PETITIONERS APPEARING PRO SE: ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT: LINDA DONOVAN AYN K. ENGLE FILED Jeffersonville, IN ATTORNEY AT LAW Dec 22 2025, 2:05 pm
Indianapolis, IN CLERK Indiana Supreme Court WILLIAM DONOVAN Court of Appeals and Tax Court Jeffersonville, IN
IN THE INDIANA TAX COURT
LINDA DONOVAN and WILLIAM DONOVAN, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Case No. 25T-TA-00002 ) CLARK COUNTY ASSESSOR, ) ) Respondent. )
ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL DETERMINATION OF THE INDIANA BOARD OF TAX REVIEW
FOR PUBLICATION December 22, 2025
MCADAM, J.
Linda Donovan and William Donovan, appearing pro se, appeal the Indiana
Board of Tax Review’s final determination that increased the 2023 assessment of their
condominium to match the price they paid to purchase it just over four months before
the assessment date. The Donovans challenge the Board’s determination as a matter of
law and fact, arguing that their purchase price could not serve as reliable valuation
evidence. Instead, they provide evidence from the sales of other condos but do not
compare them to their own property. After reviewing the certified record, the Court is not persuaded that the Board’s decision was erroneous. There is no legal impediment to the
use of a property’s purchase price to value the property, and the totality of the evidence
in the record here can support the Board’s inference of assessed value.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Donovans own a condominium unit located in Jeffersonville, Indiana, within
a complex known as The Harbours. The property is on the 11th floor—the top floor of
the building. The Donovans purchased this property on August 24, 2022, for $810,000.
For the January 1, 2023, assessment date, the Donovans’ property was
assessed at $700,000, which was approximately $300,000 more than the prior year.
The increased assessment led the Donovans to initiate an appeal. The Donovans
appealed first to the Clark County Property Tax Assessment Board of Appeals
(“PTABOA”), which affirmed the original assessed value for 2023. The Donovans then
appealed to the Indiana Board of Tax Review.
At the hearing before the Indiana Board, the Assessor had the burden of proof
because the assessment had increased by more than 5% over the prior year and so
presented first. The Assessor presented the property record card for the subject
property as well as the Sales Disclosure Form and MLS listing detailing the August 24,
2022, purchase of the condo by the Donovans. 1 The Assessor presented testimony
from an assessor-appraiser, who testified that the August 2022 sale was an
arm’s-length transaction, was valid to be used in the trending process for the 2023
1 A sales disclosure form is a document detailing a property sale that must be filed with the county auditor after transferring real property in a sale. See generally IND. CODE §§ 6-1.1-5.5-3, -5. MLS stands for “multiple listing service” and acts as a private database for sharing property listings and storing information about them. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, Multiple Listing Services (MLS): What Is It, available at https://www.nar.realtor/mls-online- listings/multiple-listing-service-mls-what-is-it (last visited December 18, 2025).
2 assessment, and was representative of the market value-in-use of the property as of
January 1, 2023.
The Donovans presented evidence including sales and assessment data for
other units in The Harbours building, property record cards, photographs, and
information from the 2023 Clark County real property assessment records. The
Donovans argued that their evidence indicated an assessed value of $558,800 for their
unit and showed an unconstitutional lack of uniformity in their assessment when
compared to others in their complex. They also contended that the Assessor’s evidence
was not sufficient to prove the market value-in-use of their condo.
In its final determination, the Board ordered the 2023 assessment increased to
$810,000 in accordance with Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-20. The Board concluded that the
totality of the evidence submitted by the parties supported a finding that the Donovans’
$810,000 purchase price represented the property’s true tax value as of January 1,
2023. The Board also found that the Donovans failed to prove a lack of uniformity and
equality in the assessment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court’s review of Indiana Board decisions is governed by Indiana Code
§ 33-26-6-6, which closely mirrors the language governing judicial review of
administrative decisions from Indiana’s Administrative Orders and Procedures Act.
Compare IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(e) (2025), with IND. CODE § 4-21.5-5-14(d) (2025).
Under Indiana Code § 33-26-6-6, the party seeking to overturn a final determination of
the Board bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(b).
Challengers must demonstrate that they have been prejudiced by a final determination
3 of the Board that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in
excess of or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations; without observance of
the procedure required by law; or unsupported by substantial or reliable evidence.
