Lincoln-Sudbury Regional School District v. Frasca Construction Corp.

234 N.E.2d 759, 354 Mass. 22, 1968 Mass. LEXIS 755
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedMarch 6, 1968
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 234 N.E.2d 759 (Lincoln-Sudbury Regional School District v. Frasca Construction Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lincoln-Sudbury Regional School District v. Frasca Construction Corp., 234 N.E.2d 759, 354 Mass. 22, 1968 Mass. LEXIS 755 (Mass. 1968).

Opinion

Spalding, J.

This is a petition under G. L. c. 251, § 2 (b), by the Lincoln-Sudbury Regional School District (owner) to stay an arbitration proceeding initiated by the Frasca Construction Corporation (general contractor).1 No evidence was introduced. The case having been submitted on the petition (to which were attached copies of the construction contract and the demand for arbitration) and answer, was, in effect, a case stated. The judge entered a final decree denying the stay of arbitration on the ground that “there has been an agreement of the parties ... to arbitrate their dispute.” From this decree the owner appealed.

The owner entered into a contract with the general contractor on June 30, 1965, providing for the construction of certain additions and alterations to the Lincoln-Sudbury [23]*23Regional High School. In December, 1966, the general contractor filed a “Demand for Arbitration” with the American Arbitration Association alleging that the owner “on orders of the Architect” had “arbitrarily refused to accept or honor [[certain] Requisitions” under the contract and that the architect was “unjustifiably threatening ... to impose a penalty on [[the general contractor].” On March 8, 1967, the owner filed this petition for a stay of arbitration. No arbitration hearing has been held. The sole issue presented is whether the dispute is subject to arbitration.

The only contract provisions relative to arbitration are those contained in §§ 26 and 42. Nowhere does the contract make disputes relating to payments of requisitions subject to arbitration. The only section of the contract expressly subjecting a dispute to arbitration is § 26 which provides for arbitration of disputes arising out of the distribution of insurance proceeds. The only other reference to arbitration is found in § 42 which sets out the procedure to be followed for “[a]ll disputes, claims or questions subject to arbitration under this [c]ontract” (emphasis supplied).2

The general contractor argues that the third paragraph of § 42, which prescribes time limits for filing a demand for arbitration when such a demand is an appeal from a deci[24]*24sion of the architect, subjects decisions of the architect to arbitration. A contrary construction, it is urged, would render this provision meaningless, as it is unlikely that § 42 was inserted in the contract merely to deal with insurance disputes under § 26. But as to what the parties may have intended by the insertion of § 42 in the contract we can only speculate. The short answer is that the contract, including the provisions of § 42, failed to provide for the arbitration of a dispute of the sort here involved. In the absence of such a provision, there is no right to compel arbitration. J. F. Fitzgerald, Constr. Co. v. Southbridge Water Supply Co. 304 Mass. 130, 134, and cases cited. Section 42 prescribes merely the procedure to be followed in case of arbitration but it creates no obligation to arbitrate.

The final decree is reversed and a new decree is to be entered granting a stay of arbitration. The petitioner is to have costs of appeal.

So ordered.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
234 N.E.2d 759, 354 Mass. 22, 1968 Mass. LEXIS 755, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lincoln-sudbury-regional-school-district-v-frasca-construction-corp-mass-1968.