United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-8413.
Jesse J. LIGHTNING, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
Aug. 16, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. (No. 1:91-00585-CV-JOF), J. Owen Forrester, Judge.
Before HATCHETT and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and GIBSON*, Senior Circuit Judge.
HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:
The principal issue we discuss in this appeal is whether the
appellee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
a Georgia state law claim, is preempted under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act. We affirm the district court's
ruling that the claim is not preempted.
I. FACTS
The district court made the findings of fact stated herein
after conducting a bench trial on appellee Jesse Lightning's claims
against his former employer, appellant Roadway Express, Inc.
(Roadway).
Lightning worked as a janitor for Roadway, a trucking company,
in its Atlanta terminal from February 1988 until his discharge in
August 1990. Although Lightning initially served as an on-call
employee, he eventually received regular employee status. The
* Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 728 (the
Union) represents regular, non-management employees at Roadway's
Atlanta terminal. The collective-bargaining agreement between
Roadway and the Union allows for progressive discipline, but it
also grants employees the right to grieve any discipline imposed
upon them.
Lightning liked his job and earnestly tried to please his
superiors. He worked slowly, however, and his job performance was
marginal. In attempting to document Lightning's poor work
performance, Roadway supervisors photographed him from time to
time. Roadway management counseled or disciplined Lightning
several times for violating the collective-bargaining agreement and
company rules. These violations included wasting time, failing to
follow instructions, and failing to wear steel-toed shoes. Due to
these work-rule violations, Roadway discharged Lightning several
times following the progressive discipline process. Until August
1990, Roadway reinstated Lightning after each discharge.
Roadway supervisors subjected Lightning to verbal abuse on
numerous occasions. For example, Roadway supervisors Mitchell
Lilly and Darrell Poole stood over Lightning while he cleaned under
a truck, and, in the presence of other employees, one of the
supervisors stated, "Look at that piece of shit down there." On
another occasion, supervisor Buddy Looney called Lightning into his
office and stated, "We pay you really good for the shit you do,
which is nothing. We hate you. You don't belong here." Another
supervisor told Lightning, "I don't know why you stay here; none
of the managers like you." Poole told Lightning that the company needed to "get rid of his ass." He also called Lightning a "sorry
son of a bitch" and told Lighting he did not know why Roadway had
hired him. Lilly and another supervisor told Lightning to quit.
Lightning also received phone calls at home telling him to resign.
Lightning endured two incidents where Roadway supervisors
acted even more egregiously. One confrontation commenced when
supervisor Ike Franz told Lightning with regard to his sweeping:
"We pay you to do this?" Lightning responded that he could perform
Franz and Poole's jobs better than those two men. A few minutes
later, Poole arrived with other supervisors and, with his face six
inches away from Lightning's, spoke to Lighting in a loud,
insulting manner. Poole spat on Lightning. He also stated, "Who
do you think you are?" and "You ain't no better than a janitor."
On another occasion, Lightning told management employees that
Mark Keahon was the only supervisor who treated him with decency.
The following day, Keahon called Lightning into an office and
criticized him about work he had performed. As the conversation
progressed, Lightning requested the presence of a union steward.
Keahon responded, "Fuck the union steward. Get your sorry ass out
of here." Lightning returned with a union steward and, during the
heated conversation that ensued, Keahon tried to hit Lightning.
Toward the end of his employment, Lightning suffered from a
psychotic episode which included manifestations of paranoid
delusions. This episode occurred on an evening when managers had
"chewed out" Lightning on three separate occasions. Lightning was
hospitalized and received treatment at the Georgia Mental Health
Institute (GMHI) and another mental health facility. The causes for this episode were work-related, though other stressors
contributed to Lightning's condition. According to Lightning's
mother, he had not suffered previously from any mental problems or
disorders. Although Roadway officials had knowledge that Lightning
had been admitted to GMHI, they took no action to learn about his
condition or to investigate its cause. While Lightning was
hospitalized, Roadway sent him a registered letter documenting a
prior verbal counseling regarding his failure to wear steel-toed
shoes.
After Roadway had discharged Lightning in August 1990,
supervisor Fred Dominick left a message on Lightning's telephone
answering machine stating, in essence, "Hey, we understand you want
your job back here at Roadway." A great deal of laughter from
others accompanied Dominick's voice on the message.