IND. CODE § 33-26-6-6(e). The Board’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and its
factual determinations are afforded deference when they are supported by substantial
and reliable evidence. Majestic Props., LLC v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Assessor, 241 N.E.3d
642, 644 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024).
DISCUSSION
The Donovans claim that the Board’s final determination is contrary to law,
unsupported by substantial evidence, an abuse of discretion, and a violation of the
Indiana Constitution’s guarantee of uniform and equal assessments. They make four
arguments based on these assertions: First, they contend the Board’s decision is
contrary to law, arguing that the purchase price of a property is distinct from its market
value-in-use and cannot prove the property’s true tax value without other supporting
evidence. Second, they contend that, even if their condo’s purchase price could be used
to prove true tax value, the Board’s decision is unsupported by substantial evidence
because the evidence in the record contains factual errors and fails to account for the
circumstances surrounding the sale and its proximity to the valuation date. Third, they
contend that the Board’s decision is an abuse of discretion because the totality of the
evidence compels an alternative assessment of $558,800. Fourth, and finally, they
contend that, even if the Board’s valuation is supported by the evidence, the resulting
assessment creates a lack of uniformity and equality in violation of the Indiana
4 Constitution’s Property Tax Clause, Article 10, Section 1. Ultimately, each of these four
arguments fail, as the Donovans did not accurately apply Indiana law or demonstrate
that the evidence in the record compelled a different result. As such, the Court affirms
the Board’s determination.
I. The Board’s reliance on the purchase price was not contrary to law
The Donovans raise two arguments as part of their first claim that the Board’s
reliance on the purchase price of the Donovans’ condo was contrary to law: (1) They
argue that the purchase price represents the fair market value of the condo rather than
the market value-in-use, which is the standard for Indiana assessments. (2) They argue
that this Court has held that the purchase price of a property, standing alone, is not
sufficient to support an inference of value for the property. Both arguments, however,
misapprehend the law.
A. Fair market value and market value-in-use may converge when
the pre- and post-sale uses of a property are the same
The first contention—that the purchase price of a property cannot be used to
value that property because the price reflects the property’s fair market value while
Indiana’s assessment system is founded on market value-in-use—fails to account for
circumstances where fair market value converges with market value-in-use. When such
a convergence occurs, a recent purchase of the property can reflect a property’s value-
in-use.
Although true tax value does not mean “fair market value,”
IND. CODE § 6-1.1-31-6(c), regulations governing Indiana assessments acknowledge
that true tax value and market value overlap when there are regular exchanges of a
5 type of property for its current use. See 2021 REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT MANUAL
(“2021 Manual”) (incorporated by reference at 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2.4-1-2 (2020)) at 2.
Property assessments in Indiana are based on “true tax value,”
IND. CODE § 6-1.1-31-6(b)(6), which simply means “[t]he market value-in-use of a
property for its current use.” 2021 Manual at 2. Put differently, a property’s market
value-in-use is “the price that would induce the owner to sell the real property and . . .
the buyer would purchase the real property for a continuation of the use of the property
for its current use.” Id. Market value focuses instead on the price resulting from a
property’s “reasonable exposure in a competitive market under all conditions requisite to
a fair sale, with the buyer and seller each acting prudently, knowledgeably, and for self-
interest,” regardless of the property’s pre- or post-sale use. 2021 Manual at 6. Market
value-in-use therefore emphasizes the specific use of the property, while fair market
value does not. When the use of the property before and after its sale is the same, fair
market value and market value-in-use can converge when there are regular exchanges
of the same type of property, ensuring a competitive market. See generally THE
APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 48–53 (15th ed. 2020) (defining,
comparing, and contrasting market value, fair value, use value, and market
value-in-use).
