GILBERTSON, Justice.
[¶ 1.] Applicant and appellant, Garrett Larry Lien (Lien), alleges his prior guilty plea was entered involuntarily as a result of his defense counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance in failing to properly investigate a motor vehicle accident and in failing to retain an accident reconstruction expert. Lien also contends that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence thus denying him due process of law. Lien appeals from an order entered in the Third Judicial Circuit denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
[¶ 2.] On August 11, 1995, a “teen” dance was being held at a country club near Lake Kampeska in Watertown, South Dakota. Lien, age 21, was present and was the owner of a 1972 four-wheel drive Chevrolet Blazer that had its roof removed. At approximately [605]*60510:20 p.m., after exiting the country club parking lot, the Blazer careened off of a parked ear, and then rolled over. Adam Dailey (Dailey), then age 15, a passenger in the rear seat was thrown clear of the vehicle. The first observers on the scene found Lien and Joshua West (West) pinned beneath the driver’s side of the Blazer. Bystanders were able to lift the Blazer enough to pull Lien out from under the vehicle. However, West could not be removed and died as a result of his injuries. It was later determined that all three occupants had consumed alcohol before the accident.1 At the hospital a bag of marijuana fell out of Lien’s shorts.
[¶ 3.] Lien claims, due to accident injuries, he does not remember whether he was driving. However, Dailey, who was interviewed by the police the night of the accident and the following day, stated that Lien was driving the Blazer at the time of the collision. Dailey also testified, under oath, before a Codington County Grand Jury that Lien was driving at the time of the accident.
[¶ 4.] Lien was indicted on August 30,1995 on a charge of vehicular homicide, SDCL 22-16-41, and possession of more than one ounce but less than one-half pound of marijuana. SDCL 22-42-6. Lien independently retained the professional services of an attorney, Albert Holgerson (Holgerson), to represent him against these charges. The record indicates that Holgerson had experience in defending vehicular homicide eases and had successfully defended his most recent client in this kind of criminal proceeding. Holger-son’s investigation of the accident consisted of reviewing accident scene photographs, witness statements, police reports, grand jury testimony, and a videotaped interview with Dailey. In addition, he interviewed certain witnesses and filed and argued numerous motions, including a suppression motion.
[¶ 5.] Holgerson did not interview all the prosecution witnesses, did not show some of the actual accident photos to Lien, and did not show the Dailey videotaped interview to Lien.2 However, the habeas court found Hol-gerson discussed the contents of these exhibits and materials “in depth” with Lien as well as the context of the grand jury transcript. Holgerson considered but decided against hiring an accident reconstruction expert because he felt the best case scenario would pit his expert against the State’s expert and Dailey, the only accident eyewitness. Hol-gerson and Lien were aware of some discrepancies 3 with Dailey’s account of the accident. However, Holgerson felt that Dailey was credible and would be a strong witness who could not be successfully impeached during a trial.4
[¶ 6.] Holgerson testified he had three to four meetings with Lien discussing the State’s evidence leading up to the plea. Lien’s father was present 50 to 70 percent of the time.5 After reviewing certain evidence with Lien and obtaining his consent, Holger-son entered into plea negotiations with the [606]*606State. Holgerson’s negotiations proved successful and the State agreed to recommend a suspended imposition of sentence for the vehicular homicide charge. The record is unclear as to the exact date when the agreement was finalized between the State and Lien.
[¶ 7.] Lien was sentenced on January 10, 1996. Holgerson presented mitigating testimony through Lien’s Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor who stated that Lien’s rehabilitation efforts were sincere and that he felt that Lien would “make it.” The State informed the court that a suspended imposition of sentence for the vehicular* homicide charge “continues to be our recommendation.” The State explained it had made the agreement after consulting Joshua West’s parents, who indicated some reluctance about having to endure a trial. The State then brought out several aggravating factors such as Lien’s age in relation to the Blazer’s occupants and the fact that he had been drinking and had marijuana in his possession. On the other hand, the State informed the court that Lien is “a young man, and I think that ... weighs to his benefit” and urged that Lien not be sent to prison. Mr. West had informed the State that Lien should not be sent to prison but should be punished in some other way such as jail time for the marijuana possession. The trial court found a factual basis for the guilty plea6 but refused to follow the State’s recommendation for suspended imposition of sentence. Rather, it sentenced Lien to 10 years in the South Dakota State Penitentiary, with four years suspended.7 Additionally, upon release Lien was ordered to serve five years on probation and 180 days in the Codington County Detention Center for possession of the marijuana.
