LALLY-GREEN, J.:
¶ 1 Appellant, Erie Insurance Exchange (“Erie”), appeals from the Order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Appellees Robert A. Lewis, Linda S. Lewis, and Robert J. Lewis. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
¶2 The pertinent facts underlying this case are as follows. On November 23, 1992, Erie issued Robert A. Lewis an automobile liability insurance policy, policy no. Q06-0502942-N (“Policy”). In his initial application, Robert A. Lewis requested and received bodily injury liability coverage of $500,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. Also, as part of his initial application, Appellee requested and re[841]*841ceived reduced uninsured/underinsured (“UM/UIM”) coverages in the amount of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident. (Reduced coverage is permitted by § 1734 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1701 et seq. (“MVFRL”)).1 The stacking option also applied to the Policy.
¶ 8 As of July 21, 1997, the Policy was still in full force and effect and provided for the same coverages and premiums as was provided in the initial Policy dated November 23, 1992. It was on this date (July 21, 1997), that Robert A Lewis’s son, Robert J. Lewis, was injured in an automobile accident while riding as a guest passenger in a vehicle insured by another insurance company. As a “resident relative” of Robert A. Lewis, Robert J. Lewis was an “insured” under the Policy. A dispute arose between Appellees and Erie over the amount of underinsured motorist coverage available to Robert J. Lewis.
¶ 4 On April 24, 1998, Appellees filed an action for Declaratory Judgment. Appel-lees asserted that an election of reduced UM and UIM coverage limits is valid under § 1734 only when the election meets the technical requirements of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1731.2 One of § 1731’s technical requirements is that an insurer must provide the waivers of UM and UIM coverages on separate pages. See 75 Pa.G.S.A. § 1731(c.l). Further, § 1731 provides that a failure to comply with the § 1731 requirements causes the rejection form to be void and, therefore, the UM and UIM coverage is equal to the bodily liability limits. On the other hand, § 1734 states that a request for reduction of UM or UIM coverages must be made in writing. None of the technical requirements of § 1731 is explicitly set out in § 1734.
¶ 5 Appellees argued that this § 1781 separate-page requirement should also apply to requests for reduced coverages under § 1734. Since Robert A. Lewis signed an Erie form which contained the requests for reduced UM and UIM coverages on the same page and not separate pages, Appellees argued that the requirements of § 1734 were not met. Consequently, they concluded, the Policy was void and unenforceable. Appellees asked the trial court to reform the insurance contract to provide UM/UIM coverages equal to the amount of bodily injury liability coverage, with the stacking option applicable.
¶ 6 Erie filed a motion for summary judgment,3 arguing that § 1731(c.l) does not apply where the issue is the reduction of UM/UIM coverages and not the complete rejection of such coverages. Docket Entry 5. Erie argued alternatively that even if § 1734 required strict technical compliance with the mandates of § 1731, § 1734 does not provide a statutory remedy and the courts are not permitted to imply one. Id.
¶ 7 The trial court treated Erie’s motion for summary judgment as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.4 The court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of Appellees, holding that the selection by Robert A. Lewis of reduced UM/UIM coverages was void and unenforceable because the reduction/waiver forms provided by Erie violated the technical mandates of § 1731. Trial Court Opinion at 3-4. Furthermore, the court ordered reformation of the Policy to provide UM/UIM coverage equal to the Policy’s bodily injury liability coverage, with the stacking option applicable. Id. at 4.
¶ 8 Erie asserts the following questions for our review:
[842]*842(1) Whether the subject automobile insurance policy properly provides UM/UIM coverage limits of $50,000 per person/$100,000 per accident when the named insured, plaintiff Robert A. Lewis, made a written request for coverage in those amounts, which request complies with the requirements of 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1734?
(2) Even if the insurer must comply with § 1731 in addition to § 1734 before providing UM/UIM coverage limits less than the bodily injury liability limits of the policy, does the MVFRL provide a remedy requiring reformation of the policy to provide more coverage than was purchased?
