Opinion issued March 31, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-13-00849-CR ——————————— LINDA N. LEWIS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 13 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1836750
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Linda N. Lewis was charged with resisting arrest, to which she
pleaded “not guilty.” See TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.03. A jury found her guilty, and
the trial court sentenced her to 365 days in county jail and placed her on community supervision for two years. Lewis filed a motion for new trial, which
was denied by operation of law. See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.8(c).
On appeal, Lewis argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her
conviction, that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
stop and arrest her, and that she was deprived of her right to due process.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
Deputy G. Quellhorst of the Harris County Sheriff’s Office was on patrol in
Houston, wearing his uniform and driving his patrol car, when he observed a black
2005 Dodge Caravan minivan with truck license plates. In his experience, a
minivan with truck plates was unusual. Quellhorst entered the license plate
information into the computer in his squad car and learned that the plate belonged
to a yellow Dodge truck. He turned on his siren and stopped the minivan.
Appellant Linda Lewis, who was driving the minivan, turned into a nearby
shopping center and provided her driver’s license to the deputy. After running its
information through his computer, Quellhorst determined that the Department of
Public Safety had suspended the license due to an expired temporary visitor visa.
Because driving with a suspended license is a misdemeanor offense, Quellhorst
printed out a ticket. Lewis asked to read the ticket before signing it. Unable to
understand her, Quellhorst urged her to sign the citation and fight the ticket in
2 court later. After Lewis began to argue about the ticket and refused to sign it,
Quellhorst decided to arrest her for the violation. But as he attempted to handcuff
her, she turned around and swung her hand within inches of his face. In turn, he
wrestled her to the ground and a struggle ensued. For the next five minutes, Lewis
thrashed and kicked her legs, striking Quellhorst. A nearby witness, Joshua Hill,
recorded part of the struggle on his phone. Eventually, with help from another
responding officer, Quellhorst successfully handcuffed Lewis.
A jury found Lewis guilty of resisting arrest, and she was sentenced to
confinement in county jail for 365 days. The sentence was suspended, and Lewis
was placed on community supervision for two years. This appeal followed.
Analysis
Lewis brings three issues on appeal. First, she argues that the evidence is
insufficient to support her conviction. Second, she argues that her conviction must
be overturned because the arresting deputy did not have reasonable suspicion or
probable cause necessary to stop and subsequently arrest her. Third, she argues that
various aspects of the trial violated her constitutional right to due process.
I. Sufficiency of the evidence
When evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
3 doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Brooks
v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We do not resolve any
conflict of fact, weigh any evidence, or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, as
this is the function of the factfinder. See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting
inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. See Jackson, 443
U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793.
A person commits the offense of resisting arrest if she “intentionally
prevents or obstructs a person [she] knows is a peace officer . . . from effecting an
arrest, search, or transportation of the actor or another by using force against the
peace officer . . . .” TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.03(a). “It is no defense to prosecution
under this section that the arrest or search was unlawful.” Id. § 38.03(b).
Lewis argues that the evidence is not sufficient to establish that her actions
were intentional. To this end, she characterizes her act of swinging her hand near
Quellhorst’s face as a reflex in response to him handcuffing her without first
informing her that she was under arrest. She emphasizes that Quellhorst agreed at
trial that her reaction was a “mistake,” yet the record also shows that he explained
that characterization by stating that “she shouldn’t have done it, is what I mean,”
and testifying that her act was intentional. Hill corroborated Quellhorst’s version of
the events, and his video of the incident was admitted into evidence. Furthermore,
4 Lewis makes no argument that she did not intentionally thrash and kick Quellhorst
repeatedly while struggling with him on the ground. We conclude that this
evidence permitted a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Lewis
acted intentionally when she swung her hand at Quellhorst and kicked at him while
she was on the ground. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902.
Next, Lewis argues that the jury could not have concluded that her actions
constituted “using force against” Quellhorst, because “refusing to cooperate with
being arrested does not constitute resisting arrest by force.” Recently, the Court of
Criminal Appeals clarified that the statutory language of section 38.03 “plainly
requires a use of force directed ‘against’ the officer himself, not against his broader
goal of effectuating an arrest.” Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014). This concept requires “some showing of force that is actually directed
against the officer in the sense that it is either in opposition to the officer’s physical
efforts at making an arrest, such as a forceful pulling away from the officer, or is
physically directed at or toward the officer, such as hitting or punching the
officer.” Id. at 172; see also Finley v. State, 449 S.W.3d 145, 147–50 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2014, pet. filed) (applying Dobbs and determining that evidence of a
“struggle” in which defendant was “flailing around” was sufficient to support a
conviction for resisting arrest).