A former Roadway supervisor, Timothy Marshall, stated that
Looney said he was going to get Lightning if it was the last thing
he did. Marshall also stated that when Roadway management had
difficulty getting rid of an unwanted employee, they undertook a
strategy to have that employee "written up" as much as possible.
Managers sought to provoke and demean the employee, and otherwise
try to persuade the employee to quit. These efforts were known as
"mad-dogging." Ronnie Henson, a Roadway employee for over
twenty-five years and an experienced union steward, characterized
management's treatment of Lightning as "severe" and stated that he
had never seen a worker similarly treated.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In February 1991, Lightning brought this lawsuit against Roadway in state court in Georgia alleging breach of contract
stemming from violations of the collective-bargaining agreement,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault. Roadway
removed the action to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia.
In August 1991, Roadway moved for summary judgment, arguing
that: (1) federal labor law preempted Lightning's breach of
contract claim; (2) federal labor law preempted Lightning's
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; (3) Roadway's
alleged conduct did not constitute intentional infliction of
emotional distress as a matter of law; and (4) the Georgia
Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for
Lightning's assault claim. In March 1992, the district court
granted in part and denied in part Roadway's motion. The district
court found that federal labor law preempted Lightning's contract
claim, but otherwise denied Roadway's motion.
After conducting a non-jury trial on Lightning's remaining
claims in August 1993, the district court entered judgment for
Lightning. The court awarded $33,720 in damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress ($25,000 for pain and suffering
and $8,720 in medical expenses), nominal damages for assault, and
$100,000 in punitive damages. This appeal followed.
III. CONTENTIONS
Roadway contends that the resolution of Lightning's
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim depends upon
interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, and thus
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, preempts that claim. Roadway also argues that Lightning has
failed to allege conduct sufficient to support an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim under Georgia law. The
company also asserts that the district court clearly erred in
finding that Keahon assaulted Lightning. Additionally, Roadway
contends that the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act provides the
exclusive remedy for Lightning's injury. Finally, Roadway argues
that the district court's award of punitive damages was excessive
as a matter of law.
Lightning responds to Roadway's contentions as follows.
First, the resolution of his intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim does not require an interpretation of the labor
contract, and thus section 301 of the LMRA does not preempt that
claim. Second, Roadway's actions were extreme and outrageous and
therefore sufficient to establish a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress under Georgia law. Third,
substantial evidence existed for the district court to find that
Keahon assaulted Lightning. Fourth, Lightning's emotional distress
does not constitute a compensable "injury" under the Georgia
Workers' Compensation Act. Finally, the district court's award of
punitive damages was reasonable.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Section 301 Preemption and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Whether section 301 of the LMRA preempts a state-law claim
constitutes a question of law subject to de novo review. See
Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir.1991).
Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides: Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301 not only grants federal courts
jurisdiction over employment disputes involving
collective-bargaining agreements, but also expresses a federal
policy "that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a)
is federal law which the courts must fashion from the policy of our
national labor laws." Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 456, 77 S.Ct. 912, 918, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957).
In Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,
108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988), the Supreme Court
reiterated the principles of the section 301 preemption doctrine:
[I]f the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement, the application of state law (which might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state-law principles as there are States) is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles—necessarily uniform throughout the nation—must be employed to resolve the dispute.
Lingle, 486 U.S. at 405-06, 108 S.Ct. at 1881; see also Allis-
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1912,
85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (preemption is justified when the "evaluation
of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of
the terms of the labor contract"). The preemption doctrine
"ensure[s] uniform interpretation of collective-bargaining
agreements, and thus ... promote[s] the peaceable, consistent
resolution of labor-management disputes." Lingle, 486 U.S. at 404,
108 S.Ct. at 1880. Therefore, "§ 301 pre-emption merely ensures
that federal law will be the basis for interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, and says nothing about the
substantive rights a State may provide to workers when adjudication
of those rights does not depend upon the interpretation of such
agreements." Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409, 108 S.Ct. at 1883. Indeed,
" "not every dispute ... tangentially involving a provision of a
collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301[.]' "
Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 n. 12, 108 S.Ct. at 1885 n. 12 (quoting
Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211, 105 S.Ct. at 1911).