II.
A.
¶ 9 Our standard and scope of review in matters involving the grant or denial of judgment on the pleadings is as follows:
[Appellate review of an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings] is plenary. The appellate court will apply the same standard employed by the triál court. A trial court must confíne its consideration to the pleadings and relevant documents. The court must accept as true all well pleaded statements of fact, admissions, and any documents properly attached to the pleadings presented by the party against whom the motion is filed, considering only those facts which were specifically admitted. Further, the court may grant judgment on the pleadings only where the moving party’s right to succeed is certain and the case is so free from doubt that trial would clearly be a fruitless exercise.
Kafando v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 704 A.2d 675, 676 (Pa.Super.1998), appeal denied, 557 Pa. 629, 732 A.2d 615 (1998), quoting Steiner v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 426 Pa.Super. 84, 87-89, 626 A.2d 584, 586 (1993). The reviewing court is to determine if the trial court’s action respecting the motion for judgment on the pleadings “was based on a clear error of law or whether there were facts disclosed by the pleadings which should properly go to the jury.” Kelly v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 414 Pa.Super. 6, 8-10, 606 A.2d 470, 471 (1992) (citation omitted). Since there are no factual issues disclosed by the pleadings that should properly go to the jury, our review is to determine whether the trial court committed a clear error of law.
B.
¶ 10 The MVFRL mandates that an insurer, who issues motor vehicle liability policies, offer its customers UM/UIM coverages in amounts equal to the amount of the bodily injury liability limits of the customers’ policies. See 75 Pa.C.S.A § 1791(6). In order for an insured to obtain UM/UIM coverages that are lower than the policy’s bodily injury liability coverage, the insured must specifically request such levels in accordance with either § 1734 (for reduction), or § 1731 (for complete rejection). 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1734, 1731. In order to address Erie’s issues, we must interpret the purpose and meaning of § 1734 and its relationship to § 1731.
¶ 11 The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b); Pennsylvania Fin. Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan v. English, 541 Pa. 424, 430, 664 A.2d 84, 87 (1995). “The basic tenet of statutory construction requires a court to construe the words of the statute according to their plain meaning.” Grom v. Burgoon, 448 Pa.Super. 616, 619-620, 672 A.2d 823, 825 (1996), citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a). ‘When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, this Court cannot disregard them under the pretext of pursuing the spirit of the statute.” Grom, 672 A.2d at 825. Where, however, the statute is unclear or [843]*843ambiguous, the intent of the legislature is ascertained by reviewing the following: the necessity of the law; the object to be attained by the law; the circumstances under which the law was enacted; and the mischief to be remedied by the law. English, 541 Pa. at 430, 664 A.2d at 87. “Our duty to interpret statutes does not include the right to add provisions that the legislature has omitted.” Grom, 672 A.2d at 825.
C.
Sections 1734 and 1731 are set out below. Section 1734 provides:
Request for lower limits of coverage
A named insured may request in writing the issuance of coverages under section 1731 (relating to availability, scope and amount of coverage) in amounts equal to or less than the limits of liability for bodily injury.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1734. Section 1731 provides, in pertinent part:
Availability, scope and amount of coverage
(a) Mandatory offering. — No motor vehicle liability insurance policy shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this Commonwealth, with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this Commonwealth, unless uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist coverages are offered therein or supplemental thereto in amounts as provided in Section 1734 (relating to request for lower limits of coverage). Purchase of uninsured motorist and un-derinsured motorist coverages is optional.
(b) Uninsured motorist coverage.— Uninsured motorist coverage shall provide protection for persons who suffer injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle and are legally entitled to recover damages therefor from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles. The named insured shall be informed that he may reject uninsured motorist coverage by signing the following written rejection form:
REJECTION OF UNINSURED MOTORIST PROTECTION
By signing this waiver I am rejecting uninsured motorist coverage under this policy, for myself and all relatives residing in my household. Uninsured coverage protects me and relatives living in my household for losses and damages suffered if injury is caused by the negligence of a driver who does not have any insurance to pay for losses and damages. I knowingly and voluntarily reject this coverage.
