Lindblad v. Blair

2025 IL App (1st) 241753-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 15, 2025
• Docket: 1-24-1753
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 241753-U Order filed: May 15, 2025

FIRST DISTRICT FOURTH DIVISION

No. 1-24-1753

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

ERIC LINDBLAD, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 23 CH 04728 ) CHARLES G. BLAIR, as Trustee of the ) Mignon Buehler Trust, ) Honorable ) Anna M. Loftus, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hoffman and Ocasio concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: In this declaratory action, we affirmed the order denying the trust beneficiary’s motion for summary judgment and granting the trustee’s cross-motion for summary judgment where the trustee complied with section 813.1(b)(6) of the Illinois Trust Code (760 ILCS 3/813.1(b)(6) (West 2022)) by providing the beneficiary with a complete copy of the trust instrument.

¶2 Plaintiff-appellant, Eric Lindblad, one of three beneficiaries of the Mignon Buehler Trust

dated May 14, 1987, as amended and restated January 9, 2020, established by his mother, Mignon

Buehler, filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief against defendant, Charles G. Blair, the

successor trustee. Lindblad alleged that Blair failed to provide him with a complete copy of the

trust instrument in violation of section 813.1(b)(6) of the Illinois Trust Code (Trust Code) (760 No. 1-24-1753

ILCS 3/813.1(b)(6) (West 2022)). Lindblad and Blair filed cross-motions for summary judgment,

and the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Blair and against Lindblad. We affirm.

¶3 The following factual and procedural history is derived from the pleadings and exhibits of

record.

¶4 On May 14, 1987, Mignon established the Mignon Buehler Trust (Trust) pursuant to the

provisions of a trust agreement entered into by Mignon, as grantor and trustee, (Original

Agreement) which she amended and restated at various times between 1987 and 2020. Beginning

in 2007 and until her death, Blair acted as Mignon’s estate planning attorney. Blair joined the law

firm of Levin, Schreder & Carey (LSC) in 2011. LSC has represented Blair throughout this matter.

¶5 On January 9, 2020, for the final time, Mignon executed a new will and the pertinent

document, titled “Amendment and Restatement of the Trust Agreement Establishing Mignon

Bueler Trust” (2020 Restatement). The 2020 Restatement specified:

“WHEREAS, I created *** ‘the Mignon Buehler Trust’ (the ‘Trust’) *** pursuant

to the provisions of a Trust Agreement entered into *** on May 14, 1987, as last amended

and restated on January 29, 2018 (the last such restatement, the ‘Original Agreement’); and

WHEREAS, Section 1.3 of the Original Agreement provided that I, by a signed

instrument delivered to the Trustee, may revoke or amend the Original Agreement from

time to time; and

WHEREAS, it is my intention to amend and restate the terms of the Original

Agreement, with the intent that the Trust shall continue to be known as the ‘Mignon

Buehler Trust.’

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NOW, THEREFORE pursuant to Section 1.3 of the Original Agreement, upon

executing this Agreement, I hereby amend and restate the Original Agreement and agree

to act in accordance herewith.”

The 2020 Restatement is 41 pages in length and sets out in detail the provisions governing the

Trust. Mignon made no further amendments or modifications. The 2020 Restatement named Blair

as the successor trustee after Mignon’s death and directed him, as trustee, to distribute her assets

as follows: a specific bequest of $500,000 to, her son, Lindblad and the remainder, after debts and

taxes, to the decedents of her daughter, Retana.

¶6 Mignon died on December 9, 2020. On March 29, 2021, the circuit court admitted

Mignon’s will to probate and appointed Blair as executor. Mignon had a “pour-over” will, which

directed her executor to distribute any assets in her estate to the Trust.

¶7 LSC provided Lindblad with two restatements of the Trust, a restatement dated January 29,

2018 (2018 Restatement) and the 2020 Restatement. On June 4, 2021, Lindblad demanded that

Blair furnish all of Mignon’s “other estate plan and trust documents for the period May 14, 1987

through her date of her death for his counsel’s review” (Mignon’s Estate Planning Documents).

