Avery, J.
— after stating the facts: The main purpose of the action is to establish the plaintiffs’ title and right to present possession of the land in dispute. The general denial .by the defendants raises, as usual, the issues of title, possession and damages. It is competent for a defendant to show, under the general issue as to ownership, that a deed relied on by'the plaintiff to establish title is void, because it was executed in the face of a statute prohibiting its execution, or in such form or manner as amounts to a failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of the law.
Jones
v.
Cohen,
82 N C., 75;
Mobley
v.
Griffin
(decided at this term), “ evidence impeaching an alleged title deed is always as competent as that sustaining it.”
This Court will impose no limit to the exercise of discretion on the part of the Judge below in settling the issues, exceptthattheyshall .be raised by the pleadings/that the facts established by the responses to them shall constitute a .lawful basis for the judgment, and that an appellant shall not be denied an opportunity to have the law applicable to any material portion of the testimony fairly presented and passed upon by the jury through the medium of some issue.
Emery
v.
Railroad,
102 N. C., 225. The Judge had the right to settle the issues and submit those.framed to the jury. In this case it does not appear that, at any subsequent stage of the trial, the defendants were deprived of the privilege of presenting any view of the law arising on the evidence by reason of the form of the issues.
The title to land, that is, the separate property of a
feme covert,
cannot be divested out of her except by a deed to
which both husband and wife are parties, proved or acknowledged as provided by law as to both, or by a deed made by an attorney in fact in pursuance of a power of attorney, executed by both and proved in the same way.
The Code,
§§ 1256 and 1257 ;
Ferguson
v.
Kinsland,
93 N. C., 339. “The requirement that the husband should execute the
same deed
with his wife was to ensure his protection against the wiles and insidious acts of others; while her separate and private examination was to secure her against coercion and undue influence from him.”
Ferguson
v.
Kinsland, supra.
In
Southerland
v.
Hunter,
93 N. C., 310, the late Chief Justice says: “We have at the present term decided, in the case of
Ferguson
v.
Kinsland,
not only that the deed which conveys the estate of a married woman must be executed by both, but it must
he proved to have been executed by the husband or must have been acknowledged by him
according to the act of 1869, which governs this attempted probate, or proved or acknowledged as to both parties under the act in force
(The Code,
§ 1256),
before the private examination is had.”
The deed is none the less effectual to pass the title of the wife because the husband not only executes it before she does, but after execution sends the officer to take her acknowledgment and privy examination at a point several miles distant, provided that she does then voluntarily assent, and her acknowledgment and privy examination is taken and certified in a form substantially the same as that prescribed by
The Code,
§1246 (7), by a competent officer.
The proof of acknowledgment by him must precede in the order of time the examination of his wife, but it was not essential under the provisions of the law in force before
The Code
was enacted (Rev. Stat., ch. 37, §§ 10, 11), nor is sec. 1256 of
The Code
fairly susceptible of the construction that both are required to acknowledge the deed at the same moment.
McGlennery
v.
Miller,
90 N. C., 216. That section (1256) requires that “every conveyance, power of attorney,
or-other instrument affecting the estate, right or title of any married woman, in, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, must be executed by such married woman and her husband, and due proof, or acknowledgment thereof, must be made as to the husband and as to the wife, and the privy examination of the wife-,-touching her voluntary assent to such conveyance, power of attorney, Ac., * * . * shall, be taken separate and apart from her husband.” While the husband and wife must both be parties to the same deed, there is manifestly no requirement in the language of the law which we have quoted that •the act of acknowledgment by .both should be contemporaneous. Indeed, the words “jointly executed ” are used in
Ferguson
v.
Kinsland
in reference solely to writing in “the same deed.”
The last scene necessary to the valid execution of such a deed by the wife, is certainly o.ne that the law does not intend shall be witnessed by the husband. Proof of execution by him must be made on his acknowledgment, taken before that of his wife, and her privy examination must be subsequent to both, but the law fixes no definite interval that must elapse between these acts, and it is not even essential that the probate, as to the husband, should be taken and- certified to by the same officer who conducts the privy examination of the wife.
But the learned counsel contended that the probate -was defective, and the deed inadmissible as evidence, because Bostic, the Justice of the Peace, by whom the acknowledgment and privy examination was taken, did not attach his seal to the certificate. It is true that this Court, in
Welch
v.