Signature of First Named Insured
Date
(c)Underinsured motorist coverage.— Underinsured motorist coverage shall provide protection for persons who suffer injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle and are legally entitled to recover damages therefor from owners or operators of underin-sured motor vehicles. The named insured shall be informed that he may reject underinsured motorist coverage by signing the following written rejection form:
REJECTION OF UNDERIN-SURED MOTORIST PROTECTION
By signing this waiver I am rejecting underinsured motorist coverage under this policy, for myself and all relatives residing in my household. Underin-sured coverage protects me and relatives living in my household for losses and damages suffered if injury is caused by the negligence of a driver who does not have enough insurance to pay for all losses and damages. I knowingly and voluntarily reject this coverage.
Signature of First Named Insured
Date
[844]*844(e.l) Form of waiver. — Insurers shall print the rejection forms required by subsections (b) and (c) on separate sheets in prominent type and location. The forms must be signed by the first named insured and dated to be valid. The signatures on the forms may be witnessed by an insurance agent or broker. Any rejection form that does not specifically comply with this section is void. If the insurer fails to produce a valid rejection form, uninsured or underinsured coverage, or both, as the case may be, under that policy shall be equal to the bodily injury liability limits. On policies in which either uninsured or underinsured coverage has been rejected, the policy renewals must contain notice in prominent type that the policy does not provide protection against damages caused by uninsured or underinsured motorists. Any person who executes a waiver under subsection (b) or (c) shall be precluded from claiming liability of any person based upon inadequate information.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1731(a), (b) and (e.l) (emphasis added).
¶ 12 Sections 1791 and 1791.1, 75 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 1791 and 1791.1, are often referred to when a court addresses either § 1734 or § 1731. Neither § 1791 nor § 1791.1 is at issue in this case. However, in order to properly understand the relevant case law discussed below, we set out § 1791 and § 1791.1 here.
¶ 13 Section 1791 contains a presumption that the “insured has been advised of the benefits and limits available” under the MVFRL if the insurer complies with the § 1791 requirements respecting statutory language and format.5 Section 1791.1 im[845]*845poses on the insurer a requirement to provide to the insured an itemized invoice listing the minimum motor vehicle insur-anee coverage levels, notice respecting alternative tort options, notice concerning discounts, and additional requested information concerning the cost of insurance, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1791.1(a)-(d). Said invoice and notice of tort options are to be given in accordance with statutory language and format. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1791.1(a)-(b).6 Since the courts read §§ 1791 and 1791.1 in pari materia with the other sections of the MVFRL, “the conclusive presumption of § 1791 is not triggered unless and until the statutory mandate of [the applicable waiver provision] has first been fulfilled.” Lucas v. Progressive Cos. Ins. Co., 451 [846]*846Pa.Super. 492, 494-496, 680 A.2d 873, 875 (1996), appeal denied, 548 Pa. 619, 693 A.2d 589 (1997), quoting Motorists Ins. Cos. v. Emig, 444 Pa.Super. 524, 543-545, 664 A.2d 559, 569-570 (1995).
D.
¶ 14 The proper relationship of § 1731 and § 1734 in a situation involving reduced UM or UIM coverage (and not complete rejection of either coverage) is one of first impression. As the following overview of the relevant case law reflects, both the Supreme Court and this Court have had the opportunity to interpret 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1731, 1791 and 1791.1. Yet, neither Court has had to answer the question of whether policies issued under § 1734 must comply with the technical requirements of § 1731 in order to effect a valid election of reduced UM/UIM coverages under § 1734. Thus, we review existing case law so that we are properly guided in our decision regarding whether an insurer of a policy under § 1734 must comply with the requirements of § 1731 and, if it fails to do so, whether the MVFRL provides for a remedy of contract reformation to the bodily injury liability benefits.
