L'Heureux v. Ashton

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: October 13, 1998
• Docket: 98-1336
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT] United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 98-1336

RONALD L'HEUREUX,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

LEO ASHTON, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, Boudin and Lipez, Circuit Judges.

Ronald L'Heureux on brief pro se. Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney General and Elisabeth A. Wallace, Special Assistant Attorney General, on Motion to Dismiss Appeal or to Summarily Affirm the Judgment Below and Memorandum in Support, for appellees.

October 13, 1998

Per Curiam. Upon careful consideration of plaintiff's brief and defendants' motion to dismiss this appeal, and de novo review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendants and in refusing to exercise pendent jurisdiction. We reach this conclusion for the following reasons: 1. As to the first amendment claims, even to the extent that plaintiff may have had some constitutional right to act as a jailhouse lawyer for other inmates, any such right was not unfettered: "plaintiff in this case is a prisoner and unlike an ordinary citizen, his associational rights may be permissibly restricted by prison authorities because of the institutional need to maintain order." Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1985). Such restriction is "valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). Here, defendants presented sufficient justification for the subject restrictions, the substance of which plaintiff failed to refute as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Thus, as far as the record shows, the regulations violated by plaintiff and the resulting disciplinary actions did not unreasonably impinge on his first amendment rights. Accordingly, summary judgment for defendants on the first amendment claims was warranted. 2. As to plaintiff's due process claims, the disciplinary segregatio imposed was not such an atypical, -2- significant deprivation as would create a liberty interest subject to constitutional due process protection. See Sandinv. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485-86 (1995). Further, plaintiff's claims regarding loss of good time credits were not cognizable in this 1983 action. See Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 1588-89 (1997). Because, under Sandin and Balisok, neither of plaintiff's disciplinary proceedings raised due process claims cognizable in this federal action, there was no call to consider plaintiff's additional arguments that the proceedings violated various consent decrees and other state laws and regulations. Accordingly, summary judgment for defendants on the due process claims was appropriate, and the district court properly declined to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims. 3. Defendants' conduct in disciplining plaintiff, even if not unconstitutional, still might have been actionable if it was done in retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected rights. See Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888 892 n.4 (1st Cir. 1980). To succeed on such a retaliation claim, plaintiff must prove that the action would not have been taken "but for" the alleged improper reason. McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1979). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient. See Leonardo v. Moran, 611 F.2d 397, 398 (1st Cir. 1979). Here, plaintiff's allegations of a retaliatory conspiracy remained vague and conclusory, and those allegations did not establish a "but for" connection between the disciplinary proceedings and the alleged retaliatory motive. Therefore, on the record here, summary judgment for defendants on the retaliation claims also was proper. See McDonald, 610 F.2d at 18-19. 4. Further, we agree with the district court that all defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to the damage claims. And we note that the state Department of Corrections was not a party to the district court action or to this appeal, so that plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief against the state DOC have no merit whatsoever. 5. To the extent that the additional arguments and claims raised in plaintiff's brief are cognizable at all in this appeal, they are meritless. Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1.