Scott,
5 Ired., 72, held (resting the opinion solely upon the doctrine of
stare
decisis) that a seal was essential to the validity of a criminal warrant. But the Act of 1868-69, (ch. 178, sub-ch. 1, §5;
The Code,
§ 1134) allowed the magistrate to issue a proper, criminal warrant “ with or without seal.”
The Code,
§909 (Act of 1868-69, ch. 191) prescribed
forms of proceedings in civil actions before Justices of the-Peace, but we find no seals attached to the forms of summons, warrant of attachment, or process, that are prescribed, and a substantial conformity to which is, in terms, required by that section. We see no reason, however, why a warrant of attachment, or summons, should be held invalid if a magistrate should attach a private seal as well as his officiál signature. Sub-section 7, § 1246 of
The Code
provides that, the certificates of privy examination of married women shall be
“ substantially ”
as follows, and the form given concludes, with the words, “Witness my hand and seal (private or official) this (day of month) A. D. (year). Signature of officer (seal).” The word “substantially” is used in this-connection, as it often is, in the sense of comprehending all of the form given that is necessary or essential. Where a-Justice of the Peace takes the examination, the law presumes that the Clerk of the Superior Court of the county, in whose office his subscribed oath is filed, knows his signature.
The Code,
§ 821.
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Avery, J.
— after stating the facts: The main purpose of the action is to establish the plaintiffs’ title and right to present possession of the land in dispute. The general denial .by the defendants raises, as usual, the issues of title, possession and damages. It is competent for a defendant to show, under the general issue as to ownership, that a deed relied on by'the plaintiff to establish title is void, because it was executed in the face of a statute prohibiting its execution, or in such form or manner as amounts to a failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of the law.
Jones
v.
Cohen,
82 N C., 75;
Mobley
v.
Griffin
(decided at this term), “ evidence impeaching an alleged title deed is always as competent as that sustaining it.”
This Court will impose no limit to the exercise of discretion on the part of the Judge below in settling the issues, exceptthattheyshall .be raised by the pleadings/that the facts established by the responses to them shall constitute a .lawful basis for the judgment, and that an appellant shall not be denied an opportunity to have the law applicable to any material portion of the testimony fairly presented and passed upon by the jury through the medium of some issue.
Emery
v.
Railroad,
102 N. C., 225. The Judge had the right to settle the issues and submit those.framed to the jury. In this case it does not appear that, at any subsequent stage of the trial, the defendants were deprived of the privilege of presenting any view of the law arising on the evidence by reason of the form of the issues.
The title to land, that is, the separate property of a
feme covert,
cannot be divested out of her except by a deed to
which both husband and wife are parties, proved or acknowledged as provided by law as to both, or by a deed made by an attorney in fact in pursuance of a power of attorney, executed by both and proved in the same way.
The Code,
§§ 1256 and 1257 ;
Ferguson
v.
Kinsland,
93 N. C., 339. “The requirement that the husband should execute the
same deed
with his wife was to ensure his protection against the wiles and insidious acts of others; while her separate and private examination was to secure her against coercion and undue influence from him.”
Ferguson
v.
Kinsland, supra.
In
Southerland
v.
Hunter,
93 N. C., 310, the late Chief Justice says: “We have at the present term decided, in the case of
Ferguson
v.
Kinsland,
not only that the deed which conveys the estate of a married woman must be executed by both, but it must
he proved to have been executed by the husband or must have been acknowledged by him
according to the act of 1869, which governs this attempted probate, or proved or acknowledged as to both parties under the act in force
(The Code,
§ 1256),
before the private examination is had.”
The deed is none the less effectual to pass the title of the wife because the husband not only executes it before she does, but after execution sends the officer to take her acknowledgment and privy examination at a point several miles distant, provided that she does then voluntarily assent, and her acknowledgment and privy examination is taken and certified in a form substantially the same as that prescribed by
The Code,
§1246 (7), by a competent officer.
The proof of acknowledgment by him must precede in the order of time the examination of his wife, but it was not essential under the provisions of the law in force before
The Code
was enacted (Rev. Stat., ch. 37, §§ 10, 11), nor is sec. 1256 of
The Code
fairly susceptible of the construction that both are required to acknowledge the deed at the same moment.
McGlennery
v.