(1)
¶ 15 The Supreme Court has examined §§ 1731 and 1791 in three cases. The first case, Salazar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 Pa. 658, 702 A.2d 1038 (1997), focused on the requirements of 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1791.1 and 1731. The Court addressed whether an insurer who fails to include the notice required of § 1791.1 is required to pay full UM benefits. The Salazar claimants were resident relatives of the named insured, Ms. Brown, who had rejected UM coverage in her initial application for insurance. When Ms. Brown renewed the policy, Allstate failed to include the § 1791.1 notice. Claimants argued that this violation of the statutory requirements entitled them to a remedy of UM benefits equal to the bodily injury liability benefits.
¶ 16 The Court held that Allstate had not complied with § 1791.1 but refused to order the requested remedy. The Court concluded that, when §§ 1731, 1791 and 1791.1 are read in pari materia, an insurer is required by § 1791.1 to provide notice on renewal forms that informs the named insured of his or her options at the time of renewal concerning the purchase of UM/UIM coverage. Id. at 662-667, 702 A.2d at 1041-1043. The Court, however, refused to order the requested remedy because the MVFRL did not provide for a remedy for an insurer’s failure to comply with the notice requirements of § 1791.1. Id. at 668, 702 A.2d at 1044. The Court explained:
While we recognize that section 1791.1 requires that an insurer must provide specific information to the insured at the time of renewal, the legislature has not provided in the MVFRL any enforcement mechanism regarding this requirement.
Id. at 670, 702 A.2d at 1044.
¶ 17 In 1998, the Supreme Court addressed § 1731 in the context of the “limited tort” option in two cases. The first case was Rump v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 551 Pa. 339, 710 A.2d 1093 (1998), where the Court ruled on the interrelationship of §§ 1705(d)(1) and 1731(d)(2) of the MVFRL. Section 1705(d)(1) states that a person who elects “limited tort” remains eligible to seek compensation for economic loss sustained in a motor vehicle accident caused by the fault of another. 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1705(d)(1). Such person, however, is not eligible to seek non-economic damages for such accident except where the person at fault:
(ii) is operating a motor vehicle registered in another state [or]
(iv) has not maintained financial responsibility as required by this chapter, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall affect the limitation of section 1731(d)(2) (relating to availability, scope and amount of coverage).
Id. (emphasis added). Section 1731(d)(2) provides:
[847]*847A person precluded from maintaining an action for noneconomic damages under section 1705 (relating to election of tort options) may not recover from uninsured motorist coverage or underinsured motorist coverage for noneconomic damages.
¶ 18 In Rump, an insured selected the “limited tort” option for his automobile insurance policy pursuant to the MVFRL. 710 A2d at 1095. The insured argued that the § 1705(d)(1), “registered in another state,” exception allowed him to recover non-economic damages under the UM provisions of his insurance policy. Id. Aetna argued that the § 1705(d)(l)(iv) proviso applied to all exemptions under § 1705(d)(1). Id. at 1095-1096.
¶ 19 The Court agreed with Aetna and held that § 1781(d)(2) prevented an insured from recovering non-economic damages under the UM provisions of his own policy when the insured had selected the “limited tort” option.7 Id. at 1097-1098. The Court, applying principles of statutory construction, noted that the “legislative concern over the increasing costs of automobile insurance is the public policy which is to be advanced when interpreting the statutory provisions of the MVFRL.” Id. at 1096. The Court concluded that:
By limiting appellant’s ability to recover such damages, this Court is holding appellant to his voluntary choice of limiting his ability to recover such damages in return for a reduced insurance premium.
Id. at 1098.