Here, the record firmly supports the Board’s determination that the Donovans’
purchase price represented the market value-in-use of the property. The determination
of whether a sale represents the market value-in-use of a piece of property is a factual
question because it turns, at least in part, on a comparison of the use of the property
before and after sale. The Donovans do not claim that they used the condo for a
6 different purpose than the previous owner. The record shows that both the Donovans
and the seller used the condo for a residential purpose. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 74, 128;
see also Cert Admin. R at 38 (showing that condo was classified as owner-occupied
homestead property for tax cap purposes beginning in 2018).) The Donovans also do
not argue that the purchase and sale of condos similar to the subject property are
uncommon. The extensive sales evidence in this case suggests that condos in the
Donovans’ building are regularly exchanged in the open market. The Donovans fail to
identify any evidence that would suggest that their purchase of the subject property was
not representative of a convergence of fair market value and market value-in-use. 2
B. This Court’s precedent does not preclude the use of a property’s
purchase price to value the property
The second contention is that existing precedent precludes the use of the
purchase price of a property to value that property, pointing to this Court’s decision in
Hubler Realty Co. v. Hendricks Cnty. Ass’r, 938 N.E.2d 311 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2010). The
Donovans argue that the purchase price of the property at issue in Hubler was “only
persuasive because it was accompanied by appraisals, supporting testimony, and
documentation of utility to the buyer.” (Pet’rs’ Reply at 6.) They maintain that “a
property’s sale price may be indicative of market value-in-use only if it results from an
arm’s-length transaction and is supported by credible and probative evidence.” (Pet’rs’
Reply at 6 (emphases removed).)
2 Residential sales are regularly used when determining true tax value for Indiana taxation purposes. See, e.g., Bougie v. Chapman, 244 N.E.3d 987, 991–92 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2024) (affirming Board’s value determination that relied on comparing recently-sold homes near the subject property); DuSablon v. Kaufman, 160 N.E.3d 587, 589 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2020) (same); Marinov v. Tippecanoe Cnty. Assessor, 119 N.E.3d 1152, 1154 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2019) (same).
7 The Donovans are correct that Hubler does not automatically make the purchase
price of a property determinative of assessed value, but they wrongly infer restrictions
on the use of such evidence that are not found in the Court’s decision. Hubler never
reached the question of whether the purchase price of a property could support an
inference of value for the same property. The question before the Court in Hubler was
whether the evidence indicated that the assessor in that case had engaged in the
practice of selective reappraisal and sales chasing. 3 Hubler, 938 N.E.2d at 313. The
Court concluded that the evidence did not support such a finding. Id. at 315. The Court
also held that the use of the property’s purchase price by the PTABOA and the Board to
determine the value of the property as part of an administrative assessment appeal did
not amount to selective reappraisal or sales chasing. Id. Neither of these questions
required the Court to consider the probative value of a property’s purchase price in
determining the property’s value.
The price paid for a property can be used to prove the value of that property.
See, e.g., Pachniak v. Marshall Cnty. Assessor, Case No. 49T10-0904-TA-18, 2010 WL
2284248, *2 (Ind. Tax Ct. June 8, 2010) (finding purchase price of subject property
“evidence as to its actual value” for purposes of assessment). But like any other sale
offered to prove value, the extent of a purchase price’s persuasiveness turns on the
facts and circumstances surrounding the sale. These facts and circumstances must be
3 “Sales chasing, also known as selective reappraisal, is the practice of selectively changing values for properties that have been sold, while leaving other values alone . . . . [s]elective reappraisal cases have been characterized as those in which either one taxpayer or a small group of taxpayers are singled-out for revaluation or for first-time assessment when similar property is not assessed for any additional tax liability.” Big Foot Stores LLC v. Franklin Twp. Assessor, 919 N.E.2d 621, 623 n.5 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
8 evaluated to determine whether they permit an inference that the purchase price is
representative of market value-in-use at the time of assessment. See, e.g., Millennium
Real Est. Inv., LLC v. Assessor, Benton Cnty., 979 N.E.2d 192, 194–95 (Ind. Tax Ct.
2012) (rejecting previous purchase prices for a property for various reasons, including
that a sale involved related parties and that a sale related to a foreclosure), trans.
denied; cf. Shepard v. Clatsop Cnty. Assessor, No. TC-MD 170163R, 2018 WL
1299284, at *3, *8–9 (Or. Tax Ct. Mar. 13, 2018) (finding the purchase price of a home
unpersuasive because the home was not adequately marketed and was immediately
relisted after purchase for nearly double the purchase price). In this regard, the
purchase price of the subject property may represent the best indication of value for that
property because it eliminates the need to adjust for differences between the subject
and comparison properties. 4
Ultimately, both the probative and persuasive value of a property’s sale in
determining that property’s market value-in-use is a factual question, not a legal one.
