Lillian B. Mahoney v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., a Corporation

Eighth Circuit

Lillian B. Mahoney v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., a Corporation

377 F.2d 549, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 6291

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedMay 22, 1967

Docket18629

StatusPublished

Cited by25 cases

This text of 377 F.2d 549 (Lillian B. Mahoney v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., a Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Lillian B. Mahoney v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., a Corporation, 377 F.2d 549, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 6291 (8th Cir. 1967).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from final order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff is a citizen of Nebraska. Defendant is incorporated in Iowa. The jurisdictional amount is present. Plaintiff alleged defendant’s principal place of business is in a state other than Nebraska. Defendant in its motion to dismiss asserts its “principal place of business” as such term is used in 28 U. S.C.A. § 1332(c) is in Nebraska. Evidence was introduced in the form of affidavits and answers to interrogatories. The dispositive issue is whether the trial court’s determination that defendant’s principal place of business is in Nebraska is clearly erroneous. See Janzen v. Goos, 8 Cir., 302 F.2d 421, 423, 426.

We hold that the judgment is entitled to be affirmed on the basis of the trial court’s opinion reported at D.C., 258 F.Supp. 500. The pertinent facts are fairly set out in Judge Robinson’s well reasoned opinion. The proper legal standards are stated and when such principles are applied to the established facts, substantial evidentiary support exists for the determination that Nebraska is defendant’s principal place of business.

Plaintiff makes the additional contention, not considered in the trial court’s opinion, that defendant is estopped from denying jurisdiction. We have held that jurisdiction cannot be established by consent of the parties or by waiver. Pacific Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 341 F.2d 514, 516; Rock Island Millwork Co. v. Hedges-Gough Lbr. Co., 8 Cir., 337 F.2d 24, 26.

It is equally well established that jurisdiction cannot be acquired by estoppel. Poole v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 5 Cir., 273 F.2d 423; Silvers v. Maryland Cas. Co., 3 Cir., 239 F.2d 865, 868; In Re Federal Facilities Realty Trust, 7 Cir., 227 F.2d 651, 656.

Since it is clear that jurisdiction cannot be established by estoppel, no purpose will be served in determining whether the record here would support an estoppel.

The order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from final order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff is a citizen of Nebraska. Defendant is incorporated in Iowa. The jurisdictional amount is present. Plaintiff alleged defendant’s principal place of business is in a state other than Nebraska. Defendant in its motion to dismiss asserts its “principal place of business” as such term is used in 28 U. S.C.A. § 1332(c) is in Nebraska. Evidence was introduced in the form of affidavits and answers to interrogatories. The dispositive issue is whether the trial court’s determination that defendant’s principal place of business is in Nebraska is clearly erroneous. See Janzen v. Goos, 8 Cir., 302 F.2d 421, 423, 426.

We hold that the judgment is entitled to be affirmed on the basis of the trial court’s opinion reported at D.C., 258 F.Supp. 500. The pertinent facts are fairly set out in Judge Robinson’s well reasoned opinion. The proper legal standards are stated and when such principles are applied to the established facts, substantial evidentiary support exists for the determination that Nebraska is defendant’s principal place of business.

Plaintiff makes the additional contention, not considered in the trial court’s opinion, that defendant is estopped from denying jurisdiction. We have held that jurisdiction cannot be established by consent of the parties or by waiver. Pacific Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 341 F.2d 514, 516; Rock Island Millwork Co. v. Hedges-Gough Lbr. Co., 8 Cir., 337 F.2d 24, 26.

It is equally well established that jurisdiction cannot be acquired by estoppel. Poole v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 5 Cir., 273 F.2d 423; Silvers v. Maryland Cas. Co., 3 Cir., 239 F.2d 865, 868; In Re Federal Facilities Realty Trust, 7 Cir., 227 F.2d 651, 656.

Since it is clear that jurisdiction cannot be established by estoppel, no purpose will be served in determining whether the record here would support an estoppel.

The order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is affirmed.

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377 F.2d 549, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 6291, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lillian-b-mahoney-v-northwestern-bell-telephone-co-a-corporation-ca8-1967.

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