On June 9, 2021, LSC, by letter, denied his request citing ethical obligations. Lindblad’s attorney

responded, by letter, on June 10, 2021. LSC responded and, again, denied the request, by letter, on

June 18, 2021.

¶8 On May 15, 2023, Lindblad initiated this declaratory judgment action, with a complaint

against Blair, as trustee of the Trust. Lindblad alleged that, at the time of Mignon’s death, the Trust

held approximately 8.5 million dollars in assets. Lindblad believed that from May 14, 1987 to

January 9, 2020, Mignon made more than two restatements, modifications, amendments, or

changes to the Original Agreement. Lindblad alleged and defendant denied that, on March 24,

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2021, LSC informed Lindblad that it had in its possession 20 different “Amendments” to the

Original Agreement.

¶9 Lindblad further alleged that Blair wrongfully denied him access to Mignon’s Estate

Planning Documents in violation of section 3/813.1(b)(6) of the Trust Code (760 ILCS

3/813.1(b)(6) (West 2022)) and sought a declaration that he was entitled to receive all of

“[Mignon’s] Estate Planning Documents, including the [Original Agreement] and all restatements,

modifications, wills, codicils, and amendments thereto.” Lindblad, alleged that, “based upon

decades of communications with his mother,” Mignon’s Estate Planning Documents provided him

with gifts upon her death far exceeding $500,000 and that any changes to those greater gifts

resulted from fraud or undue influence or both and that the changes are statutorily deemed void ab

initio. He also alleged that, at an unspecified time, he expressed to LSC that his mother’s “mental

capacity to make changes to her estate plan and trust documents was also a concern.” The only

relief sought was a declaration that Blair deliver to Lindblad all of Mignon’s Estate Planning

Documents, including the Original Agreement and “all restatements, modifications, wills, codicils,

and amendments thereto.”

¶ 10 On February 13, 2024, Lindblad filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that

pursuant to section 813.1(b)(6) of the Trust Code (id.), he is entitled to a complete copy of the trust

instrument, which includes the Original Agreement and all amendments, modifications, and

restatements. Blair filed a cross-motion for summary judgment arguing that, based on the plain

statutory language of section 813.1(b)(6), the trustee was obligated only to furnish the 2020

Restatement and was not obligated, under a restated trust, to provide the beneficiary with prior,

superseded writings, which were rendered obsolete and inoperative by a restatement.

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¶ 11 The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Blair and against Lindblad.

Lindblad filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the circuit court.

¶ 12 Lindblad appealed from the order denying his motion for summary judgment and

granting’s Blair’s cross-motion for summary judgment and the order denying his motion for

reconsideration.

¶ 13 On appeal, Lindblad argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in

favor of Blair. Specifically, Lindblad argues that the circuit court too narrowly interpreted the

definition of “a complete copy of the trust instrument” in section 813.1(b)(6) of the Trust Code

(760 ILCS 3/813.1(b)(6) (West 2022)), where the Original Agreement was never revoked and still

constituted part of the trust instrument. He argues that the narrow reading of “Trust Instrument”

prevented him from investigating whether he was cheated out of a bequest greater than $500,000

and that he “may have several causes of action recognized in Illinois which he may learn of upon

a review of the trust documents he seeks.” Blair, on the other hand argues that because the 2020

Restatement fully restated the terms of the Original Agreement, he was not obligated, under section

813.1(b)(6), to furnish the previous renditions of the trust as they were rendered obsolete and not

part of the “trust instrument.”

¶ 14 Summary judgment is appropriate where, construed liberally and in favor of the non-

moving party, “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2020). Summary judgment should

be denied and the issue referred to the trier of fact when reasonable individuals could draw different

inferences from the undisputed material facts, or when there is a genuine dispute over a material

fact. Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc., 185 Ill. 2d 418, 424 (1998). When parties file cross-motions

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for summary judgment, they agree that there are no issues of material fact and that the case

disposition turns on the resolution of purely legal issues. Founders Insurance Co. v. Munoz, 237

Ill. 2d 424, 432 (2010). Our review of a circuit court’s grant or denial of summary judgment is de

novo. Doria v. Village of Downers Grove, 397 Ill. App. 3d 752, 756 (2009).