¶ 20 The other “limited tort” case is Donnelly v. Bauer, 558 Pa. 596, 720 A.2d 447 (1998), where the Court ruled on the interrelationship of §§ 1705(a)(1) and (4) of the MVFRL. Section 1705 provides in relevant part:
(a) Financial responsibility requirements.-
(1) Each insurer, not less than 45 days prior to the first renewal of a private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance policy on and after July 1, 1990, shall notify in writing each named insured of the availability of two alternatives of full tort insurance and limited tort insurance described in subsections (c) and (d). The notice shall be a standardized form adopted by the Commissioner and shall include the following language:
(4) Each insurer, prior to the first issuance of a private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance policy on and after July 1, 1990, shall provide each applicant with the notice required by paragraph (1). A policy may not be issued until the applicant has been provided an opportunity to elect a tort option.8
¶ 21 In Donnelly, the plaintiffs had purchased limited tort automobile insurance policies, but sought reformation of the policies to give them full tort status. 553 Pa. at 601, 720 A.2d at 449. They claimed that, when they made their limited tort selection in original policies issued after July 1,1990, they were not given the statutory notice explaining the price differentials between full tort and limited tort [848]*848coverage, as mandated by § 1705(a)(4). Id. at 605, 720 A.2d at 451. The insurers argued that § 1705(a)(4) did not apply to original purchasers of automobile insurance. Id. Rather, the notice of price differentials were to be given under § 1705(a)(4) only to existing policyholders as of July 1, 1990 who desired to have a new policy issued with the tort options rather than wait until their renewal date to receive the tort option. Id. at 605-606, 720 A.2d at 451-452.
¶ 22 The Donnelly Court agreed with the insureds, holding that insurers must provide proper § 1705 notices to insureds buying original coverage after the effective date of the MVFRL amendments. Id. at 607-608, 720 A.2d at 452-458. The Court, however, refused to imply a remedy of full tort coverage. Id. at 610, 720 A.2d at 454. Like it did in Salazar, the Court noted that the 1990 amendments to the MVFRL were designed by the legislature to “stem the rising cost of insurance in the Commonwealth.” Id. The Court held that where the MVFRL provides no explicit remedy, the courts cannot imply the remedy of full tort coverage. Id. Significantly, the Court said:
Here, appellants, based on a notice form which provided accurate information on the difference between the tort alternatives, freely chose the limited tort option. In making this free choice, appellants received a greater reduction in their premiums than if they had chosen the full tort option. Appellants were content with this lower premium and their choice until they unfortunately were involved in automobile accidents[.] Now, appellants seek to escape from what they freely chose and paid for in order that they may obtain a full tort recovery. If this Court were to fashion a remedy not expressly provided for in the MVFRL, this Court would essentially contravene the cost containment policy behind the MVFRL because allowing appellants the full tort coverage they seek would result in giving appellants something for which no individual has paid, which in turn, would result in insurance companies passing on this extra costs [sic] to all other insureds.
Id.
(2)
¶ 23 Our Superior Court has interpreted § 1781, and the valid rejection of UM and/or UIM coverages, in a number of cases. A valid rejection of UM/UIM coverage was addressed in Lucas, 680 A.2d 873. There, the insureds signed waiver forms that rejected both the UM and the UIM coverage. Id. at 875. While the waiver forms contained the language required by § 1731(b) and (c), they were printed on the same sheet of paper. Id. at 876. Thus, the forms failed to meet the separate page requirement of § 1731(c.l).9 Id. at 876-877. The consequence for failure to comply with this mandate was the explicit remedy found in § 1731(c.l), ie., uninsured and underinsured coverage was to be provided to insureds equal to their bodily injury liability limits. Id. at 877.
¶24 The separate-page requirement of § 1731(c.l) was also at issue in Winslow-Quattlebaum v. Maryland Casualty Co., 723 A.2d 681 (Pa.Super.1998), appeal granted, 742 A.2d 172 (Pa.1999). This Court held that an insured was entitled to UIM coverage because the insurer’s rejection form for UIM was not on a page separate from her rejection of stacked un-derinsurance coverage limits. Id. at 684. The remedy was the § 1731(d) remedy of UIM coverage equal to the bodily injury liability limits under the policy. Id.