[¶ 8.] Lien petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and a hearing was held on October 2, 1996. Lien claimed that Holgerson was ineffective for failing to properly investigate the accident which could have cast doubt on whether Lien was the driver of the Blazer. This ineffectiveness, Lien argued, resulted in an involuntary plea of guilty. Lien further claimed that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. The habeas court denied Lien’s petition for relief.
[¶ 9.] Lien’s issues on appeal are:
1. Whether Holgerson’s investigation constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel?
2. Whether Lien’s guilty plea was voluntary?
3. Whether Lien has sustained his burden of proof in his claim that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of due process?
SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 10.] We must first note the remedy in a habeas proceeding is in the nature of a collateral attack on a final judgment, therefore, our scope of review is limited. Black v. Class, 1997 SD 22, 560 N.W.2d 544. It is not a substitute for direct review. Loop v. Class, 1996 SD 107, ¶ 11, 554 N.W.2d 189, 191.
Habeas corpus can be used only to review (1) whether the court had jurisdiction of the crime and the person of the defendant; (2) whether the sentence was authorized by law; and (3) in certain eases, whether an incarcerated defendant has been deprived of basic constitutional rights. For purposes of habeas corpus, constitutional violations in a criminal case deprive the trial court of jurisdiction '
Black, 1997 SD 22 at ¶ 4, 560 N.W.2d at 546 (quoting St. Cloud v. Leapley, 521 N.W.2d [607]*607118, 121 (S.D.1994) (St Cloud III) (internal citations omitted)).
[¶ 11.] The habeas petitioner has the initial burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to relief. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1025, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1469 (1938); Loop, 1996 SD 107 at ¶ 14, 554 N.W.2d at 191; Two Eagle v. Leapley, 522 N.W.2d 765, 768 (S.D.1994). The habeas court’s factual findings are given “considerable deference” and we will not reverse these findings unless they are clearly erroneous. St. Cloud III, 521 N.W.2d at 121; McCafferty v. Solem, 449 N.W.2d 590, 592 (S.D.1989) cert. denied, McCafferty v. Leapley, 503 U.S. 911, 112 S.Ct. 1277, 117 L.Ed.2d 503 (1992); Satter v. Solem, 422 N.W.2d 425 (S.D.1988), cert. denied, Rist v. Satter, 490 U.S. 1091, 109 S.Ct. 2432, 104 L.Ed.2d 989 (1989).
[¶ 12.] Whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact. Lykken v. Class, 1997 SD 29, 561 N.W.2d 302 (1997). In the absence of a clearly erroneous determination, we defer to the habeas court’s findings of fact regarding what counsel did or did not do, but we may substitute our own judgment “as to whether defense counsel’s actions or inaction’s constituted - ineffective assistance of counsel.” Lykken 1997 SD 29 at ¶ 6, 561 N.W.2d at 304-05 (quoting Aliberti v. Solem, 428 N.W.2d 638, 640 (S.D.1988)).
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[¶ 13.] 1. Whether Holgerson’s investigation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel?
[¶ 14.] This Court has adopted the Strickland test to determine whether a defendant received effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by Article VI, § 7 of the South Dakota Constitution. Luna v. Solem, 411 N.W.2d 656, 658 (S.D.1987); Woods v. Solem, 405 N.W.2d 59, 61 (S.D.1987). “The standard that applies in evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel challenges to guilty pleas is the same standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984). Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).” Cox v. Lockhart, 970 F.2d 448 (8th Cir.1992). Under this standard, the burden is on the petitioner to show 1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, and 2) that petitioner was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Addressing the first part of the Strickland test, deficient performance, we have stated that:
‘When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. ‘Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.’' Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694. ‘Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.’ Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95 (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 164, 100 L.Ed. 83, 93 (1955)).
Two Eagle, 522 N.W.2d at 768 (quoting Primeaux v. Leapley, 502 N.W.2d 265, 267 (S.D.1993)).
[¶ 15.] The second prong of the Strickland test concerns prejudice to the petitioner.
In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would [608]*608have changed the outcome of a trial. Similarly, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the “prejudice” inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370, 88 L.Ed.2d at 210 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
[¶ 16.] Subsequent to Strickland, the scope of the analysis was refined to not focus “solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair, or unreliable .... ” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842-43, 122 L.Ed.2d 180, 189; see also Loop, 1996 SD 107 at ¶ 15, 554 N.W.2d at 189; Hopfinger v. Leapley, 511 N.W.2d 845, 847 (S.D.1994).