¶ 15 What documents a trustee is obligated to furnish to a qualified beneficiary, under section

813.1(b)(6) of the Trust Code (760 ILCS 3/813.1(b)(6) (West 2022)), is a question of statutory

interpretation.

¶ 16 “ ‘The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the

legislature’s intent.’ ” Mosby v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 2023 IL 129081, ¶ 30 (quoting In re

E.B., 231 Ill. 2d 459, 466 (2008). “ ‘The language of the statute is the best indication of legislative

intent, and we give that language its plan and ordinary meaning.’ ” Id. Where the language is plain

unambiguous, courts may not read into the law exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the

legislature did not express. Mosby, 2023 IL 129081, ¶ 31 (citing Shultz v. Illinois Farmers

Insurance Co., 237 Ill. 2d 391, 408 (2010). Courts “ ‘may consider the reasons for the law, the

problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing

the statute one way or another.’ ” Mosby, 2023 IL 129081, ¶ 31 (quoting McDonald v. Symphony

Bronzeville Park, LLC, 2022 IL 126511, ¶ 18. We review questions of statutory interpretation de

novo. Mosby, 2023 IL 129081, ¶ 29 (citing Raab v. Frank, 2019 IL 124641, ¶ 18).

¶ 17 A trustee owes a fiduciary duty to a trust’s beneficiary. Gearhart v. Gearhart, 2020 IL App

(1st) 190042, ¶ 144. Illinois law imposes several duties on trustees, including the duty to

“administer the trust in good faith, in accordance with its purposes and the terms of the trust, and

in accordance with [the Trust] Code” 760 ILCS 3/801 (West 2020); the duty of loyalty (Id. § 802);

the duty of impartiality (Id. § 803); and the duty to inform and account (Id. § 813.1), among others.

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Section 813.1(b)(6) of the Trust Code provides: “Upon the reasonable request of a qualified

beneficiary, the trustee shall promptly furnish to the qualified beneficiary a complete copy of the

trust instrument.” Id. § 813.1(b)(6).

¶ 18 The parties do not dispute whether Lindblad is a “qualified beneficiary,” or whether

Lindblad made a reasonable request to Blair. At issue here is what documents constitute “a

complete copy of the trust instrument.”

¶ 19 Section 103(39) of the Trust Code, defines “trust instrument” as

“the written instrument stating the terms of a trust, including any amendment, any court

order or nonjudicial settlement agreement establishing, construing, or modifying the terms

of the trust in accordance with Section 111, Sections 410 through 416, or other applicable

law, and any additional trust instrument under Article 12.” Id. § 103(39).

“Terms of the trust” is defined as:

“(A) except as otherwise provided in paragraph (B), the manifestation of the settlor’s intent

regarding a trust’s provisions as:

(i) expressed in the trust instrument.”

(ii) established by other evidence that would be admissible in a judicial proceeding;

or

(B) the trust’s provisions as established, determined, or modified by:

(i) a trustee or other person in accordance with applicable law;

(ii) a court order; or

(iii) a nonjudicial settlement agreement under Section 111.” Id. §103(36).

¶ 20 Lindblad focuses on the language of the 2020 Restatement, that Mignon intended to

“amend and restate” the Original Agreement but did not explicitly revoke the Original Agreement.

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He argues that as the Original Agreement was not revoked it is one of the written instruments

stating the terms of the trust and the trustee was obligated to provide him with the Original

Agreement and any and all amendments and restatements made between May 14, 1987 and

Mignon’s death. Blair, on the other hand, argues that the 2020 Restatement, which amended some

provisions but otherwise restated the terms of the Original Agreement, is a complete copy of the

trust instrument where the 2020 Restatement rendered the Original Agreement and previous

amendments and restatements obsolete.