Such questions are committed to the discretion and judgment of the finder of fact.
Hubler placed no restrictions or corroboration requirements on the use of a property’s
purchase price to infer the value of that property. The Board, as the trier of fact, is best
equipped to examine the evidence underlying the purchase price and determine
whether the sale represents the market value-in-use of the subject property.
4 This principle has been formalized in other jurisdictions, such as Oregon, where “[a] recent sale of property is ‘very persuasive’ in determining the property’s fair market value, if the sale was a voluntary, arm’s-length transaction between a knowledgeable and willing buyer and seller.” Miller v. Dep’t of Revenue, State of Or., 958 P.2d 833, 837 (Or. 1998).
9 II. The Board’s value determination is supported by substantial evidence
Notwithstanding their arguments that the use of a purchase price to value a
property was legally erroneous, the Donovans lodge an alternative claim that the
Board’s conclusion of value for their condo is unsupported by substantial evidence. The
Donovans claim that the evidence of their purchase price contained three flaws that
render it incapable of supporting the Board’s value determination: (1) the MLS listing
contained unverified and inaccurate data, (2) the purchase price was not adjusted for
the time between the sale and the assessment date, and (3) the evidence failed to
account for the Donovans’ atypical motivations as buyers. While the evidence in the
certified record may be imperfect, the Court will uphold the Board’s decision if there is
more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the Board’s findings. See CVS Corp.
v. Searcy, 137 N.E.3d 1053, 1056 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2019). Here, the evidence is sufficient to
support an inference that the Donovans’ purchase of the subject property represented
the market value-in-use of the property for the 2023 assessment date.
A. Evidence relied upon by the Board to determine true tax value
The Donovans first note that the MLS listing contained incorrect data pertaining
to the square footage and number of balconies for their condo. (Pet’rs’ Reply at 8; see
Cert. Admin. R. at 67–69, 78.) But they do not explain why these two inaccuracies
preclude the Board from relying on the body of evidence surrounding the sale to infer a
value. Determining the value of a property must often rely on imperfect market data.
See Madison Cnty. Assessor v. Kohl’s Indiana, LP, 268 N.E.3d 873, 884 (Ind. Tax Ct.
2025) (citing Lake Cnty. Assessor v. O’Day Holdings, LLC, 249 N.E.3d 677, 688 (Ind.
Tax Ct. 2024), opinion superseded on reh’g, No. 24T-TA-00009, 2025 WL 3202637
10 (Ind. Tax Ct. Nov. 17, 2025). The Donovans do not identify factual errors in the other
evidence detailing their purchase of the subject property, nor do they explain how these
two errors in the MLS listing affected the price they paid for the property. The Board
found the sale to be a “valid, arm’s length transaction in which both parties were
represented by realtors,” which is sufficient to overcome the minor inaccuracies
contained in the MLS listing. (Cert. Admin. R. at 108 ¶ 24.)
B. Difference between purchase date and assessment date
The Donovans next argue that the unique market conditions prevailing at the
time they purchased the condo and the lapse of time between their August 2022
purchase and the January 1, 2023, assessment date deprive the sale price of
persuasive value absent adjustments. In its final determination, the Board found that
there was “no evidence showing a significant change in the market” between the sale
date and the assessment date and concluded that the sale was “sufficiently close to the
valuation date for it to be reliable evidence” of the condo’s value as of the assessment
date. (Cert. Admin R. at 108 ¶ 24.) Although the Donovans offered a different
perspective in their testimony, the Board’s finding is supported by the testimony of the
Assessor’s expert who testified that the August 24, 2022, purchase price was
representative of the market value-in-use for the January 1, 2023, assessment date.
This testimony combined with the fact that the sale occurred a little more than four
months before the assessment date was sufficient to support an inference by the Board
that the sale price reflected the value of the Donovans’ condo on the assessment date.
11 C. The Donovans’ personal considerations at time of purchase
The Donovans also challenge the Board’s finding that their purchase is “reliable
evidence of the subject property’s true tax value” by arguing that they were atypically
motivated buyers, which led them to pay a price that outpaced the market. (Cert. Admin.