[¶ 17.] Lien contends that Hol-gersoris performance was deficient and that this resulted in Lien entering an involuntary plea of guilty. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 209 (D.C.Cir.1976) (“Holding a claim of failure to interview a witness may sound impressive in the abstract, but it cannot establish ineffective assistance when the person’s account is otherwise fairly known to defense counsel.”). Specifically, Lien contends that Holgerson failed to properly investigate the accident outside of the files of the prosecuting attorney and therefore Hol-gerson was not functioning as “counsel” as guaranteed Lien by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article VI, § 7 of the South Dakota Constitution.
Reasonable performance of counsel includes an adequate investigation of facts, consideration of viable theories, and development of evidence to support those theories. An attorney must make a reasonable investigation in preparing a case or make a reasonable decision not to conduct a particular investigation.
Foster v. Lockhart, 9 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir.1993) (citation omitted). Thus, our review is limited to a consideration of whether Holgerson had a reasonable basis for concluding that his investigation was sufficient to recommend that Lien plead guilty. We “consider all the circumstances” leading up to counsel’s challenged conduct to determine whether they were reasonable. Two Eagle, 522 N.W.2d at 770.
[¶ 18.] Lien’s reliance on Thomas v. Lockhart, 738 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.1984), for the proposition that defense counsel’s failure to conduct an investigation outside the files of the prosecuting attorney to be per se ineffective, is unpersuasive when applied to the facts of this case. The Thomas court did find ineffective assistance of counsel for, among other reasons, defense counsel’s failure to contact three alibi witnesses whose names were supplied by the defendant.8 Id. However, the Thomas court clearly distinguished its holding from cases such as Lien’s “in which the defendant did not provide counsel with any information easting doubt on the events as portrayed by the files of the prosecuting attorney.” Id. (citations omitted). Lien testified that he could not remember anything concerning the accident. As a result, he could not provide Holgerson with any information casting doubt upon the identity of the driver of his Blazer which would require him to conduct a more stringent investigation.
[¶ 19.] We agree with the habeas court that Holgerson’s investigation of the accident and subsequent recommendation that Lien plead guilty falls within reasonable performance. Holgerson’s investigation consisted of interviewing two witnesses who were near the accident scene, reviewing witness statements, police reports, grand jury testimony and the Dailey video. As in every criminal case, Holgerson’s investigation was shaped by the evidence he received from the State-and his client. The only eyewitness to the accident was Dailey, who identified Lien as the driver to a police officer at the scene, a police officer at the hospital, to a police officer the day after the accident, and to a grand jury. Hol-[609]*609gerson felt that Dailey had no motive to lie and any inconsistencies in his account of the accident could be easily explained. Holger-son testified he could not find anything with which to impeach Dailey at trial.9
[¶ 20.] Concerning the specifics of Holgerson’s investigation, Lien claims that Holgerson’s failure to interview several witnesses in order to establish Lien’s habit of letting others drive after he had been drinking constitutes deficient performance. It is important to note that “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. Holgerson testified that Lien told him that “with one exception ... he didn’t allow others to drive his vehicle ... [in the last year or 18 months before the accident].” Further, Lien testified that he told Holger-son “I drank quite a bit” that evening and had refused West’s earlier request to drive. Holgerson testified he talked “to two young people who had seen [Lien] sitting behind the steering wheel in the Country Club [before] the accident.” Although Shad Bradber-ry testified that right before trial was scheduled he had told Holgerson that he drove Lien’s vehicle “quite a few times” when Lien had been drinking, Holgerson concluded that Lien’s actual practice was not to allow others to drive his car. Particularly, as a result of Lien’s own statements concerning his driving practice, Holgerson’s investigation of Lien’s habit and custom was not deficient. We conclude that Holgerson’s investigation of Lien’s habit and custom was sufficient under the circumstances.10
[¶ 21.] Lien next contends that Holgerson’s failure to retain an accident reconstruction expert constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. As we noted in Fast Horse, “The reasonableness of a decision not to investigate is to be judged according to the circumstances of each case with great deference given to the attorney’s decision.” 521 N.W.2d at 106 (citation omitted). This Court has often recognized that it is not our function to “second-guess the tactical decisions” of defense counsel and we will not “substitute [our] own theoretical judgment for that of counsel.” St. Cloud III, 521 N.W.2d at 129; Miller v. State, 338 N.W.2d 673, 678 (S.D.1983) (citing State v. McBride, 296 N.W.2d 551, 553 (S.D.1980)).
[¶ 22.] Holgerson testified that he did not hire an accident reconstruction expert because,
I thought there were real dangers in trying a technical ease in front of a Codington County jury where we had an eye witness who I didn’t think I could successfully impeach. However, before going to the next stage, [the State] agreed to recommend a suspended imposition of sentence.
(Emphasis added).