¶ 21 A court’s primary concern in construing a trust instrument is to discover the intent of the

settlor. Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Donovan, 145 Ill. 2d 166, 172 (1991). In determining that

intent, the court must first consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used. Eychaner

v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 256 (2002). We determine the intent as expressed by the instrument’s

language as opposed to the intent presumed to have been in the settlor’s mind. Spencer v. Di Cola,

2014 IL App (1st) 121585, ¶ 21.

¶ 22 Mignon created the Original Agreement on May 14, 1987. Under section 1.3 of the Original

Agreement, Mignon reserved the right to revoke or amend the Original Agreement, by a signed

instrument delivered to the trustee. See 760 ILCS 3/602 (West 2020) (A settlor may revoke or

amend a revocable trust instrument by, inter alia, “substantially complying with a method provided

in the trust instrument.”) Between 1987 and 2020, Mignon amended and restated the Original

Agreement, at least twice. It is not disputed that Mignon followed the method as provided in

section 1.3 of the Original Agreement in executing the 2020 Restatement. Following the 2020

Restatement, Mignon did not amend or modify any terms of the 2020 Restatement.

¶ 23 Mignon died on December 9, 2020, leaving the 2020 Restatement as the final version of

the trust. The 2020 Restatement specified that it was Mignon’s “intention to amend and restate the

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terms of the Original Agreement, with the intent that the Trust shall continue to be known as the

‘Mignon Buehler Trust.’ ” (Emphasis added.) It further stated that “pursuant to Section 1.3 of the

Original Agreement, upon executing this Agreement, I hereby amend and restate the Original

Agreement and agree to act in accordance herewith.” (Emphasis added.) Based on the language of

the 2020 Restatement, it was Mignon’s express intention that the 2020 Restatement both amend

portions of the Original Agreement and otherwise restate the terms of the Original Agreement

within its four corners.

¶ 24 Lindblad cites Taylor v. Nationsbank Corp., 481 S.E.2d 358 (N.C. App. 1997), to show

that where Mignon amended and restated the Original Agreement instead of revoking the Original

Agreement, it is still part of the trust instrument. In Taylor, a settlor created at least five versions

of a trust. Id. at 359. The first three were revoked prior to his death and two were left in effect at

his death: (1) a “Second Restated and Amended Irrevocable Trust Agreement” and (2) a “First

Amendment to Second Restated and Amended Revocable Trust Agreement.” Id. at 359-360. The

beneficiaries filed a declaratory judgment complaint, seeking an order requiring the trustee to

produce the second restated agreement “together with all versions and amendments of the trust

both prior to and since its execution, as well as other documents relating to the trust.” Id. at 360.

The trial court granted the beneficiaries partial relief ordering the trustee to produce the second

agreement and the first amendment to the second agreement. Id. The parties cross-appealed. Id.

¶ 25 On appeal, the appellate court citing section 173 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts,

concluded that a trustee is obligated to provide beneficiaries with complete and accurate

information and that beneficiaries are entitled to view a trust document relating to their interest in

the trust. Id. at 362. The appellate court found that the prior revoked documents were not

“reasonably necessary” to enforce the plaintiff’s rights or to “redress a breach of trust” in that the

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documents were inoperative and that the only two documents that addressed plaintiffs’ interest

were the second agreement and the first amendment to the second agreement. Id. The appellate

court held that beneficiaries are entitled to view the trust document from which their interest is

derived, but that right does not include trust documents that are no longer operative due to

revocation. Id.

¶ 26 Lindblad maintains that the Taylor decision that the trustee did not need to produce all prior

trust documents which were no longer operative was based on their revocation and thus the

Original Agreement, which had not been explicitly revoked, is still part of the trust instrument.

However, we agree with Blair that the holding turns on whether the prior trust documents were

operative not whether they were revoked. Here, it is only the 2020 Restatement which is operable

and the only instrument from which Lindblad’s interest is derived.

