Lillard v. Freestone County

57 S.W. 838, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 363, 1900 Tex. App. LEXIS 326
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 24, 1900
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 57 S.W. 838 (Lillard v. Freestone County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lillard v. Freestone County, 57 S.W. 838, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 363, 1900 Tex. App. LEXIS 326 (Tex. Ct. App. 1900).

Opinion

BOOKHOUT, Associate Justice.

This suit was filed in the County Court of Freestone County, Texas, on the 22d day of March, 1899, by L. D. Lillard against Freestone County to recover judgment for the sum of $496.50, actual damages for breach of contract. On October 19, 1897, appellant and appellee entered into the following contract:

“October 19, 1897. It is ordered by the court that the contract for publishing the delinquent tax list as required by the Colquitt delinquent tax law, and as now prepared and in the hands of the tax collector, be and the same is hereby awarded to L. D. Lillard, upon the following terms: *364 Said L. D. Lillard is to do said publishing at the legal rate of 25 cents per tract, and is to pay for the material and preparation of the copy from which said list is published, and is to have said publication complete in ample time for the county attorney to file suit thereon for the February term, District Court, and the said L. D. Lillard is to look to the delinquent taxpayers for his costs when paid. The county assumes no responsibility. And it is expressly agreed that the county shall not pay, nor be in any way responsible for, any costs or expense in any way connected with said publication. It is further required that said L. D. Lillard enter into bond in the sum of $500 for prompt and faithful performance of this contract; said bond to be approved by the county judge before this contract shall become valid and binding.”

Appellant alleged that he had the copy of the said delinquent tax list prepared and it was duly certified to by the tax collector as being true and correct and complete, etc., and by the county clerk, as required by law, and said copy was examined and approved by the Commissioners Court of said county and ordered to be published in said Fairfield Eecorder, etc. Said tax list or record was correctly published by appellant for three consecutive weeks, to wit, April 22, April 29, and May 5, 1898, in said paper. Afterwards it was discovered that the publication was illegal, because it did not show all the data required by law. Defendant county had said delinquent tax record republished by W. 0. Peery, and paid for same. On February 4, 1899, appellant presented to the Commissioners Court his account for said publication, and asked that it be allowed in the terms of his contract, that is, that the county treasurer be instructed to pay appellant 25 cents per tract as collected, which said account was rejected by the court on February 21, 1899, all of which exhibits were a part of appellant’s petition.

Appellee answered by general and special exceptions, and by general denial, and by cross-bill, alleging that said contract between appellant and appellee, of date October 19, 1897, was illegal and void; and asked that defendant county have judgment against said appellant to recover back $40 paid to appellant by appellee for other tax list advertising theretofore made; and that on August 15, 1898, appellant and one W. 0. Peery, acting together, entered into a pretended contract with appellee to publish said delinquent tax record at 17 cents per tract, which publication was made, and paid for by appellee, appellant drawing the scrip therefor, $445..90; that said contract was illegal, because appellant was a member of the Twenty-fourth Legislature ^hen said- Colquitt law was passed, and of the Twenty-fifth Legislature when same was amended, and asked for judgment against appellant for said $445.90 also.

Appellant by supplemental petition excepted generally to appellee’s cross-action, and denied generally the allegations therein contained.

The court sustained appellee’s general exception and special exceptions 2 and 3, and appellant’s general exception; and both parties refusing to amend, the cause was dismissed and both parties excepted and gave notice of appeal, and plaintiff perfected his appeal.

*365 It is not alleged that appellant ever executed a bond in the sum of $500, and that the same was approved by the county judge conditioned for the prompt and faithful performance of the contract. The contract expressly provides that this shall be done before the contract shall become valid and binding. This seems to be made a condition precedent to the contract becoming valid and binding, and in failing to allege it the petition was subject to appellee’s demurrer.

The contract also expressly provides that said L. D. Lillard “is to look to the delinquent taxpayers for his costs when paid. The county assumes no responsibility, and it is expressly agreed that the county shall not pay, nor be in any way responsible for, any cost or expense in any way connected with said publication.” The effect of this provision is to relieve the county from any liability to plaintiff for the payment of the cost of said publication. But appellant contends that “some of the costs due to plaintiff under said contract have been paid to the county treasurer of said county, and that other costs will continue to be paid as said taxes are paid until the most or greater part of the same shall have been paid,” which' he claims he is prevented from collecting by defendant’s wrongful act in refusing to allow his said account.

These allegations are insufficient to charge defendant for money had and received by its county treasurer for the use and benefit of plaintiff. It does not allege the amount so received, or from whom received, or show that the amount is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the county court. Nor does it set forth any reason for his failure to give the amount.

Again, appellant contends that “the court erred in sustaining defendant’s second special demurrer to plaintiff’s original petition and dismissing this cause, and in holding that plaintiff was disqualified by law from contracting with defendant county for advertising or publishing the delinquent tax record under the Colquitt law passed by the Twenty-fourth Legislature and amended by the Twenty-fifth Legislature, in both of which plaintiff represented Freestone County, because the contract between plaintiff and defendant herein involved was made in October, 1897, after the expiration of plaintiff’s term of office as representative in the Twenty-fourth Legsilature, and by the amendments in the Twenty-fifth Legislature, said law, as to the pay of publishing the said delinquent tax record, was not materially changed and was not increased, and said pay was the same as it was originally made in said Colquitt law- and had been for years before, i. e., 25 cents per tract.”

The law known as the “Colquitt Law,” relating to the collection of delinquent taxes was passed by the Twenty-fourth Legislature and approved April 18, 1895. Laws 24th Leg., p. 50, et seq.

Section 5 of said law provided for the publication of the delinquent tax list, and provides the amount to be received by the publishers as compensation shall be the same as is provided by law for like services in other cases.

This law was amended by the Twenty-fifth Legislature, and the entire *366 law re-enacted, in which it was provided that the county shall not allow for said publication a greater amount than 25 cents for each tract of land so advertised.

The appellant was a member of both the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Legislatures.

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Bluebook (online)
57 S.W. 838, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 363, 1900 Tex. App. LEXIS 326, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lillard-v-freestone-county-texapp-1900.