R. at 108, ¶ 24.) Because of their age and health issues, the Donovans claim that they
decided against buying another similarly sized condo in the same complex that would
have required several months of renovation. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 127:22–31.) But
the Donovans provided no evidence suggesting that such motivations are atypical or
demonstrating that such motivations affected the eventual sale price. See DuSablon v.
Kaufman, 160 N.E.3d 587, 595 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2020) (rejecting taxpayer’s claim that they
overpaid for personal reasons because there was objective evidence that the purchase
price resulted from an “open, competitive, fair, arm’s-length transaction). Paying a
premium for a fully renovated property does not seem at all unusual, and buyers are
likely to be motivated by an array of factors when purchasing residential property. 5
Notwithstanding the Donovans’ stated motivations, the Board was empowered to weigh
that testimony against the other evidence of the sale.
Here, the record contains substantial evidence supporting the Board’s
determination that the sale was probative and reliable, as the sale bore many hallmarks
of an arm’s-length transaction: the buyer and seller were unrelated parties (see Cert.
Admin. R. at 74–75, 124); both were represented by their own agents from different
5 Paying a premium for a renovated space is not only usual but also accounted for in standard valuation approaches. “If the subject property requires some expenditure immediately after the purchase to reach its full utility, the adjustment amount is subtracted from the sale prices of all comparable sales that do not require a similar expenditure to adjust those transactions for differences from the subject property.” THE APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, supra, at 386.
12 brokerages (see Cert. Admin R. at 125–26); the property was actively marketed on the
MLS for 122 days (see Cert. Admin. R. at 78, 126); and the final sale price was
negotiated down from the asking price (see Cert. Admin. R. at 80). There was also
testimony from the Assessor’s expert that the transaction appeared to be a valid arm’s-
length sale that was representative of the market value-in-use for the 2023 assessment
date. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 124–25.) This evidence cuts against the Donovans’ stated
motivations and is capable of supporting a finding by the Board that the Donovans’
purchase was not atypical. As such, the evidence is sufficient to support an inference
that the Donovans’ purchase was indicative of the property’s true tax value.
III. The evidence does not compel a different result
The Donovans contend that the Board abused its discretion by finding that the
Donovans offered no reliable market-based evidence showing their condo’s true tax
value. On the contrary, the Donovans claim that they submitted evidence that
conclusively demonstrates the value of their property in 2023 was $558,800. Like its
review for substantial evidence, the Court’s review for an abuse of discretion sets a
highly deferential standard. “An abuse of discretion may occur if the Indiana Board’s
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it,
or if the Indiana Board misinterprets the law.” Hubler, 938 N.E.2d at 315 n.5.
While the certified record contains several pieces of evidence which the
Donovans believe support their argument, there are substantial differences between
those units and the subject property which the Donovans do not reconcile. The record
shows that units in The Harbours vary significantly in floor level, views, bedroom and
bathroom counts, condition, and upgrade quality. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 39–65, 134–
13 38.) While the Donovans estimated costs for some upgrades when comparing
properties, they did not establish how those costs translated into value differences.
(See, e.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 130.) Ms. Donovan confirmed this in her testimony to the
Board, agreeing when cross-examined that she did not adjust any of the properties she
offered as comparables for differences such as condition, location in the complex,
number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and condition or quality of the amenities.
(See Cert. Admin. R. at 134–35, 138.) More fundamentally, the Donovans did not
establish that they selected sales of comparable units when accounting for all value-
affecting characteristics.
Rather than showing that the Board’s conclusion is against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances before it, the evidence in the record supports the Board’s
finding that the Donovans’ evidence is unreliable. And while the Donovans demonstrate
in their briefing that they are familiar with the concept of generally accepted appraisal
principles, as the Board found, no evidence in the record shows that the Donovans used
these principles to explain their valuation method or analyze their data to support their
proposed valuation. Taken together, the evidence does not compel a result different
than the Board’s, and the Court will not disturb the Board’s determination on this basis.
