Lijin Yang v. Christopher Chestnut, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LIJIN YANG, No. 1:26-cv-01902-DJC-EFB 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER 14 CHIRSTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Pet. (ECF No. 1)) and a 19 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Mot. (ECF No. 2)) filed by a noncitizen who 20 has been detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) for over eleven 21 months pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). During this time, Petitioner has never received 22 a bond hearing nor any other individualized assessment of whether she presents a risk 23 of flight or danger to the community. Having considered the arguments made and 24 exhibits submitted in support of the Petition and Motion for Temporary Restraining 25 Order and those submitted in opposition, the Court now rules directly on the 26 underlying claims raised in the Petition. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds 27 Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing and the Petition is granted. 28 1 BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner is a noncitizen who entered the United States in November 1992. 3 (Pet. ¶ 1.) In 2007 and 2011, Petitioner was convicted of state crimes, including the 4 misdemeanor attempt of “assaulting or obstructing a public officer,” for which she was 5 sentenced to 60 days in jail and 12 months of probation. (Opp’n (ECF No. 9) at 1; 6 Juarez Decl. (ECF No. 9-1 at 3.) In 2024, Petitioner was arrested for supplying alcohol 7 to a minor. (Opp’n at 1.) In 2023, she was “indicted of intentionally conspiring to 8 distribute 50 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing marihuana in 9 violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.” (Id. at 1–2.) Petitioner pled guilty and completed a six- 10 month sentence without incident. (Pet. ¶¶ 3–4.) Thereafter, Petitioner was 11 immediately detained by ICE pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B), which requires 12 detention of anyone who “is deportable by reason of having committed any offense 13 covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title.”1 (8 U.S.C. 14 § 1226(c)(1)(B); Opp’n at 2; Mot. ¶ 10.) 15 On November 3, 2025, an Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s applications 16 for asylum, withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), withholding or 17 deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, and cancellation of 18 removal for Lawful Permanent Residents and ordered Petitioner removed (ECF No. 9- 19 2 at 13–14.) Petitioner timely appealed that order to the Board of Immigration 20 Appeals (“BIA”). (Pet. ¶ 7; Opp’n at 2.) The BIA has not yet set a hearing date on that 21 appeal. (Pet. ¶ 7.) To date, Petitioner has been detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 22 § 1226(c) for eleven months without a bond hearing. (Pet. ¶ 6.)

23 1 Although Respondents initially assert Petitioner was detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii), 24 they later state that “Petitioner correctly concedes that she is subject to mandatory detention based on her aggravated felony conviction.” (Opp’n at 2.) The cited portion of Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary 25 Restraining Order provides that, as Petitioner’s removability was alleged under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, she is detained under the auspices of 8 U.S.C. 26 § 1226(c).” (Mot. ¶ 10.) The subsection that permits detention on these grounds is 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B), not 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). As the parties appear to agree on this point and 27 Respondents do not identify which of Petitioner’s acts would justify detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii), the Court assumes Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 28 § 1226(c)(1)(B). 1 DISCUSSION 2 Petitioner argues her eleven-month detention without a bond hearing violates 3 the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. (Pet. at 27.) 4 This Court has previously joined other district courts in concluding that the 5 prolonged and indefinite detention of noncitizens pursuant to statutes mandating 6 detention without a bond hearing can violate the Due Process Clause. See Keo v. 7 Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-01192-DJC-CSK, 2026 WL 747117 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2026); 8 Mohammed v. Warden of Cal. City Det. Ctr., No. 1:26-cv-00118-DJC-CSK, 2026 WL 9 192368 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2026); K C v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-00227-DJC-CSK, 2026 10 WL 412505 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2026); see also Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden 11 State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-cv-00098-SAB, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 12 July 25, 2025) (explaining that “essentially all district courts that have considered the 13 issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, 14 without a bond hearing, ‘will—at some point—violate the right to due process’”) 15 (quoting Martinez v. Clark, No. 2:18-cv-01669-RAJ, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. 16 Wash. May 23, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:18-cv-01669-RAJ, 17 2019 WL 5962685 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019)). 18 Though the Government argues the Supreme Court’s decision in Demore v. 19 Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) sanctions Petitioner’s detention under 1226(c), the 20 Government also acknowledges Demore’s understanding that “in most cases, 21 detention lasts for less than 90 days.” (Opp’n at 3 n.1 (citing Demore, 528 U.S. at 22 529).) Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that “the detention at stake under 23 § 1226(c) lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is 24 invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which the [noncitizen] 25 chooses to appeal.” Demore, 528 U.S. at 530. In contrast, in cases where the length 26 of detention far exceeds the limited period addressed in Demore, “district courts 27 throughout this circuit have ordered immigration courts to conduct bond hearings for 28 noncitizens held for prolonged periods under § 1226(c).” Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1 1219 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 144 S. Ct. 2 1339 (2024). Although the Ninth Circuit has not decided that question, it has 3 expressed “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention 4 without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy 5 precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary deprivation of liberty would 6 have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018). This Court 7 shares those doubts. 8 To determine if Petitioner’s due process rights have been violated by her 9 eleven-month detention without a bond hearing, the Court must answer two 10 questions: “the first asks whether there exists a protected liberty interest under the 11 Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary to ensure 12 any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution.” 13 Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-cv-01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 14 July 14, 2025). 15 Petitioner has a clear liberty interest in securing her freedom from detention. 16 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 17 physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. 18 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Petitioner was initially detained in April 2025 and has 19 remained in custody for the eleven months since. (Pet. ¶ 6.) Further, Petitioner faces 20 indefinitely prolonged detention while judicial review of her claims for relief from 21 removal plays out. As Petitioner has been deprived of the liberty secured by the Due 22 Process Clause and this deprivation may continue for a protracted and indefinite 23 period, Petitioner has established her liberty interest. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, 24 693. 25 Having established that Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Court 26 must determine whether Petitioner is now due process under the Constitution. Courts 27 in this Circuit weigh the following factors to ascertain when prolonged detention 28 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) violates the Due Process Clause: “(1) the total length of 1 detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) whether the detention 2 will exceed the time the petitioner spent in prison for the crime that made [them] 3 removable; (4) the nature of the crimes the petitioner committed; (5) the conditions of 4 detention; (6) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner; (7) delays 5 in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (8) the likelihood that the 6 removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal.” Martinez, 2019 WL 7 5968089, at *7. 8 First, the “length of detention,” which is “the most important factor,” weighs in 9 Petitioner’s favor as Petitioner has been detained for over eleven months. (Id. at *9; 10 Pet. ¶ 6.) This length aligns with those other courts have found warrants a bond 11 hearing under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., See Yagoub v. LaRose, No. 3:26-cv- 12 00914 JLS-JLB, 2026 WL 673799, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2026) (finding Petitioner’s 13 detention of “nearly eight months” without a bond hearing weighed in Petitioner’s 14 favor); see also Amado v. United States Dep't of Just., No. 3:25-cv-02687-LL-DDL, 15 2025 WL 3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (explaining that “[c]ourts have found 16 detention over seven months without a bond hearing weighs toward a finding that it is 17 unreasonable” and collecting cases); Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879–80 18 (finding fact that detention had spanned twelve months weighed in favor of granting 19 bond hearing). 20 The second factor also favors Petitioner. This factor requires consideration of 21 “how long the detention is likely to continue absent judicial intervention; in other 22 words, the anticipated duration of all removal proceedings including administrative 23 and judicial appeals.” Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *9. Petitioner’s detention is 24 likely to endure indefinitely while determinations about Petitioner’s removability are 25 made and appealed. Id. (finding likely length of future detention absent judicial 26 intervention weighed in favor of granting a bond hearing even where Petitioner had 27 already received a removal order and filed an appeal). Thus, this factor weighs in 28 Petitioner’s favor. Loba L.M. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00611-JLT-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 1 2939178, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2 1:25-cv-00611-JLT-SAB, 2025 WL 3187577 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (finding that 3 “[a]lthough future events are difficult to predict, the Court nevertheless finds that the 4 pending appeal before the BIA and possible remand to the immigration court for 5 further proceedings or possible judicial review by the Ninth Circuit will be sufficiently 6 lengthy such that this factor weighs in favor of Petitioner”); Bojorge-Sequeira v. Geo 7 Grp. Inc., No. 2:25-cv-01807-KKE-GJL, 2026 WL 288378, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 8 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:25-cv-01807-KKE-GJL, 2026 WL 9 285657 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2026) (finding this factor weighed in favor of petitioner 10 who had appealed the Immigration Judge’s decision to the BIA). 11 Petitioner’s relatively short sentence tips the third factor in her favor. This factor 12 considers “whether the detention will exceed the time the petitioner spent in prison 13 for the crime that made [them] removable.” Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *7; see 14 also Zagal-Alcaraz, 2020 WL 1862254, at *5 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2020) (finding “the 15 imbalance between the length of [Petitioner’s] criminal sentence and his immigration 16 detention weighs in Petitioner's favor”). Petitioner’s current detention of eleven 17 months exceeds the six-month sentence Petitioner received for the conviction 18 underpinning her 1226(c) detention. (See Juarez Decl. at 3.) Therefore, this factor 19 weighs in Petitioner’s favor. 20 The fourth factor weighs slightly in the Government’s favor. Petitioner has been 21 convicted of two crimes, including a misdemeanor attempt of “assaulting or 22 obstructing a public officer.” (Opp’n at 1; Juarez Decl. at 3.) Petitioner has also been 23 arrested for supplying alcohol to a minor and pled guilty to “intentionally conspiring 24 to distribute 50 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing marihuana.” 