Lincoln County Fiscal Court v. Department of Public Advocacy

794 S.W.2d 162, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 64, 1990 WL 87586

• Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
• Decided: June 28, 1990
• Docket: 89-SC-71-DG
• Status: Published

Opinions

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice.

This appeal is from a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed an order of the circuit court which had required the Department of Public Advocacy to pay for the costs of private mental health experts in the defense of an indigent imprisoned defendant.

The issue is who is responsible to pay for an indigent defendant’s mental health experts when that defendant is confined in a state correctional institution.

At the time the criminal defendant requested the payment of costs for mental health experts, he was already confined in a state correctional institution. His confinement was a result of his conviction in Madison County for capital murder which he had committed one month after the crimes he allegedly committed in Lincoln County.

K.R.S. 31.185 permits a defense attorney the use of state facilities for the evaluation of evidence. The trial judge may also authorize the use of private facilities to be paid for by the county. K.R.S. 31.200(3) requires that payment for mental health experts be borne by the Department of Public Advocacy when the defendant is incarcerated at the state prison at the time of the use of the mental health experts even though the experts are being used for a crime committed prior to the imprisonment.

The trial judge held that the Department of Public Advocacy was responsible for the payment of the experts pursuant to K.R.S. 31.200(3). The Department argues that Lincoln County was liable for payment under K.R.S. 31.185 as interpreted in Perry County Fiscal Court v. Commonwealth, Ky., 674 S.W.2d 954 (1984), and that it is only required to pay the costs of the defense of crimes committed at a state correctional institution by an indigent person. The defendant in the Madison County case was represented by a private attorney and apparently asserted the defense of insanity. After being convicted and sentenced to death, his appeal was assumed by the Department of Public Advocacy. The defendant has always been represented by the Department in the Lincoln County case. In that case, the public defender requested funds for the employment of mental health experts to analyze various mental functions and ultimately to testify for the defense.

The language of K.R.S. 31.200(3) is clear and unambiguous. It provides as follows:

Expenses incurred in the representation of needy persons confined in a state correctional institution shall be borne by the State Department of Public Advocacy. Prior to 1976, this section of K.R.S. 31.-

200(3) had read as follows:

Expenses incurred in the defense of needy persons confined in a state correctional institution who are charged with a serious offense committed at such institution shall be borne by the state office of public defender.

Consequently, in 1976, K.R.S. 31.200(3) was amended so that the requirement that the offenses were to have been committed within the institution was deleted and the language now simply provides that expenses incurred in the representation of a needy person who is in a state correctional institution is to be borne by the Department. There are no conditions, limitations, restrictions or other qualifications now included in the statute.

Where the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is no room for construction or interpretation and the statute must be given its effect as written. Griffin v. City of Bowling Green, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 456 (1970). An unambiguous stab ute must be applied without resort to any outside aids. Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Revenue Cabinet, Ky., 689 S.W.2d 14 (1985).

The exact question presented here has not been previously decided. None of the cases cited by the Department or noted by the Court of Appeals concerns who is to pay for psychiatric evaluation as between the Department and the county in this context. The cases used by the Department are distinguishable on their facts and do not concern a prisoner who is in the custody of the Department of Corrections but is being tried for crimes committed prior to the incarceration. Perry County Fiscal Court, supra, is also not applicable in this situation.

When the plain wording of the present statute is compared with that of the statute prior to 1976, it is obvious that the clear legislative intent is to abandon the former policy that the Department should pay only those costs for crimes committed at a correctional institution in favor of a policy that the Department pay the costs of defense for all crimes committed by indigent inmates who are now committed to prison facilities regardless of where those crimes were committed.

The Court of Appeals expanded the meaning of the statute to arrive at what it believed the legislature intended. In applying its rationale to the statute, it created direct conflict with the clear meaning of the words. The court must apply the statute as written and leave any changes to the General Assembly.

K.R.S. 441.047 is not properly before this Court for review and accordingly will not be considered.

It is the holding of this Court that the clear and unambiguous meaning of K.R.S. 31.200(3) requires that the Department of Public Advocacy must bear the expenses for mental health experts for indigent persons confined in a state correctional institution regardless of the time or location of the crime.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and this matter is remanded to the circuit court for appropriate disposition.

STEPHENS, C.J., and COMBS, LAMBERT, VANCE and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. LEIBSON, J., dissents by separate opinion in which GANT, J., joins.