¶ 25 Section 1791 was the focus of Tukovits v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 448 Pa.Super. 540, 672 A.2d 786 (1996), appeal denied, 546 Pa. 668, 685 A.2d 547 (1996). The Court first recognized that the § 1791 statutory presumption arises when the insurer’s notice complies with § 1791. Id. at 789. However, if the insurer’s notice does [849]*849not meet the requirements of § 1791, then the insurer must show waiver “affirmatively expressed in writing by the insured, which must evidence an express agreement or acquiescence on the part of the insured to delete or relinquish this protection.” Id., citations omitted. The Court held that the requirements of § 1791 were not met and that the record failed to reflect that the insured had voluntarily and knowingly reduced his UM/UIM coverages. Id. at 790.10
¶ 26 The Court addressed the rejection of UM claims under § 1731 as well as the argument that a rejection under § 1781 was a reduction (albeit to zero) under § 1734 in National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Irex Corp., 713 A.2d 1145 (Pa.Super.1998). There, an insured’s employee rejected UM benefits on waiver forms that neither contained the requisite § 1731 language nor were on separate sheets of paper. Id. at 1151. First Union argued that the insured’s employer, a sophisticated company, knowingly and voluntarily rejected UM coverage when its vice president signed an endorsement that intended to waive such coverage; therefore, the waiver was valid despite the insurer’s violations of § 1731. Id. at 1147.
¶ 27 The Court disagreed. It held that the rejection waiver forms failed to comply with § 1731 and, therefore, the rejection waiver was void and the remedy was the statutory one of reformation to include UM coverage equal to the policy’s bodily injury liability limits. Id. at 1151.
¶28 National Union then argued that even if this Court found an invalid rejection/waiver of UM coverage pursuant to § 1731, the endorsement executed by the insured’s vice president could be classified as an election to reduce its UM coverage limits under § 1734. Id. at 1151. The Court rejected “this absurd argument and result.” Id. It held that an invalid rejection of UM coverage cannot be converted into a valid election of reduced UM limits because it would circumvent the intent behind the MVFRL. Id. at 1153.
¶ 29 The Court then suggested that:
an insured cannot make a valid election to reduce UM/UIM statutory coverage limits under section 1734 unless and until the insured/applicant comports with the requirements set forth in section 1731.
Id. As Judge Brosky notes in his concurring Opinion, this statement is dicta because it was unnecessary to the disposition of the issues before the Irex Court. Accordingly, Irex is not binding as precedent in the instant case.
¶ 30 The one Superior Court case dealing directly with § 1734 focused on whether the insured had requested a reduction of coverages in writing. Emig, 664 A.2d 559. There, the insured signed her original policy application and the requisite waiver for reduced UM/UIM benefits of $15,000/$30,000 (“15/30”) pursuant to §§ 1734 and 1791(6). Id. at 561. Prior to renewal of the policy, she requested that her UM/UIM benefits be raised to $50,000/ $100,000. On renewal, she received a declaration page evidencing renewal of the policy and the increased UM/UIM coverages. Id. Five months later, she executed a casualty policy change request form, the purpose of which, among other things, was to add a car, add her new husband as an additional named insured, and reject stacking of UM/UIM coverages. Id. She left completely blank the section entitled “UM/UIM REJECTION OR REDUCTION” and did not sign it. Her insurance agent, however, had filled in a section “ADD COVERAGE SAME AS ON POLICY” with “x”s, the word “reduce” and the [850]*850numbers “15” and “30”. Id. at 564. Also, the insured had signed the policy change form at the end. Id. at 565.
¶ 31 The Court ruled that the writing requirement of § 1734 had not been met because the insured had not requested in writing that UM/UIM coverages be reduced. Id. at 565-566. Her agent, therefore, had no authorization to make the reductions. Id. at 565. The Court then concluded that even if the requirements of § 1791 were met, the § 1791 presumption did not trigger because the writing requirement of § 1734 was not met. Id. at 567-570.