5 In this case, Quellhorst testified that when he attempted to place a handcuff
on Lewis’s left wrist, she “swung around and, with an open hand in kind of a
clawing action, tried to strike at [his] face.” He testified that, after evading her
hand, he took her to the ground, at which point “she turned on her back, started
kicking at [him], struck [him] in the legs.” Hill testified that he witnessed
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Opinion issued March 31, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-13-00849-CR ——————————— LINDA N. LEWIS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 13 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1836750
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Linda N. Lewis was charged with resisting arrest, to which she
pleaded “not guilty.” See TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.03. A jury found her guilty, and
the trial court sentenced her to 365 days in county jail and placed her on community supervision for two years. Lewis filed a motion for new trial, which
was denied by operation of law. See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.8(c).
On appeal, Lewis argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her
conviction, that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
stop and arrest her, and that she was deprived of her right to due process.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
Deputy G. Quellhorst of the Harris County Sheriff’s Office was on patrol in
Houston, wearing his uniform and driving his patrol car, when he observed a black
2005 Dodge Caravan minivan with truck license plates. In his experience, a
minivan with truck plates was unusual. Quellhorst entered the license plate
information into the computer in his squad car and learned that the plate belonged
to a yellow Dodge truck. He turned on his siren and stopped the minivan.
Appellant Linda Lewis, who was driving the minivan, turned into a nearby
shopping center and provided her driver’s license to the deputy. After running its
information through his computer, Quellhorst determined that the Department of
Public Safety had suspended the license due to an expired temporary visitor visa.
Because driving with a suspended license is a misdemeanor offense, Quellhorst
printed out a ticket. Lewis asked to read the ticket before signing it. Unable to
understand her, Quellhorst urged her to sign the citation and fight the ticket in
2 court later. After Lewis began to argue about the ticket and refused to sign it,
Quellhorst decided to arrest her for the violation. But as he attempted to handcuff
her, she turned around and swung her hand within inches of his face. In turn, he
wrestled her to the ground and a struggle ensued. For the next five minutes, Lewis
thrashed and kicked her legs, striking Quellhorst. A nearby witness, Joshua Hill,
recorded part of the struggle on his phone. Eventually, with help from another
responding officer, Quellhorst successfully handcuffed Lewis.
A jury found Lewis guilty of resisting arrest, and she was sentenced to
confinement in county jail for 365 days. The sentence was suspended, and Lewis
was placed on community supervision for two years. This appeal followed.
Analysis
Lewis brings three issues on appeal. First, she argues that the evidence is
insufficient to support her conviction. Second, she argues that her conviction must
be overturned because the arresting deputy did not have reasonable suspicion or
probable cause necessary to stop and subsequently arrest her. Third, she argues that
various aspects of the trial violated her constitutional right to due process.
I. Sufficiency of the evidence
When evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
3 doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Brooks
v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We do not resolve any
conflict of fact, weigh any evidence, or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, as
this is the function of the factfinder. See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting
inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. See Jackson, 443
U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793.
A person commits the offense of resisting arrest if she “intentionally
prevents or obstructs a person [she] knows is a peace officer . . . from effecting an
arrest, search, or transportation of the actor or another by using force against the
peace officer . . . .” TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.03(a). “It is no defense to prosecution
under this section that the arrest or search was unlawful.” Id. § 38.03(b).
Lewis argues that the evidence is not sufficient to establish that her actions
were intentional. To this end, she characterizes her act of swinging her hand near
Quellhorst’s face as a reflex in response to him handcuffing her without first
informing her that she was under arrest. She emphasizes that Quellhorst agreed at
trial that her reaction was a “mistake,” yet the record also shows that he explained
that characterization by stating that “she shouldn’t have done it, is what I mean,”
and testifying that her act was intentional. Hill corroborated Quellhorst’s version of
the events, and his video of the incident was admitted into evidence. Furthermore,
4 Lewis makes no argument that she did not intentionally thrash and kick Quellhorst
repeatedly while struggling with him on the ground. We conclude that this
evidence permitted a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Lewis
acted intentionally when she swung her hand at Quellhorst and kicked at him while
she was on the ground. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902.
