Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Short

795 P.2d 118, 102 Or. App. 495, 1990 Ore. App. LEXIS 694
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedJuly 18, 1990
Docket85-15198, 85-15197, 85-12701; CA A51178
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 795 P.2d 118 (Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Short) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Short, 795 P.2d 118, 102 Or. App. 495, 1990 Ore. App. LEXIS 694 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).

Opinions

[497]*497EDMONDS, J.

Employer seeks review of a Workers’ Compensation Board order awarding compensation to claimant on his aggravation claim and assessing penalties and attorney fees for employer’s failure to pay compensation. We affirm.1

Claimant filed an occupational disease claim for “tennis elbow” in his right arm on February 7, 1980. Temporary disability benefits were paid, and the condition was declared stationary on April 4, 1980. In 1984, claimant suffered an aggravation and was off work for three days.2 Employer paid claimant’s medical expenses, but denied payment of temporary disability benefits. The referee upheld the employer’s denial and claimant sought Board review. The Board awarded temporary disability benefits and assessed penalties and attorney fees against employer, pursuant to ORS 656.262(10), holding that, “because claimant had previously received time loss benefits for this condition, he had already satisfied the three-day waiting period set forth in former ORS 656.210(3).”3 Employer seeks review, arguing that the Board erred in awarding benefits for the three-day time loss.

ORS 656.210(3) provides:

“No disability payment is recoverable for temporary total disability suffered during the first three calendar days after the worker leaves work as a result of the compensable injury unless the total disability continues for a period of 14 days or the worker is an inpatient in a hospital.” (Emphasis supplied.)

ORS 656.005(7) (a) defines “compensable injury” as

“an accidental injury, * * * arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services resulting in disability or death * *

ORS 656.273(1) provides:

[498]*498“After the last award or arrangement of compensation, an injured worker is entitled to additional compensation, including medical services, for worsened conditions resulting from the original injury.”

“Aggravation” is defined in OAR 436-60-005(1) as

“the worsened condition of an injured worker which is a medically verified increase in seriousness or severity of a condition arising from an industrial injury to the worker since the last award or arrangement of compensation for that industrial injury.”

Employer argues that an injured worker’s absence from work must exceed three days before he is entitled to temporary disability benefits by reason of an aggravation because, under ORS 656.263(6), an aggravation claim is processed in accordance with the provisions of ORS 656.262 that apply to an original claim. However, ORS 656.210(3) can also be reasonably interpreted, when read with ORS 656.273(1), to limit the three-day waiting period only to original injury claims, because (1) the statute refers only to a compensable injury and (2) the legislature could have easily added the words “or aggravation” after “compensable injury” had it intended a broader application.

When statutory language lends itself to more than one interpretation, we can look to legislative history to identify the context in which it was adopted as an aid to resolving the ambiguity, City of Portland v. Rice, 94 Or App 292, 296, 765 P2d 228 (1988), aff’d 308 Or 118 (1989). However, the legislative history of ORS 656.210(3) is not dispositive. There is an indication that the three-day period was added to reduce the cost of administering the workers’ compensation system by excluding coverage for a large number of insignificant temporary injuries. See Minutes, House Committee on Labor and Management, January 18, 1965, pp 2-3. That purpose may apply to insignificant aggravations as well as to insignificant initial injuries. However, the history also indicates strong opposition to the adoption of any three-day waiting period. Before adding the three-day waiting period in 1965, Oregon was the only state requiring a one-cent employee contribution and allowing claims of disability without a waiting period. Both the House Labor and Management and Senate Labor and industries Committees discussed whether to add any [499]*499waiting period at all, because the unique provisions were thought to offset each other. There was also testimony supporting elimination of the three-day waiting period from the bill altogether.4 It can be inferred from the history that the legislature intended that “compensable injury” meant only the original injury.

Our inquiry, then, is to determine how the legislature would have intended the statute to be applied, had it considered the question. Security State Bank v. Luebke, 303 Or 418, 737 P2d 586 (1987). To answer that inquiry, we look to the language used, the statutory objective and any other evidence of the intended meaning. ORS 174.010. State v. Parker, 299 Or 534, 704 P2d 1144 (1985).

Generally, the Workers’ Compensation Law should be interpreted in a light most favorable to the worker. SAIF v. Bond, 64 Or App 505, 506, 669 P2d 332 (1983). Looking at the [500]*500language of ORS 656.210(3), its statutory companion, and its legislative history in the light most favorable to the worker, we conclude that had the legislature intended to require a worker to incur more than one three-day waiting period without compensation relating to the same injury, it would have expressly said so.

Affirmed on petition and on cross-petition.

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Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Short
795 P.2d 118 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1990)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
795 P.2d 118, 102 Or. App. 495, 1990 Ore. App. LEXIS 694, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/liberty-northwest-ins-corp-v-short-orctapp-1990.