1 Fan does not allege the citizenship of each of the parties, including herself. See id. at ECF 2; see 2 also Civil L.R. 3-15(b)(3) (in diversity actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), requiring non- 3 government parties to file a statement of citizenship). Accordingly, the complaint, on its face, 4 does not assert sufficient facts to support federal diversity jurisdiction. To the extent Ms. Fan 5 continues to rely on diversity of citizenship as a basis for federal jurisdiction, she must file an 6 amended complaint that states the citizenship of each party to support diversity jurisdiction under 7 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 8 The complaint also asserts federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Dkt. 9 No. 1 at ECF 2. In addition to several state law and/or common law claims,2 Ms. Fan asserts a 10 sole federal claim for violation of the RICO statute. For the reasons discussed below, the 11 complaint does not allege sufficient facts plausibly supporting an essential element of her RICO 12 claim. 13 RICO imposes civil liability on persons and organizations engaged in a “pattern of 14 racketeering activity,” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), and “provides a private right of action for ‘[a]ny 15 person injured in his business or property’ by a RICO violation,” Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV 16 Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). “RICO focuses on 17 ‘racketeering activity,’ which the statute defines as a number of specific criminal acts under 18 federal and state laws.” Canyon Cnty. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2008) 19 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)). The elements of a civil RICO claim are “(1) conduct (2) of an 20 enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (known as ‘predicate acts’) (5) causing 21 injury to plaintiff’s business or property.” Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 22 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotations and citation omitted). 23 Ms. Fan’s complaint indicates that her RICO claim is based on 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). She 24 2 The complaint lists claims for “Fraud/Fraudulent Inducement (including promissory fraud)”; 25 “Malicious Competition/Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage” (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 16600; common law)”; “Negligent Misrepresentation (alternative)”; 26 “Rescission & Restitution/Unjust Enrichment/Constructive Trust”; “Promissory Estoppel (alternative)”; “Conversion/Detinue (diploma & official transcripts)”; “IIED; Assault & Battery; 27 Civil Conspiracy”; “Unfair Competition (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200)”; “Harassment 1 alleges that defendants “engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity” and lists several acts of 2 alleged misconduct, including “Fraudulent enrollment communications and misrepresentations 3 (wire/mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, § 1343).” See Dkt. No. 1 at ECF 4-5. The Court does not at 4 this time assess whether Ms. Fan’s complaint sufficiently pleads each element of a civil RICO 5 claim. However, insofar as the complaint indicates that her RICO claim sounds in fraud, Ms. Fan 6 must also meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil 7 Procedure, which requires a party alleging fraud to “state with particularity the circumstances 8 constituting fraud[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). “Allegations of fraud under [RICO] section 1962(c) 9 must identify the time, place, and manner of each fraud plus the role of each defendant in each 10 scheme.” Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotations and 11 citation omitted); see also Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2004) 12 (requiring party pleading RICO fraud claim to allege time, place, and specific content of false 13 representations, as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations). As currently 14 drafted, Ms. Fan’s RICO claim is not pled with sufficient particularity. For example, the predicate 15 acts of mail and wire fraud are alleged in general terms, with no specificity regarding the identity 16 of the parties who made the alleged misrepresentations using the mail or interstate wires, the 17 content of such misrepresentations, or the time and place of such misrepresentations. 18 Ms. Fan is directed to file an amended complaint that pleads her RICO claim with the 19 necessary particularity. 20 III. SEALING MOTION 21 Ms. Fan requests sealing for her IFP application and her contact information, citing privacy 22 concerns. Dkt. No. 14. None of the information in those filings warrant sealing under Rule 5.2(a). 23 Ms. Fan has not sufficiently explained the legitimate private or public interests that warrant 24 sealing. Nor did she follow the procedures in this District’s Civil Local Rule 79-5 for requesting 25 sealing for documents in civil cases. Ms. Fan’s motions to seal are denied without prejudice. For 26 any future motions to seal, Ms. Fan is directed to review and follow the procedures in Civil Local 27 1 || Rule 79-5.° 2 || IV. CONCLUSION 3 As explained above, the Court grants Ms. Fan’s IFP application. 4 For the reasons discussed above, as currently pled, Ms. Fan’s complaint does not state 5 sufficient facts to support diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and does not state 6 sufficient facts to support a plausible RICO claim sounding in fraud. These are the only bases on 7 which she asserts that this Court has federal subject matter jurisdiction. Ms. Fan therefore is 8 directed to file an amended complaint addressing the issues described above. Her amended 9 || complaint must be filed no later than November 21, 2025 and must include the caption and civil 10 case number used in this order, Case No. 25-cv-07860-VKD, and the words “First Amended 11 Complaint” on the first page. 12 If Ms. Fan does not file an amended complaint in time, or if the amended complaint fails to 13 cure all defects described above, the Court may issue an order reassigning the case to a district 14 || judge with a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed in whole or in part. 3 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. a 16 Dated: November 3, 2025
Virginia K. DeMarchi 19 United States Magistrate Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 This District’s Civil Local Rules are available at https://cand.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/local-rules/CAND_ Civil Local _Rules_10_25.pdf.