Ill
¶ 32 Erie first contends that the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings for Appellees because the statutory requirements of § 1734 had been met, ie., Appellee signed a writing requesting reduced UM/UIM coverage under § 1734. Therefore, Appellees’ election for reduced benefits was valid and the fact that both elections were on the same sheet paper is irrelevant because § 1734 has no requirement that reduction elections be placed on separate sheets of paper.
¶ 33 We first look to the language of § 1734 and construe the words of the statute according to their plain meaning:
Request for lower limits of coverage
A named insured may request in writing the issuance of coverages under section 1731 (relating to availability, scope and amount of coverage) in amounts equal to or less than the limits of liability for bodily injury.
The plain meaning contains no standards concerning the language or form that a named insured uses to “request in writing” the issuance of reduced UM/UIM coverages. Since the words of § 1734 are clear and unambiguous, we cannot disregard them under the pretext of pursuing the spirit of the statute. Grom, 672 A.2d at 825.
¶ 34 Assuming that an ambiguity is said to exist, we ascertain legislative intent by reviewing: the necessity of the law; the object to be attained by the law; the circumstances under which the law was enacted; and the mischief to be remedied by the law. The 1990 amendments to the MVFRL reflect that the “legislative concern over the increasing costs of automobile insurance is the public policy which is to be advanced when interpreting the statutory provisions of the MVFRL.” Rump, 710 A.2d at 1096; see also Donnelly, 720 A.2d at 452-453. The issue of whether the writing is sufficient under § 1734 is not before us. Since the 1990 amendments were designed to stem the rising cost of insurance in Pennsylvania, and since there is no express legislative intent to incorporate the § 1731 requirements into § 1734, we will not do what the legislature has not done. Our duty to interpret statutes does not include the right to add provisions that the legislature has omitted. Thus, we conclude that the separate sheet requirement of § 1731 is not a requirement of § 1734. Erie’s claim has merit.
¶ 35 Erie next argues that even if the insurer must comply with § 1731 in addition to § 1734 before providing UM/ UIM coverage limits less than the bodily injury liability limits of the policy, the MVFRL does not provide a remedy requiring reformation of the policy to provide more coverage than was purchased.11
[851]*851¶36 In both Rump and Donnelly, our Supreme Court held each insured to his “voluntary choice of limiting his ability to recover such damages in return for a reduced insurance premium.” Rump, 710 A.2d at 1098; see also Donnelly, 720 A.2d at 454. Importantly, the Supreme Court held that where the MVFRL provides no explicit remedy, the courts cannot imply the remedy of full tort coverage. Id. Significantly, the Court said:
Here, appellants, based on a notice form which provided accurate information ... freely chose the limited tort option. In making this free choice, appellants received a greater reduction in their premiums than if they had chosen the full tort option. Appellants were content with this lower premium and their choice until they unfortunately were involved in automobile accidents[.] If this Court were to fashion a remedy not expressly provided for in the MVFRL, this Court would essentially contravene the cost containment policy behind the MVFRL because allowing appellants the full tort coverage they seek would result in giving appellants something for which no individual has paid, which in turn, would result in insurance companies passing on this extra costs [sic] to all other insureds.
Donnelly, 720 A.2d at 454 (footnote omitted). The same analysis applies here.12
¶ 87 Our conclusion is consistent with our own precedent. All except one case dealt with §§ 1731 and 1791. As we explained above, § 1731 contains explicit statutory requirements and an explicit remedy for failure to comport with the statutory requirements. See Lucas, 680 A.2d at 876-877; Winslow-Quattlebaum, 723 A.2d at 684; Tukovits, 672 A.2d at 790; and Irex, 713 A.2d at 1151-1153.13
¶ 38 Only one case addressed § 1734 and the problem there was the absence of a writing. Thus, the explicit language of § 1734 was not met. Emig, 664 A.2d at 567-570. Here, the writing requirement is not disputed. Therefore, we conclude that when there is no explicit statutory remedy, we will not create one by judicial interpretation. Erie’s second claim also has merit.
¶ 39 Order reversed. Remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
¶ 40 BROSKY, J., files a Concurring Opinion.