25 (Opp’n at 1–2.) Given the number of crimes Petitioner has committed and the 26 seriousness of some of those crimes, this factor weighs in the Government’s favor. 27 See Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Off., No. 3:19-cv-01358-SB, 2020 WL 1862254, at *5 (D. 28 Or. Mar. 25, 2020), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Zagal-Alcaraz v. 1 ICE Field Off. Dir., No. 3:19-cv-01358-SB, 2020 WL 1855189 (D. Or. Apr. 13, 2020) 2 (weighing this factor in Government’s favor when Petitioner pled guilty to a controlled 3 substance charge and had been arrested for a misdemeanor assault charge). 4 However, as Petitioner received relatively short sentences for the 2011 and 2023 5 crimes, this factor only slightly favors the Government. (See Juarez Decl. at 3.) 6 The fifth factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. “The more that the conditions under 7 which the [non-citizen] is being held resemble penal confinement, the stronger [the] 8 argument that [they are] entitled to a bond hearing.” Gomez v. ICE Field Off. Dir., No. 9 2:25-cv-02242-TL-TLF, 2026 WL 449536, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2026), report and 10 recommendation adopted sub nom. Osuna Gomez v. ICE Field Off. Dir. & Facility 11 Adm'r, No. 2:25-cv-02242-TL-TLF, 2026 WL 447409 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 17, 2026) 12 (alterations in original) (quoting Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 860 (D. 13 Minn. 2019). Petitioner asserts, and Respondents do not dispute, that the conditions 14 of confinement at the California City detention facility are “deficient in provision of 15 access to legal counsel, medical care, sanitation, food access, access to fresh air, and 16 access to sufficiently warm clothing and bedding.” (Pet. ¶ 66.) Thus, this factor 17 weighs strongly in Petitioner’s favor. 18 The sixth factor is neutral while the seventh favors Petitioner. In assessing 19 whether petitioners have contributed to the delay, courts distinguish between 20 “legitimate defenses” to removal, which “cannot undermine [a petitioner’s] claim that 21 detention has become unreasonable,” and “dilatory” or “bad faith” tactics to 22 “deliberately slow the proceedings.” Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *10 (collecting 23 cases); see also Abduraimov v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00843-EPG-HC, 2025 WL 24 2912307, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2025). The Government does not identify any steps 25 Petitioner took in bad faith to delay her removal proceedings but rather solely asserts 26 that such delays stem from Petitioner’s “desire to seek post-conviction relief.” (Opp’n 27 at 5.) However, Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA is a proper avenue for relief Petitioner is 28 entitled to pursue. See Masood v. Barr, No. 19-cv-7623-JD, 2020 WL 95633, at *3 1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2022) (observing that it “ill suits the United States to suggest that he 2 could shorten his detention by giving up these rights [to appeal] and abandoning his 3 asylum application”). Though Petitioner points to no steps the Government has taken 4 in bad faith to delay these proceedings, “this delay is attributable to the Government.” 5 See Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *10. 6 Finally, the eighth factor is neutral. The Court lacks sufficient information to 7 assess the likelihood that Petitioner’s removal proceedings will result in a final order of 8 removal and, therefore, declines to do so. See Sarr v. Scott, 765 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 9 1109 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (declining to speculate as to the merits of Petitioner’s appeal 10 to the Ninth Circuit after the Immigration Judge and the BIA found Petitioner 11 removable). 12 The balance of these factors supports Petitioner as four factors, including the 13 most important one, the length of Petitioner’s detention, weigh in Petitioner’s favor 14 while one slightly favors Respondents. Having established Petitioner has a liberty 15 interest and determined that her prolonged and indefinite detention warrants 16 process, the Court finds Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. 17 CONCLUSION 18 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 19 1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED as to the 20 third cause of action.2 21 2. Within seven (7) days of this Order, Petitioner shall be afforded a 22 constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. 23 At this hearing, the Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by 24 clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the 25 community or a risk of flight, and Petitioner shall be allowed to have 26

27 2 In the interests of judicial economy, the Court declines to address the remaining grounds for relief in 28 the Petition. nen een eee I III I ISERIES IED

1 counsel present.’ In the event Petitioner is “determined bea 2 danger to the community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require 3 detention without bond,” the Immigration Judge should consider 4 Petitioner's financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release. 5 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 1000. 6 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and enter judgment 7 for Petitioner. This Order resolves all pending motions. 8 9 IT |S SO ORDERED. 10 | Dated: _ April 3, 2026 “Daniel Cob bra tto— Hon. Daniel It |. Cod " UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 | pJc7 -Yang26cv01902.merits 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 3 This burden of proof has been regularly applied by courts reviewing similar cases, and the Court adopts the views of those courts here. See, e.g., Pablo Sequen v. Albarran, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 27 2935630, at *13-14(N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2025); Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01035-JLT- HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025); Castellon v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-00968-JLT- 28 EPG. 2025 WL 2373425, at *11-12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2025).

oO