[¶ 23.] Holgerson was an experienced criminal trial lawyer who was a resident of the County in which the trial would be held. He was familiar with what type of jurors would be found in the jury panel. If Holgerson and his client proceeded to trial based on their “expert” defense Holgerson knew that the State would have substantial evidence to overcome it:
1. It was Lien’s ear that was involved in the accident;
[610]*6102. The direct testimony of Adam Dailey that Lien was driving. No other witness including Lien would testify to the contrary. While there were minor inconsistencies in Dailey’s descriptions of the accident, he consistently told investigating officers near the time of the accident that Lien was the driver. The video taped interview of Dailey which Holgerson studied at length led Holgerson to conclude Dailey was credible and could not be broken on the stand. The habeas trial court viewed this tape and agreed finding, “[Dailey] came across as candid and at ease. There was not motivation for him to lie.” The sole contrary witness was Lien’s father who claimed Dailey admitted to him Dailey could not remember who was driving. Being the father of the defendant, this evidence was obviously open to attack by the State on the grounds of bias;
3. The direct testimony of two other individuals who told Holgerson they “had seen [Lien] sitting behind the steering wheel in the Country Club [before] the accident.” Thus with Dailey, three persons with no bias or motive to fabricate could put Lien behind the wheel of his own vehicle just prior to the accident;11
4. Lien admitted to Holgerson with one exception that when Lien had been drinking, “he didn’t allow others to drive his vehicle.” Further, the “one exception” occurred between a year to 18 months prior to the accident;
5. Evidence would be presented to the jury that the intoxicated Lien had been consuming alcohol in very substantial amounts and marijuana prior to the accident and the minors who were with him had also been drinking which would not endear Lien to jurors who disprove of these illegal acts;
6.An expert (Lofgren) for Lien would obviously be subject to attack that he was being paid for his testimony while the State’s eye witnesses were not and that the • expert had not been at the’ accident scene. In fact, expert Lofgren at his habeas testimony failed to indicate that he had personally interviewed Dailey or any of the witnesses to the accident.12 Given all of the above, Lofgren’s conclusion that, “[t]here’s nothing that supports Mr. Lien as being the driver” is questionable at best.
[¶24.] Holgerson’s decision not to hire an expert before trial was influenced by Lien’s instructions to attempt to get a suspended imposition. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698 (counsel’s actions can be “determined or substantially influenced” by defendant’s instructions and statements). If Lien proceeded to trial he faced a maximum of 15 years and a $15,-000 fine, or both, on the vehicular homicide charge and a year in the county jail and a thousand dollar fine or both on the possession of marijuana charge.
[¶ 25.] The only pertinent references to the timing and specifics of the plea is found in a colloquy between Holgerson and the State at Habeas:
I [Holgerson] discussed with [Lien] the plea proposal. I think his father was present for perhaps 60 to 70 percent of the meetings that [Lien] had in my office and maybe not, maybe 50 to 60 percent.... But his father was aware that a proposal— there was a consensus, if you will, that if we got to the stage — -we meaning the defense team and the defendant — where the State was prepared to recommend a suspended imp, then we would take that....
[611]*611While it is not evident exactly when the plea agreement was reached with the State, it appears from the contents of the record that Lien had several discussions with Holgerson concerning the plea. This falls well short of Lien’s burden to establish his claim that the plea agreement was not made until the day set for trial and thus at that point, Holgerson should have already retained an expert in expectation of trial. Johnson; Loop; and Two Eagle, swpra.
[¶26.] We do not require defense counsel to retain experts to complete a full investigation before recommending a plea to his client. Such a blanket assumption would run counter to the purpose of plea bargaining. Under the facts and circumstances of this case Holgerson’s decision not to hire an expert was reasonable.13
[¶ 27.] Lien also claims that Holger-son’s failure to show Lien the Prairie Lakes Hospital medical reports constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Factually, this claim was dismissed by the habeas trial court who found Holgerson had discussed the contents of the documents “in depth” with Lien. This aside, the Prairie Lakes reports showed that Lien’s blood alcohol level was .40%. This unlikely result indicates that the test performed by Prairie Lakes was flawed. Neither Holgerson nor the State relied upon the Prairie Lakes report. Instead, the more reliable results appear to have been obtained through the State Health Laboratory which indicated a blood alcohol level of .174% and the presence of THC.14 Lien has failed to show that the Prairie Lakes report is of sufficient exculpatory value so as to undermine the confidence in the reliability of his plea. Cf. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370, 88 L.Ed.2d at 210 (prejudice may be found through a prediction as to whether “the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial”).