Miller,
90 N. C., 216. That section (1256) requires that “every conveyance, power of attorney,
or-other instrument affecting the estate, right or title of any married woman, in, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, must be executed by such married woman and her husband, and due proof, or acknowledgment thereof, must be made as to the husband and as to the wife, and the privy examination of the wife-,-touching her voluntary assent to such conveyance, power of attorney, Ac., * * . * shall, be taken separate and apart from her husband.” While the husband and wife must both be parties to the same deed, there is manifestly no requirement in the language of the law which we have quoted that •the act of acknowledgment by .both should be contemporaneous. Indeed, the words “jointly executed ” are used in
Ferguson
v.
Kinsland
in reference solely to writing in “the same deed.”
The last scene necessary to the valid execution of such a deed by the wife, is certainly o.ne that the law does not intend shall be witnessed by the husband. Proof of execution by him must be made on his acknowledgment, taken before that of his wife, and her privy examination must be subsequent to both, but the law fixes no definite interval that must elapse between these acts, and it is not even essential that the probate, as to the husband, should be taken and- certified to by the same officer who conducts the privy examination of the wife.
But the learned counsel contended that the probate -was defective, and the deed inadmissible as evidence, because Bostic, the Justice of the Peace, by whom the acknowledgment and privy examination was taken, did not attach his seal to the certificate. It is true that this Court, in
Welch
v.
Scott,
5 Ired., 72, held (resting the opinion solely upon the doctrine of
stare
decisis) that a seal was essential to the validity of a criminal warrant. But the Act of 1868-69, (ch. 178, sub-ch. 1, §5;
The Code,
§ 1134) allowed the magistrate to issue a proper, criminal warrant “ with or without seal.”
The Code,
§909 (Act of 1868-69, ch. 191) prescribed
forms of proceedings in civil actions before Justices of the-Peace, but we find no seals attached to the forms of summons, warrant of attachment, or process, that are prescribed, and a substantial conformity to which is, in terms, required by that section. We see no reason, however, why a warrant of attachment, or summons, should be held invalid if a magistrate should attach a private seal as well as his officiál signature. Sub-section 7, § 1246 of
The Code
provides that, the certificates of privy examination of married women shall be
“ substantially ”
as follows, and the form given concludes, with the words, “Witness my hand and seal (private or official) this (day of month) A. D. (year). Signature of officer (seal).” The word “substantially” is used in this-connection, as it often is, in the sense of comprehending all of the form given that is necessary or essential. Where a-Justice of the Peace takes the examination, the law presumes that the Clerk of the Superior Court of the county, in whose office his subscribed oath is filed, knows his signature.
The Code,
§ 821. But the Clerk can judge of the genuineness of his certificate none the more accurately because a private seal may be attached. Indeed, this principle is recognized on the two forms that follow and constitute a part of the same section. For the purpose of registration of the deed
in the county
for which the Justice is appointed, the Clerk is required, on inspection of the form and signature, simply to adjudge it correct and order the registration. But where the proof of privy examination is taken out of the county in which the land is situate, the Clerk must certify, in addition, both to the official character and genuineness of the attestation of the person who signed the certificate. So that the law presumes not only that the-Clerk knows the signature of a Justice of the Peace of his-county, but that all citizens of the county are sufficiently acquainted with it to respect process that he may be
empowered to issue by virtue of his office. It is not material that a seal should be added, and, when appended, it does not furnish the meáns to officers or private persons of passing more readily upon the genuineness of the certificate. The Clerk of the Superior Court, as well as every other citizen of a county, is bound to respect a criminal warrant, or. other process, lawfully issued by a Justice of the Peace for that county, and is expected to know his signature. A bench warrant issued by a Judge of the Superior Court or Justice of the Surpeme Court, runs in the hands of an officer empowered to serve it to every county in the State. AVe can conceive of no substantial benefit to be derived from adding a private seal to the signature of any official instrument by a Justice of the Peace, a Judge of the Superior Court, or Justice of the Supreme Court, when the signature is presumed to be known as far as his authority extends, while his private seal is not. AVe conclude that so much of the statutory form as provided for the use of a private seal is merely suggestive, or, at most, directory — not mandatory.
AVe see no error in so much of the charge of the Court as refers specifically .to the evidence of the witness Bostic. The jury were left free to pass upon the testimony where there was any conflict between that of the
feme
defendant and that of witness. The statement of Bostic that he took the acknowledgment of her husband in Shelby, and, leaving her husband there, went several miles into the country and took her acknowledgment and privy examination at her home, is not disputed. If the jury believed that the husband was not present, his Honor told them that the validity of the probate would not be affected by that fact, and in that view as to the law he is sustained by this Court. The conflict between her testimony and that of Bostic is not material in its bearing upon the issues.
Affirmed.