Lindsay N. Grubbs v. State of Indiana

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 30, 2019
• Docket: 19A-CR-572
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED Aug 30 2019, 8:44 am

CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Valerie K. Boots Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana Caroline G. Templeton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lindsay N. Grubbs, August 30, 2019 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-572 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable David Hooper, Appellee-Plaintiff Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49G25-1807-F6-24993

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-572 | August 30, 2019 Page 1 of 6 [1] Lindsay N. Grubbs appeals her convictions of Class A misdemeanor possession

of methamphetamine 1 and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. 2

Grubbs asserts the State failed to present sufficient evidence that she possessed

methamphetamine and paraphernalia. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On July 27, 2018, Officer Katrina McEvilly of the Indianapolis Metropolitan

Police Department (“IMPD”) was on patrol on the east side of Indianapolis

when she ran the license plate on a black Monte Carlo travelling westbound on

Washington Street. The report she received indicated the license plate was

registered to a gray Pontiac, so Officer McEvilly initiated a traffic stop. The

Monte Carlo was occupied by three people: the driver, the front seat passenger,

and Grubbs, who was sitting in the back seat behind the passenger. Also in the

back seat with Grubbs “was a bunch of personal property. It had a bunch of

clothes, bags, personal belongings . . . a lot of people’s personal belongings.”

(Tr. Vol. II at 9.) Next to Grubbs on the back seat was a blue purse, and

Grubbs was holding a purse on her lap. Grubbs placed the purse she had been

holding on the back seat when she exited the car.

1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a). 2 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-572 | August 30, 2019 Page 2 of 6 [3] Officer McEvilly determined she would tow the Monte Carlo in accordance

with IMPD’s standing general order 7.3, which controls the towing or

impounding of vehicles, (see State’s Ex. 2), and provides a vehicle may be towed

if it has “no or improper certificate of registration or license plate.” (State’s Ex.

2 at 3.) Prior to the tow, Officer McEvilly was required to inventory all the

property inside the car, including the items in the bags in the back seat of the

car. Inside the purse that Grubbs had been holding, Officer McEvilly found a

glass pipe used for smoking narcotics and “a baggie with white powder residue

in it.” (Tr. Vol. II at 14.) Laboratory testing determined the white powder

residue was methamphetamine.

[4] The State charged Grubbs with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine

and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. Grubbs waived her

right to a jury trial. After hearing evidence, the trial court found Grubbs guilty

as charged. The court entered Grubbs’ conviction of the Level 6 felony as a

Class A misdemeanor because it was Grubbs’ first felony conviction. The court

sentenced Grubbs to 365 days for possession of methamphetamine, with 201

days suspended, and to 60 days for possession of paraphernalia, with 60 days

suspended.

Discussion and Decision [5] Grubbs alleges the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. When

considering whether the State’s evidence was sufficient to support convictions,

“we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-572 | August 30, 2019 Page 3 of 6 support the trial court’s finding[s] of guilt.” Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174

(Ind. 2011). If there is conflicting evidence, we considered it in the light most

favorable to the judgment. Id. The evidence need not overcome every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. Rather, we must affirm “unless no

reasonable trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime [proven]

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

[6] Specifically, Grubbs asserts the State failed to demonstrate she knowingly

possessed the methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Convictions for

possession of illegal items can be based on either actual or constructive

possession. Id. Actual possession occurs when a person “has direct physical

control over” an item. Id. Constructive possession can be inferred when a

person had the capability and intent to maintain dominion and control over the

item. Id.

[7] Grubbs asserts “the only evidence of constructive possession was her close

proximity to the contraband.” (Br. of Appellant at 4.) In support of her

assertion, Grubbs notes the back seat of the Monte Carlo was filled with bags of

personal items and yet the State produced no evidence that she knew what was

in the “bag” that she had been holding. (See, e.g., Reply Br. at 7) (“the State

points to no additional circumstantial evidence to support an inference of guilty

knowledge: only to the evidence that the bag was in Grubbs’ control as it sat on

her lap”) (emphasis in original).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-572 | August 30, 2019 Page 4 of 6 [8] In her briefs, Grubbs fails to acknowledge the “bag” she was holding was

neither, for example, a large trash bag of personal property nor a suitcase of

clothing, either of which she could have needed to hold to sit on the back seat

that was filled with bags of personal property. Rather, the “bag” that Grubbs

was holding on her lap was a purse. When there were two women and two

purses in the car and Grubbs had one purse on her lap, the only reasonable

inference is that the purse Grubbs was holding was her own. See Norris v. State,

732 N.E.2d 186, 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (noting a purse “is generally not an

object for which two or more persons share common use and authority”).

Officer McEvilly identified the purse Grubbs was holding as the purse

containing “the pipe and also a baggie with white powder residue in it.” (Tr.

Vol. II at 14.)

[9] Although Grubbs testified that she does not carry a purse, that she did not have

a bag in her lap, and that she did not know what was inside any of the bags in

the back seat of the car, the trial court was not required to believe her testimony

or to give it more weight than Officer McEvilly’s testimony. See Edgecomb v.

State, 673 N.E.2d 1185, 1194 (Ind. 1996) (“The jury is not required to believe

every part of a defendant’s testimony.”), reh’g denied. Grubbs argues the State

failed to prove she knew the methamphetamine and pipe were in the purse,

such that she could have knowingly possessed those illegal items; however,

when we have already concluded the evidence supports a reasonable inference

that Grubbs was holding her own purse, such evidence also supports the

inference that Grubbs knew what was inside her own purse. See Halsema v.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-572 | August 30, 2019 Page 5 of 6 State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 673 (Ind. 2005) (“[W]hen determining whether an

element exists, the [trier of fact] may rely on its . . . common sense and

knowledge acquired through everyday experiences.”).

Conclusion [10] Because the evidence was sufficient to support Grubbs’ convictions, we affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

[11] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-572 | August 30, 2019 Page 6 of 6