Lewis v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided July 12, 2018·No. 16-1394·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 16-1394V Filed: June 8, 2018

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * DON LEWIS, * * UNPUBLISHED Petitioner, * v. * Special Master Oler * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Decision on Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Alison H. Haskins, Maglio Christopher and Toale, PA, Sarasota, FL, for Petitioner. Jennifer L. Reynaud, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

On October 25, 2016, Don Lewis (“Petitioner”), filed a petition for compensation in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (“the Program”),2 alleging that he suffered from Guillain-Barré syndrome (“GBS”) as a result of receiving an influenza (“flu”) vaccination on September 29, 2013. Petition (“Pet.”) at ¶¶ 1, 4-5, ECF No. 1. Petitioner eventually moved for a motion for a decision dismissing his petition on July 19, 2017, stating that an “investigation of the facts and science supporting his case” revealed that he would be “unable to prove that he is entitled to compensation in the Vaccine Program.” ECF No. 26 at ¶ 2. The special master previously assigned to this case issued a Decision on July 19, 2017, dismissing the petition for insufficient proof. See Decision, ECF No. 27.

1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I intend to post this Decision on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012)). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), a party has 14 days to identify and move to delete medical or other information, that satisfies the criteria in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)(B). Further, consistent with the rule, a motion for redaction must include a proposed redacted decision. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within the requirements of that provision, I will delete such material from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (“Vaccine Act” or “Vaccine Program”), Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012). 1 I. Relevant Procedural History Regarding Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

On October 19, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs (AFC Motion), requesting $42,847.60 in attorneys’ fees, and $7,686.41 in costs, for a total of $50,534.01. Petitioner’s (“Petr’s”) Application (“App.”) dated October 19, 2017, ECF No. 34 at 1-2.3 In accordance with General Order #9, Petitioner filed a signed statement indicating that he did not incur any out-of-pocket expenses throughout the pendency of this case. See Ex. 10, ECF No. 34.

This case was transferred to my docket on November 30, 2017. ECF No. 35. On that same date, Respondent filed a response to Petitioner’s AFC motion. See Respondent’s Response, dated November 30, 2017, ECF No. 36. Respondent argues that “[n]either the Vaccine Act nor Vaccine Rule 13 contemplates any role for respondent in the resolution of a request by a petitioner for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 1. Respondent adds, however, that he “is satisfied the statutory requirements for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs are met in this case.” Id. at 2. Additionally, he “respectfully recommends that [I] exercise [my] discretion and determine a reasonable award for attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 3.

Petitioner filed a reply to Respondent’s response on December 5, 2017. ECF No. 38. Petitioner argues (1) that Respondent’s position regarding Petitioner’s AFC Motion is “overly burdensome on the Court and prejudices Petitioner” (id. at 2); (2) that “Petitioner has met his burden of establishing reasonable fees and costs” (id. at 3); and (3) that his “attorneys’ fees should be paid and his case costs reimbursed” (id. at 4). This matter is now ripe for a decision.

II. Applicable Law and Discussion

The Vaccine Act permits an award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees” and “other costs.” § 15(e)(1). If a petitioner succeeds on the merits of his or her claim, the award of attorneys’ fees is automatic. Id.; see also Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 373 (2013). A petitioner need not prevail on entitlement to receive a fee award, however, as long as the petition was brought in “good faith” and there was a “reasonable basis” for the claim to proceed. §15(e)(1). Respondent does not argue that this case lacks good faith or a reasonable basis. Upon my review of the record, and an examination of the overall circumstances of this case, I also agree that this case was filed in “good faith,” and with a “reasonable basis.”

3 Petitioner filed his application for attorneys’ fees and costs without proper pagination. See generally Petr’s App. Thus, for ease of reference, I will use the page numbers generated from the CM/ECF filing reflected at the top of the page. Therefore, the page entitled “Motion For Payment of Petitioner’s Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement Of Case Costs Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 300aa-15” will be cited as “Petr’s App. at 1” with subsequent pages numbered accordingly.

2 A. Reasonable Hourly Rates and Time Expended

i. Requested Hourly Rates

The Federal Circuit has endorsed the use of the lodestar approach to determine what constitutes “reasonable attorneys’ fees” and “other costs” under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under this approach, “[t]he initial estimate of a reasonable attorney’s fee” is calculated by “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at 1347-48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). That product is then adjusted upward or downward based on other specific findings. Id.

Special masters have substantial discretion in awarding fees and may adjust a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by Respondent, and without providing petitioners with notice and opportunity to respond. See Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (2009). Special masters need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of a petitioner’s fee application when reducing fees. See Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (2011).

A “reasonable hourly rate” is defined as the rate “prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). In general, this rate is based on “the forum rate for the District of Columbia” rather than “the rate in the geographic area of the practice of petitioner’s attorney.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Avera, 515 F.3d at 1349).

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