Lin v. La Vie en Szechuan Restaurant Corp.

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided April 9, 2020·No. 1:15-cv-09507·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

YUAJIAN LIN, et al.,

Plaintiffs, -against- 15cv09507 (DF)

LA VIE EN SCHEZUAN RESTAURANT MEMORANDUM CORP., et al. AND ORDER

Defendants.

DEBRA FREEMAN, United States Magistrate Judge: In January 2020, this Court conducted a bench trial in the above-captioned wage-and- hour case, which is before this Court on consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Following the trial, the Court found that plaintiffs Yunjian Lin (“Lin”) and Yu Huang (“Huang”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) were entitled to judgment in their favor under the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”) against defendants La Vie En Szechuan Restaurant Corp. (“La Vie En Szechuan”), Savour Sichuan Inc. (“Savour Sichuan”), and Yi Zhang (“Zhang”) (collectively, for purposes of this Memorandum and Order, “Defendants”).1 As stated on the record at trial, and reiterated in the Court’s February 11, 2020 Order (Dkt. 117), the Court directed the parties to attempt to stipulate to the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs to be awarded to Plaintiffs in connection with the judgment, and further instructed Plaintiffs that, if no agreement could be reached, then they

1 Plaintiffs have moved for entry of a default judgment against defendant Zhong Qing Wang (“Wang”), who did not appear to defend this case at trial. (Dkt. 118.) The Court has given Wang until April 27, 2020 to respond to Plaintiffs’ motion. (Dkt. 132.) If the Court determines that a default judgment against Wang is warranted, then it will separately address any attorneys’ fees or costs that may be recoverable as against Wang, upon a separate application by Plaintiffs setting out the time spent by counsel with respect to the pursuit of Plaintiffs’ claims against him. (See Dkt. 127, at 4.) should submit a fee application. On February 24, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a letter motion seeking leave to file a motion for attorneys’ fees (Dkt. 123), even though the Court had already granted Plaintiffs leave to file such a motion, and although Plaintiffs apparently intended their submission to constitute a complete fee application (see id. (attaching a substantive attorney

declaration, a copy of counsel’s contemporaneous time records, and a memorandum of law)). On March 5, 2020, Defendants filed an attorney declaration in opposition to Plaintiff’s application. (Dkt. 126.) Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, but they argue that the amounts Plaintiffs seek are “excessive and unreasonable.” (See id.) Plaintiffs have made no further submission in reply. Having reviewed Plaintiffs’ counsel’s requested hourly rates and time records, the Court finds that, in connection with the judgment to be entered against defendants La Vie En Szechuan, Savour Sichuan, and Zhang, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover $41,681.81 in attorneys’ fees and costs. DISCUSSION

I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS “Under both the FLSA and the NYLL, a prevailing plaintiff may recover [his or] her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Najnin v. Dollar Mountain, Inc., No. 14cv5758, 2015 WL 6125436, at *4; 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); N.Y. Lab. Law § 198(1-a). The Court has discretion to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees that would be appropriate to satisfy a fee award. See Barfield v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2008). As a general matter, the “starting point” in analyzing whether claimed attorneys’ fees are appropriate is “the lodestar – the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case.” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011). The party seeking fees bears the burden of demonstrating that its requested fees are reasonable, and must provide the Court with sufficient information to assess the fee application. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984); New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir. 1983).

An attorney’s hourly rate is considered reasonable when it is “in line with those [rates] prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. Although the fee applicant has the burden of demonstrating prevailing market rates for comparable work, the Court may also apply its “own knowledge” of rates charged in the community in assessing the reasonableness of the rates sought. Broome v. Biondi, 17 F. Supp. 2d 230, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Miele v. N.Y. State Teamsters Conf. Pension & Ret. Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir. 1987). When an attorney’s requested hourly rate is higher than rates found to be reasonable in the relevant market, it is within the Court’s discretion to reduce the requested rate. See Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1998).

Where the requested amount of fees is excessive because the number of stated hours is greater than that which should have been required for the work produced, the Court should reduce the stated hours accordingly. See Seitzman v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 311 F.3d 477, 487 (2d Cir. 2002). In determining whether an excessive amount of time was expended on the matter, the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and quality of the work submitted by counsel in connection with the litigation, and whether the work was complicated or straightforward. Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998); Castellanos v. Mid Bronx Cmty. Hous. Mgmt. Corp., No. 13cv3061 (JGK), 2014 WL 2624759, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2014). In addition to the lodestar amount, attorneys’ fees may include “those reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their clients.” LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). These expenses, or “costs,” may include photocopying, travel, telephone costs, and postage, as well as

filing fees and reasonable process-server fees. Kuzma v. Internal Revenue Serv., 821 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1987); Rosendo v. Everbrighten Inc., No. 13cv7256 (JGK) (FM), 2015 WL 1600057, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 4557147 (July 28, 2015). II. PLAINTIFF’S FEE APPLICATION In their motion, Plaintiffs seek an award of $91,163.64, representing $87,385.33 in attorneys’ fees incurred by the firm of Troy Law, PLLC (“Troy Law” or the “Firm”) and $3,778.31 in costs. (See Declaration of John Troy, Esq., in Support of Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, dated Feb. 24, 2020 (“Troy Decl.”) (Dkt. 123-2), at 23.) Counsel’s time records indicate that Troy Law expended a total of 248.94 hours on this case. (See id.) As stated above,

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Broome v. Biondi
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