In determining whether Lightning's state tort law claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress requires
interpretation of the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement,
we first look to the elements of the state-law claim. See Lingle,
486 U.S. at 406-07, 108 S.Ct. at 1881-82. To succeed on a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Georgia, a
plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant's conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (2) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly;
(3) the defendant's conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the
resulting emotional distress was severe. Yarbray v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 409 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1991).
Roadway contends that Lightning's claim is inextricably
intertwined with the collective-bargaining agreement and thus
preempted by section 301. Specifically, the company argues that
this court must interpret the labor contract in order to assess the
reasonableness of Roadway's conduct. We agree that an "analysis of
an employee's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
may well require a court to refer to and interpret the contract
provisions governing the terms and conditions of her employment." Douglas v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 571
(7th Cir.1989). Nonetheless, "the "extreme and outrageous'
character of certain sorts of employer conduct may be evident
without reference to the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement...." Douglas, 877 F.2d at 571. This is such a case.
Contrary to Roadway's assertions, Lightning's intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim does not concern the terms
and conditions of his employment, but rather the severe abuse he
endured from Roadway's supervisors.** As outlined above, Roadway
management verbally abused Lightning on several occasions.
Moreover, supervisor Poole spat on Lightning, and supervisor Keahon
assaulted him. Thus, Lightning's claim "revolve[s] around conduct
by his employer that is not even arguably sanctioned by the labor
contract." Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways of Del., Inc., 825
F.2d 133, 138 n. 6 (7th Cir.1987). As a result, the resolution of
Lightning's tort claim does not implicate the provisions of the
** All of the cases that Roadway cites in support of its preemption argument involved controversies relating to the terms and conditions of employment and thus required interpretation of the relevant collective-bargaining agreements. See McCormick v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 534-37 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1048, 112 S.Ct. 912, 116 L.Ed.2d 813 (1992); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 239-40 (9th Cir.1990); Douglas, 877 F.2d at 569-573; Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285-1286 (9th Cir.1989); Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1148-50 (9th Cir.1988); Miller v. AT & T Network Systems, 850 F.2d 543, 550- 51 (9th Cir.1988); Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 996, 1002 (9th Cir.1987); Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1347, 1350-52 (9th Cir.1985); Choate v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 715 F.2d 369, 370-72 (7th Cir.1983). Accordingly, we do not find these authorities persuasive as applied to the facts in this case. We remain mindful that "[t]he full scope of the pre-emptive effect of federal labor-contract law [is] to be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis." Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220, 105 S.Ct. at 1915. collective-bargaining agreement. See Knafel v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers
of Akron, Inc., 899 F.2d 1473, 1483 (6th Cir.1990) ("Knafel's
alleged emotional distress was ... of the abuse she claims to have
endured while employed. This tort claim ... does not require an
interpretation of the labor contract."). Therefore, section 301
does not preempt Lightning's intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim.
B. Judgment on the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Roadway asserts that the district court erred in finding that
the company's conduct was sufficiently outrageous to support a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under
Georgia law. "Whether a claim rises to the requisite level of
outrageousness and egregiousness to sustain a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress is a question of law." Yarbray,
409 S.E.2d at 838.
As stated above, in order to prevail in Georgia on a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
establish that: (1) the defendant's conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (2) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly;
(3) the defendant's conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) the
resulting emotional distress was severe. Yarbray, 409 S.E.2d at
837. In order to sustain this cause of action, the defendant's
conduct, in light of the totality of the circumstances, "must have
been so terrifying or insulting as naturally to humiliate,
embarrass or frighten the plaintiff." Moses v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 187 Ga.App. 222, 369 S.E.2d 541, 542-44 (1988). Moreover,
"the existence of a special relationship in which one person has control over another, as in the employer-employee relationship, may
produce a character of outrageousness that otherwise might not
exist." Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 176 Ga.App. 227, 335
S.E.2d 445, 448 (1985). In fact,
[t]he workplace is not a free zone in which the duty not to engage in willfully and wantonly causing emotional distress through the use of abusive or obscene language does not exist. Actually, by its very nature, it provides an environment more prone to such occurrences because it provides a captive victim who may fear reprisal for complaining, so that the injury is exacerbated by repetition, and it presents a hierarchy of structured relationships which cannot easily be avoided. The opportunity for commission of the tort is more frequently presented in the workplace....
Coleman v. Housing Auth. of Americus, 191 Ga.App. 166, 381 S.E.2d
303, 306 (1989).