¶ 27 Blair cites two cases from different jurisdictions interpreting trust documents that use the

terms “amend and restate”, which we find persuasive. First, in Gabbert v. Coyne, 888 S.E.2d 878,

884-85 (W. Va. 2023), the West Virgina Supreme Court interpreted an “Amended and Restated”

trust document which stated that it was the settlor’s “intention that it ‘amend and restate’ the

original trust.” Id. at 884. The court found the language clear and unambiguous and that it

“demonstrate[d] that [the “Amended and Restated” trust document] constitute[d] the entire trust,

rather than an amendment to the original trust.” Id. at 885. The court explained where a settlor

states their intent to amend and restate the terms of their trust, the settlor intends to render the prior

version “fully replaced and superseded.”

¶ 28 The second case was cited in Gabbert. In In re Estate of Flake, 71 P.3d 589 (Utah 2003),

abrogated on other grounds by Mounteer Enters., Inc. v. Homeowners Association for Colony at

White Pine Canyon, 422 P.3d 809 (Utah 2018), the Utah Supreme Court construed a 1998

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Restatement in which the settlor expressly stated that he “hereby amends and restates in full” his

prior, 1987 trust agreement. The court concluded that the “terms and contents of the 1998

Restatement did fully supercede [sic] all of the operative provisions of the original 1987 Trust

Agreement.”

¶ 29 Here, the 2020 Restatement amended and restated the Original Agreement, and as a result,

it replaced and superseded the Original Agreement and any previous amendments and

restatements. And because Mignon did not make any further amendments to the 2020 Restatement,

the 2020 Restatement is the instrument which states and manifests Mignon’s intent regarding the

trust. Thus, the clear and unambiguous language of the 2020 Restatement demonstrates that it

constitutes the trust instrument.

¶ 30 Lindblad also argues that section 813.1(b)(6) should be broadly interpreted in light of

section 406 of the Trust Code (760 ILCS 3/406 (West 2022)) and that the circuit court’s

interpretation deprived him of redress available to a trust beneficiary who suspects misconduct.

We do not agree.

¶ 31 Section 406 states

“Creation of trust induced by fraud, duress, or undue influence. If the creation, amendment,

or restatement of a trust is procured by fraud, duress, mistake, or undue influence, the trust

or any part so procured is void. The remainder of the trust not procured by such means is

valid if the remainder is not invalid for other reasons. If the revocation of a trust, or any

part of the trust, is procured by fraud, duress, mistake, or undue influence, the revocation

is void.” Id.

Section 406 is a distinct section of the Trust Code dealing with the validity of a trust when there is

fraud, duress, mistake, or undue influence. On the other hand, section 813.1(b)(6) delineates the

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responsibility of a trustee and the rights of a beneficiary as to access to the trust instrument. Further,

Lindblad filed a declaratory action solely seeking a declaration as to what constituted the trust

instrument under section 813.1(b)(6). He has not brought a trust action contesting the validity of

the 2020 Restatement and also did not allege facts in his declaratory judgment complaint

supporting a claim of fraud, duress, mistake, or undue influence.

¶ 32 Lastly, Lindblad argues that the statutory definition of a “trust instrument” includes the

term “amendment” and therefore he is entitled to every amendment that Mignon made from the

Original Agreement to her death. Again, we disagree.

¶ 33 As discussed, because the 2020 Restatement made amendments and otherwise restated the

terms of the Original Agreement, any prior amendments also were rendered obsolete. The 2020

Restatement is the written instrument that states the terms of the Trust. The only amendments that

Lindblad would be entitled to under section 813.1(b)(6) would be any amendments to the 2020

Restatement itself. As we have stated, there were no amendments to the 2020 Restatement.

¶ 34 Therefore, where Blair provided Lindblad with the 2020 Restatement, the written

instrument that stated the terms of the trust, he provided Lindblad with a complete copy of the trust

instrument and complied with section 813.1(b)(6). Lindblad was not entitled to the declaratory

relief which he sought.

¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the circuit court denying Lindblad’s

motion for summary judgment and granting Blair’s cross-motion for summary judgment and

denying Lindblad’s motion for reconsideration where Blair complied with section 813.1(b)(6) of

the Trust Code (760 ILCS 3/813.1(b)(6) (West 2022)) by providing Lindblad with a complete copy

of the trust instrument.

¶ 36 Affirmed.

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