Lindsey v. Auto Now Financial Services Incorporated

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJuly 24, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-02254
StatusUnknown

This text of Lindsey v. Auto Now Financial Services Incorporated (Lindsey v. Auto Now Financial Services Incorporated) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lindsey v. Auto Now Financial Services Incorporated, (D. Ariz. 2025).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Okasia Mya Lindsey, No. CV-25-02254-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Auto Now Financial Services Incorporated, et al., 13 14 Defendants. 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 16 (Doc. 2). The Court will consider whether Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed in forma 17 pauperis. 18 I. Legal Standards 19 A. Ability to Pay 20 “There is no formula set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when 21 someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1235 22 (9th Cir. 2015). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges 23 that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. at 1234 24 (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)). 25 B. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

26 Congress provided with respect to in forma pauperis cases that a district court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that 27 the “allegation of poverty is untrue” or that the “action or appeal” is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be 28 granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While much of section 1915 outlines 1 how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners. Lopez 2 v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints”). “It is also clear that section 1915(e) not only 3 permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.” Id. Therefore, this court must dismiss an in forma 4 pauperis complaint if it fails to state a claim or if it is frivolous or malicious.

5 Kennedy v. Andrews, 2005 WL 3358205, *2 (D. Ariz. 2005). 6 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim 7 upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a 8 claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 9 screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 12(b)(6)”).

11 Hairston v. Juarez, No. 22-CV-01801-BAS-WVG, 2023 WL 2468967, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 12 Mar. 10, 2023). 13 To survive screening, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, which, if 14 accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 15 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual content 16 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 17 misconduct alleged. Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility requires 18 more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. “Where a complaint 19 pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the 20 line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (citing Bell Atlantic 21 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). 22 II. Screening 23 A. Ability to Pay 24 The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s financial information. (Doc. 2). In her 25 application, Plaintiff claims she receives monthly disability benefits in the amount of 26 $1,241.00 and has monthly expenses in the amount of $1,211.00. The Court finds that she 27 does not have the ability to pay the filing fee and still afford life’s necessities. Accordingly, 28 the motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. 1 B. Screening 2 Plaintiff brings an eleven-count complaint under the Fair Credit Reporting Act 3 relating to her credit report. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff names two Defendants: Auto Now Financial 4 and Experian Information Solutions. Plaintiff presents her complaint in a narrative form 5 without carefully distinguishing which count is against which Defendant. (Doc. 1 at 6–8). 6 Frequently, grouping the Defendants together will not survive screening. 7 Specifically, for a complaint to be plausible, it cannot be a “shotgun pleading…. One 8 common type of shotgun pleading comes in cases with multiple defendants where the 9 plaintiff uses the omnibus term ‘Defendants’ throughout a complaint by grouping 10 defendants together without identifying what the particular defendants specifically did 11 wrong.” Sollberger v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. SACV 09-0766AGANX, 2010 WL 12 2674456, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2010). Here, while Plaintiff did not distinguish which 13 count was against which Defendant, she did name at least one Defendant in each count. 14 Thus, the Court will interpret the counts to the best of the Court’s ability. 15 Count 1: Plaintiff brings a claim for early reporting of a debt in alleged violation of 16 15 U.S.C §1681s-2(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting the furnishing of inaccurate information) and 15 17 U.S.C §1681e(b) (requiring a consumer reporting agency to take reasonable steps to ensure 18 accuracy). (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff’s allegation that Auto Now reported this debt before it 19 was assigned to Auto Now states a claim that inaccurate information was furnished. This 20 portion of count 1 thus survives screening. However, nothing in count 1 states a claim 21 against Experian and Experian is dismissed from this count; additionally, a claim under 15 22 U.S.C §1681e(b) in this count is dismissed. 23 Count 2: Plaintiff brings a claim for Experian allegedly allowing Auto Now to 24 report a debt without verifying Auto Now was a “lawful furnisher” allegedly in violation 25 of 15 U.S.C §1681e(b) (requiring a consumer reporting agency to take reasonable steps to 26 ensure accuracy) and 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) (requiring “reinvestigation” of a charge on a 27 report if the consumer files a dispute). (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff’s allegation that Experian 28 did not take steps to verify Auto Now was correctly furnishing information states a claim 1 under 15 U.S.C §1681e(b). See Chaitoff v. Experian Info.

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Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Raymond Watison v. Mary Carter
668 F.3d 1108 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Wilhelm v. Rotman
680 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Maria Escobedo v. Apple American Group
787 F.3d 1226 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
Robert Coleman v. P. Maldonado
564 F. App'x 893 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Jeffrey Chaitoff v. Experian Information Solutions
79 F.4th 800 (Seventh Circuit, 2023)

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Lindsey v. Auto Now Financial Services Incorporated, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lindsey-v-auto-now-financial-services-incorporated-azd-2025.