[¶28.] With the benefit of perfect hindsight, Holgerson testified that he may have done some things different while representing Lien. However, there is nothing in the record indicating that Holgerson would have altered his plea recommendation. Furthermore, even if Holgerson had conducted the type of investigation that Lien' believes he should have, the evidence would not have likely changed the outcome of a trial. Had they proceeded to trial the outcome of the trial would have been a conviction with Lien facing up to 16 years imprisonment and substantial fines.15
[¶29.] 2. Lien’s guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
[¶ 30.] With it being determined that Holgerson’s representation was not deficient, Lien’s claim that his guilty plea was entered
[612]*612involuntarily as a result of ineffective assistance is substantially weakened.16
[¶31.] As we stated in Hopfinger, this Court will look at the “totality of the circumstances” in determining if a guilty plea was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. 511 N.W.2d at 847-48. Lien relies upon State v. Wahle:
Where the record shows that ‘circumstances as they existed at the time of the guilty plea, judged by objective standards, reasonably justified his mistaken impression,’ a defendant must be held to have entered his plea without full knowledge of the consequences and involuntarily.
521 N.W.2d 134 (S.D.1994) (quoting United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21, 24-25 (3rd Cir.1976) (citations omitted) (emphasis original)).' Lien’s reliance upon Wahle is misplaced because the defendants in Wahle and Crusco claimed they should be allowed to withdraw their guilty pleas because they misunderstood the possible sentences they faced. Lien does not contend he did not understand the possible sentence.
[¶ 32.] In fact, the Statement of Defendant’s Constitutional Rights and Waiver of Rights by Plea of Guilty correctly specified the maximum possible sentence for vehicular homicide as fifteen years.17 Lien informed both the sentencing and habeas courts that Holgerson explained the alternatives of not accepting the State’s plea proposal. At the time Lien entered his guilty plea he was aware of the State’s evidence against him, including the inconsistencies in Dailey’s version of the accident18 and the maximum possible sentence.19 The court also carefully and thoroughly described the constitutional rights Lien would be waiving. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Furthermore, Lien was not under the influence of. medication or drugs at the time he entered his plea. Lien entered his guilty plea voluntarily and with “full knowledge of the consequences.” Wahle, 521 N.W.2d at 137.20
[¶ 33.] 3. Whether Lien has sustained his burden of proof in a claim that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpa- . tory evidence in violation of due process?
[¶ 34.] “[B]efore beginning a Brady analysis to determine whether or not specific evidence must be disclosed to [the defendant] by the prosecution, we must de-[613]*613termine that the evidence was not disclosed.” Ashker v. Solem, 457 N.W.2d 473, 478 (S.D.1990).21
[¶ 35.] During the August 1995 grand jury proceedings a grand juror asked the State whether it was “definitely determined that ... Lien was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident, through testimony?” The State responded “through [Daily’s] testimony, we are going by that, yeah.” Lien contends that it was improper for the State to rely on Dailey’s testimony and further that the State should have disclosed any exculpatory evidence at this time. To the contrary, the grand jury need only hear the prosecution’s side of an investigation and need not be presented with exculpatory evidence in the possession of the prosecutor. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992). A defendant has no right to have evidence favorable to him or her presented to a grand jury, just as he has no right to testify himself before such a body. Id.', see also United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.1992) (“In fairly expansive language, Williams clearly rejects the idea that there exists a right to such ‘fair’ or ‘objective’ grand jury deliberations”). Thus, under the circumstances, it was not error for the grand jury to solely rely upon the Dailey’s testimony.
[¶ 36.] Lien also alleges that the first officers on the scene, Officers Seim and McMahon, failed to officially report that West was found on the driver’s side of the vehicle in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). When the officers arrived, Lien had already been removed from the vehicle by bystanders and Dailey was sitting on a nearby lawn. The only person under the vehicle was West. Officer McMahon stated in his accident report that he “found the .arm of ... West sticking out from underneath the vehicle.” Officer Seim’s report does not elaborate on the location of West upon arrival. Lien contends that the failure of the officers to specifically state that West’s arm was sticking out of the driver’s side of the vehicle was “inexcusable” and justifies relief. Perhaps the better procedure would have been for the officers to more carefully document the exact location of West upon their arrival.22 It is true that West’s upper extremities were located on the driver’s side of the Blazer. Perhaps the officers failed to detail the location of West since there were no other persons in the vehicle to judge in relation to West’s body. .However, under the circumstances, the officers lack of specificity does not rise to withholding of exculpatory evidence. Our review of the record fails to reveal any evidence the State suppressed any evidence or deceived Lien in any respect.
[¶ 37.] Affirmed.
[¶ 38.] MILLER, C.J., and KONENKAMP, J., concur.
[¶ 39.] SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., dissent in part and concur in part.