We conclude, considering the totality of the circumstances,
that the district court properly granted judgment for Lightning on
his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. We note
that Georgia courts have upheld awards under this theory for
conduct far less outrageous than Roadway's. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Chatham, 190 Ga.App. 559, 379 S.E.2d 793, 799-800 (1989).
C. Findings of Fact on the Assault Claim
Roadway also alleges that the district court erred in finding
that Lightning "reasonably apprehended that he would be struck by
Mr. Keahon." This court "will hold a finding of fact clearly
erroneous if the record lacks substantial evidence to support it."
Thelma C. Raley, Inc. v. Kleppe, 867 F.2d 1326, 1328 (11th
Cir.1989).
The record possesses substantial evidence to support the
district court's finding on this issue. Lightning testified that
Keahon "jumped up and tried to hit me." The district court found Lightning credible and was not troubled by Lightning's failure to
mention Keahon's attempt to hit him when reporting the
confrontation to a colleague. Keahon did not testify at trial, and
the district court (reasonably, we believe) drew a negative
inference from his failure to do so. Two people present in the
room during the incident testified that Keahon did not attempt to
strike Lightning. The district court, however, found one of those
men, Roy Sweatman, "wholly uncredible." Warren Wilhoite, a witness
not present in the room during the incident, testified that no one
threw a punch during the encounter. The district court found that
"it was difficult ... to believe that [Wilhoite] could have
observed everything." Wilhoite also testified that Scott Heard
restrained Keahon during the incident, a fact that tends to support
Lightning's version of events. In sum, the district court did not
clearly err in finding that Keahon assaulted Lightning.
D. Applicability of the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act
Roadway next contends that the Georgia Workers' Compensation
Act (the Act) provides the exclusive remedy for any injury
Lightning suffered as a result of Roadway's intentional infliction
of emotional distress and assault. Accordingly, Roadway argues,
the district court should not have entertained Lightning's tort
claims.
The Act states, in relevant part, that "[t]he rights and the
remedies granted to an employee by this chapter shall exclude all
other rights and remedies of such employee ... at common law or
otherwise, on account of ... injury." O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a)
(1992). The Act provides the following definition of injury: " "Injury' or "personal injury' means only injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of the employment...." O.C.G.A. § 34-9-
1(4) (1992 & 1994 Supp.). Georgia courts have consistently held
that "psychic trauma precipitated by psychic stimulus" (as opposed
to physical injury) does not constitute an "injury" under the Act.
Hanson Buick Inc. v. Chatham, 163 Ga.App. 127, 292 S.E.2d 428, 428-
30 (1982); see also Oliver v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 209 Ga.App.
703, 434 S.E.2d 500, 500-01 (1993); W.W. Fowler Oil Co. v. Hamby,
192 Ga.App. 422, 385 S.E.2d 106, 106-07 (1989). Consequently,
Roadway's claim that the Act provides the exclusive means for
Lightning's remedy lacks merit.
E. Propriety of the Punitive Damages Award
Finally, Roadway argues that the district court's award of
punitive damages was excessive as a matter of law. Under Georgia
law, "[p]unitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions
in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud,
wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would
raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences."
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b) (1982 & 1994 Supp.). Moreover, "[p]unitive
damages shall be awarded not as compensation to a plaintiff but
solely to punish, penalize, or deter a defendant." O.C.G.A. § 51-
12-5.1(c) (1982 & 1994 Supp.). The district court found that
"punitive damages are justified on the facts and are necessary to
deter future wrongdoing."
In determining the reasonableness of an award of punitive
damages, courts should consider whether: (1) the misconduct caused personal injury or merely damage to property; (2) the actor's
misconduct was active or passive; and (3) a rational relationship
exists between the misconduct and the amount of the award. See
Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 258 Ga. 115, 365 S.E.2d 827, 833
(plurality opinion), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 36,
102 L.Ed.2d 15 (1988). Applying these factors, we conclude that
the district court's award of $100,000 was reasonable. The active
misconduct of Roadway's supervisors caused Lightning to suffer a
mental disorder that required his hospitalization. Moreover, given
Roadway's egregious conduct, and the actual damages that Lightning
endured, we conclude that a rational relationship exists between
the misconduct at issue and the amount of the award. Accordingly,
we reject Roadway's contention that the district court's punitive
damages award was excessive.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court. AFFIRMED.