Next, Lewis argues that the jury could not have concluded that her actions
constituted “using force against” Quellhorst, because “refusing to cooperate with
being arrested does not constitute resisting arrest by force.” Recently, the Court of
Criminal Appeals clarified that the statutory language of section 38.03 “plainly
requires a use of force directed ‘against’ the officer himself, not against his broader
goal of effectuating an arrest.” Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014). This concept requires “some showing of force that is actually directed
against the officer in the sense that it is either in opposition to the officer’s physical
efforts at making an arrest, such as a forceful pulling away from the officer, or is
physically directed at or toward the officer, such as hitting or punching the
officer.” Id. at 172; see also Finley v. State, 449 S.W.3d 145, 147–50 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2014, pet. filed) (applying Dobbs and determining that evidence of a
“struggle” in which defendant was “flailing around” was sufficient to support a
conviction for resisting arrest).
5 In this case, Quellhorst testified that when he attempted to place a handcuff
on Lewis’s left wrist, she “swung around and, with an open hand in kind of a
clawing action, tried to strike at [his] face.” He testified that, after evading her
hand, he took her to the ground, at which point “she turned on her back, started
kicking at [him], struck [him] in the legs.” Hill testified that he witnessed
Quellhorst take Lewis to the ground because “it was like she was trying to . . .
almost hit him.” In addition, the jury watched a video recorded from Hill’s mobile
phone depicting the events. From this evidence, a rational jury could conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Lewis both forcefully pulled away from Quellhorst
when she swung her hand near his face, and that she physically directed force
against him when she thrashed and kicked him while on the ground. See Dobbs,
434 S.W.3d at 171–72; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902.
Finally, Lewis does not argue that she did not know that Quellhorst was a
peace officer, but this element of the offense was self-evident. Quellhorst testified
that he was in uniform and driving his patrol car when he pulled Lewis over. A
rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Lewis knew
that Quellhorst was a peace officer. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902.
Having determined that a rational jury could have found each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, we overrule Lewis’s first issue. See TEX.
PENAL CODE § 38.03; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902.
6 II. Legality of arrest
Intertwined with her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, Lewis also
challenges Quellhorst’s basis for stopping and arresting her. She contends that her
arrest was unlawful because Quellhorst did not verify that the minivan was not hers
by checking the vehicle identification number. Furthermore, she argues that any
evidence that her license was suspended was false because she had legal immigrant
status at the time of her arrest. She asserts that, cumulatively, these factors
demonstrate the lack of reasonable suspicion and probable cause necessary for
Quellhorst to initiate the traffic stop and subsequently arrest her for driving with a
suspended license. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29–31, 8 S. Ct. 1868, 1884
(1968).
Lewis does not argue that any lack of reasonable suspicion or probable cause
required exclusion of the State’s evidence. Her brief mentions a motion to
suppress, and the record indicates that she made a pretrial motion to suppress all
evidence and testimony that the State obtained in connection with her arrest. But
the trial court did not rule on the motion. Based on our review of the record, Lewis
did not make any renewed objection at trial to the admission of the State’s
evidence or testimony. Thus, to the extent Lewis argues that the State’s evidence
should have been suppressed, we conclude that the error was not preserved for
7 appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); see also Garza v. State, 126 S.W.3d 79, 81–85
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
III. Deprivation of due process
In her third issue, Lewis argues that she was denied due process. She claims
that “[f]rom the transcript it is blatantly obvious that [the trial] was reduced to a
complete sham and farce.”
The remaining portion of the brief discussing this issue identifies numerous
alleged errors of the trial court. For example, Lewis asserts that she was indicted
only to “cover up the extreme malpractice” of Quellhorst, whom she claims
ambushed her. She states that her conviction should be reversed because it was
based on false testimony and because the prosecution tampered with the video
evidence admitted at trial. She claims that the court erred during voir dire when
explaining the offense of resisting arrest. Finally, she contends that the court erred
when it declined to rule on her motion to suppress and motion for new trial.
Lewis’s third issue is multifarious because it embraces more than one
specific ground for reversal. See Stults v. State, 23 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d). We may address a multifarious issue that is
sufficiently developed in the brief, Foster v. State, 101 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.), but that is not the situation here. An
appellant’s brief must contain “a clear and concise argument for the contentions
8 made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P.
38.1(i). An issue that is conclusory and cites no authority presents nothing for
appellate review. See Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 119 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996).
Lewis’s third issue merely states various alleged errors of the trial court. She
does not offer any legal authorities to support her assertions. Nor does she make
any argument as to why any of her complaints rise to the level of a due-process
violation that justifies reversal. Accordingly, we hold that Lewis’s third issue is
inadequately briefed and therefore waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
Conclusion
Michael Massengale Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Massengale.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).