IV. The Donovans failed to show entitlement to an equalization adjustment
The Donovans contend that the assessment of their condo is unconstitutional
and requires an equalization adjustment because it is abnormally high when compared
to the average assessment of other properties in their complex. The Board found that
the Donovans failed to complete a ratio study or compute an assessment-to-price ratio,
which left the Donovans unable to demonstrate an entitlement to an equalization
14 adjustment of the subject property’s assessment. After reviewing the evidence, the
Court finds ample support for the Board’s finding against an equalization adjustment
and is not persuaded by the Donovans’ ratio-study-type analysis that a constitutional
violation exists in this case.
An equalization adjustment provides a method to bring assessments into
compliance with Article 10, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc.
v. Matonovich, 842 N.E.2d 901, 904 n.4 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006). That provision of the
Constitution states, in part, that “[t]he General Assembly shall provide, by law, for a
uniform and equal rate of property assessment and taxation.” IND. CONST. art. 10, § 1.
This requires a “uniform, equal, and just system” of assessment and taxation in Indiana,
where “each taxpayer’s property wealth bear[s] its proportion of the overall property tax
burden.” State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d 1034, 1039–1040
(Ind. 1998) (internal citation omitted); accord Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d
318, 327 (Ind. 1996). For the Donovans to prevail on such a claim, they must
demonstrate that their property was “assessed and taxed on a different basis as
compared to taxpayers with substantially similar property.” Indianapolis Hist. Partners v.
State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 694 N.E.2d 1224, 1229 (Ind. Tax Ct. 1998).
This Court has previously explained that one way to measure uniformity and
equality in property assessment is through a ratio study. Westfield Golf Practice Ctr.,
LLC v. Washington Twp. Assessor, 859 N.E.2d 396, 399 n.3 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2007). A ratio
study analyzes sales data to examine the relationship between an assessed value of a
property and its market value-in-use. 50 IND. ADMIN. CODE 27-2-10. This can
demonstrate a lack of uniformity and equality by “compar[ing] the assessed values of
15 properties within an assessing jurisdiction with objectively verifiable data.” Thorsness v.
Porter Cnty. Assessor, 3 N.E.3d 49, 51 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2014). To do so accurately, a ratio
study “must be based on data that has been both appropriately stratified and statistically
analyzed” with “all the properties . . . divided (i.e., stratified) into two or more
subpopulations” before “a statistical measure of assessment uniformity [is] calculated.”
Id. at 53–54. The coefficient of dispersion, which “indicates the average deviation from
the median sale/assessment ratio,” is the most widely accepted statistical measure of
tax assessment uniformity. Id. at 54.
As the Board found in its determination, the Donovans “offered a significant
amount of raw sales and assessment data” but failed to use the data to develop a ratio
study or compute an assessment-to-sales price ratio. 6 (Cert. Admin R. at 111 ¶ 33; see
Cert. Admin. R. at 104–5 ¶ 14.) The Assessor’s expert witness testimony confirmed that
the Donovans’ calculations differed from those in a traditional ratio study. (See Cert.
Admin. R. at 145:18–146:4.) Instead of calculating a coefficient of dispersion, or another
established measure of uniformity, the Donovans testified that they compared similar-
sized condos in their complex and calculated an average assessment, which they then
compared to their own assessment. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 52, 139–40.) The
Donovans also compared these assessments based on an assessment-to-area ratio.
(See Cert. Admin. R. 39, 50.) These comparisons were made without any adjustments
6 Throughout the certified record, the Donovans conflate the term “ratio study” with the data used for such a study, referred to by the Donovans as a “ratio file.” (E.g., Cert. Admin. R. at 34, 114, 133–34.) A ratio study is a form of applied statistics used to draw conclusions about a group of properties sold during a given timeframe. INT’L ASSOCIATION OF ASSESSING OFFICERS, Standard on Ratio Studies 8 (2013), available at https://www.iaao.org/wp-content/uploads/Standard_on_Ratio_Studies.pdf. While a ratio study can only be as accurate as its data, that data must be analyzed and used in calculations to derive meaningful conclusions about valuation levels or uniformity. See id. at 11, 13–14.
16 to the previous sales. (See Cert. Admin. R. at 138:23–24, 140:20–23, 143:29–30,
144:14–16, 147:22.)
