Lincoln Rug Co. v. East Newark Realty

61 A.2d 448, 142 N.J. Eq. 743
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedSeptember 5, 1948
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 61 A.2d 448 (Lincoln Rug Co. v. East Newark Realty) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lincoln Rug Co. v. East Newark Realty, 61 A.2d 448, 142 N.J. Eq. 743 (N.J. 1948).

Opinion

"The defendant is the owner of a group of buildings in East Newark, several of which are occupied by the complainant as tenant. Complainant operates a rug cleaning and dyeing business, and uses large quantities of steam which it buys from the defendant under a contract embodied in the lease. The dispute relates to the price of the steam. The contract fixes a base price of 75 cents per 1,000 pounds with this proviso:

"`If Landlord's cost to produce steam shall increase between the time of the signing of this lease and the beginning of the term provided for herein, Landlord shall, upon proof thereof, have the right to increase the charge to Tenant sufficiently to compensate Landlord therefor to the extent of Tenant's steam consumption. Landlord shall also have the same right if any further cost increases occur after the beginning of the term; any such increases in cost to Tenant shall be reduced proportionately if and when Landlord's costs decrease again.'

"The term began February 1st, 1946, but the lease was executed six years earlier, December 23d 1939. Early in January, 1946, defendant advised complainant it would charge for steam $1.09 per 1,000 pounds, thereby indicating that the *Page 745 cost of producing steam had increased 34 cents since the lease was made. On March 1st, defendant billed complainant for steam used in February at $1 per 1,000 pounds, fearing trouble with the O.P.A. if it charged more than that amount. The complainant, after some correspondence, refused to pay this bill and thereupon the defendant warned that it would shut off complainant's supply of steam. The bill of complaint was then filed, praying that defendant be enjoined from carrying this threat into execution. An order was made by consent restraining the defendant, pending suit, on condition that complainant pay for steam at 75 cents. After the defendant answered, an order was made on motion of complainant that its engineer be permitted to examine defendant's steam plant and facilities and the records and charts connected with the operation thereof, and that Messrs. Puder Puder be permitted to examine the accounts of the defendants. This firm was selected by the court when the parties were unable to agree upon an accountant. The final hearing was directed almost exclusively to ascertaining defendant's cost of steam production.

"The complainant argues that defendant has no right to increase the charge for steam until after it submits to complainant `proof' of its increased cost. I agree with complainant that nothing which can be called `proof' was furnished it prior to the final hearing, but I cannot agree with its conclusion that it should not pay more than 75 cents for steam furnished before the hearing. The essence of the agreement between the parties was the provision for payment of increased cost. It is equitable that complainant should pay the increase, regardless of when the proof was submitted. By seeking the aid of the court, it assumed the burden of doing equity.

"The chief question of difficulty in the case goes to the expression `cost to produce steam.' As Mr. Justice Washington said, in Goodwin v. United States, Fed. Cas. No. 5554, `The term (cost) is certainly of an equivocal meaning.' In HazeltonTripod Boiler Co. v. Citizens Street Railway Co.,72 Fed. Rep. 320, the court mentioned `the seemingly insuperable difficulty of ascertaining the cost, for example, of producing *Page 746 a pound of cotton or of making a yard of cloth.' In McMullin v.Bodine (Pa.), 93 Atl. Rep. 321, where the `actual cost' of manufacturing glass was a factor in a contract, the court excluded those fixed charges which would have been incurred whether or not glass was manufactured. On the other hand, inSaulsbury Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 142 Fed. Rep. 2d 27, 38, which involved `cost of boosting and/or transportation' of oil, indirect overhead and depreciation were included. See, also, Stanwood v. Comer, 188 Mass. 54;Fillmore v. Johnson (Mass.), 109 N.E. Rep. 153; BostonMolasses Co. v. Molasses, c., Corp. (Mass.),175 N.E. Rep. 150.

"The meaning of the term `landlord's cost to produce steam' depends upon the construction of the contract, that is, the intention of the parties. We are apt to think of costs in terms of a year, but the parties had in mind a very much shorter period; cost at the time the lease was made and at the beginning of the term. They anticipated not only a possible increase between the date of the lease and the beginning of the term, but variations from time to time during the four-year term. Also, they meant by cost something readily susceptible of proof. The word `proof' in the contract signifies such data and calculations, supported by such books of account and records as would satisfy an intelligent businessman. I cannot believe that the parties intended a figure that could be reached only after an elaborate investigation and audit such as Mr. Puder has made. The defendant, in its letter of January 10th, 1946, explaining how it reached a rate of $1.09, pointed out that the cost of fuel oil had increased from $1.11 to $1.61 per barrel, an increase of 45 per cent. `Applying this 45 per cent. increase in cost to the base rate of 75 cents per 1,000 pounds, we arrived at the new figure of $1.09 per thousand pounds. Fuel is, of course, the principal expense in the production of live steam. But all other elements of cost have risen at least in the same proportion or more.' The writer recognized that the increase in cost was to be determined by a simple calculation, and in this he was correct.

"It is significant that the parties, when making the lease, did not determine the current cost. They must have meant *Page 747 by cost at `the time of signing of this lease,' a figure which, six years later, could be derived with reasonable accuracy by inspecting the old books and records of the company. For instance, the defendant, in 1939, as well as in 1946, bought electric current and used some of it in the power plant, but made no record of how much was so used. One of its agents now guesses that 30 per cent. of the electricity bought in the winter of 1939 should be allocated to the cost of producing steam. The price of steam should not depend on this type of estimate.

"These considerations lead me to a rather narrow interpretation of the word `cost.'

"From Mr. Puder's report, the figures below are derived:

                                           December, 1939   January, 1946

Steam produced .......................... 16,085,970 pds. 23,932,347 pds.

Costs:

Fuel .................................... $4,385.84 $9,933.71 Water ................................... 87.01 115.96 Supplies ................................ 120.63 183.84 Boiler insurance ........................ 11.81 19.98 Wages ................................... 1,051.73 2,604.51 Compensation insurance .................. 5.64 22.51 Social Security Taxes ................... 45.68 80.91 __________ __________ $5,696.53 $12,961.42

December, 1939 January, 1946

Cents, per 1,000 lbs. ................... 35.48 54.15 Repairs ($76.53) ........................

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Bluebook (online)
61 A.2d 448, 142 N.J. Eq. 743, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lincoln-rug-co-v-east-newark-realty-nj-1948.