Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Money

4 S.E.2d 739, 174 Va. 50, 1939 Va. LEXIS 140
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedOctober 9, 1939
DocketRecord No. 2168
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 4 S.E.2d 739 (Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Money) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Money, 4 S.E.2d 739, 174 Va. 50, 1939 Va. LEXIS 140 (Va. 1939).

Opinion

Gregory, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

On August 8, 1938, Clingmon Money, while unloading beer cases, suffered an injury in his right groin. He died September 8, 1938, of lobar pneumonia. The Industrial Commission made an award in favor of Eliza Money, his widow, which is the subject of the present review.

The sole issue here to be determined is whether there was any causal connection between the accident to Money and his death. The commission found that the accident was a contributing cause.

The evidence discloses that Money was employed by Meade H. Kendrick, trading as Kendrick’s Service. His duties required him to load and unload beer cases on and from a truck. Prior to the accident he appeared to be in [52]*52good health except that he had pyorrhea. He had not missed a single day’s employment for 11 years prior to the accident nor had he been treated for any disease during that time.

On August 8th while unloading beer cases from a truck his right foot slipped a distance of from 18 to 24 inches and he fell and was injured in his groin. From the time of his injury until his death a month later he suffered from the injury and continued to grow worse.

Money called in his physician two days after the accident and was told by him that inasmuch as he was covered by liability insurance he should go to the insurance clinic in Washington, D. C., for treatment. This clinic is maintained by the insurance companies and is in charge of physicians employed by them. At the time he went to see his physician he was suffering pain in his back and hip which extended down his right leg. The right leg later swelled to an abnormal size causing high fever and intense pain.

The treatment at the clinic was not very successful. The patient continued to suffer great pain. He again called his own physician and at this time the leg was flexed, greatly swollen and Money was unable to move it. His physician sent him to a hospital. At the hospital he was again seen and treated by the physicians of the insurance companies. His leg continued to be badly swollen and he made no improvement. His condition was diagnosed at that time as diabetes and pyorrhea and he also had phlebitis. It was suspected that he had an abscess.

Money died on September 8th and an autopsy was performed which disclosed that he had lobar pneumonia, generalized toxemia, chronic nephritis, long standing inflammation of the coecum, diabetes, pyorrhea, abscess on the right side and thrombophlebitis of the right femoral vein.

The appellant contends that Money’s death was the direct result of pneumonia which was brought on by the diseases which he had and that it had no connection with the accident. Thus it is argued that the award is not supported by the evidence.

[53]*53It is true that physicians employed by the insurance companies testified that the death of Money could not be attributed to the accident but was solely due to the many ailments he had. On the other hand, from the testimony of other physicians it could be inferred that the accident caused a “flare up” of the diseases with which he was afflicted, and in that manner the accident was a contributing cause of death. When we consider the undisputed fact that Money had not lost a day from his work in 11 years and to outward appearances seemed to be in good health, except the disease of the gums, we can not say as a matter of law that the award is without evidence to support it.

Chairman Nickels rendered the opinion of the commission and after setting forth many excerpts from the testimony he made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law which we think are justified and with which we are in accord: “The facts above quoted and other parts of the record show a man who had worked steadily although certain diseased conditions were in evidence. He sustained an accident which was admitted. Following this he grew progressively worse and ultimately died. There was evidence of pain down the back and hip going into the right leg which began the day of the accident and lasted till death. A careful study of the record shows continuous pain in the area of the psoas muscle. The subjective symptoms of pain in the region of the upper right thigh and in the right groin began with the accident and were followed by the objective symptoms of swelling. He suffered intense pain; ran a high fever, and could not move himself in bed.

“It was shown that the deceased had abscessed teeth. There is a possibility that the abscess in the region of the psoas muscle was secondary to the infection in the teeth. However, as a general rule many are seen by physicians with diseased teeth and among such number few with abscess in the region of the psoas muscle. The thought of the abscess being secondary to the diseased teeth is in the nature of a theoretical explanation of a possibility, rather than a practical application of the thought expressed by [54]*54Dr. Gray to the effect that ‘ * * * strain of the psoas muscle is not unusual, and induces pain * * * .’ In this case the pain began with the accident, there were subjective symptoms in the region of the psoas muscle, followed by the objective symptoms of tenderness and swelling. If abscessed teeth were the primary cause for this condition, it is equally as probable the infection would have resulted in the absence of trauma. On the other hand the presence of a general toxic condition would require less trauma to produce a flare up of the predisposing condition, than is ordinarily required in a healthy person. Quite naturally, there is a more immediate danger of getting an abscess in the presence of a general toxemia from abscessed teeth, than there would be in the absence of this predisposing condition. Hence, all the causative factors of a traumatic abscess follow each other in an unbroken chain in the instant case. The accident must have done one of two things: either stretched the muscle by hyperextension of the thigh, or have jerked it by a quick flexion in an attempt to save himself from the fall. Such strains, according to Gray’s Anatomy, are not unusual. The underlying diseased conditions of nephritis, diabetes and general toxemia from diseased teeth made the deceased more susceptible to an infection from accidental causes. A preponderance of the evidence shows that the abscess of the psoas muscle was of traumatic origin and that the pneumonia which was the immediate cause of death was produced by it.
“It is a foregone conclusion that an accident occurred and the compensation payments hereinbefore stated were made on the basis of a compensable case. The evidence quoted shows that although the deceased had continued to work, his health was undermined by a generalized diseased condition. It is alleged that death was produced by natural causes bearing no causal relationship to the accident. In tracing the facts in the chain of causal relationship in an endeavor to find the proximate cause for death, one must not pass over lightly a deteriorated health condition which had produced a general toxemia. This thought is repeatedly [55]*55emphasized throughout the record. When the accident was superimposed upon the diseased condition there follows an unbroken chain of facts so closely interwoven with the accident, one must resort to pure medical theory to arrive at the conclusion from the evidence as a whole that the accident was not a contributory factor in lighting up the latent diseased condition.

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4 S.E.2d 739, 174 Va. 50, 1939 Va. LEXIS 140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/liberty-mutual-insurance-v-money-va-1939.