Indiana law does not require taxpayers to present ratio studies or present their
findings in a particular format to demonstrate a constitutional infirmity in their
assessment. See Westfield Golf, 859 N.E.2d at 399 n.3. But when the Donovans
“present[ed] evidence to the Indiana Board, it [wa]s their duty to walk the Indiana Board
through every element of their analysis.” Blesich v. Lake Cnty. Assessor, 46 N.E.3d 14,
17 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2015) (emphasis omitted).
In this case, the Donovans relied on data from a previous ratio study and applied
basic statistical analysis to that data. If the Donovans were attempting to complete a
ratio study, the Board correctly determined that they failed to conform with
professionally accepted standards for such a study. If instead the Donovans were
attempting to use another method to demonstrate a lack of uniformity and equality, then
the Board correctly determined that the Donovans’ evidence was insufficient because it
lacked the rigor and thoroughness necessary to demonstrate the validity of their
alternative method for showing a lack of uniformity and equality. The Donovans failed to
explain how comparing the average assessments of condos with square footage similar
to their own demonstrated a nonuniform or unequal assessment. They never explained
how such measures related to the market value-in-use of the analyzed properties.
While the Donovans used techniques that may be somewhat similar to valuation
statistics used in ratio studies, they did not demonstrate that these alternative methods
produce accurate results for comparing uniformity. Furthermore, while the Donovans
may have presented some probative evidence of their property’s value, the Board’s
17 findings against the Donovans are supported by substantial and reliable evidence in the
certified record and did not violate the law. The Donovans failed to sufficiently analyze
their data or explain their methodology in such a way as to prove a lack of uniformity
and equality in their assessment. Because the Board’s findings in this case were not
shown to be illegal, unsupported by evidence, or unconstitutional, the Court will not
disturb the Board’s resulting determination.
V. Warning regarding the use of artificial intelligence
In their briefing, the Donovans cited “Rawles v. Monroe Cnty. Ass’r, 48T10-1705-
TA-00014, slip op. at 5–6 (Ind. Tax Ct. May 13, 2019)”—a case which neither the Court
nor the Donovans were able to locate, because it does not exist. (Pet’rs’ Reply at 10;
see generally Pet’rs’ October 6, 2025 Memo.) Ms. Donovan confirmed at the hearing
that she had relied on artificial intelligence to aid in drafting her briefs, leading the Court
to believe that this citation was an AI hallucination. (Oral Arg. at 24:24–25:15.) The
Donovans also appear to quote this Court’s Piotrowski, O’Donnell, and Westfield Golf
cases in their reply brief, but the quoted language is not present in any of these Indiana
Tax Court cases. Compare Piotrowski v. Shelby Cnty. Ass’r, 144 N.E.3d 887, 892 (Ind.
Tax Ct. 2020), and O’Donnell v. Department of Local Government Finance, 854 N.E.2d
90 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2006), and Westfield Golf Practice Ctr., LLC, 859 N.E.2d 396, with
(Pet’rs’ Reply at 5, 9–10).
Courts have sanctioned both attorneys and pro se litigants for citing fictitious
cases in briefs. Williams v. Kirch, 268 N.E.3d 284, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025); see also In
re Baby Boy, --- N.E.3d ----, ----, 2025 WL 2046315, at *23 (Ill. App. Ct. July 21, 2025)
(requiring an attorney who cited fictious cases in his briefs to pay monetary sanctions
18 and sending a copy of the opinion to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission). False citations may also have negative effects on the outcome of a case.
See, e.g., Kruse v. Karlen, 692 S.W.3d 43, 52–53 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024) (determining that
the appellant’s use of fictitious citations in his brief mandated a dismissal of the appeal),
reh’g denied, trans. denied. Citing fictious cases adversely affects all parties in a case.
See Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). It “wastes time
and money in exposing the deception” and takes a court’s time “from other important
endeavors.” Id. Moreover, “client[s] may be deprived of arguments based on authentic
judicial precedents.” Id.
The Court admonishes the Donovans for failing to confirm the accuracy of their
legal presentations but will impose no further penalties. Particularly when using
generative AI, attorneys and pro se litigants alike have a duty to independently verify the
authenticity of authoritative sources cited to the Court and to ensure they are used
accurately. Judges must be able to rely on the authenticity of the authorities cited by the
parties to make just decisions. Williams, 268 N.E.3d at 288.
CONCLUSION
The Board’s final determination in this matter is AFFIRMED.