Liedka v. Liedka

101 Misc. 2d 305, 423 N.Y.S.2d 788, 1979 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2675
CourtNew York Family Court
DecidedNovember 27, 1979
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 101 Misc. 2d 305 (Liedka v. Liedka) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Family Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Liedka v. Liedka, 101 Misc. 2d 305, 423 N.Y.S.2d 788, 1979 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2675 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1979).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Edward J. McLaughlin, J.

The issue now before the court is one of great practical significance. How does the court compute the amount of a support order when a wage deduction order will issue pursuant to section 49-b of the Personal Property Law in a case where the respondent is also subject to a garnishment or an assignment of future earnings? The intermeshing of recent Federal legislation and changes in State law make this necessary computation, which the court is frequently called upon to make, an exercise in the interpretation of complex statutory law and evolving case law. This court finds that a court ordered wage deduction order for the support of a wife and/or children takes priority over a garnishment and over an assignment of wages. (Personal Property Law, § 49-b, subd 2.) The court further finds that when a wage deduction order for support takes up the allowable percentage of disposable income for a garnishment under the Federal law, the garnishment must fail. The court also finds that when a wage deduction order for support reduces the respondent’s disposable income to $85 (Personal Property Law, § 48-b), a competing assignment of future earnings is subject to reduction by the amount statutorily available for a wage deduction order for support.

FACTS

Petitioner originally filed a petition for support on Novem[307]*307ber 6, 1978. On November 22, 1978, respondent was ordered to pay petitioner $150 per week for the support of their minor children. Subsequently the order was modified downward and a wage deduction order for $100 was issued. Fifty dollars per week was "deferred” from the original order of $150 per week.

Petitioner states that she has needs of $150 per week for the support of four minor children1 and requests that the original order of support be reinstated. Respondent states that he does not have sufficient financial ability to meet these needs. He further states that he has a garnishment on his wages of $25 per week and that, therefore, his disposable income available for support is only $100 per week.

At trial respondent put into evidence proof of an income of $265 for an average week.2 As well as the deduction of $25 per week for the garnishee, respondent showed deductions of $19.13 withheld for Federal taxes, $6.90 withheld for New York State taxes, $14.88 for F.I.C.A., and 30 cents for disability insurance. His paycheck also indicated deductions of $3.73 for group insurance, $50 for an advance (a nonrecurring deduction) and $100 for child support, leaving him a net income of $22.81. Clearly, $22.81 was insufficient to meet respondent’s weekly needs. In order for the court to determine the amount of support that the respondent can be ordered to pay, the court must determine respondent’s disposable income for purposes of child support and the results of the priority of that order over the garnishment or assignment of a respondent’s future earnings. (See Sullivan v Sullivan, 68 AD2d 884.)

LAW

I. FEDERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION

Pursuant to Federal law, consumers are protected from having more than a certain portion of their aggregate disposa[308]*308ble earnings3 subject to garnishment by creditors. (US Code, tit 15, § 1673, subd [a].) As defined in the statute "garnishment” is defined to mean "any legal or equitable procedure through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for payment of any debt.” (US Code, tit 15, § 1672, subd [c].)

These consumer protection restrictions do not apply, however, to "any order for the support of any person issued by a court of competent jurisdiction * * * which affords substantial due process, and which is subject to judicial review.” (US Code, tit 15, § 1673, subd [b], par [1], cl [A].) In such cases a garnishment to enforce any order of support shall not exceed 50% of an individual’s disposable earnings if the individual is supporting a spouse or dependent child other than the spouse or child for whose support the order is to be used (US Code, tit 15, § 1673, subd [b], par [2], cl [A]), or 60% where the individual is not supporting another spouse or child. (US Code, tit 15, § 1673, subd [b], par [2], cl [B].)

The protections afforded to the consumer by the Federal statutory scheme apply only to garnishments that have been subject to a judicial transaction. (Atwater v Roudebush, 452 F Supp 622, 631.) Contractual wage assignments do not come within the purview of the Federal law. (Western v Hodgson, 494 F2d 379; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v A. T. & G. Co., 66 Mich App 359.)

The restrictions on garnishment laws do "not annul, alter, or affect or exempt any person from complying with, the laws of any State (1) prohibiting garnishments or providing for more limited garnishments than are allowed under” the Federal law. (US Code, tit 15, § 1677; Evans v Evans, 429 F Supp 580; see Hisquierdo v Hisquierdo, 439 US 572, 587, n 20.) The [309]*309statutory scheme has been viewed as an exemption statute. (Hodgson v Cleveland Municipal Ct., 326 F Supp 419.) The intent of the Congress was to put a limitation on the garnishment of wages, in order to "relieve countless honest debtors driven by economic desperation from plunging into bankruptcy in order to preserve their employment and insure a continued means of support for themselves and their families.” (US Code, Cong & Admin News, 1968, vol 2, p 1979.) Thus, the Federal law provides a consumer with protection from court ordered deductions which go beyond a certain percentage of an individual’s disposable income.

Whether or not the court is limited in its support order to the maximum percentages established in Federal law when the support order provides for payment directly to petitioner is a question not reached here. However, it would seem clear that when a support order provides for payment to the support collection unit and all such orders must provide for a wage deduction order upon a failure to make a designated number of payments, that in such a case the Federally mandated percentages do apply. This is so for the reason that the wage deduction order is served on the employer upon the happening of the contingency of nonpayment and that no such order could be carried out by an employer which exceeds the mandated percentages without additional notice to respondent. (See Fuentes v Shevin, 407 US 67; Sniadach v Family Fin. Corp., 395 US 337.)

II. DISPOSABLE INCOME

Disposable earnings as defined by title 15 (§ 1672, subd [b]) of the United States Code constitutes the base figure from which wage deduction orders and garnishments are computed. The court must look to the gross earnings of the wage earner and subtract legally mandated deductions, such as withholding for income tax (US Code, tit 26, §§ 3401, 3402), Social Security taxes (US Code, tit 26, § 3121), and unemployment insurance (US Code, tit 26, § 3306), to arrive at the disposable earnings available to compute the percentage of earnings available for a wage deduction order for support.

III. STATE PRIORITIES

The priority given to a wage deduction order for support is a matter of State law. (Marshall v District Ct. for Forty-First-b Judicial Dist. of Mich.,

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Bluebook (online)
101 Misc. 2d 305, 423 N.Y.S.2d 788, 1979 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2675, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/liedka-v-liedka-nyfamct-1979.